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MYRES S. MCDOUGAL
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
Accountability, Asylum, and Sanctuary:
Challenging our Political and Legal
Imagination
RICHARD FALK*
I. THE McDOUGAL PRESENCE
Professor Ved Nanda and others here at the University of Denver
College of Law deserve our gratitude for establishing an annual lecture
bearing the name of this country's most distinguished international law-
yer, ever. It is especially impressive that we are moved to acknowledge
Professor McDougal's distinction while he is still very much with us as a
live, active force. Myres McDougal is a teacher and scholar of extraordi-
nary range and power who has inspired by now several generations of
students of the most diverse national, cultural, and ideological back-
ground. All over the world one finds influential individuals who can pass
the McDougal loyalty test by reciting the 8 base values in their proper
order no matter what their state of sobriety. Many of us who have been
strongly influenced by the depth and character of McDougal's overall ap-
proach often disagree with the foreign policy implications drawn by the
master himself, or by some of his more conservative disciples. No matter.
Far stronger than these disagreements are certain shared features of the
McDougal orientation: above all, a commitment to the creative role of law
and lawyers in carrying out their professional roles in such a way as to
promote the values at stake, an attachment to law as a process that works
toward a humane society for all of its members; and a realization that the
final normative test of adequacy for any legal system is the ways in which
it deals with issues of justice and freedom, especially as pertaining to the
status and rights of individuals.
I am confident that Professor McDougal would be enthusiastic about
* Alfred G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Princeton University;
B.S., Wharton, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., Yale Law School; J.S.D., Harvard. This
article is the text of the tenth annual Myres S. McDougal Distinguished Lecture in Interna-
tional Law and Policy, presented at the University of Denver College of Law in May, 1986,
chaired by Professor Ved Nanda.
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a conference theme devoted to issues associated with the flow of refugees
across international borders. McDougal has always encouraged legal anal-
ysis at the cutting edge of societal process, in settings of fundamental
choice, where clashes of interests and policies are at stake.
II. POSING THE PROBLEM
In general, increases in refugee flows express rising tides of distress in
countries of origin. Individuals seldom cut their roots unless escaping
from something - poverty, repression, the absence of opportunity. Of
course, the pattern is not invariable. Individuals, even segments of a
whole society, are sometimes lured by the image of a promised land else-
where, and leave the country of birth to fulfill dreams and ambitions, and
possibly merely a quest for adventure and change. But we think of such
persons as immigrants, not refugees; that is, as individuals who have ac-
ted out of a discretionary spirit rather than in response to some sort of
felt necessity.
There is one category of refugee that brings joy to the hearts of many
- the deposed dictator who flees from his country of origin to escape
prosecution, imprisonment, and possibly, execution. It is the one kind of
refugee for which, in general, an increase in volume can be taken as a sign
of ameliorating world conditions, a reflection of democratizing tendencies.
There are two important types of states in the world these days that
have opposed preoccupations with walls - those that build walls to keep
people within (Berlin Wall); those that build walls to keep people out
(the chainlink fences and patrolled areas of U.S./Mexico border). Neither
kind of wall is pleasant, although the conditions of daily existence tend to
be more attractive for those who are walling others out because they want
to enjoy the benefits of getting in. Often the experience of the homeland
is vividly dismal, but the image of the promised land is romanticized and
apocryphal. The film El Norte explores this reality, contrasting the magi-
cal lure of the United States (the land of the North) for poor, persecuted
Guatemalans with the humiliating and disillusioning rite of passage un-
dergone by an Indian brother and sister who act on this imagery of eman-
cipation and go North, bypassing the wall intended to keep them out, but
then finding a far more disquieting reality on the other side than they
had anticipated.
Nevertheless, the admission of illegitimacy that accompanies a wall
to keep people in is a far more humiliating expression of political impo-
tence on the part of reigning authorities, as it involves holding captive
one's own citizenry. Both kinds of walls are constructed to coincide with
the outer limits of territorial sovereignty and are complementary expres-
sions of unhappiness and despair in the world. Ultimately, overcoming
the challenge of refugees is to work toward a world order system where
neither kind of wall is needed, where freedom of movement is assured,
and no one is either denied entry or held captive. Obviously, such a goal
is remote in a world of gross inequality and unevenness with respect to
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human rights and the material conditions of life. So long as sovereignty
combines with inequality, the issue of refugees is bound to arise, espe-
cially under conditions of crowding relative to resources. That is, the in-
visible influence of population pressures is one important background fac-
tor that leads individuals to move from one society to another.
I would like this evening to focus on an aspect of this problem that
arises when United States official policy admits one kind of dubious alien
seeking asylum and expels another kind who has not satisfied our govern-
ment that refugee status or asylum are warranted. The deposed dictator
is a kind of dubious alien who comes here after plundering his homeland
and is fleeing for safety, often accompanied by a retinue of followers and
a pile of wealth. An ill-considered receptivity to such victims of history
generated the inflamed atmosphere that produced the Iranian Hostage
Crisis in 1979-81 and is again presented in a more ambiguous form by the
1986 arrival and actions of the Marcos family in the state of Hawaii.
The other cluster of issues arises when individuals manage to reach
our country to gain safety, especially these days from the war zones of
Central America, particularly El Salvador, and then by the operation of
government procedures these individuals are ordered to be returned to
their country of origin. In this setting, individuals and communities have
been intervening to provide refuge by reestablishing the ancient religious
practice and tradition of "sanctuary." When Churches and their congre-
gations confer "sanctuary" they are interposing their bodies and lives be-
tween the government and these beleaguered individuals from overseas.
The government has reacted by charging criminal interference with the
implementation of "the law," by claiming, in effect, that only the state is
entitled to determine who is entitled to qualify as a legitimate refugee.
III. EXPLORING THE ISSUE OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND AsYLuM
The struggle for human rights and political democracy has over cen-
turies centered upon the struggle by social movements to impose limits
on the exercise and abuse of power by rulers. The most dramatic step
occurred in 1215 when the English nobility, joined by some farming ele-
ments, moved England to the brink of civil war in its effort to place limits
on King John's ability through royal prerogative to tax and commit the
country to war -- this was a dramatic step in the direction of establishing
constitutional order, formalized in the Magna Carta. In retrospect, the
overall process of limiting the state has not been fully successful, al-
though the principle of hereditary dynasty has been widely challenged.
After World War II another important innovation was introduced:
the defeated leaders of Germany and Japan were prosecuted and held
responsible for crimes of state committed in their official capacity. Sover-
eignty was no longer a shield behind which an individual, whether Head
of State or policy-maker, could hide and obtain immunity. One category
of crime prosecuted was Crimes against Humanity, an innovation, that
was restricted to patterns of behavior somehow connected with illegal
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warmaking, but which could theoretically be extended to include abuse of
one's own citizenry in times of peace. Those carrying out these prosecu-
tions claimed at the time that they were creating precedents for the fu-
ture that would govern the victors as much as those judged in defeat.
These promises were reinforced by the unanimous adoption by the
United Nations General Assembly of the Nuremberg Principles as consti-
tuting an authoritative expression of legal obligation.
As often is the case with revolutionary legal principles, the seeds of
Nuremberg have sprouted in expected ways. The main seed has not taken
root as anticipated - the states that dominate international society have
engaged in activity that would appear to constitute crimes of state in the
Nuremberg sense, and have refused even to consider establishing proce-
dures of accountability to judge allegations against their civilian and mili-
tary leaders. The state has shut tight the Nuremberg door, and does not
even invoke notions of criminal accountability against its most bitter ad-
versaries, or even risk such a taunt for propaganda purposes. Neverthe-
less, the notion that international law binds governments and their lead-
ers has struck a responsive chord in the moral sensibility of modern
society, and a variety of efforts have been made to fill the institutional
vacuum created by the withdrawal of governments from the scene.
During the Vietnam War, the famous British philosopher, Bertrand
Russell, established "a tribunal of distinguished citizens" to inquire into
the legal, moral, and political status of the American involvement in Viet-
nam (late 1960s). In the last ten years or so, inspired by this model, the
Permanent Peoples Tribunal (PPT) has been established with its head-
quarters in Rome, and operating within a constitutional framework set
forth in the 1976 Algiers Declaration on the Rights of Peoples.
The PPT was brought into being by an Italian parliamentarian
named Lelio Basso, claiming its authority through spontaneous creation
by citizens and jurists from various countries, through the quality of its
proceedings and publications, and by its willingness to stand apart from
partisan East-West geopolitics. The PPT, quite significantly, investigated
and denounced both the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the
United States intervention in Central America. Beyond this the PPT con-
sidered a number of grievances against governments, policies, and specific
individuals. It assessed, for instance, Indonesia's conduct in East Timor,
Armenian allegations of Turkish genocide in 1915-16, and Marcos' repres-
sive rule in the Philippines. The proceeding was held in a third country.
The accused government was invited to participate but never has, the
defenses available to the accused government were put before the Tribu-
nal, but perhaps not in a completely satisfactory manner. The Judgment
of the Tribunal is not the outcome of a criminal proceeding against indi-
viduals, but is rather, in effect, a validation of a prospective criminal in-
dictment, based on evidence of governmental wrongdoing.
We are now in the midst of two further dramas - the insistence by
the new leadership in Haiti and the Philippines that Duvalier and Marcos
face up to their crimes of state - and in Marcos' case that the property
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plundered be returned. With apparent reluctance, France has accepted
Duvalier, U.S. has accepted Marcos, (although it has sought a more se-
rene place of asylum for the former Filipino leader, but without either
any show of willingness by Marcos or receptivity by foreign governments.)
We extradite lesser criminals, but offer the prospect of a lavish life
style to deposed dictators. Marcos, in a monumental display of impru-
dence, held a party for 1000 guests in Hawaii shortly after his U.S. arri-
val, inviting a reaction of fury by those victimized by his 15 years of plun-
dering rule, but unlike the Khomeini government in Iran, the Aquino
leadership has not played upon Marcos' criminal culpability during his
period of Filipino rule.
In the case of Marcos and the Shah, the U.S. Government shielded
rulers whom it has earlier supported, and even helped to remain in power.
In the case of Iran, the CIA facilitated the disruption of the constitu-
tional process by facilitating Mossadegh's overthrow in 1953; to many
Iranians, even those outside the religious movement, the decision to ad-
mit the Shah was interpreted as a refusal by Washington to accept the
outcome of the Iranian revolution. This interpretation enabled Ayatollah
Khomeini to mobilize enormous popular enthusiasm about the retaliatory
seizure of the American Embassy and the holding hostage of those of
more than 80 Americans associated with the diplomatic facility. Such a
development became an ordeal for those held hostage and for the United
States generally. It revealed the anti-American fury that lay at the base
of the Iranian revolutionary process. These events unfolded in reaction to
the American grant of asylum, but they might have occurred in any event.
The Fernando Marcos case is quite different in many respects. True,
he was our man in Manila, yet his ascent to power was perceived to be
based on his own capabilities, including a ruthless attitude toward adver-
saries. Furthermore, the United States distanced itself from some of his
abuses of state power and opposed his retention of power at the end in
the face of a manifestly fraudulent election, mass civil disobedience, and
large-scale mutiny in the armed forces. The United States was less impli-
cated, and also had given to the Philippines a kind of political indepen-
dence after World War II. What is more, by removing Marcos to this
country at the time of deepening crisis, the United States enabled the
transition to Aquino leadership without bloodshed, a major contribution
to the new order in the Philippines dedicated to social justice and politi-
cal democracy. What is more, the U.S. Government seems to be cooperat-
ing in the early efforts to impose accountability on the Marcos family for
its vast economic plunder during its period of autocratic rule. This coop-
eration has taken various forms, including giving over evidence, freezing
assets, and allowing the new leadership to pursue their claims in our
courts. Of course, separation of powers here means that the courts are
substantially free to determine their own rules of procedures, and those
pose large obstacles. There is a need for both an international convention
and domestic legislation that mandates assistance from banks and other
fiduciary entities to public claimants of assets expropriated during prior
1988
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
periods of dictatorial rule. In the early period of Marcos residency, U.S.
officials tried to arrange a less inflammatory place of asylum, exploring
without success, the willingness of Panama, Spain, and others to give se-
cure asylum. In the light of the experience after the Shah's admission the
United States naturally associated political risks with granting asylum to
a former friendly dictator deposed by angry, populist action. Develop-
ments in the Philippines, as well as in Haiti, and even Argentina, suggest
that the anti-American backlash in Iran that followed upon the admission
of the Shah (and was invoked to justify the seizure of the U.S. Embassy
and hold hostage its residents for more than a year) was a special case
rather than a general pattern.
That, then, is the proper approach for the United States to adopt
toward the grant of "asylum" to deposed dictator? What is the best over-
all approach for the world community? It is a complicated matter: it is
desirable to have beleaguered dictators leave rather than stay behind and
fight in the belief that they have no alternative. Jacopo Timmerman dur-
ing the last years of Argentinean military rule told me that "the ghosts of
Nuremberg" kept the generals in place long after they lost the will to
govern. It is difficult to assess the impact of the Argentinean trials of for-
mer officials on the Chilean dictatorships. It might provide Chile with
relief from repressive rule if Pinochet could be offered attractive asylum
somewhere. But where? Do we want to make this country a center for
extremist exile movements and politics? Experience with Batista exiles
from Cuba and Somoza exiles suggests the destabilizing impacts on the
host country. Johnny Carson, although not normally acknowledged as a
noted political analyst, had a practical proposal - establishing an inter-
national island haven called Fled where deposed dictators could live out
their years in slumber, being punished by the disagreeable company of
their former colleagues. My own view is that we need a flexible approach
that balance the importance of personal accountability for crimes of state
against the desirability of promoting peaceful and rapid transitions to de-
mocracy. In effect, a case-by-case approach based on Executive discretion.
From the viewpoint of potential asylum-granting country that prior-
ity be given to peaceful transition, as was done in the instance of Marcos,
but once the transition has occurred, or it is evident that it will not be
democratic in any event, then it is important not to poison relations with
a successor government by protecting a former tyrant from efforts to in-
flict punishment for crimes of state. Here, too, the issues are confused,
and no rigid set of guidelines will suffice. A country should neither want
to insulate a former ruler from inquiry and even prosecution for former
wrongs, nor to deliver such a person to a legal process that offers no rea-
sonable prospect of due process. Such a dilemma is made more acute if
the former ruler acted in a repressive and dishonest manner, and yet was
a close ally. This situation is made even more serious if the asylum coun-
try has been perceived by the new leadership as having practiced in-
terventionary diplomacy that led to the installation of the displaced lead-
ership in past years. All these elements were present in the aftermath of
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the Shah's fall from power, as well as efforts by special banking interests
and by such influential figures as Henry Kissinger and David Rockefeller
to push for the Shah's admission, partly to provoke the crisis that ensued.
Only by a crisis between post-Shah Iran and the United States did those
with heavy credits gain the leverage needed to collect their debts. Per-
haps, it would be helpful to draw a general distinction between provoca-
tive asylum to be avoided and constructive asylum to be granted, al-
though in a specific instance a delicate judgment may be required.
In general, while accountability is important, the possible adverse
consequences of refusing asylum in some instances seem paramount.
Hence, the prospects of accountability should be subordinated at this
stage of international relations whenever a grant of asylum contributes to
a peaceful transition. It remains an option to impose responsibility sym-
bolically by a legal process held in the country where the individual com-
mitted crimes of state. Furthermore, it should be a strict policy that the
asylum state limit the activities of a deposed leader and his entourage
(i.e. avoid provocative asylum) by forbidding the practice of exile politics.
The asylum state could also extend friendship and aid to a new leader-
ship that seemed committed to democratic governance and the restora-
tion of human rights.
There are some additional issues. It is important to refrain from in-
tervention in foreign societies on behalf of dictatorial political forces. The
relation of the CIA to such rulers as the Shah and Pinochet creates re-
sentment and suspicions on the part of democratic forces. If the United
States renounced such covert operations on behalf of dictatorial rule the
whole issue would largely disappear. Finally, there is a problem connected
with counter-democratic movements that bring reverse considerations
into play. Suppose that Ms. Aquino is deposed by military forces and is
placed in a position of seeking asylum. In such a political setting, the
grant of asylum would be appropriate even if it had some adverse reper-
cussions on bilateral relations. Further, the considerations that militate
against exile politics in the instance of a deposed dictator work in reverse
if the deposed leader has been committed to democratic practices and
human rights. Such "discrimination" is not meant to endorse pro-demo-
cratic intervention as a matter of foreign policy.
IV. SANCTUARY, CONSCIENCE, AND LAW
It might seem as if dealing with the vulnerability of the weak should
be simple ... or is it? In a world of mass poverty, ethnic persecution, and
ideological strife, grounds of persecution are numerous and severe. The
humanitarian case for easy admission of the persecuted seems strong, but
so are the problems. The U.S. already feels its integrity and prosperity
threatened by a flood of immigrants, many of whom are illegal. Further-
more, by granting asylum from persecution or conferring refugee status
we pass a kind of judgment on the foreign government that may under-
mine foreign policy efforts to support that government. As might be ex-
pected during the period of Cold War, refugee laws have been loosely ap-
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plied in relation to those who flee Communist rule because we seek to
emphasize and manifest disapproval, and are rigidly applied in relation to
anti-Communist regimes because we have not wanted to erode their
claims of legitimacy, or to lessen grounds for support.
The issue of Sanctuary Movement represents an extremely deter-
mined attempt to wrest the initiative away from the State on these issues
of rights of entry in a context of unusual harshness. The main context
arises from official policies that have led to the return of refugees by de-
portation to Guatemala and El Salvador in circumstances where they face
hardships and severe punishments and abuses. In effect, citizens relying
on religious tradition challenge the monopoly of legal authority over is-
sues of admission and exclusion. Ever since Antigone defied the Theban
ruler Creon by burying her brother slain in battle has the issue of individ-
ual conscience and tradition versus state authority been posed in Western
civilization. This issue is posed by civil disobedience and conscientious
objection to unjust laws, as well as by performance of so-called "Nurem-
berg Actions."
Religious institutions have a particular role in acting as guardians of
conscience and sacred tradition. The state, especially beneath the banner
of national security, has come to exert unconditional claims over the obe-
dience of its citizenry. More than ever before, even in democratic coun-
tries, we need the ethical safety valve provided by upholding the preroga-
tive of churches to offer sanctuary to aliens threatened with dangerous
and harsh deportation. In a sense, I am arguing for the other side of the
separation of church and state, that the state respect a domain of con-
science defined by the assertion of judgment by duly constituted religious
bodies.
Of course, here too the general principle needs to be qualified by va-
rious special circumstances of application. It is not unimaginable that
some churches would extend "sanctuary" to fascist and other anti-demo-
cratic elements, or to those seeking to avoid legitimate prosecution for
crimes in their country of origin. The limits of sanctuary seems like an
appropriate question for judicial assessment, but only within a context
that acknowledges legitimate scope for grants of sanctuary based on the
reasonable belief that the individuals involved face risks of persecution or
severe hardship is forced to return to their country of origin.
There is, of course, room for extravagant claims, but all human ar-
rangements are subject to abuse. These alleged concerns at this stage are
mainly disguised forms of opposition to any derogation from the concen-
tration to authority in the state. It is fair to inquire why should govern-
ments lose some of their authority over immigration policy. The broader
constitutional issues here are several: establishing effective mechanisms
for protecting human rights; restoring popular sovereignty and the role of
the citizenry; de-centering political and legal authority. In the back-
ground is a search for greater internal balance between state and civil
society, a search that reacts to the steady accretion of power at the gov-
ernmental center of state power that has occurred over the decades. Sanc-
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tuary is a creative embodiment of our earliest constitutional vision of
"checks and balances" and it offers our society a way to moderate the
exercise of power by government through the privileged inter-position of
conscience validated by formal action of religious communities, as well as
through taking account of spiritual considerations in the formulation of
public policy.
V. CONCLUSION
The argument of this lecture has been a simple plea: to establish con-
stitutional governance, given the expansion of state power and the uneven
pattern of its application in context of entry and exclusion by those of
foreign origin, we require considerable legal innovation, especially if, in
the spirit of Myres McDougal, we regard the overarching mission of law
to be the promotion of values associated with human dignity. Translating
this generalized sentiment into practice at the doctrinal level suggests
several policy conclusions. We need to strengthen procedures for personal
accountability arising from alleged crimes of state by foreign leaders
through national and international action. Additionally, we require a flex-
ible doctrine of asylum that is sensitive to humanitarian issues, to the
diplomatic conditions for positive international relations, and to the
grievances of foreign societies against leaders who have been guilty of
gross abuses of power. And finally, we need to give constitutional protec-
tion to principled practices associated with the provision of sanctuary to
individuals threatened with deportation in circumstances where genuine
risks of persecution and hardship exist. These complementary norms are
designed to accommodate complex and contradictory issues bearing on
whether entry or exclusion is the appropriate stance.
In dealing with the special, somewhat unusual, problems of deposed
dictators exceedingly sensitive issues can be involved, especially here in
the United States where the dictatorial regime has often been treated as a
friend during its period of political tenure. One suggestion made here is
to draw a distinction based on circumstances and probable effects be-
tween constructive and provocative asylum, and if a controversial former
dictator or autocratic ruler is admitted, then his activities should be con-
strained to avoid provoking a successor government, especially if it frus-
trated in its efforts to apprehend a former ruler for prosecution. Even
provocative asylum may be justified if the practices of the new govern-
ment represents a deterioration of respect for human rights and democ-
racy. However, such interpretations will be lacking incredibility if
manipulated to reflect the geopolitical alignments of the Cold War.
As part of a process of domestic readjustment, it is necessary to re-
consider United States policies and practices that encourage the emer-
gence of dictatorial rule in foreign countries. To the extent this encour-
agement has become known, it has aroused strong anti-American
resentment. In this regard, covert operations in particular and interven-
tionary diplomacy in general have damaged the reputation of the United
States as a friend of democracy and a promoter of human rights. It is a
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matter of reassessing national interests so that the United States will not
be regarded as the natural adversary of nationalist movements in the
Third World.
Although it is difficult to document, there seems to be a connection
between structures of oppression and recourse to desperate strategies of
violent resistance, including various forms of terrorist practice. If we seek
to break the connection we must as a political actor take human suffering
seriously, both at home and abroad. Such a moral perspective underlies
what I have had to say on these diverse issues of asylum for deposed
dictators and protected entry for endangered aliens.
The law needs, in my judgment, to be guided by this understanding
of the moral foundations of political order. It is time to associate the
grant of asylum, the option of sanctuary with questions of suffering and
the reduction of violence rather than with the abstract, and often mis-
leading, calculations of geopolitics and ideological rivalry. Of course, there
are gray areas where judgment is required and errors can occur, as when
it becomes necessary to balance the claim of a deposed dictator for asy-
lum and that of an aggrieved people for personal accountability, or to
assess whether granting asylum is necessary to induce abdication and the
avoidance of civil strife.
In the end, all those with the power of legal decision are encouraged
to wrestle with the normative challenge of promoting the values of human
dignity in a realistic and effective manner, but with a bias toward decen-
tralist and grassroots solutions (sanctuary) and a skepticism about statist
claims to dispose of issues of moral and political choice.
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Glasnost and Perestroika: An Evaluation of
the Gorbachev Revolution and Its
Opportunities for the West
HAROLD E. ROGERS, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Russian Bear is stirring from a long winter's nap, and to the
surprise of the western world, is showing a new, friendly smile. The rea-
son for the changed appearance, according to its new masters, is the effect
of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) now sweeping Rus-
sia. These changes are so broad and fundamental that they stir world
speculation and hope that the cold war may be ending."
The principal author of these changes is Mikhail Gorbachev who, in
March, 1985, became General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party.'
Since his appointment as Party General Secretary, Gorbachev has star-
tled the world with a dazzling succession of new plans and proposals
aimed at slowing the arms races, democratizing Soviet society," reforming
* Harold E. Rogers, Jr. is an attorney practicing in San Mateo, California, a graduate of
Stanford University (majoring in History) and of the Stanford Law School. For this article,
Mr. Rogers has drawn on his personal observations and conversations in the Soviet Union
during travels there in 1971, 1982, 1985, 1987, and 1988 and upon a variety of personal
meetings in the United States in recent years with Soviet diplomats posted to the Soviet
Consulate in San Francisco, and upon recent research conducted at Stanford University and
its Hoover Institution.
1. See TimE, July 27, 1987, at 12.
2. After waiting patiently in the wings following the death of his mentor Yuri Andropov
in 1984, Gorbachev on March 10, 1985, at age 54, was named General Secretary, within 24
hours of the death of Andropov's successor, Konstantin Chernenko. By April, 1985, the Cen-
tral Committee had put its preliminary stamp of approval on Gorbachev's far-reaching pro-
posals for opening Soviet society and restructuring its economy. It was obvious from the
rapidity with which Gorbachev consolidated his position after Chernenko's death, that his
plans had been formulated and his key allies selected well before his succession to the top
Soviet post. See generally William G. Hyland, The Gorbachev Succession, 63 FOREIGN AFF.
800 (Spring 1985). See also C. SCHMIyr-HAUER, GORBACHEV-THE PATH TO POWER 112-114
(1986).
3. For an outline of his disarmament proposals see M. GORBACHEV, THE RESULTS AND
LESSONS OF REYKJAVIK (1986).
4. In a speech to the Central Committee on January 27, 1987, Gorbachev discussed his
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
its long stagnant economy, and restoring Soviet influence in the world.
While many in the West are applauding the fresh new winds emanating
from Soviet Russia,' others are speculating that with a less menacing de-
meanor and in a more conventional western manner, Gorbachev could
prove to be a far more dangerous threat than his predecessors.' To para-
phrase the American Bolshevik admirer John Reed, the Russian Revolu-
tion created by Gorbachev7 is "shaking the world," and because of its
implications and opportunities for the West, deserves to be examined in
some detail.
II. EcONoMIc REFORM
A. Background
The centerpiece of perestroika in the Soviet Union is economic re-
form.8 The utopian promises of Marx and Lenin9 have not materialized."0
Gorbachev and his supporters recognize that the Soviet economy has
reached a pre-crisis state and that unless fundamental, far-reaching
proposals for democratizing Soviet society, including the replacement of incompetent lead-
ers at the top with an influx of new faces, and secret ballot elections of local officials and
factory bosses. Pravda and Izvestia, January 28, 1987, at 1-5; The Current Digest of the
Soviet Press, XXXIX, No. 6., 1987, at 8-10.
5. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, upon the occasion of Gorbachev's first
visit to Britain in 1984 remarked: "I like him. We can do business together." SCHMIr-
HAUER, supra note 2, at 8.
6. Moscow News, July 19, 1987, at 6, reporting on an article by Egon Bahr, in the West
German magazine Vorworts (No. 24).
7. John Reed, an American journalist sympathetic to Lenin and the Bolshevik revolu-
tion of 1917, wrote an account of the revolution entitled TEN DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD.
He is buried in the Kremlin wall in Moscow. See Moscow News, supra note 6, at 13.
8. In his newly published book Mikhail Gorbachev has outlined the historical develop-
ment and application of restructuring in the Soviet Union, in amplification of the detailed
outline of his new economic program set out in his June 25, 1987, speech to the Central
Committee. M. GORBACHEV, PEREsTRoIKA-NEw THINKING FOR OUR CouNTRY AND THE
WORLD (1987).
9. For a very readable account of the life and writings of both Marx and Lenin see J. K.
GALBRAITH, THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (1977).
10. The promise of Communism as portrayed by Marx and Lenin is that if workers
take control of government, and free from exploitation, supply all man's economic require-
ments, class conflict will cease and government will wither away. Marx postulated that there
would first be required a dictatorship of the proletariat (workers) who would overthrow the
exploiting bourgeoisie (capitalist class). Initially there would be socialism during which
workers would be paid in accordance with their contribution ("to each according to his
work") Ultimately when material wants were satisfied, a state of communism would ensue in
which each worker would contribute according to his ability and receive according to his
needs. Jealousy and competition would presumably disappear, along with the achievement
of plenty provided by the new economy. Socialism required that the government (workers)
would own and control the means of production to prevent exploitation of workers by the
bourgeoisie owners of capital. See J. BARRON, KGB TODAY-THE HIDDEN HAND 10 (1983). In
contrast to today's reality, the Twenty Second Congress of the Communist Party in 1961
declared that by 1980 the Soviet Union would achieve the utopia of true communism. Little
is heard about this boast today.
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changes are made, Russia will continue to fall further behind the West in
almost every measure of economic development, technology, standard of
living and military." In addition, since Communism is becoming an evi-
dent failure at home, it is increasingly difficult for the Soviets to sell it as
the wave of the future to third world and other countries.
Gorbachev recognizes likewise that more than cosmetic changes will
be required-that the problems are endemic to the system. Since the
Communist Party rulers have invested their entire political capital in the
sanctity of Marxist-Leninist theory and its Stalinist legacy as the ulti-
mate scientific truth about the behavior of society and the economy,12
enormous skill in theory' and politics will be required to orchestrate a
credible about-face in the thrust of the Soviet economy without simulta-
neously creating a political revolution. "
Because of the long totalitarian tradition beginning with the early
Czars and Russian princes, and continuing with the Communists, changes
in the Soviet Union have quite often been accomplished by violence, in-
cluding assassination.' 5 Through draconian measures, including terror im-
11. For an excellent discussion of the general economic problems facing Gorbachev, see
M. Goldman, Gorbachev and Economic Reform, 64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 56 (1985). A particular
problem of the Soviets with their centrally planned economy has been their failure to
master the new high technology sweeping the world. Since the life cycle of many new prod-
ucts is only two or three years, by the time the Soviets have learned a new process, it often
is already obsolete. Id. at 58.
12. Professor Richard Pipes of Harvard argues that among the ruling elite in the Soviet
Union (the "nomenklatura," some 40,000 strong), there is a nostalgia for the order and disci-
pline of Stalinism. Over the years these ruling party members have maintained their power
and privilege by fear and strict control (through the KGB and its predecessors), and
through aggressiveness and threats of war. Democratization will thus require the nomen-
klatura to give up power. Gorbachev must overcome this legacy of fear and control to free
creative energies of the Soviet people. See R. Pipes, Can the Soviet Union Reform, 63 FoR-
EIGN AFF. 47 (1984). See also Ford, The Soviet Union: The Next Decade, 62 FOREIGN AFF.
1137 (1984).
13. A. N. Yakovlev, orchestrator of Gorbachev's international publicity for glasnost and
recently appointed by him to the Politburo, set out the guidelines for the change in theory
in a report published in Pravda, April 18, 1987: Our task today ". . . involves enriching
Marxist thought at a qualitatively new stage of world development and constantly renewing
and upgrading our world outlook . . . Lenin . . . summarized . . . natural sciences at the
beginning of the century. It is our duty to collectively develop Marxist-Leninist teaching
just as dynamically, keeping in mind that the amount of information available now doubles
every 20 months as opposed to 50 years in K. Marx's times. . . We need to be aware that no
one has a monopoly on truth in either raising new questions or finding answers."
14. Following Khruschev's speech to the Central Committee in 1956 attacking Stalin
and his brutality, a democratic Hungarian regime declared itself independent of the Warsaw
Pact. And after duplicitous reassurances from Russia, Hungary's efforts to achieve freedom
were snuffed out by Soviet tanks and troops sent in to overthrow the new government and
to quell the rebellion. See BARRON, supra note 10, at 7. Likewise in 1953 following Stalin's
death, riots occurred in East Germany.
15. Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great are accused of personally eliminating political
enemies. Czar Paul I, son of Catherine the Great, was assassinated in 1801 in favor of his
son Alexander I when he displeased the ruling Boyar class. In 1825 the Decembrists (a revo-
lutionary group opposed to the harsh policies of Czar Alexander I and his brother and suc-
1988
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
posed by secret police and slaughter of kulaks and appropriation of their
farms, Stalin created his socialist-industrial dictatorship. 6
Changes as fundamental as those proposed by Gorbachev, while not
portending the terror or bloodshed of earlier eras, do carry with them
severe risks to the Soviet regime itself; among them are loss of Marxism-
Leninism, loss of moral power among Soviet citizens, and loss of control
over the Socialist world. 7
B. Gorbachev's Call For Change
1. Generally
Gorbachev was a known reformer when he assumed office in March,
1985. Under the tutelage of Yuri Andropov among others, his rise from
humble beginnings in Stavropol at the base of the Caucasus Mountains,
to Moscow and the Politburo was swift."8 Following Brezhnev's death in
cessor Nicholas I), were caught and executed or exiled in accordance with the degree of their
participation. In 1905 the palace guards of Nicholas II massacred peacefully petitioning citi-
zens led by Father Gapon to the Winter Palace in Leningrad. The ensuing uproar finally led
Nicholas to create the First Duma, an advisory legislative body. The Duma was in turn
abolished (1918) by the Bolsheviks through armed threat, following the abdication of
Nicholas II in 1917. See generally B. PARES, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA (1965).
16. So pervasive was the use of mass terror to accomplish reform, particularly during
the Stalin era, that by some estimates some 20 million innocent Soviet citizens were annihi-
lated in prisons and forced labor camps. See W. CORSON & R. CROWLEY, THE NEW
KGB-ENGINE OF SOVIET POWER 41 (1986). Stalin is alleged to have said "One man's death
is a tragedy; 10,000 deaths is merely a statistic." Id. Alexandre I. Solzhenitsyn confirmed the
brutality in THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 435-439 (1973). Based on reports of prisoners who
presumably witnessed the events or were in a position to develop accurate information,
Solzhenitsyn estimates that in the 16 month period between June, 1918 and October 1919,
more than 16,000 persons were shot (more than 1,000 per month, compared to about 10
executions per month during the peak years of the Inquisition in Spain (1420-1498) by
burning at the stake. During the period of NKVD chief Yezhov's purges of 1937-1938, exe-
cution by shooting increased to more than 500,000 political prisoners, plus 480,000 habitual
thieves. According to other Solzhenitsyn sources, 1,700,000 condemned prisoners had been
shot by 1939.
17. A realist, Gorbachev is said to have proclaimed to visiting rulers of the Communist
satellites during the recent 1987 November Communist celebration that Moscow is no
longer the center for world communism and that each communist country is on its own and
must tailor its own policy. China, Yugoslavia and Rumania, have been following such a
course for some time. While Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski has become an ideological
ally of Gorbachev, hardline leader Erich Honecker of East Germany and Gustav Husak of
Czechoslovakia are lukewarm, and Rumania's Nicolae Ceausescu is clearly opposed to
Gorbachev's new ideas. The Hungarians under Janos Kadar experimented with their econ-
omy for two decades. See Szulc, How East Europeans View Gorbachev's Reforms, San
Francisco Chron., August 12, 1987, at C-5.
18. See generally SCHMIDT-HAUER, supra note 2. Under Andropov's wing Gorbachev
became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1979, and a year later became a full mem-
ber, six months before his 50th birthday. This rapid ascension was startling in view of the
fact that the average age of Politburo members at that time was over 70. See generally
Breslauer, The Nature of Soviet Politics and the Gorbachev Leadership, in THE GORBACHEV
ERA: THE PORTABLE STANFORD 11-29 (Dallin & Rice eds. 1986).
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1982, Andropov was elected his successor, but soon fell ill. Gorbachev, as
his crowned prince, appeared to independently take over Andropov's du-
ties during his illness in order to continue the momentum for reform, par-
ticularly against alcoholism 9 and corruption, started by Andropov. 0
When Andropov died on February 9, 1984, there was speculation that
Gorbachev might become his successor. The old guard, however, had been
alarmed by the Andropov reforms, and felt the pace of change should be
slowed. It felt safer with Chernenko, who was too old and frail even at
that time to make any dramatic changes.2 ' As a result of the wholesale
sacking of Party officials in Andropov's campaign against corruption, the
old guard and its proteges where frightened and anxious about their ten-
ure, privileges, and benefits. 2 In addition it feared that any sudden
changes might lead to loss of control, a weakening of planning, and a host
of other unpredictable consequences if Gorbachev were allowed to assume
power at that time.28 To credit his political skills,' Gorbachev was willing
to make a deal with the older generation and wait a while longer, until
Chernenko finally died on March 10, 1985 of complications resulting from
emphysema.2
1
19. Alcoholism, always a serious social problem in Russia, seemed to become worse as
workers faced increasing hopelessness of bettering their lot through increased personal ef-
forts. BARRON, supra note 10, at 12. It has been estimated that as many as 40 million Soviet
citizens are alcoholics. US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Oct. 19, 1987, at 36. Murray Feshbach
of Georgetown University estimates that urban families in the Soviet Union spend nearly
the same proportion of their weekly budget on alcohol as American families do for food.
Gorbachev was shocked to learn that government tax returns on liquor sales grew to 169
billion rubles (about $253 billion) in the 11th five year plan period, from only 67 billion
rubles in the 8th five year plan. Moscow News Supp. No. 27, p. 7. Also it was reported
recently in the Soviet press, that the government battle against alcoholism has extended to
a crackdown on illegal home distilling of moonshine. San Francisco Chron., supra note 17, at
91.
20. SCHMIDT-HAUER, supra note 2, at 91; BARRON, supra note 10 at 18, gives examples
of wide-spread corruption. In one case, local newspapers in January, 1983 reported the trial
of Stanislav Ivanov and 14 conspirators who allegedly embezzled millions of rubles by regis-
tering a nonexistent factory and collecting wages for 515 phantom employees over a three
year period. Bribes and kickbacks kept officials quiet. Id. at 21.
21. According to Harvard professor Richard Pipes, the Soviet leadership and the party
evolved into a self serving privileged class which became parasitic and "Corrupted by privi-
lege and peculation, it [had] lost, since Stalin's death, any sense of service or obligation,
whether to the ideal of communism or to the nation; it so [dreaded] any change in the
Stalinist system, from which its power and privilege largely derive, that it [chose] ever
weaker secretaries as Party leaders."Pipes, supra note 12, at 49-50.
22. See US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Oct. 19, 1987, at 36.
23. As it turned out, some of their worst fears were soon to be realized.
24. Zdenek Mlynar, a Czechoslovak Communist and law school classmate of
Gorbachev's in the early 1950's regards him as a person with great political skill to have
survived the Brezhnev years while still retaining his independence and outspokenness. Said
Mlynar: "If he could live under Brezhnev for 18 years with these exceptional ideas and then
come to the top, that's proof that he is a man who knows what steps he can afford to take."
San Francisco Chron., Nov. 7, 1987.
25. SCHMIDT-HAUER, supra note 2, at 97. At the time of Chernenko's death, three of the
ten Politburo members were away from Moscow. The remaining members gathered together
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Moving quickly on his agenda for reform, before the end of 1985,
Gorbachev had removed 16 of the Soviet Union's 64 ministers and had
replaced about 20 percent of all local Party officials. Four months after
his ascension, his champion Gromyko was moved out of the foreign minis-
try and pushed upstairs to become Head of State. His rivals Grishin and
Romanov were quickly forced into retirement. Truly, he was demonstrat-
ing his passion for restructuring and "his teeth of iron," so aptly de-
scribed by Gromyko.ss
The principal outline of Gorbachev's proposals for economic reform
began to emerge almost immediately following his ascension in speeches
before the Central Committee and to various interest groups within and
from outside the Soviet Union.
27
2. Speech to the Central Committee, June, 1987
In a major address to the Central Committee on June 25, 1987,
Gorbachev provided the details of his economic proposals, and sought
and received Committee approval for his extensive program.2" He out-
lined his proposals as follows: 9
a. Outline of Proposals
1) Factories and amalgamations are to be given substantially greater
independence, and will
a) be converted to full profit and loss accounting,
b) become self-financing, and
c) have increased responsibility for end results, including direct link-
at about 10:30 PM, less than three hours after he had died. Gorbachev's leading opponent
Grigori Romanov of Leningrad proposed Viktor Grishin, the 70 year old party chief of Mos-
cow, as the new General Secretary. But Foreign Minister Gromyko countered by success-
fully arguing in favor of Gorbachev, to be seconded by KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov. The
next day with only 200 of 300 representatives of the Central Committee Plenum in attend-
ance, the Politburo choice of Gorbachev was ratified. At the party Plenum, Gromyko de-
scribed Gorbachev as a man with a nice smile, but "he has teeth of iron." After his election,
opposition to Gorbachev collapsed. Id. at 112-114.
26. Id. at 114, 115, 120.
27. On January 27 and 28, 1987, at a plenary session of the Central Committee,
Gorbachev delivered a report on the draft U.S.S.R. Law on the State Enterprise. Copies of
the draft had previously been circulated among committee members for review. During his
report Gorbachev noted that the April, 1985 session of the Committee had initiated restruc-
turing. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, Feb. 25, 1987, at 1, 2.
Steps toward reform were discussed with U.S. Congressional leaders in Moscow on April 15,
1987. See Pravda, April 16, 1987.
28. Moscow NEws, No. 28 (Supp. 1987) (hereinafter MN Supp. No. 28). The
Gorbachev address was printed in Pravda on June 27, 1987. Virtually all statements in this
section have been drawn from the Gorbachev speeches delivered to the Central Committee,
whether or not specifically documented, and represent Gorbachev's characterizations of the
state of the Soviet economy, and proposed solutions. These statements take on significance
in that they were endorsed by the Central Committee and were delivered to party members,
rather than being generated for propaganda purposes for the western press.
29. Moscow NEWS, No. 27 (Supp. 1987) at 8 (hereinafter MN Supp. No. 27).
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ing of income to work performance
2) Centralized command and control will be radically reduced.
a) Central planning bodies are not to interfere in the day-to-day activ-
ities of subordinate economic units.
b) Management is to become more democratic and self administering.
3) Planning, pricing, financing and crediting will be reformed,
including
a) transition to wholesale trade, and
b) reorganization of foreign economic activities.
b. Justification For Program- Weakened Economy
To justify the radical new programs to his comrades on the Central
Committee, Gorbachev painted a rather grim picture of the Soviet econ-
omy. Restructuring is necessary, he said, because of accumulating contra-
dictions in the development of Soviet society. Such contradictions, which
have remained unsolved, have assumed "pre-crisis forms."3 0The Soviet
economy as it entered the 1980's was in a state of virtual stagnation.3'
This dire state of affairs, brought tension and turmoil in national
finances."2
Production growth assignments were not met, according to
Gorbachev, during the past 3 five year plans. Wages substantially ex-
ceeded plan budgets. Due to shortages of everything-metal, fuel, cement,
machinery and consumer goods, together with a chronic shortage of man-
power,"3-it became clear that the economy would not be able to develop
30. Id., at 1. Quotations are from and references are to the speech reported in Supp.
No. 27, unless otherwise stated.
31. "We began to concede one position after another, and the gap in production effi-
ciency, output, quality and in technology as compared with the most developed countries
began to widen." "The desire to shore up declining growth rates by extensive methods
brought exorbitant outlays for the fuel and energy branches and the hasty commitment of
new natural resources to production, their irrational use, an excessive growth in demand for
additional labour, and an acute shortage thereof in the national economy, with a decline in
the out-put-per-asset ratio." Id. at 7.
Gorbachev's assessments are generally consistent with statistics derived from Western
intelligence sources. Although Soviet per capita consumption nearly tripled between 1950
and 1970, it was only about one third the U.S. level, and less than half that of France and
Germany in the late 1970's. Soviet per capita consumption growth rates averaged about
3.4% annually from 1950, but slowed to less than 2% in 1981, and to under 1% in 1982. See
G. SCHROEDER, SOVIET LIVING STANDARDS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 367, 368; SoVIET
ECONOMY IN THE 1980's: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, Part 2, Selected Papers (Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States, December 31, 1982) cited as Joint Economic
Committee. Despite periodic shortages of food throughout the Soviet Union, roughly 25% of
its labor force is employed in agriculture. By contrast, the U.S. so employs only 3.4% of its
labor force, yet has a continuing problem of excess production. BARRON, supra note 10, at
12, 13.
32. "Outwardly everything looked fine" (in the State budget). But the budget was bal-
anced not by increasing economic efficiency but by extensive selling of oil and other fuel and
raw material resources on the world market. MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 7.
33. Labor shortages are likely to become more acute in the future. Between 1964 and
1980, the mortality rate in the Soviet Union increased almost 50% from 6.9 deaths to 10.3
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normally. The housing industry failed to meet demands,"' as had indus-
tries producing consumer goods.35 Gorbachev admitted that a shadow
economy had emerged to provide for unmet consumer services."'
He expressed alarm that the U.S.S.R. had begun to lag in scientific
and technical development during a period when Western countries had
begun large-scale restructuring of their own economies. He confirmed
that economic incentives necessary to raise quality and efficiency were
not operating, and that this created fuel for inflation. Furthermore, hard
currency earned from exports of oil and raw materials is not being used to
modernize the economy, but to meet current needs. The Soviet economy
is so bad, conceded Gorbachev, that revolutionary in-depth transforma-
tions are needed to get it out of the pre-crisis situation it is in.
Present management difficulties, he said, stem from the Stalin era,
when the U.S.S.R. was attempting to pull its backward economy forward
in the face of isolation from the capitalist world.37 Dramatic strides in
industrialization were made during the Stalin period."8 Following adop-
deaths annually per 1000 people, due primarily to poor medical care. Barron, supra note 10,
at 10. In the past, Communist leaders had been able to show increases of production by
adding more workers to the work force. However, recently declining population, particularly
among the northern Russians, has deprived the economy of important necessary motive
power which can be replaced only through innovation, efficiency and new technology. See
Urban, Perestroika versus Oblomov, The Times (London), July 23, 1987.
34. Notwithstanding a housing shortage, Gorbachev asserts that there is unused hous-
ing construction capacity of about 20% in the country. Brickyards and building materials
plants, he says, should be operated continuously and not be operated on half day shifts nor
shut down on weekends.
35. "We need ... more goods of better quality and wider range ... service standards
are low ... there are many queues because the number of shops is . . . insufficient" MN
Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 7. Studies conducted in 1982 found that a typical Moscow
worker must labor 53.5 hours to provide a family of 4 with basic groceries needed for a week,
while comparable work time in Washington would be 18.6 hours, and in London, 24.7 hours.
BARRON, supra note 10, at 12. These figures cited by Barron are slightly misleading because
of government subsidies and the relative cost of housing, utilities and recreation for Soviet
citizens is substantially lower than comparable costs in the West.
36. The Central Statistical Board estimates that 1.5 billion rubles (about $2.25 billion)
is paid annually by Soviet citizens for such services in the shadow economy. "Let us call a
spade a spade and stop feigning innocence. Individual enterprise has always existed in our
economy. Illicit, underground, the black economy, call it what you like .... This phenome-
non has assumed a mass scale. We are not introducing individual enterprise, we are just
giving this practice civilized and organized forms . . . We are legalizing individual enter-
prise, and introducing a system of taxation and elements of planning to it." Interview with
Lionid Abalkin, Director of the Institute of Economics at the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences,
in New Times (Moscow), July 20, 1987 at 3.
See H. SMITH, THE RUSSIANS 106-134 (1976) for a very readable account of how the
shadow or counter economy works.
37. "The foundations for the present system of management were laid down ... in the
1930's. In that difficult period our country, which was far from the most developed economi-
cally and which was up against the whole capitalist world, needed to rapidly overcome the
technic-economic lag and to bring about quick structural changes in the national economy."
MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 7.
38. Gorbachev states that in the pre World War II period, gross industrial output grew
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tion of the five-year plans beginning in 1928, the number of industrial
workers tripled over the next twelve pre-war years. Sixty percent of the
national income was redistributed through the State budget. Great re-
sources were channeled into heavy industry. A highly centralized, rigid,
over-regimented management system was devised to direct these changes
in the economy. Such a system permitted the Soviet Union, according to
Gorbachev, to achieve strategic tasks which took capitalist countries de-
cades to achieve. But, over the years this system has clashed with the
requirements of modern economics including the technological revolution,
emphasis on quality and the consequence of social conditions. Although
since the 1950's attempts to change the management system were made,
such efforts were short lived.3 9 The prevailing system thus continued to
stifle rather than to stimulate the economy.
c. Proposed Solutions and Benefits of Changes
The solution to the problem, according to Gorbachev, is more social-
ism combined with greater democracy. What we are planning, he said,
does not weaken socialism, but rather will strengthen it, and remove bar-
riers holding it back. 0 The most difficult challenge, is to create under
socialism more powerful stimuli than those of capitalism, which will pro-
mote economic, scientific, technological and social progress. In addition,
Soviets must learn how best to blend planned guidance with the interests
of the individual and society.
The worker must become the real master of the workplace."1 Income
6.5 times and the Soviet Union moved from fourth to first place in Europe and to second in
the world.
39. The seeds of change were beginning to be sown upon the death of Stalin. Khruschev
made efforts to revitalize the economy, boasting to then Vice President Nixon in the late
1950's at a Moscow trade fair: "We will bury you." Khruschev instituted a disastrous effort
to improve grain harvests through a "virgin lands" policy by plowing up new lands which
added little to grain production.. FODOR'S SovIET UNION 1985 103 (1984). He attempted
other reforms but without sufficient political skills, stepped on too many toes and in 1964
was deposed. See also US NEws AND WORLD REPORT, supra note 20, at 42. Andropov, upon
the death of Brezhnev in 1982, made a determined effort to crack down on bureaucratic
corruption and alcoholism, but died too soon to effect any substantial changes. Chernenko
was too frail and old to initiate any major reforms before his death in March 1985, little
more than a year after taking the helm of the Soviet Communist Party.
40. The changes will bring out the immense potential of socialism and "lend it the most
modern forms. . .socialism should not be seen as an ossified, unchanging system, or the
practical work to refine it as a means of adjusting complex reality to fit ideas, notions and
formulas adopted once and for all." "We should strive after Lenin's ability to creatively
develop the theory and practice of building socialism, adopt scientific methods..." MN
Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 8.
41. [This] "means giving collectives and individual workers broad possibilities to man-
age public property and increase their accountability for how efficiently it is used." ".. •
man with his real interests and motives is central to our economic policy..." "We must
realize that the time when management consisted of orders, bans and calls has gone . . .
such methods can no longer be employed for they are simply ineffective." Id. at 8. Under
the new enterprise law ". . . the actual pay of every worker [should] be closely linked to his
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of working people should be geared to individual performance. The crite-
rion for performance and material rewards should be whether the enter-
prise will help meet peoples' vital needs and help eliminate the shadow
economy.
Under the new price and credit system, the market is to be "won and
controlled in accordance with its laws. . ." Competition is central to acti-
vating the forces of socialism. There should be competition between gov-
ernment-run and cooperative factories. The winners should be rewarded
with tangible economic benefits. This, he said, "is in line with the princi-
ples of socialism. . . ." There should also be competition in science and
technological development.4
2
Gorbachev noted that the present Soviet economic system has suf-
fered from an inherent' weakness of internal stimuli for the proper devel-
opment of the enterprise.43 Under the new program, the factory itself,
guided by public requirements, will draw up its own production and mar-
keting plans. The plan will not be based on detailed targets handed down
by superior agencies, but rather on commercial orders placed by state
agencies, by enterprises operating on a self-supporting basis, and by trad-
ing establishments. Factories should compete economically to meet con-
sumer demand and state contract orders should be awarded, as a rule, on
a competitive basis.
Planning target figures should serve as a guide to the factory regard-
ing the social need for products. Such figures should not serve as direc-
tives and thus shackle the work collective in drafting its plans.
Factories should pay their own way. From their own revenues and
profits, they should cover their current expenses, including wages and sal-
ary, make investments for modernization and increased capacity, and pay
for social amenities for their collectives. State budget funding will only be
used for important state tasks. Factories will be allowed to draw bank
credits. They will make payments to the state for interest on credits,
land, water, manpower and other basic resources. Supplies to factories
will no longer be provided by central authorities but rather from whole-
sale trade, to be paid for from earnings. Work collectives individually
should determine all production matters at their factories, including elec-
tion of their top managers.
personal contribution to the end result, and that no limit be set. There is only one criterion
of justice: whether or not it is honestly earned." Id. at 11.
42. ". . . Experience has convinced us that monopoly for individual organizations is a
serious drag on scientific and technological progress..." Id. at 8.
43. "A factory is given production quotas and resources through a system of directive-
like indices. Virtually all costs are covered and the marketing of products is effectively guar-
anteed. . . workers' incomes are connected poorly with the end result of work. . . (In this
situation) manufacturers find it disadvantageous to use cheap. . . materials and unprofita-
ble to improve product quality and apply research innovation. Under such an economic
mechanism, the line between effective and systematically lagging enterprises is virtually
erased." Id. at 8.
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Gorbachev recognized that excess labor will be a necessary by-prod-
uct of the changes, particularly with the resulting scientific and techno-
logical progress." Part of the surplus labor forces will be absorbed into
expanded public service, education, medicare, recreational and cultural
jobs to be created. The dislocations must be handled with due regard for
workers' rights.4
He also touched on the critical problem of bankruptcy." If a factory
has been mismanaged and cannot make guaranteed payments to the state
or payments for labor, aid can be provided initially from a bank or the
industrial branch of which the failing enterprise is a part. If there is no
improvement, the enterprise can be reorganized or terminated; in such
circumstances, the state should help dismissed workers find new jobs.
d. Providing A Theoretical Base For Changes
Gorbachev recognized the need for a solid theoretical underpinning
to his bold initiatives, to keep at bay his detractors who would argue that
he was abandoning the precepts of the fathers of Socialism. Both Marx
and Lenin, said Gorbachev, had early practical experiences in analyzing
the problems of society and in developing theories for building socialism,
but over the years basic socialist principles have been oversimplified and
corrupted, and this has resulted in negative influences on the Soviet
economy.
4
"
Management of the economy has mistakenly been attempted by de-
cree and resort to enthusiasm 49 , Gorbachev asserted, we have tended to
44. It is anticipated that some 16 million workers might be displaced by the end of the
century. US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, supra note 19, at 38.
45. We must pay close attention to the rearrangements, and "... ensure social guaran-
tees for employment of the working people, for their constitutional right to work." MN
Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 9. It was reported that the Politburo has approved plans for
a government-run placement service and for greater unemployment benefits to ease the
shock of job losses expected under the economic reforms. About half of all government min-
istry jobs are to be terminated by 1990. San Francisco Chron., Nov. 20, 1987, at A31.
46. According to recent Pravda reports, 13 percent of Soviet state-owned businesses are
unprofitable and may be closed under the new economic reforms. San Francisco Chron.,
Aug. 20, 1987, at 14.
47. We need a "real breakthrough on the theoretical front . . . a scientific substantia-
tion of the aims and prospects of our movement." MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 2.
48. "[Our] task now is to make a profound analysis of the practice of socialist develop-
ment, the wealth of experience accumulated by us." In making "the transition to full profit-
and-loss accounting, to remunerate according to the end result" the socialist principle of
"from each according to his abilities, to each according to his work" was often sacrificed in
the name of a simplified concept of equality. "Equality does not mean levelling off" (i.e.
paying similar wages to all). This, states Gorbachev, has " generated sponging, negatively
influenced the quality and quantity of work and reduced incentives to increase productiv-
ity". Id. at 2-3.
49. The Central Committee annually promulgates slogans to be used for May Day cele-
brations to whip up enthusiasm among Soviet citizens for party programs. Some of those
promulgated for May Day, 1987, are as follows: "Toilers of the Land of Soviets! More
broadly develop competition. . .Communists! Be in the vanguard of restructuring. . .Ex-
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forget about Lenin's precepts that the growth of production can be en-
sured on the basis of personal interest" and material incentives. To
demonstrate the validity of the gospel he was propounding, he lauded
new, capitalistic family contracts that were initiated to help boost agricul-
tural production.5 ' Advantages of the contract system, utilizing small un-
used plots, are substantially lower costs and higher production, all of
which benefit the community generally.
Although his reforms sound very capitalistic, 2 he does not see these
new procedures as contradicting or corrupting socialism.5 3 Socialism he
said, is a system of working people for working people, which provides a
high degree of social protection to the Soviet citizen. Work, and work
alone should be the basis of a person's material and moral standing in
socialist society. "Every encouragement should be given to creative,
highly productive work, to talent, to real contribution to the common
pand Soviet democracy and the Socialist self-government of the people!" The Current Di-
gest of the Soviet Press, XXXIX No. 17 (May 27, 1987).
50. "[U]nshackled grass roots initiative and departure from over-organization and from
excessive reliance on centralized management make it possible, with the same resources, to
achieve a breakthrough in increasing food stocks." MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 5.
He cites an example of workers on a farm collective in the Novosibirsk region of Siberia who
say they were attracted "not only by high wages, but, in no lesser degree, independence,
realization of their human significance, and pride that they are doing really useful work."
MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 4.
51. He described a contract in which A. A. Volochensky, a state farm machinery opera-
tor is assigned 40 hectares of land, some calves and feed, and with the help of his family of
four will produce 11 tons of meat. After reimbursing the state farm 23,000 rubles for rent,
seed, fuel and other resources, the family business will retain wages (profit) of 8,000 rubles,
about $12,000. This spare time return is substantial considering that the average Soviet
citizen earns 200 rubles (about $300) per month ($3600 per year) at his regular job. Thus in
comrade Volochensky's case, since both he and his wife work at the state farm and presuma-
bly earn about $7,200 annually between them, and with the help of their two children, who
are students, they can more than double their family yearly income by their spare time
livestock business. In another calf producing operation by a small group of workers, the
average monthly wage per team member was 534 rubles (about $800) per month.
"Gorbachev responds . . there is nothing wrong with that because the money is for work,
for real products. Let me ask: has this undermined the collective farm system? No it
hasn't. .. So this is nothing other than socialism, effective, creative and labour-minded." Id.
at 4-5.
52. Soviet economist Leonid Abalkin in the New Times interview, supra note 36, was
asked whether capitalism and socialism were converging under the new economic program.
He stated: ". . . there exist certain universal forms of social and economic progress ..
without competition any advance is unthinkable . . .the economy must be geared to the
needs of the consumer..." It is on the producer's ". . . ability to meet consumer demand
that the income of a self-supporting factory, the earnings of its collective and social welfare
funds depend. What is this: capitalist competition or a manifestation of certain universal
economic laws?. . .The difference between our society and capitalism lies not in the form,
but in the social and class essence of production relations. What really matters is who reigns
supreme in the country, who owns the means of production. I see no convergence here . .
As for the forms, we ought to adopt the best of them." Id. at 5.
53. "Rather, the old practice, when negligence in work was paid from the budget, cor-
rupted the farmer." Id. at 4.
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cause."54
e. Democratization
Democratization, according to Gorbachev, is the key to successful re-
structuring; this is in accordance with Leninist principles.5 5 Revitalization
cannot be successful without massive support of Soviet citizens. This in
turn, can be achieved only through a general democratization of society."
Democratization in all spheres of life is expanding; it includes a cultural
revival, and extends to science, literature and art. Soviet citizens are more
keenly interested in the ethical problems of their society and want to
know more about their country's past,57 present and future. As a conse-
quence of these positive changes in attitude, labor productivity and in-
dustrial output have increased noticeably during the last two years. De-
mocratization affects all aspects of Soviet life. Soviet citizens "[n]o longer
want decisions related to their interests to be taken without their partici-
pation, no matter who takes them." Party committees and state authori-
ties must stay constantly in touch with public opinion and use it to verify
decisions that they are about to make.
He recognizes that the new democratic procedure will not be easy for
everybody."8 Gorbachev sees democracy as a way of holding the feet of
54. Perhaps in preparation for his speech on revitalizing the Soviet economy,
Gorbachev and his advisors read T. PETERS & R. WATERMAN, IN SEARCH OF EXCEL-
LENCE-LESSONS FROM AMERICA'S BEST-RUN COMPANIES 14 (1982). Among the authors' find-
ings is that the most productive and profitable companies foster autonomy and entrepre-
neurship. One of the successful companies, 3M, was described as "so intent on innovation
that its essential atmosphere seems not like that of a large corporation but rather a loose
network of laboratories and cubbyholes populated by feverish inventors and dauntless en-
trepreneurs who let their imaginations fly in all directions. . .They encourage practical risk
taking, and support good tries." Id. For a capitalistic view of factors leading to the renewal
of business organizations, compare R. WATERMAN, THE RENEWAL FACTOR (1987).
55. Democracy according to Gorbachev, appears to be involvement of the masses in the
decision making process, not necessarily through voting as we in the west think of it. Quot-
ing Lenin, he says: "The more profound the change we wish to bring about, the more we
must rouse an interest in and an intelligent attitude towards it, and convince more millions
and tens of millions of people that it is necessary." MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 6.
56. "Comrades, I want to stress once again that our economic work, the reorganization
in the national economy can be successful only if [it] attract[s] millions of working people.
So it can be said that our course of fundamentally restructuring management actually
merges with the course of further democratization and not only of economic life, but of the
entire life of society. Progress in the economy and development of socialist democratization
are indivisible." Id. at 7.
57. Gorbachev has laid the foundation for a correction of Soviet history books which
had been tampered with, particularly during the Stalin years: ". . . there should be no for-
gotten names or blank spots in either history or literature. Otherwise, what we have is not
history and literature but artificial, opportunistic constructs. . .The Party has spoken about
the painful matters. We do not intend to portray them in a rosy light today. . .History must
be seen as it is. Everything happened, there were mistakes-grave mistakes-but the coun-
try moved forward." Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XXXIX, No. 7 (1987) at 7.
58. "Some have difficulties with openness; others find it hard to accept criticism and
unfavorable press reports, still others have come to believe that only their own opinion is
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wayward public officials to the fire in order to bring about desired
changes in the bureaucracy."
He has made some bold pronouncements concerning the virtue of un-
fettered debate in a democratic society, and the need for changes in the
Party control mechanism. 0 Though recent events demonstrate that there
are limits to democratic expression in the Soviet Union," and that the
Party leaders are still feeling their way through the minefields of glasnost.
f. Planning
Gorbachev foresees a radical reformation of central planning in the
Soviet Union. 2 He anticipates a greater role for economic contracts be-
tween enterprises to balance the economy." The national economic plan
should define basic priorities and objectives for the country's socio-eco-
nomic development, trends in investment policy and targets for scientific,
educational, cultural and defense capability. The plan should provide
targets for the ministries and the republics and, over a 15 year period,
should balance all major programs. Yearly goals should be set in the five-
year plans.6 4
g. Pricing
Radical reform in pricing is contemplated. According to Gorbachev,
'infallible?'" MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 6.
59. Such officials "understand perfectly well that they can talk their way out of it when
brought to account by their superiors, but the people will hold them responsible in full
measure." Id.
60. "To live and work in conditions of extended democracy means to have no fear of
debates and of the collision of views and positions. All this is natural and essential in the
quest for truth..." Under the new democracy, control mechanisms must change. Without
giving up the predominant guiding role of the Party in Soviet society "We should master in
full the Leninist principle of socialist control combining broad democratization with Party
guidance. We regard people's inspection both as an efficient tool for detecting new issues
which demand urgent solution and as one of the most important forms of bringing the
masses into the process of self government, into running the affairs of society and the
State." Id.
61. Particularly the highly publicized demotion of one of Gorbachev's supporters, Boris
Yeltsin, former Party boss of Moscow for his outbursts at a Party gathering in which he
decried the slow pace of restructuring. See San Francisco Chron., November 14, 1987. For
overstepping the boundaries of glasnost in his enthusiasm to push reforms, Yeltsin was
given a public dressing down by party leaders, led by Gorbachev himself, and the proceed-
ings were given full coverage by the Soviet press. Tiaa, Nov. 23, 1987, at 34.
62. "It is an illusion to think that everything can be foreseen from the centre within the
framework of such a huge economy as ours." MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 9.
63. The new "genuinely democratic centralism as Lenin understood it... possesses a
far greater potential than centralism thorned by attempts to regulate all and everything."
Id.
64. This planning process appears to be moving more closely toward our own in the
United States where the President and Congress establish national long term goals through
various legislative pronouncements, and then as a part of the budgeting process, particularly
in military procurement, provide for expenditures over a multi-year period.
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price must be an important stimulus for lowering costs, improving use of
resources product quality, and in speeding up technological progress.
Pricing has been geared to cheap natural resources. Existing low prices of
coal, gas, oil and electricity keep an illusion of inexhaustibility of natural
resources and promote increased production, consumption and export.
Low pricing has resulted in rapid growth of subsidies. 65 Poor pricing has
provided an unjustifiably high level of profit for many goods and does not
contribute to efficient production. Those who understate prices have no
incentive to increase output.
Pricing must be radically reformed to interconnect the entire price
system-wholesale, purchase and retail prices together with tariffs. The
price of the most important products must be centrally set as a part of
the state plan. But the sphere of contract prices must be widened to pro-
mote economic independence. Wholesale price reform must promote
higher production efficiency, resource savings and quality. Much work
and discussion must ensue before the price system can be reformed and
the new five year plan is prepared."
h. Wholesale Trade
Wholesale trade will become more dependent upon direct contacts
between suppliers and consumers, with the state playing only a regulatory
role. The present system is wasteful and results in large stocks of com-
modities being stored. Wholesale trade would normalize stocks.' 7
i. Finance and Crediting
Gorbachev observed that the national economy is oversaturated with
money's and that monetary funds are thus divorced from movement of
material values. The ruble therefore does not fulfill its role of active fi-
nancial control over the economy." Cooperatives should be established to
65. It has been estimated that to keep rents at 1928 levels and meat prices at those
prevailing in 1964, the government must now pay annual subsidies of some $115 billion. US
NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, supra note 19, at 38.
66. Soviet citizens have displayed anxiety about potential price reforms. For many
years they have been used too low, highly subsidized basic commodities, not to mention
housing and utilities. US NEws AND WORLD REPORT, Oct. 19, 1987, at 37 As Gorbachev has
observed however, the failure of the Soviets to permit the market to regulate prices has
brought about shortages and waste. Polish citizens, socialist neighbors of the Soviets, are
alarmed over the prospect of price reform in their country, fearing that price increases con-
templated by the government may be beyond many family budgets. San Francisco Chron.,
Nov. 16, 1987.
67. There are complaints about shortages. However stockpiles of metals grow, observes
Gorbachev. The surplus stocks are scattered around the economy. "Therefore the sooner we
establish direct ties and embark on wholesale trade, the quicker we shall get rid of shortages
in supply and of surplus stocks. . ." MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 10.
68. Excess money supply developed from 1971 through 1985, when the volume of
money in circulation grew 3.1 times while consumer goods production only doubled.
69. "The national financial system has grown largely out dated." MN Supp. No. 27,
supra note 29, at 10.
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provide public services, and Soviet citizens should invest surplus funds in
such enterprises. In addition, personal funds should be used to finance
cooperative and individually constructed housing, as well as leisure and
tourist facilities.7
0
j. International Trade
Gorbachev recognized that because of the vast size of the Soviet
economy and the increasing interdependence of world economies, the So-
viet union is increasingly linked economically to the outside world. The
U.S.S.R. must deepen its participation in the international division of la-
bor. External ties will impact the quality of Soviet products and the sci-
entific and technological progress of Soviet industries through increased
competition with world class products and technology transfers. In addi-
tion, Gorbachev foresees that restructuring will increase the integration of
Soviet industries with those of other socialist countries.7 1
k. Organization of Amalgamations and Enterprises
New forms of business organization should be permitted to increase
the efficiency of the economy. Labor has been wasted by irrational organi-
zation and lack of specialization. Switching to profit and loss accounting
must be combined with allowing enterprises to form joint ventures and to
provide for shareholding. Mergers should be permitted if dictated by eco-
nomic expediency. Under the contemplated new conditions, enterprises
can be expected to form all sorts of new organizations such as computing
centers, social and environmental protection facilities, and transport and
training schools.
Presently 37,000 industrial enterprises are controlled by the state
plan, directly from the center.7s The ministries should be relieved of oper-
ational economic management and concentrate instead on broad stimula-
70. To some extent private savings are already being tapped to provide housing, partic-
ularly in instances where parents wish to assist their newly married children. Increasingly,
Gorbachev's recommendations as to how citizens should utilize their savings would seem to
open up vast possibilities of investment akin to capitalistic stock or bond holding. Perhaps
socialist principles can remain untarnished if the government controls the amount of return
payable for the use of capital. Such control however, would quite often be authorizing a
subsidy for the user of the capital if he borrows below what would otherwise be market
rates.
71. "We must study the experience of our friends closely and profoundly, and apply
everything that can be used in the interests of the national economy of the U.S.S.R.." MN
Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 10. The Hungarians have been experimenting with capital-
ism for at least several decades. In addition, the Soviets have been closely wAtching the
economic restructuring going on in China in recent years.
It was recently reported that a U.S.-Hungarian institute will be established in Budapest
for the study of capitalistic management techniques. San Francisco Chron., Nov. 15, 1987.
72. Marshall Goldman of Harvard's Russian Research Center estimates that Gosplan,
the central planning committee which administers the economy, handles 7 million docu-
ments a year and makes 83 million calculations, most of them without the benefit of com-
puters. US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, supra note 19, at 36.
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tion of new products, achieving world standards, and promoting science
and technology. As a consequence, their large staffs can be reduced. As
the economy is restructured, the roles and functions of state ministries
will change significantly in order to help industries within their oversight
to work out new forms and mechanisms. The U.S.S.R. State Planning
Committee should concentrate on determining prospects for develop-
ment, realizing fundamental and social tasks and insuring overall balance
in the economy.
1. Implementation of the New Program
The Soviet Communist Party, with the assistance of the country's
economic managers, will be responsible for implementing the reform.
Gorbachev warned that unless managers behind restructuring are sup-
ported and those opposed are reassigned, reform will proceed with diffi-
culty. Discussion of the new procedures is to take place at all Party levels.
National progress on restructuring was reviewed at the 19th All-Union
Party conference which began June 28, 1988. The principal reforms are to
be in place as a part of the 13th, five year plan, beginning in 1991. s
In charging his communist cadres to spread the new gospel through-
out the land, Gorbachev stated that a ground swell of support by the or-
dinary citizen is essential, to be achieved by prompt tangible benefits to
the common man. 4 While tremendous hopes have been aroused, he says,
the benefits of restructuring have not yet become evident to the masses.
The Party must make sure that these hopes are effectuated by its leaders.
A principal roadblock to renewal and creativity, according to
Gorbachev, is the conservatism, inertia, and selfish interests of the bu-
reaucracy.7 As a part of his campaign to pressure recalcitrant officials to
get on-board with his program, along with encouraging the press to put
pressure on laggards7 6 and encouraging workers to participate in work-
place elections, Gorbachev has adopted a practice of publicly criticizing
responsible Party members for their failures.7 A basic problem of change
73. The June, 1987 plenary meeting of the Central Committee approved the Gorbachev
sponsored "Guidelines for Radical Restructuring of Economic Management." He had pro-
posed that they should become the Party directives for all work in that area and that the
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopt the "Law of the U.S.S.R. on the State Enterprise
(Amalgamation)" which he explained to the Committee in his address. Gorbachev expects
that beginning in 1988, the new principles will apply to about two thirds of all Soviet indus-
trial output and that transition to the new system will be completed by 1989.
74. "People should feel that perestroika is spreading, deepening and beginning to bear
real fruit in all spheres of life and above all in what concerns meeting daily, essential needs
of the working people." Id.
75. See US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, supra note 19 at 36, 37.
76. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, supra note 57, at 7. "The press is called upon to
be even more active, to give no rest to idlers, self-seekers, time servers and suppressors of
criticism, and to more actively help those who are fighting for restructuring." "Criticism is a
bitter pill. But the illness makes it necessary. You wince but you take it." Id. at 6.
77. Gorbachev provided examples to the Central Committee of national targets in cer-
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at local levels is the historical predisposition to wait for commands to
originate from above-a necessary side-effect of dictatorship."'
Time is running out warns Gorbachev: "That beautiful tomorrow"
may not happen if everyone does not work today by the sweat of his
brow, changing his way of thinking, overcoming inertia and accepting new
approaches.
III. SOVIET TRADE OFFENSIVE
As a part of his efforts to implement restructuring of the economy,
Gorbachev has launched a new foreign trade offensive. On December 8,
1986, some 50 top trade officials from the Soviet Union, headed by Minis-
ter of Foreign Trade Boris Aristov descended on New York City for the
annual meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council. The
Russians were joined by more than 250 American businessmen, largely
chief executive officers of major American corporations interested in trad-
ing with the Soviet Union.7 9 Among the American participants was Ar-
mand Hammer, chairman of Occidental Petroleum Corporation, and Don-
ald Kendall, chairman of Pepsico. Both companies are heavily involved in
trade with the Soviet Union.
The purpose of the December meeting was to continue the dialogue
which had been initiated upon formation of the Trade and Economic
Council in 1973, but at a more intense pace. Following the Moscow sum-
mit meeting between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in
1972, a number of accords were entered into in order to give substance to
the new detente which had developed. Among them was the creation of
the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council. Its purpose was to bring
together leading American businessmen and heads of Soviet foreign trade,
industrial, and service organizations on an annual basis. The Council
tain industries which were not met. Serious miscalculations were made, but problems could
have been foreseen and prevented. Primarily responsible were Comrade N. V. Talyzin of the
State Planning Committee and other ministers named by Gorbachev. Armenia and its party
boss Demirchyan, according to Gorbachev is showing ". . . totally unjustified tranquility"
and "no effective efforts are being made against bribery, profiteering and protectionism."
Similar problems exist in the Gorky region. In a veiled threat to improve performance,
Gorbachev states: "It may be presumed that . . . party officials there (will) . . . draw con-
clusions from the criticism and put things right." MN Supp. No. 27, supra note 29, at 3.
78. "Many local officials show the most deep-seated parasitic attitudes. Even in cases
when a minimum of effort and attention would be enough, officials keep shifting the burden
onto the central authorities, and waiting for assistance from those higher up. Such an atti-
tude . . . should be resolutely condemned. . ." Id. at 3. According to Arkady N.
Shevchenko, Soviet Under Secretary General of the United Nations, who defected to the
United States in the early 1980's: "Official Soviet pedagogy prescribed that independent
behavior or thinking means above all the ability to understand orders and carry them out in
the best way possible. What this means in practical terms is that any initiative which might
go beyond established limits should be viewed as dangerous and suppressed." A.
SHEVCHENKO, BREAKING WITH Moscow (1985).
79. See The U.S.S.R. Trade Supplement, The Journal of Commerce (Moscow) Dec. 8,
1987, at 10.
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seeks ways to improve trade and cooperation between the two countries
and, in so doing, facilitates the exchange of trade delegations, the conduct
of seminars and joint scientific research, participation in trade exhibi-
tions, and the conduct of joint scientific research. It also helps organize
joint ventures and promotes the exchange of technology and products.
The Council helps U.S. companies find Soviet partners and gives advice
on how to deal with Soviet counterparts."0
At the 1986 Council meeting in New York, Trade Minister Aristov
and his associates sought to capitalize on the thaw in Soviet-U.S. rela-
tions brought about by the Geneva and Reykjavik summit meetings be-
tween Gorbachev and President Reagan. They also sought to reinforce
impressions in the West that the Soviets were truly changing their de-
meanor through massive restructuring of their economy and glasnost, and
that they wanted to become full fledged members of the world commu-
nity through trade,"' including admission to GATT."'
During the course of the two days of official meetings (plus additional
days of informal meetings to permit trading companies to conclude
deals), the Soviets explained the new economic policies emanating from
80. During the 1985-86 period the Council helped conduct in the Soviet Union some 70
scientific seminars sponsored by U.S. companies concerning agriculture, oil processing and
drilling, tobacco, foodstuffs and other products. And in the same year, 16 Soviet trade dele-
gations visited the United States. Furthermore, in 1986, Soviet foreign trade organizations
and U.S. companies concluded some $1.8 billion in contracts. Id. at 34.
81. The West for many years has sought to use trade as a means of taming the Russian
bear. In 1922 British Prime Minister Lloyd George said: "I believe we can save her [Russia]
by trade. Commerce has a sobering influence... Trade, in my opinion will bring an end to
the ferocity, the rapine, and the crudity of Bolshevism surer than any other method." H.
SMITH, THE RuSSIANs 655 (1976).
82. The Journal of Commerce, supra note 79, at 25.
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was initiated in 1947, following the
post war failure of the U.S. proposed International Trade Organization. Twenty three na-
tions met in Geneva, Switzerland and negotiated an extensive set of bilateral trade conces-
sions which they incorporated into the GATT agreements. See P. T. ELLSWORTH, THE IN-
TERNATIONAL ECONOMY 512 (1964). See also K. DAM, THE GAIT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970). Since then the signatory parties have met periodically to
negotiate additional trade concessions.
They have adopted a set of rules to protect their rights and obligations. Meetings are to
be held annually or oftener. The organization provides for a secretariat and a permanent
Council of Representatives. Among the rules are the following: 1) trade is to be conducted in
a non-discriminatory manner, 2) use of qualitative restrictions is condemned, and 3) dis-
agreements are to be resolved through consultation.
To ensure against discrimination, the parties have agreed to apply the most favored
nation principle to all import and export duties (each nation is to be treated as well as the
most favored nation). Dumping and export subsidies may be countered by measures limited
to the offending country. Customs unions or free trade areas are permitted if they do not
raise barriers to the trade of other parties. Though import quotas are not allowed, countries
confronted with balance of payments problems may use quantitative restrictions to forestall
a serious decline in reserves. In addition, underdeveloped countries may apply quantitative
restrictions to further economic development but only under GATT approved procedures.
Import restrictions are also allowed under certain other conditions relating to domestic mar-
ket controls imposed by the importing country. ELLSWORTH, supra note 82.
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the Kremlin. They also engaged in joint bi-lingual study sessions with
U.S. businessmen, their lawyers and other advisors, provided detailed dis-
cussions of the new joint venture law, and reminded Americans of the
continuing impediments to U.S.-Soviet trade. Their efforts were well
orchestrated to appeal to the sense and sensibilities of American busi-
nessmen, and their demeanor was business-like and free of propagandistic
bombast. One of the benefits the Soviets are deriving from the Council
meetings is the development of a high-powered American constituency for
easing trade barriers which exist between the two countries.8
While launching the trade offensive, the Soviets, with the help of
their American supporters, portrayed Russia as a potentially excellent
trading partner." Assuming that political and other problems can be
solved, there is no doubt that the Soviet Union represents a large, rela-
tively untapped market for American businessmen and politicians eager
to reduce the mounting foreign trade deficit."'
IV. JOINT ENTERPRISES
A. Background
Among his proposals to restructure the economy, Gorbachev has
called for new forms of economic and industrial organizations to permit
the Soviet economy to become more efficient and benefit from world tech-
nology. In order to implement this aspect of his program, the U.S.S.R.
Council of Ministers, on January 13, 1987, adopted a resolution permit-
ting the establishment of joint enterprises in the Soviet Union with capi-
83. In attendance at the meeting were not only the CEOs of major American corpora-
tions whose checkbooks and political influence are strongly felt in Washington, but also
leading officials of the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Soviet Ambassador to the United
Nations and Claiborne Pell, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the prin-
cipal dinner speaker. In April, 1988, a delegation of more than 500 U.S. business leaders,
headed by Secretary of Commerce Verity, traveled to Moscow for the annual Trade Council
meeting and were hosted at dinner in the Kremlin by Gorbachev and the Politburo.
84. Considerable expansion of the Soviet economy is anticipated in the current 12th
five year plan. Much of the expansion will require imports from abroad. Stressed will be the
development of scientific and technological products in the areas of electronics, comprehen-
sive automation, biotechnology, and nuclear power generation, as well as the development of
raw materials. Computer hardware and software capacity is to be increased during the plan
period 230%. Development of new metal and plastic materials is to increase 25%; machine
building will increase 40-45% and investment in engineering is to increase 80%. There will
be special emphasis on the development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East, in the search for
and processing of new supplies of oil, gas and other natural resources, in the development of
hydroelectric power, in completion of the BAM (Baikal-Amur) main railway line, and the
new rail lines through Tommot and Yakutsk in Soviet Siberia. The Journal of Commerce,
supra note 79, at 3.
85. Of the total present (1985) Soviet foreign trade turnover (exports and imports com-
bined) of 141.6 billion rubles, the U.S. enjoyed only 1.5% of such trade. Presently the U.S.
ranks 15th among Soviet trading partners in terms of volume. Id. at 11. Energy and fuel
exports accounted for 52.8% of Soviet exports in 1985. By the year 2000, the Soviets expect
to double their gross national product. Id. at 24, 29.
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talist and developing country partners. Although the Soviet Union had,
since the beginning of its history some 70 years ago under Lenin, entered
into various joint venture arrangements with capitalists (particularly dur-
ing the time of the New Economic Policy beginning in 1921) such ar-
rangements were rare under Stalin. Following the rapprochement be-
tween the United States and Russia in 1972, a variety of limited joint
venture agreements were entered into with Americans and others."6 Nota-
ble among the ventures created were the development of a trade center in
Moscow by the Soviets and Armand Hammer, an old friend of Lenin, and
a marketing agreement with Pepsico.
The new Joint Enterprise (Venture) law8 7 is part of a wide ranging
restructuring of the entire Soviet economy and represents a well thought-
out effort on the part of the Soviet leadership to tap, in a systematic and
sustained way, the technology of the West to help revitalize the national
economy. 8 Among its stated aims is to develop trade, economic, scientific
and technical cooperation with the capitalist and developing countries on
a stable and mutually advantageous basis.6 9
86. Over the past 20 years the Soviet Union has entered into more than 50 licensing
agreements with companies in capitalist countries. See article by Yuri Dryomov, Head of
the Joint Ventures Department, U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Trade, prepared for The Wall
Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1987.
87. For a discussion of Soviet perspectives on this new law, see G. Zubov, Legal Aspects
of Improvement of Foreign Economic Activity of the USSR. Paper presented to the Legal
Committee, US-USSR Trade and Economic Council in New York (December 8, 1986).
88. Although the present joint venture law is new to the Soviets, the U.S.S.R. has had
many years of experience in working with western capitalists, beginning with Lenin's New
Economic Policy in 1921. It also has had the benefit of studying the successes and failures of
other socialist countries in developing a joint venture program, particularly Yugoslavia,
Hungary and China. The new Soviet law appears to have anticipated some but not all of the
problems encountered by the Chinese who were years behind the Soviets in developing a
modern legal system. See, H. Rogers, Jr., Deterrents to Joint Venturing in China: A Look
at Shanghai Real Estate Projects, 8 EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REPORTS (July 15, 1986) (discus-
sion of problems which have arisen in China under a similar law). Such problems included:
1) lack of confidence by westerners that profits will be adequate, 2) lack of capital security,
3) shortage of foreign exchange, 4) political risks, 5) lack of an adequate legal structure, 6)
problems in valuing contributions, and 7) the high cost of doing business in China.
Similarly see comments and detailed recommendations made to the Soviets in papers
presented to the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council on December 8, 1986, supra note
87: Shillinglaw, New Soviet Decree Permitting Joint Ventures of Western Firms and the
Experience of Western Firms with Joint Ventures in P. R. China, and Hitch, August 19,
1986 Soviet Decree Permitting Joint Enterprises between Soviet Organizations and For-
eign Firms From Capitalist Countries-Recommendations to Avoid Practical Problems.
89. Initial reactions among western businessmen to the new law have been guarded.
Many feel that they need more assurances that they will be allowed to tap the large Soviet
domestic market, and that clarifications will be provided with respect to presently vague
provisions of the law regarding labor costs, reserves and other matters. The Soviets are put-
ting the best face on the reception of their new program. Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir
Kamentsev reported that by April, 1987, the Soviets had received 200 proposals for deals.
Various U.S. companies have shown an interest. The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 6, 1987, at
20. By November, 1987 it was announced that Occidental Petroleum Company would enter
into a joint venture including the Soviets and Italian and Japanese firms for the construc-
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B. Formation"0
To form a joint enterprise, the Soviet partner must present to its
supervising ministry a copy of the proposed articles of incorporation or
charter and substantiating technical and economic documents. Following
clearance of the documents with the State Planning Committee, the Min-
istry of Finance and other concerned ministries or departments, the pro-
posal will be submitted to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers for approval.
The approving authorities will be guided in their review by the need of
the country for the specific types of industrial output, raw materials, food
products, equipment and technology proposed to be provided by the ven-
ture and its capability to help the U.S.S.R. develop its export base and
reduce irrational imports."
C. Participants, Property and Rights of the Venture
The Soviet partner must own at least a 51% share of the initial capi-
talization and may include one or more legal entities under U.S.S.R. law.
The other partner likewise may consist of one or more foreign legal
entities.
The venture will be a legal person under Soviet law, fully responsible
to the extent of its assets for its own obligations, but not responsible for
liabilities of the Soviet state or any of its entities. Conversely, the Soviet
government is not responsible for the obligations of the joint venture.
The enterprise may enter into contracts, acquire rights in property, sue
and be sued. It must be financially independent. Its charter or articles of
incorporation will define its objectives, composition of its participants, in-
itial capitalization and governing procedure and will contain various other
provisions governing the rights and duties of the participating parties.
Upon approval and registration of the articles by the Ministry of Finance,
the venture will become a legal entity.
D. Capitalization
Contributed capital may be in the form of money or property such as
tion of a chemical complex to be built near the Caspian sea, valued at $6 billion. San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, Nov. 20, 1987. In addition Combustion Engineering had completed arrange-
ments for a joint venture to provide control systems for oil refineries and petro-chemical
plants. TME, Nov. 23, 1987, at 57.
90. The January 13, 1987 resolution adopted by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, was
published in Pravda on January 27, 1987. Pravda, On the Procedure Governing the Crea-
tion, on USSR Territory, and the Activities of Joint Enterprises With the Participation of
Soviet Organizations and Firms of Capitalist and Developing Countries, Jan. 27, 1987. See
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press XXXIX, No. 6 (1987) at 15.
91. Ivan Ivanoff, the Deputy Chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission of
the Council of Ministers, stated that when applications for joint ventures were processed the
government would take into account three goals: 1) to attract new technology and manage-
rial experience, 2) to stimulate import substitution, and 3) to expand Soviet exports. Wall
Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1987.
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buildings, equipment, rights to use land, water or other natural resources
and patents, technology or other property rights."' Contributions will be
valued in rubles at contractually agreed-upon values, bearing in mind
world market prices if applicable. Contributions of the foreign partner of
property or goods will be exempt from customs duties. The property of
the venture will be governed according to Soviet law and may not be req-
uisitioned or confiscated by administrative procedures. Any Party to the
venture may transfer its shares to third parties with the prior approval of
Soviet authorities, provided that the Soviet partner will have the right of
first refusal.
E. Dispute Resolution and Governance
Disputes between the venture and the Soviet state or its entities, or
disputes between the joint venturers, are heard by courts of the U.S.S.R.
or by consent in an arbitration court, either within or outside the Soviet
Union, as determined by the partners."
The governing body of the enterprise will be appointed by the par-
ticipants, which will follow decision-making procedures provided in the
articles. While the chairman of the board and general director of the en-
terprise must be Soviet citizens, general management may be provided by
both Soviet and foreign citizens.
The venture will adopt its own business plan, free from interference
of state agencies; 4 this, however, will not guarantee sale of its output."
The venture may independently conduct import and export operations
through its own foreign marketing operations or through Soviet foreign
trade organizations."
92. Yuri Dryomov observes that while adequately capitalized large corporations seeking
joint venture opportunities in the Soviet Union have expressed concerns about creating a
foreign subsidiary which would compete with the home corporation, small businesses, on the
other hand, while possessing useful technology, often lack sufficient capital. The U.S.S.R.
Ministry of Foreign Trade has explored the possibility of inviting certain foreign banks to
provide needed capital to such small businesses in exchange for an ownership share. Dry-
omov, supra note 86.
93. Ivanoff, supra note 91.
94. However, the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Trade will provide general supervisory
control over the joint venture. Dryomov, supra note 86.
95. To the extent that the Foreign Trade Ministry determines to make purchases of
products from the joint venture, it will pay the going world market price. If the product is
resold on the domestic market, the Soviet Government will price the product reflecting so-
cial goals. This might involve payment of subsidies, if products are resold domestically be-
low cost. Mathias, Turn Left Off Wall Street Into Red Square, International Herald Trib-
une, July 22, 1987.
96. The joint venture will operate in foreign markets under a general license from the
Ministry of Foreign Trade. For domestic trade within the Soviet Union, the joint venture
will sell and be supplied through the appropriate Soviet foreign trade organization on freely
contracted prices in competition with domestic producers. The competition is introduced
deliberately to force Soviet domestic firms to produce more efficiently and with higher qual-
ity. See Ivanoff, supra note 91.
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F. Finances
All foreign exchange requirements of the venture must be derived
from sale of its products on the foreign market."" Sale of output on the
Soviet market and delivery to the venture of raw materials and supplies
from the local market 8 must be paid for in rubles.
The enterprise may borrow from the U.S.S.R. Foreign Trade Bank,
or, with its consent, from foreign banks or firms" for its foreign exchange
needs, or it may borrow from the U.S.S.R. State Bank or the Foreign
Trade Bank if it requires a loan in rubles. Commercial terms may be ne-
gotiated. Interest will be paid on deposits made to the banks.
Reserves must be established by the venture to cover its operations
and requirements for the social development of its labor collective. Profits
available after payment of expenses and deductions to necessary reserves
are distributed to the participants in accordance with their proportionate
ownership. Foreign participants are guaranteed the right to extract their
profits in foreign exchange.
G. Taxation
A tax amounting to 30 percent of the net income of the joint enter-
prise, following deductions for reserves' 0 and research and development,
97. Soviet financial planners are conservative and wary of incurring hard currency debt,
and thus are unwilling to subsidize joint ventures with otherwise difficult to earn convertible
or hard currency. A principal source of hard currency for the Soviets (oil revenues) deterio-
rated sharply after world oil prices dropped in the early 1980's. Also reserves have been used
up to pay for necessary grain and food imports and to help Poland through the Solidarity
crisis. See Joan P. Zoeter, "U.S.S.R: Hard Currency Trade and Payments" Joint Economic
Committee, supra note 31, at 479.
Legal practitioners (e.g. Thomas Shillinglaw) have expressed concerns that the sections
of the joint venture law dealing with foreign exchange requirements are overly restrictive.
Although the law requires the venture to be self sufficient in foreign exchange (all foreign
exchange needs must be derived from proceeds of export sales) such needs for a new venture
can be substantial, considering required machinery, employee salaries, debt service, royalty
payments for foreign technology and eventual dividend repatriation. A start up venture
would have difficulty penetrating foreign markets quickly enough to cover operational
needs. Ventures should be able to sell to domestic markets in the U.S.S.R. and convert ruble
proceeds if the product sold, replaces what would otherwise be imported. Also ventures
which produce foreign exchange surpluses ought to be permitted to sell its foreign exchange
to those which are deficient.
98. Mathias, supra note 95. The joint venture may purchase raw materials and other
supplies wherever it chooses.
99. Although joint ventures must finance their own operations, lenders are likely to
look to the credit history of the Soviets, generally, in evaluating risks; the Soviet govern-
ment has had an excellent repayment record of its debts. During 1986, western banks made
nearly $4 billion in untied (general) loans to the Soviets. Total Soviet debt to western banks
is now nearly $36 billion, up from $21.8 billion in 1984. To help finance their proposed new
trade deals, the Soviets have indicated their desire to enter the Eurobond market and to
seek membership in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Editorial, Wall
Street Journal, July 23, 1987.
100. Supra note 92. Tax free reserves may be accumulated up to an amount equal to 25
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is assessed by the Ministry of Finance. The venture is exempt from tax
for the first two years of its operations. Tax appeal procedures are pro-
vided. An additional tax of 20 percent of the amount transferred abroad
is levied on the foreign partner at the time of transfer. Wages earned by
foreign employees are assessed an income tax of 13 percent.0 1
H. Auditing and Oversight
The participants are entitled to receive financial and other data nec-
essary to carry out their supervision of the venture. The enterprise must
maintain records required by U.S.S.R. state enterprises on forms pro-
vided by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Statistical Administra-
tion. Auditing is done for a fee by a Soviet auditing organization. Infor-
mation and reports concerning the joint venture may not be provided to
foreign state agencies.
L Personnel
The venture will be primarily staffed by Soviet citizens, although
management is free to hire foreign technicians on terms and conditions to
be negotiated by the parties.0 2 Contracts for Soviet employees must be
concluded with local collectives and must include provisions for social de-
velopment, terms of labor compensation, work and rest schedules, and
social security and insurance for the workers. The enterprise will remit
payments for social insurance coverage and pensions to the U.S.S.R. State
Budget Office.
J. Liquidation
The joint enterprise may be wound up in accordance with its articles
or terminated by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers if its activities conflict
with its articles. After payment of debts, the residual value will be dis-
tributed proportionately to the participants, and may be withdrawn from
the country.10
3
V. HISTORY OF U.S.-SOVIET TRADE
A proper evaluation of trade and joint venture proposals, now being
tendered by the Soviets, cannot be made without an understanding of the
history of U.S.-Soviet trade relations. Trade between the two superpow-
ers got off to a rocky start 70 years ago when the Bolsheviks came to
power and promptly repudiated the debts of the Czarist regime.'" The
U.S. and Britain, among others, offended the Bolsheviks by landing
percent of authorized capital.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See generally, J. GIFFEN, THE LEGAL AND PRACTicAL ASPECTS OF TRADE wrrH THE
SoVIET UNION (1971).
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troops on Russian soil during the chaotic period following the Bolshevik
revolution, when the Red and White armies were vying for control. From
1917, when Russia abandoned the war, until 1921, the Russian economy
was in a shambles. 0 5 Lenin's decrees to confiscate industry and other
measures designed to establish the communist state nearly ruined what
was left of trade following the turmoil brought about by the war. By 1923,
U.S. trade with the Soviets amounted to only 3.9 million rubles. In 1921,
Lenin recognized that his new nation was about to starve to death if dras-
tic and immediate changes were not made in the economy. As a conse-
quence, he instituted the New Economic Policy (NEP) which reinstated
capitalistic practices, but retained political control in the hands of the
Bolsheviks.
Although the United States did not recognize the Soviets until 1933
when Roosevelt came into office, it did become involved in trade through
private efforts before then. Armand Hammer and others established, with
Lenin's blessing,'"° a variety of joint venture trading and manufacturing
businesses in Russia.10 7 Immediately following the revolution, Herbert
Hoover (later U.S. Secretary of Commerce and President) headed up an
effort in Russia to provide food to the millions of starving people there.
105. Armand Hammer traveled by train from Moscow to Ekaterinburg in the Urals in
August, 1921. In his book HAMMER (1987) he describes what he saw along the way: "Every-
where we went we met the same condition-tremendous mills, factories and mine works
standing idle and the workers hanging about, hungry and despairing. Even if the mills and
factories could be put into operation, there was no market for their products, owing to the
economic stagnation of the entire country..." Id. at 108.
106. Hammer described his meeting with Lenin at the Kremlin in the summer of 1921,
in which Lenin urged Hammer to become one of the first foreign concessionaires under the
new economic policy: "Our two countries, the United States and Russia, Lenin explained,
were complementary. Russia was a backward land with enormous treasures in the form of
undeveloped resources. The United States could find here raw materials and a market for
machines, and later for manufactured goods. Above all, Russia needed American technol-
ogy. . ." According to Hammer, Lenin went on to say: "We need the knowledge and spirit
that has made America what she is today." Id. at 116. And in describing Lenin's demeanor
Hammer said: "To talk with Lenin was like talking with a trusted friend, a friend who
understood. His infectious smile and colloquial speech, his sincerity and natural ways, put
me completely at my ease." Id. at 118.
107. Fresh out of medical school, Armand Hammer, traveled to Russia in the summer
of 1921 before beginning practice as a resident in New York City. He brought with him a
complete field hospital, paid for with his own funds, and sought to help alleviate some of the
suffering he had read about, taking place in the land of his forbearers. Before the summer
was out, he had arranged a business deal to provide $1 million worth of grain to starving
peasants in exchange for Russian furs, and had come to the attention of Lenin himself.
Hammer decided to forsake his medical practice and stay in Russia to do business. He re-
mained there until the late 1920's and because of his special ties to Lenin, has remained a
friend and business benefactor of the Soviets ever since. At age 89, he is still active in con-
cluding massive trading deals with the Soviet Union. Id. at 109.
In 1973, with Brezhnev's help, his Occidental Petroleum Corporation, entered into long
term joint venture contracts with the Soviets to exchange fertilizer for urea and ammonia
(valued at $8 billion over a 20 year period), and to build an international trade center and
hotel in the heart of Moscow. Id. at 400. See also, The American Review of East West
Trade, May-June, 1973, at 15.
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In exchange for food, Hoover and his agents collected tons of books and
papers documenting the Bolshevik revolution which, happily for Western
posterity, he transported to his alma mater, Stanford University, for safe-
keeping and study by scholars from around the world.
Lenin encouraged trade with the U.S.: "We are resolutely for eco-
nomic accord with America, with all the countries, but especially with
America."108 In 1924, Amtorg Trading Corporation, a private company,
was established in New York to act as purchasing and selling agent for
Soviet trade corporations in the United States. By 1931, the Soviet Union
was the principal foreign purchaser of U.S.-made machines and equip-
ment. Some 1500 assorted American experts were in the Soviet Union. In
1937 a trade agreement was signed with Russia," 9 giving it Most Favored
Nation status. During the lend-lease program to Russia, American com-
panies shipped huge amounts of munitions and supplies to the Soviets in
a joint effort to defeat Hitler during the Second World War.
As the cold war descended over Europe and Asia following defeat of
the Nazis, trade relations took a sharp turn for the worse. In 1947, Con-
gress passed the Export Control Act"0 to limit the types of goods which
could be shipped to the Soviets and their allies; in 1951, following the
Soviet inspired invasion of South Korea, the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement
was cancelled altogether." 1 Trade nearly came to a standstill.'
With the beginning of the thaw in the Cold War in the 1970's, trade
began to increase. Nixon and Brezhnev signed a trade agreement in 1972
which reinstated Most Favored Nation status for the Soviets and a settle-
108. The Journal of Commerce, supra note 79, at 11.
109. However formal trade relations were initiated earlier on July 13, 1935 in "An
Agreement Regarding Commercial Relations with The USSR, 49 Stat. 3805, pt. 2.
110. Under the Export Administration Act of 1985, 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq., succes-
sor to the 1947 Act, the U.S., through the Department of Commerce, may control exports,
reexports, and trans-shipments of goods and technical data. This is handled through a li-
censing procedure. The purpose of the controls, among others, is to 1) protect U.S. national
security, 2) further U.S. policy, and 3) protect the U.S. domestic economy from shortages
and the inflationary impacts of abnormal foreign demand for goods. Export licensing applies
to a) export of commodities and technical data from the U.S., b) reexport of U.S. origin
commodities and technical data from one foreign destination to another, c) U.S. origin parts
and components used in a foreign country to manufacture a foreign end product for export
and d) in some instances, a foreign produced product using U.S. technical data.
Most U.S. exports require no specific U.S. approval. They are exported under a "gen-
eral license." No license application is needed if the goods in question are not on a restricted
control list maintained by the Department of Commerce. If a "validated license" is required,
the proposed transaction is reviewed to determine if the commodity or technology in ques-
tion would contribute to significant military use or promote the military-industrial base of
the importing country. See R. Starr, The Evolving U.S. Legal Framework for US-USSR
Trade," in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE USSR 16 (1975). See also GIFFEN, supra note
104, at 9-42. Under the Act, the U.S. may cooperate with other nations having common
strategic interests to restrict exports of goods and technology. 50 U.S.C. App. 2402.
111. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, sec. 5, 65 Stat. 73 (1951).
112. Id.
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ment of the long outstanding lend lease debt was reached.113 The trade
bill was, however, subject to ratification by both Congress and the Su-
preme Soviet. After much debate,"" Congress attached a rider to the
trade bill making its approval conditional upon Soviet acceptance of the
so-called Jackson-Vanick amendment, which required them to halt cer-
tain human rights violations, principally their restrictions upon the emi-
gration of Soviet jews. Although during the 1970's the Soviets did permit
substantial emigration, they refused to formally agree to the provisions of
the Jackson-Vanick amendment, and the trade bill never took effect. " " A
side casualty was cessation of payment by the Soviets of the lend-lease
debt, made conditional upon effectiveness of the trade bill.
While other trade accords did go into effect," the failure of the
113. The U.S.S.R. had agreed to pay a small percentage of the total due on the lend
lease account. The settlement amounted to $722 million, payable $24 million per year until
the year 2001. See The American Review of East-West Trade (Dec. 1972).
114. Not only the Congressional, but the national debate over trade included wide
ranging considerations concerning U.S. policy toward the Soviets and its effectiveness in
promoting peace. See G. BALL, DIPLOMACY FOR A CROWDED WORLD 110 (1976) for a discus-
sion of some of the issues surrounding U.S. participation in Soviet trade.
115. While the Trade Agreement of October 18, 1972 did not become effective, in light
of the new Soviet trade offensive, renewed efforts will be made to resurrect and debate some
of its key provisions. These should be noted here.
Included in the 1972 agreement was a provision that MFN status would be provided to
each party. Other provisions set up a procedure for preventing disruption of domestic mar-
kets, provided for payment of goods to be made in freely convertible currencies, and for the
establishment of reciprocal commercial offices and business facilities. In addition the agree-
ment provided for arbitration of commercial disputes. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union
are parties to the "United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards," concluded in New York in 1958. See Starr, supra note 110, at 14.
The agreement also provided a waiver by the Soviet Union of sovereign immunity
claims by its foreign trade organizations (FTO's) See Paper presented to the US-USSR
Trade and Economic Council, supra, on December 8, 1986, prepared by Stephen A. Oxman
and Margery S. Bronster, "Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976-an Overview."
Under the Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391 (f), 1441 (d) and 1602-1611.
Foreign states are not granted immunity from suit in U.S. courts in cases involving their
commercial activities. This question becomes important in dealing with socialist countries,
where virtually all businesses are owned by the government. As to the origin of the doctrine,
see The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) and Verlinden,
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983). See also, Osakwe, A Soviet Perspec-
tive on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Law and Practice, LAW IN THE SOVIET UNION (1984).
See Starr, supra note 110, at 1-24, for a discussion of the evolution of Soviet trade
agreements.
116. A grain agreement was'signed on July 8, 1972. This agreement provided for the
purchase of at least $750 million worth of U.S. grain by the Soviets for delivery over a three
year period. The grain agreement also permitted the Commodity Credit Corporation to pro-
vide credit to the Soviet Union. Soviet purchases in 1963 and 1971 had been for cash. Starr,
supra note 110, at 1. A lend lease settlement and a credit agreement, were signed in Octo-
ber, 1972. These agreements contemplated tripling trade over the next three years. Id. at 2,
3.
A Maritime Agreement was signed on October 14, 1972 permitting access by each of the
parties to 40 specified ports in the others's territory. This agreement and others negotiated
during the "thaw" of the 1970's have been renegotiated, or in some cases suspended as trade
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trade bill itself has denied the Soviets the coveted Most Favored Nation
status and U.S. government trade credits. In response to Soviet misbe-
havior, the Carter administration in, 1978, imposed export controls on oil
and gas equipment destined for the Soviet Union and instituted a variety
of boycotts, embargoes and sanctions.' 7 In 1980, following the Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan, the United States boycotted the Moscow Olympic
Games, placed an embargo on grain shipments to the Soviets and took
other measures which reduced trade by some 50 percent." '1 Additional
restrictions were imposed by the Reagan administration in 1982, following
Soviet intervention in Poland at the time of the Solidarity crises there.' "
Among other sanctions, the U.S. sought to dissuade its European allies
from participating in Soviet efforts to construct a gas pipeline from Sibe-
ria to Western Europe.' 20
Sensing that it was time to cool down the Cold War rhetoric which
had been building up during his first term, President Reagan in January,
1984, declared his intention to seek an expansion of trade with the Sovi-
ets. In May, 1985 the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission met in
Moscow after a hiatus of seven years. And in December, 1985, more than
400 U.S. businessmen travelled to Moscow as part of the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Trade and Economic Council, for meetings with Soviet trade officials,
highlighted by a welcoming banquet hosted by Gorbachev at the
Kremlin.1
2
'
As part of their trade offensive, the Soviets are making concerted ef-
forts to influence the American Administration and Congress to remove
outstanding trade barriers. They recognize that improvement of trade is
closely linked to improvement of political relations between the two coun-
tries. Assuming satisfactory progress in this area, they cite specific barri-
ers which must be removed:1 2
1. DENIAL OF MOST FAVORED NATION (MFN) STATUS. As a result of
the absence of MFN status, the cost to U.S. consumers of may Soviet
goods is 3 or 4 times higher than comparable goods from other coun-
tries, This makes it extremely difficult for the Soviets to find satisfac-
sanctions were imposed following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and other events. See
Brougher, Joint Economic Committee, supra note 31, at 419-453.
117. The Journal of Commerce, supra note 79, at 11.
118. J. CARTER, KEEPING FAITH-MEMOIRS OF A PRESIDENT 471-489 (1982). See also
Brougher, 1979-82: The United States Uses Trade to Penalize Soviet Aggression and Seeks
to Reorder Western Policy, Joint Economic Committee, supra note 31, at 419-453 (for an
excellent summary of sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union).
119. U.S. Department of the Treasury, US Government Policy on Economic Relations
with the Soviet Union, Joint Economic Committee, supra note 31, at 398.
120. Holliday, Foreign Economic Relations-Overview, Joint Economic Committee,
supra note 31, at 392.
121. The Journal of Commerce, supra note 79, at 29. The Trade and Economic Council
was scheduled to convene for its annual 1987 meeting in Moscow in December, but was
postponed until after the Washington, D. C. summit between Reagan and Gorbachev.
122. Id. at 29, 32.
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tory products to ship to the U.S. in order to earn dollars it needs to
purchase U.S. goods. The Soviets claim that the U.S. is its only trad-
ing partner not granting MFN status.
2. FAILURE TO GRANT GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED CREDITS, SUCH AS
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK GUARANTEES. 2 $ The Soviets say that such cred-
its are granted by the Western Europeans and Japanese, and, as a
consequence they are much more competitive as sellers than the U.S.
3. IMPOSITION OF RIGID EXPORT CONTROLS.' 24 Such controls are im-
posed, among other reasons, to deny the Soviets access to U.S. prod-
ucts deemed to assist them in their military efforts. The Soviets con-
tend that such controls are too broad, and that many of the products
denied to them by the U.S. are easily obtainable from Western Eu-
rope or Japan.
123. Under the 1972 credit agreement (later aborted by Soviet refusal to accept emigra-
tion provisions of the Jackson-Vanick amendment) the U.S. agreed to extend Export-Import
Bank credits and guarantees to the Soviets. Relations with the Bank were to be handled on
the Soviet side by the Soviet Bank of Foreign Trade (Vneshtorgbank of the USSR). For a
good general discussion of Vneshtorgbank and the Soviet banking structure, see Journal of
the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council (New York and Moscow), Vol. 11, No. 5/6
(1986), at 17, 28. See also article by Victor Gerashchenko, First Deputy Chairman of the
Board, USSR Bank for Foreign Trade, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1987. The Soviet gov-
ernment agreed to guarantee repayment of all Exim Bank credits extended to any of its
trading organizations. The U.S.S.R. also agreed to finance its exports to the U.S.. See Starr,
supra note 110, at 5.
124. In addition to controls imposed under the Export Administration Act discussed
above, the U.S. has controlled the sale of goods to the Soviet Union under a number of other
laws. For example, licenses are required for the export of certain military sensitive products
by U.S. government agencies including the State Department (arms), the Atomic Energy
Commission, Maritime Administration and others. See Starr, supra note 110, at 19. See also
Giffen, supra note 104, at 10. See generally J. BARTON & B. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INVESTMENT-SELECTED DocuMENTs (1986), for an overview of applicable trade acts.
Also controls are imposed through COCOM (The International Coordinating Commit-
tee on Strategic Trade with Communist Countries). COCOM is an organization created by
the United States and 14 other NATO countries (except Iceland), and including Japan.
COCOM provides for voluntary export restraint by its members to help preserve mutual
security. Though control mechanisms are in place, COCOM members have been ambiguous
in their support of the program. While they recognize the need to restrict transfer of tech-
nology to the Soviets which would be of military value, western industry is anxious to do
business with Russia. See Tmz, Nov. 30, 1987, at 42. As a consequence COCOM has been
under funded, and under staffed, and this in turn has contributed to such inadequate over-
sight as the recent sale by Norwegian (Kongsberg) and Japanese (Toshiba) companies of
ship propeller manufacturing equipment to the Soviets which permitted radical reduction in
the detectability of Soviet submarines. (See Perle, Keeping Western Technology Western,
Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1987). COCOM publishes a list of embargoed items and
"watches" other commodities which it feels may become worthy of embargo in the future.
Starr, supra note 110, at 17. For a good discussion of the operation of COCOM and of
related controls, see Bayard, Pelzman & Perez-Lopez, An Economic Model of United States
and Western Controls on Exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Joint Eco-
nomic Committee, supra note 31, at 511-519.
Attempting to show some flexibility in technology sales to the Soviets, the Reagan ad-
ministration recently removed its objections to sale of basic "no frills" personal computers.
San Francisco Chron., August 19, 1987.
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4. A U.S. POLICY OF BOYCOTTS, EMBARGOES, SANCTIONS AND BROKEN
CONTRACTS, ALL OF WHICH MAKES THE U.S. AN UNRELIABLE TRADING
PARTNER. The U.S., unlike many of its allies, has used trade policy
with the Soviets to register its displeasure with Soviet political behav-
ior, such as invasion of Afghanistan, intervention in Poland, and
human rights violations.)
5. IMPOSITION OF OTHER TYPES OF RESTRICTIONS. Since 1951, the
U.S. has embargoed 7 types of fur skins produced in the Soviet Union
and has banned the importation of nickel, contending that it was pro-
duced through the of slave labor. Also the U.S. has imposed anti-
dumping and countervailing duties 2 " on products from the Soviet
Union, including titanium, potassium chloride,and urea, based on the
U.S. belief that these products are disruptive to the U.S. market and
are sold in the U.S. at prices below cost in the Soviet Union."2 6
VI. LESSONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE WEST
Economic restructuring in the Soviet Union presents the West, par-
ticularly the United States (as Russia's principal rival), with an opportu-
nity to radically change its relationship with the U.S.S.R. and to reap
substantial benefits which have eluded it for the 70 years the Communists
have been in power.
The most obvious immediate benefits on the horizon are substantial
cuts in armaments and a reduction in present heavy costs for defense.
Additional benefits are opportunities for increased mutual trade and a
general normalization of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship, including in-
creased cultural, scientific and social exchanges. In many ways, all of
these benefits are interdependent. However all of them arise from the
new Soviet consciousness that its economic system is not working and
that if it wishes to keep pace economically and culturally with the rest of
the world it, must make significant changes.
The West, with proper caution, should applaud and encourage the
changes, not simply to show the Soviets good will, but rather to help to
reduce ever-spiraling arms budgets, to increase foreign trade, to reduce
the U.S. trade deficit, and to benefit from increased interchange with So-
viet artists, scholars and scientists.12 7
A. Reducing U.S. Defense Costs
On December 9, 1987, President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev signed an agreement eliminating intermediate range nuclear
125. Under the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671 et seq., the U.S. may levy
countervailing duties pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202 et seq.(the
Smoot-Hawley Act), as amended.
126. See Lazarus, Perspectives on the U.S. Role in East-West Trade, THE AMERICAN
REVIEW OF EAST-WEST TRADE, May-June, 1973, at 31.
127. See Editorial by Zukerman, Should the West Help Gorbachev?, US NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT, October 19, 1987.
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missiles. Although the agreement does not significantly reduce nuclear
arms stockpiles held by each nation,"" it is an important first step in
contributing to mutual trust.""' Hopefully it is also a prelude to a second
step in disarmament-a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear missiles
preliminarily, agreed to at Reykjavik. " "
Impetus for restructuring in the U.S.S.R. has come in large part be-
cause the Soviets find they cannot finance both "guns and butter.""
Large standing armies are depriving the civilian economy of necessary
manpower. Gorbachev and his advisors fear SDI not only because of the
nuclear risk, but also because of the cost.8 ' They find themselves being
drawn into an economic race they have no hope of winning.
Following Khruschev's humiliation in 1963, when he was forced by
President Kennedy to withdraw his missiles from Cuba, the Soviets em-
barked on a military buildup without parallel in modern history. " " Its
purpose was to prevent future embarrassment and to project Soviet
power world-wide. But because military industries were starving civilian
production and industrial renewal, the Soviets realized by the late 1970's
that their economy was not only failing to meet civilian demands, but also
threatened to curtail future military requirements.'" Thus, economic re-
structuring became a matter of national necessity, rather than a manifes-
tation of Soviet good will. To restructure the Soviet economy and to pro-
vide necessary reindustrialization, Gorbachev needs a period of repose."8 "
He cannot achieve his goals of meeting promises to Soviet citizens if his
128. The INF treaty will affect only about 4 to 6 percent of the nuclear arsenals held by
the superpowers in Europe. San Francisco Chron., November 26, 1987, at A29.
129. The Wall Street Journal, November 25, 1987, at 2. Under the proposed INF treaty,
the U.S. would eliminate missiles containing 350 warheads and the Soviets would destroy
missiles containing 1500 warheads.
130. M. GORBACHEV, THE RESULTS AND LESSONS OF REYKJAVIK 24 (1986).
131. US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, October 19, 1987, at 32.
132. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, SOVIET MILITARY PowER-1987 10 (1987).
133. See R. STARR, Soviet Union, THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1980's 744-749 (1980).
Over the decade prior to 1980, the U.S.S.R. spent about $150 billion for strategic offensive
weapons, about 3 times the amount spent by the U.S. By 1979 the Soviets outnumbered the
U.S. in nearly every class of military hardware and forces. Among twenty indices of military
power, the U.S. had an advantage in only four. For example the Soviets had 270 attack
submarines to our 77, 761 medium bombers to our 66, 4,690 fighter aircraft to our 3,400, 169
ground divisions to our 16, 53,000 tanks to our 10,500, 40,700 artillery to our 17,500, 1398
ICBM's to our 1054, and 90 ballistic missile submarines to our 41. The U.S. led the Soviets
in carriers, 12 to 3, heavy bombers 573 to 156, total warheads 8,526 to 6,132, and naval
aircraft 1,464 to 1,310. Starr, p. 745. This imbalance has been redressed in part by signifi-
cant increases in U.S. military expenditures during the Reagan administration. For example,
by 1989 the U.S. navy fleet will have grown from 479 to 600 battle force ships. SovIET MILI-
TARY PowER-1987, supra note 132, at 149. Notwithstanding, it has been estimated that
military expenditures in the U.S.S.R. have averaged 15 to 17 percent of the Soviet GNP,
about three times the comparable U.S. figure. See Sybert, The Reality of Strategic Defense,
Los ANGELES LAWYER, July-August, 1987, at 22.
134. SOVIET MILITARY POWER-1987, supra note 132, at 10.
135. See Broening, U.S. Debates how to Handle Soviets as Moscow Grapples with Re-
form, San Francisco Chron., Aug. 30, 1987, at A-5.
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limited resources and productive capacity must be redirected to a contin-
uation of the arms race, particularly an open-ended pursuit of "star
wars." 136 The economic turmoil in Russia is of direct benefit to the West
in encouraging the Soviets to enter into meaningful disarmament
agreements.
The cost of arms has not been easy for the U.S. Since 1980, President
Reagan, largely through his efforts to build up U.S. military might, has
added more than $1 trillion to the U.S. national debt,1 3 7 consequences
include consequent repercussions in foreign trade deficits, the plummet-
ing dollar on foreign exchanges and the recent crash of the stock market
in October.3 8
While President Reagan has denied that SDI is a bargaining chip,
1 3 9
the Pentagon has conceded that it will provide the basis for deep reduc-
tions in offensive weapons." 0 Due to the highly questionable merits of the
star wars program"', there is reason to believe that the Reagan adminis-
136. The Soviets see the SDI proposal as a snare to force them into an unending, eco-
nomically debilitating arms race and a means to enable the U.S. to gain a first strike capa-
bility over the Soviet Union. See McReynolds, Star Wars: Logic of the Past, reprinted from
The Bulletin of the War Resisters' League (USA), in SovmT PEACE COMMITrEE, XX CEN-
TURY AND PEACE (1986). See, in addition, M. GORBACHEV, THE RESULTS AND LESSONS OF REY-
KJAVIK (1986). Discounting Reagan's arguments that SDI would be deployed only for defen-
sive purposes, they point out that once the U.S. had emplaced space satellites capable of
locating and destroying Soviet missiles after launch, the U.S. could easily use these same
lasers or missile destroying guns to destroy Soviet missiles on the ground and thus force the
Soviets to capitulate to U.S. demands. See Manheim, Star Wars: A Dangerous Strategic
Gamble, Los ANGELES LAWYER, July/August, 1987, at 25, and McReynolds, supra.
137. For a good discussion of the military buildup during the Reagan administration
and the cost of the SDI program see N. COUSINs, THE PATHOLOGY OF POWER 179, 167-190
(1987).
138. TIME, Nov. 30, 1987, at 44.
139. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 25, 1987, at 2.
140. SOVIET MILITARY PowER-1987, supra note 132, at 148.
141. Star wars detractors not only see merit in Soviet suspicions, but point out that the
scientists charged with developing SDI technology state publicly that technology does not
presently exist to provide any credible umbrella against Soviet missile attacks, and even if
sufficient progress is made to create such technology, substantial numbers of missiles would
still get through the defenses, and new counter-defensive measures would in the meantime
be developed. Manheim, supra note 136, at 23, states: "The overwhelming consensus of the
nation's technical community is that in fact there is no prospect whatever that science and
technology can, at any time in the next several decades, make nuclear weapons "impotent
and obsolete." quoting from McGeorge Bundy, Kennan, McNamara, and Smith, The Presi-
dent's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control, 63 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 264, 265 (1984).
Even after the expenditure of sums estimated to be up to $1 trillion (about 1/3 our pre-
sent GNP), we would still have no effective defense against nuclear missiles launched from
submarines or bombers. See Manheim, supra note 136, at 23. "SDI will be designed to inter-
cept only ballistic missiles taking a trajectory that puts them above the earth's atmosphere.
It could not handle cruise missiles, short or intermediate-range missiles (e.g., submarine or
air launched), bombs dropped from aircraft, or those delivered by any other means (e.g.,
smuggled by terrorists)." A Congressional study of SDI released in August, 1987 concluded
that depending on what countermeasures are taken by the Soviets, SDI could cost up to $1
trillion. Quoting from the Pentagon's Science Board the report stated: ". . . as a conse-
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tration has pushed SDI precisely because of its belief that the Soviets
cannot afford the race, and are being compelled to negotiate seriously on
arms.
B. Increasing Trade
As part of their trade offensive toward the U.S., the Soviets hold out
the prosect of greatly expanded trade and mutual benefits. Although the
Soviet Union is one of the largest potential markets in the world, the U.S.
must recognize that aside from certain commodities, the Soviets manufac-
ture or produce very few products of the type or quality which would be
of interest to the U.S. Furthermore, they presently have little available
foreign exchange with which to purchase U.S. products.
The U.S. should, however, look to the long term and attempt to culti-
vate a political and economic climate which will permit it to increase its
sales of products and services to the Soviets and also to augment its
purchases from them. The greater its trade with the U.S.S.R., the
stronger the mutual reasons are for remaining peaceful so that trade and
intercourse will remain uninterrupted. The U.S. must recognize, however,
that while the Soviets have historically sought trade with it, they likewise
have used trade, and their desire for advanced technology, to increase es-
pionage activities." '
quence of the current gaps in system design and key technologies, there is presently no way
of confidently assessing system performance system cost; or schedule." San Francisco
Chron., Aug. 2, 1987. See also San Francisco Chron., Aug. 8, 1987.
142. In order to obtain intelligence from countries which desired trade, but which
would not concede Soviet respectability by granting diplomatic status, the Soviets immedi-
ately following the revolution, began establishing trade missions and small trading compa-
nies to serve as covers for espionage. Such trading outposts were established in the early
1920's in Great Britain, Germany, the United States, and other countries. The U.S. com-
pany, Amtorg, was formed in 1924, through a merger of several smaller firms. It was head-
quartered in New York and charged with the task of coordinating Soviet trading activities
in the United States. As a collateral task, it could operate as a fully integrated Soviet for-
eign intelligence station with its own funding, and serve as a base for hundreds of visiting
"engineers," "inspectors," "accountants," and "trade experts." A Soviet trading company in
Britain called Arcos (All-Russian Cooperative Society) was believed by the British to be the
center for espionage in England. Within three years of its establishment in London, Arcos
was raided by the police and its officers and the Soviet embassy and diplomatic personnel
were expelled from Britain. W. CoRsoN & R. CRAwLEY, supra note 16, at 282, 283.
Corson, reports that beginning in 1941, under the cover of the US-Soviet lend lease
program, the head of the NKVD (Soviet secret police) dispatched approximately one thou-
sand NKVD and GRU (Armed Forces intelligence agency officers) to the United States to
serve as "purchasing specialists" along with various "experts" from Amtorg in New York.
While their mission was to buy anything thought necessary for Russia to win the war, as a
collateral duty, they were to bribe and attempt the subornation of any interesting, influen-
tial, or powerful American with whom they came into contract, and to obtain designs, draw-
ings, and patents of military and industrial secrets. Id. at 209.
Beginning in 1967 when Yuri Andropov became head of the KGB (later General Secre-
tary) the Soviets began a massive world-wide espionage effort to acquire Western and par-
ticularly U.S. military and industrial secrets. The North Vietnamese were used as surrogates
to capture and transport to Moscow for evaluation, U.S. military equipment. Through such
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As the United States evaluates how to respond to new Soviet trade
overtures, it must bear in mind that the KGB and its agents are an ever
present part of the Soviet government and foreign policy. While the U.S.,
through the CIA, does its best to keep tabs on the Soviets and their latest
technological achievements,1 43 it must be aware that industrial espionage
within the United States and every other Western country is a fact of life;
therefore, in its dealings with its trading partners, the U.S. must continue
to take all reasonable steps to guard against industrial espionage.
C. Increasing Cultural, Scientific and Social Exchanges
Coincident with the Gorbachev revolution in the economy has been a
substantial increase in scientific and cultural exchanges with the West.
Gorbachev has recognized that the Soviet economy cannot be restruc-
tured without changing fundamental beliefs and practices among Soviet
citizens.""' Unless the Soviets are open to new ideas and methods, creativ-
ity and motivation will remain low. Western ideas in all aspects of society
are increasingly dominating the changing Soviet culture. The Soviets are
hosting diverse cultural and scientific delegations in greater numbers14
and are straining domestic hotels and travel facilities in the process.1"4
means including intelligence obtained from American traitors, Andropov was successful in
providing the Soviet armed forces with a guide to upgrading its conventional forces without
the high costs of research and development. Id. at 340-344.
During Andropov's tenure as KGB chief, the Soviets greatly widened their acquisition
of Western technology. Part of the program involved subscribing to and acquiring every
available Western technical journal, including doctoral dissertations. This information
would be analyzed by Directorate T of KGB headquarters in Moscow, from which would be
developed a shopping list of high-tech hardware for acquisition. Everything on the list
which could be acquired legitimately would be purchased through normal channels. Items
which could not be so purchased would be acquired by illegal means, including 1) setting up
dummy corporations and purchasers to get around export restrictions, and 2) outright in-
dustrial theft. See BARRON, supra note 10, at 161-206 for a description of military and in-
dustrial thefts which have been perpetrated by the Soviets in the United States. Barron
estimates that the KGB and its military subsidiary the GRU have more than 400 officers
permanently stationed in New York, Washington and San Francisco to spy and conduct
active measures. Since 1975 at least 54 persons have been accused of espionage against the
United States. The recent trials of Marine Moscow Embassy guard Clayton Lonetree (ac-
cused of fraternizing with a Soviet woman who turned out to be a spy), and of former Navy
men Jerry Whitworth and the Walker family (who stole cryptographic information), have
captured the headlines. See San Francisco Chron., Aug. 30, 1987.
143. The CIA uses many of the same techniques as the KGB to secure vital industrial
and military information. See S. TURNER, SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY-THE CIA IN TRANSI-
TION at 48-60 (1985). See also P. AGEE INSIDE THE COMPANY-CIA DIARY (1975).
144. See Bialer, Marx had it Wrong. Does Gorbachev?, US WORLD AND NEWS REPORT,
Oct. 19, 1987, at 42.
145. See Information Moscow 1987-88, Western Edition (San Francisco, US Informa-
tion Moscow, 1987) at xxvi.
146. See article by Vladimin Lebedev, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1987. Intourist, the
official Soviet travel agency runs 107 hotels, motels and camping sites in the U.S.S.R. and
can accommodate 55,000 guests. By 1990 Intourist expects that 30 new hotels will be built
and that 13 older hotels will have been refurbished.
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Likewise, delegations of Soviet citizens, ranging from members of the
press, television, radio, government, science and the arts are finding their
way with regularity to Western capitals and outlying areas. 4" The U.S.
should encourage all such intercourse. As the Soviets learn more about
the West, and the West about them, there is a possibility of giving up the
sense of mutual hostility.
VII. CONCLUSION
The changes presently taking place within the Soviet Union are per-
haps the most significant since Stalin initiated the five year plans in 1928,
and arguably could have consequences as sweeping as the 1917 Bolshevik
revolution itself. The utopian Communist society envisioned by Marx and
Lenin has proved to be hopelessly elusive, and the socialist economy in-
stituted as a precursor to the "beautiful tomorrow" is failing to provide
Soviet society with the goods and services it needs to keep pace with the
more dynamic economies of the West.
Stalin proved that terror and oppression could compel fundamental
changes in Russian society and the economy, but the Soviets have learned
to their dismay that the innovation and creativity required by a modern
economy cannot be forced through dictates from the top; they have to be
generated through individual enterprise from the bottom.
While the comprehensive reforms now underway in Russia will most
likely prove successful over time, the benefits have not yet reached the
average citizen in terms of higher standards of living. The reforms, how-
ever, are being widely discussed and appear to have the approval of the
rank and file. Members of the bureaucracy and the Party which have not
been performing satisfactorily, stand to lose their jobs, power and perqui-
sites, and as a consequence are not enthusiastically embracing the
Gorbachev revolution. To counter this foot-dragging and to inject a sense
of meaning and life into the system, Gorbachev has enlisted elements of
democracy, including a critical press and local elections in the workplace
and in political units to pressure recalcitrants to get in line and remain
accountable.
Under the new laws proposed by the Party and approved by the Su-
preme Soviet, the Soviet economy is moving substantially closer in tone
and form to the Western capitalist economies. Central planners will set
goals for industry and explore ways to help them to achieve those goals.
Decisions as to buying, selling and pricing of commodities are to be made,
for the most part, by the local industrial unit, which now will have the
responsibility of remaining profitable without government subsidies. Gov-
ernment entities will place orders for their requirements with local manu-
facturers and, to the extent feasible, bids will be awarded competitively.
147. For example a contingent of high level Soviet scientists and others met with Amer-
ican counterparts recently at Chautauqua in up-state New York to discuss among other
things, the dangers of nuclear war. TIME, Oct. 5, 1987, at 69.
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Soviet theorists say the U.S.S.R. remains a socialist economy because the
principal means of production will continue to be owned by the State.
Under the new rules, however, workers can be paid whatever their serv-
ices are worth, without limitation.
Although there remain substantial differences between the new So-
viet and Western economies, the differences have narrowed considerably.
While small entrepreneurial businesses constitute a large part of a West-
ern, particularly the U.S., economy, these economies have become mixed
with substantial socialist elements. 4" Another element of convergence in
the two economic systems arises in the manner in which ownership inter-
ests are controlled. Under the new Soviet system, while the government
will continue to own principal industries, managers and workers will have
substantial freedom in establishing business plans, wages, salaries and
other benefits, including the distribution of profits. Such an evolution in
corporate structure and management is not essentially different from that
which presently exists in many large U.S. enterprises. 4"
Soviet economic reform will provide increased opportunities for
Western trade. The United States should carefully review its policies to-
ward the Soviet Union, especially in view of their efforts to make progress
toward the solution of some of the central problems separating the two
148. Consider, for example social security, medicare, unemployment insurance, social
welfare, and government subsidies to farmers, maritime interests and through military or-
ders to defense industries. At least one third of the U.S. gross national product (GNP) can
be said to be subject to planning from central governmental authorities, since at least that
much of the GNP is taxed by federal, state and local governments and redistributed to
citizens in the form of government services, military orders, health care and so on. Further,
through our tax system our government has vast influence over other parts of the economy.
Certain types of construction are encouraged through tax exempt treatment of municipal
bonds; subsidies in the form of tax write-offs such as depreciation and various exemptions
encourage other types of economic activity. While our society can be said to be planned
through governmental intervention, such intervention up to now, is essentially different
from that of the socialist dictatorships. Our planning has tended to provide incentives to
induce private conduct to satisfy governmental goals, rather than dictating quotas, wages
and the like. Galbraith argues that capitalism as an economic system, has essentially failed
to provide adequate housing, health care and transportation facilities needed particularly by
an urban society and that Western Europe and Japan have largely accepted that reality.
GALBRAITH, supra note 9, at 319.
149. To the average worker or manager of a large American corporation such as IBM,
General Motors or General Electric, it makes little difference who owns the shares of his
corporation, so long as he gets what he considers fair compensation. A worker or manager
may or may not have any ownership interest in the firm he works for. His union will help
him bargain for what he hopes is a fair wage. Ownership of large corporations for the most
part is diversified throughout the economy and held by pension funds, other corporations
and individuals around the country. So long as the shareholders receive what they feel is a
fair and predictable dividend, they are usually happy. This is not substantially different
from Soviet ownership by the government (the proletariat or workers as a whole). Under the
new Soviet system, although the government will remain the sole shareholder, it will impose
a tax for its share of the industrial output (its dividend) and the balance can be distributed
as management thinks best among workers in accordance with their productivity, without
artificial limitations as to amount of compensation.
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societies, such as arms control, internal freedom for their citizens and eas-
ier emigration.
Although Russia has endured a difficult and complex history, its tra-
ditions have been primarily Western. But for the skill and determination
of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in turning the revolution to their favor in
1917, Russia might well have succeeded in becoming a stable democratic
government following the turmoil of the First World War and the revolu-
tion. Those same democratic impulses are again being felt, and they may
become irresistible. The United States cannot forget that through the use
of the KGB and its predecessors, and consequent terror and rigid control
over its citizenry, the Soviets have remained in power for 70 years. They
are not likely to give up control easily, and there appears to be no sub-
stantial movement within the U.S.S.R. to overthrow the central authority.
Thus change in the Soviet Union will be gradual and at a pace approved
by Communist Party leaders. 5" Only time will tell whether the forces of
change now in play will irresistibly transform the communist society into
something substantially different, and similar in essential respects to
evolving Western societies and economies.
Both the Soviets and the West have common interests-survival..'
and, to the extent possible, prosperity. Through social intercourse, trade
and mutual reductions in armed might, The West should encourage the
Soviets to continue their quest for greater democracy and freedom, but
remain vigilant not to drop its own guard or reduce its strength to unac-
ceptable levels while the transformation is taking place.
150. At an historic meeting of the Community Party beginning on June 28, 1988,
Gorbachev proposed and got approval for a radical new government structure. The party
will continue to guide the country, but substantial power will be shifted to a new super
legislature called the Congress of People's Deputies, composed of 1500 nationally elected
delegates and 750 representatives of various trade unions and party committees. This Con-
gress would in turn select a standing legislature of 400 to 450 members, and a president to
oversee it. The president would have broad powers over domestic and foreign policy. See
N.Y. Times, June 30, 1988, at A6.
151. See Nixon, Superpower Summitry, 64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1 (1985). In his new publi-
cation, Perestroika, supra note 8, Gorbachev has stated "Everyone seems to agree that there
would be neither winners nor losers in [a nuclear] war. There would be no survivors... We
are all passengers aboard one ship, the Earth, and we must not allow it to be wrecked. There
will be no second Noah's Ark." Id. at 11, 12.
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Walvis Bay: South Africa's Claims to
Sovereignty
EARLE A. PARTINGTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
After more than a century of colonial domination, the Mandated
Territory of South West Africa/Namibia' is close to receiving-its indepen-
dence. South Africa continues to administer the Territory as it has since
its military forces conquered and occupied it in 1915 during World War I.
In the negotiations between South Africa and the United Nations over
Namibian independence, differences have arisen between the parties over
whether the Territory includes either (1) the port and settlement of
Walvis Bay, an enclave of 1124 square kilometers in the center of
Namibia's Atlantic coast, or (2) the Penguin Islands, twelve small guano
islands strung along 400 kilometers of the Namibian coast between
Walvis Bay and the Orange River, the Orange River being part of the
boundary between South Africa and Namibia. South Africa claims both
Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands as parts of its Province of the Cape
of Good Hope, and thus under South African sovereignty. The United
Nations, speaking for the people of Namibia, claims that Walvis Bay and
the Penguin Islands are part of the Mandated Territory and thus must be
part of an independent Namibia. A number of articles have been written
about the legal status of these disputed areas2, and this article will take a
* A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1963; J.D., University of California, Hastings
College of the Law, 1969; LL.B., University of Rhodesia, 1978; M.C.L., Tulane University,
1987; member of the Oregon, California, District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Zimbabwe Bars.
This article was written as partial fulfillment of the requirements toward the M.C.L. degree
at Tulane University.
1. Formerly known as German South West Africa, then the Mandated Territory of
South West Africa, and since 1968 it has been called Namibia by virtue of a United Nations
General Assembly Resolution which changed the name. G.A. Res. 2372, 22 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16A) at 1, U.N.Doc. A/6176/Add. 1 (1968), 1968 U.N. Y.B. 787; South Africa still
calls the Territory by the name of South West Africa. This article will use the name
Namibia when speaking currently of the Territory and South West Africa when speaking
historically. Maps of Namibia and the Penguin Islands follow this article immediately pre-
ceding the Appendices.
2. Note, The Legal Status of Walvis Bay, 2 SoUTH AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 187 (1976)(hereinafter SAYIL); D.S. PRINSLO6, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ASSOCIATION,
Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands: Background and Status (1977); Huaraka, Walvis Bay
and International Law, 18 IND.J.INT'L L. 160 (1978); Botha, Walvis Bay: miscellany, 12
COMP. & INT'L L. J. S. AFR. 255 (1979) (hereinafter CILSA); Note, Namibia, South Africa,
and the Walvis Bay Dispute, 89 YALE L.J. 903 (1980)(hereinafter Note, Namibia); E. Lan-
dis, If it Quacks Like a Duck ... Walvis Bay, Namibia and Estoppel (June 19, 1981)(unpub-
lished paper provided by the United Nations Council for Namibia); K. Asmal, Walvis Bay:
Self-Determination and International Law, 37 U.N. GAOR Council for Namibia 29, U.N.
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critical look at the positions taken and legal issues presented in these
disputes.
It is important to first examine why these disputed areas are impor-
tant enough to warrant the controversy that has been generated. The ex-
planation is both economic and political. Walvis Bay is the only deep
water port on the southwest coast of Africa between Cape Town in South
Africa over 1000 kilometers to the south and Lobito in Angola over 1000
kilometers to the north. Walvis Bay's sheltered anchorage is the principal
trade route for Namibia's seaborne exports and imports. Its modern port
facilities are connected by paved road and railroad with the principal
towns, mines, and farming areas of Namibia as well as with South Africa.
It is the base of a sizeable fishing fleet and associated fish processing in-
dustry and is used as a base by Eastern European fishing fleets.' There is
no other location, including the southern shallow water port of Luderitz,
Namibia's only other port, which can serve the vital role for Namibia's
economy that is served by Walvis Bay. In other words, the nation that
controls Walvis Bay, in effect, controls Namibia.4
Walvis Bay has a significance far beyond that of Namibia's port.
There is a proposal to connect the railway system of Namibia via Bot-
swana with the railway system serving Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zaire
which is presently served by the ports of Angola (via the Benguela Rail-
way), Tanzania (via the Tazara or TanZam Railway), Mozambique, and
South Africa.5 The Benguela Railway is presently unreliable because of
the Angolan civil war, and the Tanzanian and Mozambique ports cannot
handle the existing traffic.6 This leaves South Africa with enormous eco-
nomic power over the black states of southern Africa which are depen-
dent upon the South African railway system and ports for international
trade.' The construction of this direct rail link to Walvis Bay in an inde-
pendent Namibia would be an important step in lessening this depen-
dence by providing a modern port on the Atlantic Ocean closer to North
and South American and north European ports than the South African,
Tanzanian, and Mozambiquan ports.
As for the Penguin Islands, South African sovereignty over them af-
ter Namibian independence would include extensive fishing zones in
Namibian waters and the potential for economic development in island
Doc. A/AC.131/SLI/L.2 (1982); R. MOORSOM, INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE AND AID FUND FOR
SOUTHERN AFRICA, Walvis Bay, Namibia's Port, (1984).
3. MooRsom, supra note 2, at 10-11, 27-30; J. J. J. WILKEN & G. J. Fox, THE HISTORY
OF THE PORT AND SETTLEMENT OF WALVIS BAY 28-37, 55-65 (1978); DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC 'OF SOUTH AFRICA, SOUTH WEST AFRICA SURVEY 1967, 82. The au-
thor visited a Polish fishing vessel at Walvis Bay in 1978.
4. This situation is well documented in MOORSOM, supra note 2, at 58-70.
5. Id. at 69.
6. AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 1986 209, 232, 679-80, 954 (15th ed. 1985).
7. MOORSOM, supra note 2, at 68-70. All of these rail lines are of the same gage and are
connected to the South African rail system. Malawi, Swaziland, and Lesotho are also con-
nected to this common gage rail system.
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coastal waters by dredging for diamonds.' Further, two of the islands -
Penguin and Seal - sit at the entrance of Luderitz Bay thereby having a
commanding position over Namibia's only other port.
II. LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF WALVIS BAY
Walvis Bay9 has a rich history0 beyond the scope of this article. It is
only the legal history that will be examined here. That history began on
March 12, 1878, when the officer commanding the H.M.S. Industry of the
Royal Navy landed at Walvis Bay, hoisted the British flag, and pro-
claimed the annexation to the British Empire of the "Port or Settlement
of Walfisch Bay", the boundary of the annexed territory being described
in the Proclamation 1 .
This annexation was confirmed on December 14, 1878, by Letters
Patent from Queen Victoria."2 These Letters Patent authorized the Gov-
ernor and Parliament of the British Colony of the Cape of Good Hope to
annex Walvis Bay, and that with such annexation Walvis Bay would form
part of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. At this time Walvis Bay
was inhabited by some European merchants as well as some Hottentots
8. G.- M. COCKRAN, SOUTH WEST AFRICAN MANDATE 2 (1976); Letter from the British
Consul in Lifderitz to the Prime Minister of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope (Feb. 20,
1910). Cape of Good Hope (Cape Colony) Original Correspondence, 1807-1910, Document
8939, CO 48/606, (microfilm pages 162-166) Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey,
England. MooRsoM, supra note 2, at inside back cover, shows the 200 mile fishing zones in
the Atlantic Ocean claimed by South Africa westward from the Penguin Islands; see also J.
PRESCOTT, THE MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 332 (1985). Such exclusive
economic zones may be challenged by virtue of the principle set out in the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122 art. 121(3) (1982),
which provides that:
Rocks, which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
9. In its history, Walvis Bay had many spellings - Walfish, Walfisch, Walvisch,
Walvich, Walwitch, Walwich, Woolich, Woolwich, Walewich, Walfischbaai, and Whale Bay.
WILKEN & Fox, supra note 3, at 22-22; PRINSLOO, supra note 2.
10. See WILKEN & Fox, supra note 3.
11. That boundary was described as follows:
... on the south by a line from
a point on the coast 15 miles south
of Pelican Point to Scheppmansdorf;
on the east by a line from
Scheppmansdorf to the Rooibank,
including the Plateau, and thence
to 10 miles inland from the
mouth of the Swakop River; on the
north by the last 10 miles of the
course of the said Swakop River.
69 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1177 (hereinafter cited as 82 B.F.S.P. 35). See Ap-
pendix "A". Because the "Plateau" was in fact a riverbed, the Germans disagreed with the
British interpretation of this description, 82 B.F.S.P. 35, 40; 173 CONSOLIDATED TREATY SE-
RIES 271, 277 (1978)(hereinafter 173 C.T.S. 271).
12. 70 B.F.S.P. 495. See Appendix "A".
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and Damaras, indigenous tribes.'" Following the annexation, a British res-
ident magistrate was appointed.14 In 1884, the Parliament of the Colony
of the Cape of Good Hope enacted legislation authorizing the Governor of
the Colony to proclaim that Walvis Bay, as described in the 1878 Letters
Patent, is annexed to and forms part of the Colony. 5 On August 7, 1884,
the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope duly signed a Proclamation de-
claring that Walvis Bay and the surrounding territory, as described in the
1878 Proclamation, the 1878 Letters Patent, and the 1884 Cape Statute,
had become and was part of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.'"
Walvis Bay had become part of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.
Germany, in the meantime, moved to build a colonial empire of its
own in Africa, and South West Africa became Germany's first colony. In
August and September 1884, ahead of efforts by the Colony of the Cape
of Good Hope to annex the territory between the Orange River and
Walvis Bay, Germany claimed the coast of South West Africa from the
Orange River north nearly to the frontier of Portuguese Angola (except-
ing Walvis Bay).17 Germany also proceeded to acquire colonies in East
and West Africa adjacent to other British colonies. As a result, in 1890,
Germany and Great Britain entered into an Agreement whereby the re-
spective spheres of influence in Africa were recognized including British
sovereignty over Walvis Bay, and the boundaries between their colonies
were fixed. The Germans, however, had been unwilling to accept the
southern boundary of Walvis Bay which had been precisely fixed by a
British survey in 1886; and, thus, the Agreement provided that the delim-
itation of the southern boundary would be reserved for arbitration, unless
it had been settled by consent within two years. s In 1909 the dispute
over the southern boundary of Walvis Bay, not having been settled by
consent, was referred to the King of Spain for arbitration." In 1911, the
arbitrator announced his award confirming the previously fixed British
13. WILKEN & Fox, supra note 3, at 6; H. VEDDER, THE NATIVE TRIBES OF SOUTH WEST
AFRICA 115 (1928). For a history and description of the native tribes and peoples of South
West Africa/Namibia, see also H. VEDDER, SOUTH WEST AFRICA IN EARLY TIMES (1966); I.
GOLDBLATT, HISTORY OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETEENTH CEN-
TURY (1971); Counter-Memorial of South Africa, South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Ar./
Lib. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. Pleadings, vol. 2, 311-380.
14. WILKEN & Fox, supra note 3, at 12.
15. Walfish Bay and St. John's River Territories Annexation Act 35 of 1884; 75
B.F.S.P. 408. The St. John's River Territory was another territory outside of South West
Africa annexed to the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope in the same Act. See Appendix
16. Proclamation 184 of 1884, Colony of the Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette
No. 6519, (Aug. 8, 1884); 75 B.F.S.P. 407. See Appendix "A".
17. 75 B.F.S.P. 546-49. The diplomatic correspondence between Germany and Britain
regarding the establishment of the German Colony of South West Africa can be found at 75
B.F.S.P. 528-53. See also W. 0. AYDELOTTE, BISMARCK AND BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, THE
PROBLEM OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA (1974).
18. 82 B.F.S.P. 35, 40; 173 C.T.S. 271, 277. See Appendix "A".
19. 102 B.F.S.P. 91, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 306 (1909).
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boundary.20
Meanwhile, in 1910 the British forged the Union of South Africa out
of four of its colonies in southern Africa: the Cape of Good Hope, Natal,
the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony (the Orange Free State).2 1 In
creating the Union, a unitary rather than a federal state, the British Par-
liament provided that the four colonies would become provinces of the
Union with "the same limits as ... at the establishment of the Union."22
Thus, the Union of South Africa had become a British Dominion, and
Walvis Bay was part of that Dominion.
In August 1914, Britain's declaration of war against Germany put the
entire British Empire at war, South Africa and the other British Domin-
ions not receiving an independent status in international law until 1919
with their signing of the Treaty of Versailles.2" On Christmas Day 1914,
South African forces landed at Walvis Bay as part of an invasion force
against German South West Africa", and in July 1915, following the
South African invasion, the Germans surrendered."
By Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles which formally ended
World War I, Germany renounced her colonies 6 , Article 22 of the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations (which was part of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles) establishing a system of mandates for them under the League of
Nations which also had been created in the Treaty.2 7 South Africa, with
the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, enacted legislation to carry the
Mandate for German South West Africa into effect pending formal estab-
lishment of the mandate system.2 8 In 1920, the Council of the League of
Nations confirmed the South African Mandate over South West Africa.
That Mandate provided in part:
20. Walfish Bay Boundary (Ger. v. U.K.), 11 U.N.R.I.A.A. 263, 104 B.F.S.P. 50 (1911);
see I. BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES, A LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 1273-88
(1979); Barnard, Die Walvisbaai Grensbeskil (1884-1911), 1 TYDSKRIF VIR AARDYKSKUNDE
(No.10) 46 (1962).
21. South Africa Act of 1909; 9 Edward VII c. 9, 102 B.F.S.P. 5.
22. South Africa Act of 1909, 11 4, 6; 102 B.F.S.P. 7. The Cape of Good Hope Parlia-
ment was succeeded by the Union Parliament, South Africa Act of 1909, 19; 102 B.F.S.P. 8.
The Provinces were granted very restricted powers by way of Provincial Councils. South
Africa Act of 1909,185; 102 B.F.S.P. 22-23. H. R. HAHLO & E. KAHN, THE UNION OF SOUTH
AFRICA, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION 129 (1960).
23. Schaffer, Succession to Treaties: South African Practice in the Light of Current
Developments in International Law, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 593, 612-14 (1981). During the
Anglo-German diplomatic exchange over the establishment of the German Colony of South
West Africa, the German Embassy in London apologized to the British Foreign Office be-
cause German officials had communicated directly with officials of the Colony of the Cape of
Good Hope instead of through the British Government in London. 75 B.F.S.P. 550.
24. WILKEN & Fox, supra note 3, at 195.
25. GOLDBLATT, supra note 13, at 201-04.
26. 112 B.F.S.P. 1, 73.
27. 112 B.F.S.P. 13, 22.
28. Treaty of Peace and South-West Africa Mandate Act 49 of 1919; 113 B.F.S.P. 313;
see Verein Fur Schutzgebietsanleihen e.V. v. Conradie, N.O., 1937 A.D. 113, 142-45.
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Article 1:
The territory over which a Mandate is conferred upon His Britan-
nic Majesty for and on behalf of the Government of the Union of
South Africa (hereinafter called the Mandatory) comprises the terri-
tory which formerly constituted the German Protectorate of South-
West Africa.
Article 2:
The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legis-
lation over the territory subject to the present Mandate as an integral
portion of the Union of South Africa, and may apply the laws of the
Union of South Africa to the territory, subject to such local modifica-
tions as circumstances may require.
The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and
moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the ter-
ritory subject to the present Mandate.
Article 7:
The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required
for any modification of the terms of the present Mandate.29
Now, instead of Walvis Bay being an enclave surrounded by foreign
territory, South Africa found itself with Walvis Bay in the center of the
coast of its newly acquired Mandated Territory. South Africa viewed the
Mandate as only a prelude to eventual annexation of South West Africa.30
In 1922, the South African Parliament enacted legislation which provided
that:
From a date to be fixed by the Governor-General by proclamation in
the Gazette (which date shall also further be notified by the Adminis-
trator of the mandated territory in the Official Gazette thereof) the
port and settlement of Walvis Bay which forms part of the province of
the Cape of Good Hope shall be administered as if it were part of the
mandated territory and as if inhabitants of the said port and settle-
ment were inhabitants of the mandated territory; .... "
Accordingly, the Governor-General of the Union of South Africa pro-
claimed October 1, 1922, as the effective date of the transfer of
29. 113 B.F.S.P. 1109. See Appendix "C".
30. J. DUGARD, THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMABIA DISPUTE, DOCUMENTS AND SCHOLARLY
WRITINGS ON THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 82 (1973).
And, in fact, South Africa sought unsuccessfully in 1946 to obtain United Nations permis-
sion to annex South West Africa. Id. at 96-112.
31. The South-West Africa Affairs Act 24 of 1922, 11(1); 116 B.F.S.P. 399. See Appen-
dix "A". This Act provided in 11(4) that no act of the Union Parliament would apply to
Walvis Bay unless expressly so declared by the act or by proclamation. In 1944, this section
of the South-West Africa Affairs Act of 1922, was amended to provide that acts of the
Union Parliament in force in the Mandated Territory would also be in force in Walvis Bay
unless the act or proclamation otherwise provided. South-West Africa Affairs Amendment
Act 28 of 1944, il.
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administration.
3 2
In 1925, the South African Parliament enacted a constitution for
South West Africa.33 That constitution provided in part that:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law -
(a) The port and settlement of Walvis Bay shall be deemed to
form part of the territory [of South West Africa] for the purposes of
this Act; .... 3
In 1949, South West Africa was granted representation in the Parlia-
ment of the Union of South Africa for the first time 5 , and in granting
such representation the following definition was used: "the territory"
means the territory of South-West Africa, and includes the port and set-
tlement of Walvis Bay." This was the first parliamentary representation
for Walvis Bay in either the Union Parliament87 or the Parliament of the
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope."
The Union of South Africa severed its ties to the British Crown and
the Commonwealth in 1961 when it became the Republic of South Africa,
the boundaries of the respective provinces remaining unchanged. 9 In
1968, South West Africa was given a new constitution by the South Afri-
can Parliament.40 This Constitution had the identical provision as the
32. Proclamation 145 of 1922, Union of South Africa Government Gazette No. 1262
(Sept. 15, 1922). See Appendix "A". On October 2, 1922, the Administrator of the Mandated
Territory issued his own Proclamation pursuant to the South-West Africa Affairs Act of
1922, which extended the law of South West Africa to Walvis Bay. Walvis Bay Administra-
tion Proclamation 30 of 1922, South West Africa Government Gazette No. 94, (Oct. 2, 1922).
See Appendix "A".
33. South-West Africa Constitution Act 42 of 1925, 143; 121 B.F.S.P. 687.
34. Id. at 143(a).
35. South-West Africa Affairs Amendment Act 23 of 1949, 1127-33. This Act provided
that the territory of South West Africa, defined to include Walvis Bay (1), would have six
members in the House of Assembly and four members in the Senate of the Parliament of
the Union of South Africa.
36. Id. at 1.
37. The white adult population of Walvis Bay was taken into consideration for deter-
mining the numbers of members to represent the Province of the Cape of Good Hope in the
House of Assembly of the Parliament of the Union of South Africa because the original
quota of members was based on population figures which included this population. Report
Presented by the Government of the Union of South Africa Concerning the Administration
of South West Africa for the Year 1929, 10 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1655, paras. 750-51
(1929). The statement in Note, Namibia, supra note 2, at 906, that "[tihe residents of
Walvis Bay had never been granted South African voting privileges" is incorrect insofar as
the white adult population is concerned because that group has had representation in the
South African Parliament (through the members from South West Africa) since 1949,
South-West Africa Affairs Amendment Act 23 of 1949, 1127-33.
38. The population of Walvis Bay was too insignificant to warrant representation in the
Cape Parliament. HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, COLONY OF CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 279-80
(1899).
39. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 32 of 1961, 11.
40. South-West Africa Constitution Act 39 of 1968.
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1925 Constitution deeming Walvis Bay to be part of South West Africa.4'
In anticipation of Namibia being granted independence, South Africa
in 1977 transferred the administration of Walvis Bay from that of South
West Africa back to that of the Province of the Cape of Good Hope.4
The white electorate of Walvis Bay were transferred to a Province of the
Cape of Good Hope electoral district until 1982 when Walvis Bay became
a separate parliamentary constituency.4 This is the situation as of today,
the South African government maintaining the position that Walvis Bay
is an integral part of the Republic of South Africa; and that it will remain
so notwithstanding that from 1922 until 1977 Walvis Bay had been inte-
grated into South West Africa to such an extent that it had become by
design the port through which the lifeline of Namibia's trade must flow.""
As we shall see, the South African position has been rejected by the
United Nations which maintains that an independent Namibia must in-
clude Walvis Bay.
III. LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE PENGUIN ISLANDS
The Penguin Islands have a shorter legal history than Walvis Bay. In
the mid-nineteenth century, guano was a valuable commercial commod-
ity. The Government of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, concerned
about the exploitation of guano found on the coastal islands of the Col-
ony, enacted an ordinance in terms of which all guano found in the Col-
ony which was not on private property would be property of the Crown. 5
North of the Orange River (and, thus, outside of the Cape Colony)
lay a number of guano islands along what is now the coast of Namibia. De
Pass, Spence and Company of Cape Town, in the business of exploiting
41. Id. at 36.
42. Walvis Bay Administration Proclamation R.202 of 1977, Republic of South Africa
Government Gazette No. 5731 (Aug. 31, 1977). For a summary of other changes in the law
resulting from this transfer of administration, see 1977 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN
LAW 42, 1978 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 51, 1979 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH
AFRICAN LAW 41, 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 41, 1981 ANNUAL SURVEY OF
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 32, and 1982 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 24.
43. Walvis Bay Administration Proclamation R.202 of 1977, §5, Annexule, Republic of
South Africa Government Gazette No. 5731 (Aug. 31, 1977); Walvis Bay Administration
Proclamation 248 of 1977, Annexule sec. 5, Republic of South Africa Government Gazette
No. 5752 (Sept. 30, 1977); Constitution Amendment Act 99 of 1982, 12; see also 1982 AN-
NUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 24.
44. MOORSOM, supra note 2, at 14-15.
45. Ordinance for Declaring Certain Guano to be the Property of Her Majesty the
Queen 4 of 1845. 15 of this Ordinance was repealed by the South African Parliament in
1934, Cape Statute Law Revision Act 25 of 1934, and the remainder of the Ordinance was
repealed by the Pre-Union Statute Law Revision Act 78 of 1967. For a brief history of guano
exploitation in southern Africa at this time, see J. A. S. PHILLIPs, DEUTSCH-ENGLISCHE
KOMDIE DER IRRUNGEN UM SUDWESTAFRIKA 26-29 (1986). The United States of America, in
the nineteenth century, enacted legislation, subject to the President's discretion, allowing
guano prospectors to claim guano islands for the United States. Guano Islands Act, 48
U.S.C. 11411-19 (1982).
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guano islands, urged the Cape Government to annex these islands to the
Cape Colony.' In 1861, the Governor of the Colony of the Cape of Good
Hope issued a Proclamation which provided:
* . .whereas it is expedient that, subject to the pleasure of Her Maj-
esty in that behalf, Her dominion shall also be declared over a cluster
of small Islands or Rocks adjacent to the said Island of Ichaboe, now
therefore, I do hereby proclaim, declare, and make known, that the
sovereignty and dominion of Her said Britannic Majesty, Queen Vic-
toria, shall be, and the same are hereby declared over the following
Islands or Rocks adjacent to Ichaboe, that is to say, Hollamsbird,
Mercury, Long Island, Seal Island, Penguin Island, Halifax, Posses-
sion, Albatross Rock, Pomona, Plumpudding, and Roastbeef or Sin-
clair's Island. This Proclamation of Her Majesty's sovereignty and do-
minion to take effect forthwith, but to be subject to Her Majesty's
gracious confirmation and disallowance. 7
The geography recited in this Proclamation was rather inaccurate be-
cause Ichaboe Island is not adjacent to the other eleven islands which are
spread along 400 kilometers of the coast and hardly can be said to be
clustered.'8 Further, Sinclair Island and Roast Beef Island are shown on
modern South African maps as different islands approximately 30 kilome-
ters apart."9
For unknown reasons, this Proclamation was not forwarded to
London for confirmation by Queen Victoria. In 1863, during the American
Civil War, an American warship, the U.S.S. Vanderbilt, during pursuit of
the Confederate raider, the C.S.S. Alabama, seized a British merchant
ship at Penguin Island carrying cargo which the Alabama had taken from
an American merchant ship. Coal which had been likewise taken by the
46. PRINSLOO, supra note 2, at 8; 60 B.F.S.P. 1122-23. Law and order was needed on
these islands because of often violent competition between guano prospectors. Watson, The
Guano Islands of Southwestern Africa, 20 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 631, 638-640 (1930). These
islands are small. The largest is Possession Island with a surface area of only 90 hectares.
MooasoM, supra note 2, at 36.
47. Proclamation 53 of 1861, Colony of the Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette
No. 3277 (Aug. 13, 1861); 60 B.F.S.P. 1123. See Appendix "B". Hollamsbird has been
spelled Hollam's Bird, Hollams Bird, Hollandbird, Holland's Bird, and today the Island is
known as Hollandsbird Island. Mercury Island has been known as Merkur Island. Ichaboe
has been spelled Itschabo, Itshabo, and Ichabod. Halifax Island is also known as Guano
Island. Albatross Rock has been known as Albatros Rock, Albatross Rocks, Albatross Island,
Albatros Island, and Bol Island. Plumpudding has been shown as Plum Pudding, Plum-
pudding, and Plumpuding. Sinclair's Island is also known as Sinclair Island. Roastbeef Is-
land is sometimes written as Roast Beef Island. In referring to specific maps, the name as
shown will be used in this article.
48. The British Government noted this discrepancy in 1864. 60 B.F.S.P. 1121-22.
49. PRINSLOO, supra note 2, after listing the islands as set out in Proclamation 53 of
1861, (at 5), shows Sinclair Island and Roast Beef Island as separate islands, (at 9) without
explaining the discrepancy. There is a question as to whether the modern maps correctly
identify Roast Beef Island because Sinclair and Roast Beef Islands were identified as one
and the same inyears past in both literature and maps. See L. GREEN, ON WINGS OF FIRE
52-53 (1967); 2 RAND McNALLY & Co.'s INDEXED ATLAS OF THE WORLD 228 (1907).
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Alabama and left on Penguin Island was also seized. During the seizure,
an American naval officer killed an officer on the British ship, and the
British Government made an unsuccessful effort to obtain compensation
for the British officer's widow. 50 Because of this incident, the 1861 Procla-
mation was brought to the attention of the British Government, and the
Proclamation was disallowed. 1
In 1866, the Royal Navy landed on Penguin Island and proclaimed
sovereignty over all of the twelve islands named in the 1861 Proclamation
except Ichaboe Island, and the Governor of the Colony of the Cape of
Good Hope proclaimed all twelve of these islands again annexed to the
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope."5 This was confirmed in 1873 by an
Act of the Parliament of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope (which
made no mention of the other eleven islands clustering adjacent Ichaboe
Island)." However, this Act was passed in ignorance of the Letters Patent
issued in 1867 which (1) authorized the Parliament of the Colony of the
Cape of Good Hope to annex these twelve islands and (2) appointed the
Governor of the Cape Colony as Governor of the "Island of Ichaboe and
the Penguin Islands."'" As a result of the oversight as to the 1867 Letters
Patent, the Parliament of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope in 1874
repealed the 1873 Act and authorized the Governor to reannex all twelve
islands at which time the laws of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope
would be in effect thereon."5 Accordingly, the Governor once again pro-
claimed .the islands annexed to the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.5"
50. The diplomatic correspondence arising from the incident can be found at 60
B.F.S.P. 1118-30. See also PHLLIPS, supra note 45, at 31 et seq.
51. Proclamation 27 of 1864, Colony of the Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette
No. 3573 (May 10, 1864). See Appendix "B".
52. Proclamation 66 of 1866, Colony of the Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette
No. 3814 (July 17, 1866). The twelve islands listed are identical to the listing in the 1861
Proclamation except that "Hollamsbird Island" is now "Hollandsbird Island". See Appen-
dix "B". PRINSLOO, supra note 2, at 10, is incorrect in asserting that the Captain of the
H.M.S. Valorous proclaimed sovereignty over all twelve of the islands in 1866. The 1866
Proclamation did not include Ichaboe Island over which sovereignty had been proclaimed in
1861. See Preamble to the Ichaboe and Penguin Islands Act 4 of 1874.
53. Annexation of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands Act 1 of 1873. The twelve islands listed
are identical to those of the 1866 Proclamation. See Appendix "B".
54. 67 B.F.S.P. 554.
55. Ichaboe and Penguin Islands Act 4 of 1874; 67 B.F.S.P. 557. The islands were, how-
ever, "deemed" to be foreign ports for the purposes of the Colony's customs laws. Ichaboe
and Penguin Islands Customs Act 5 of 1874; 67 B.F.S.P. 559. This same provision had been
included in the repealed 1873 Act. See Appendix "B". Walvis Bay was only exempted from
the Colony's customs law from 1885. Walfish Bay Customs Act 34 of 1885; Proclamation 129
of 1885, Colony of the Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette No. 6636 (Aug. 14, 1885).
This exemption was granted in order to encourage the Germans to use its port, but this
exemption drew opposition in the Cape Parliament. HousE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, COLONY
OF CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 229 (1890) and HousE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, COLONY OF CAPE OF
GOOD HOPE 219 (1894). This exemption was repealed by Proclamation 363 of 1898, Colony
of the Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette No. 8090 (Jan. 3, 1899).
56. Proclamation 45 of 1874, Colony of the Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette
No. 4674 (July 10, 1874). See Appendix "B".
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The Penguin Islands, as these twelve islands had become known, were
finally a part of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, but then came the
Germans.
The establishment of the Colony (or "Protectorate" as the Germans
called their colonies) of German South West Africa in 1884 was the prod-
uct of diplomatic maneuvering during a time of constant correspondence
between not only the British and German Foreign Offices, but also be-
tween the British Foreign Office and the British Colonial Office.67 A Mr.
De Pass of De Pass, Spence and Company, the guano exploiters, was con-
cerned about company rights acquired in the territory which was to be-
come German South West Africa; and in 1883, the Colonial Office re-
sponded to a query from the Foreign Office in response to a German
query noting DePass's claims as well as the British claim to the Penguin
Islands based on the 1867 Letters Patent, which response in turn was
communicated to the German Foreign Office." At the end of 1883, the
German ambassador in London replied to the British Foreign Secretary,
noting the British claims to Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands and
questioning whether the British Government had sanctioned the annexa-
tion of the Penguin Islands.6
The British continued to claim sovereignty over the Penguin Islands,
but suggested the Establishment of an Anglo-German commission to set-
tle all conflicting claims" which included claims on the mainland of
South West Africa. The German Proclamation of August 7, 1884, how-
ever, over the first part of South West Africa annexed extended German
sovereignty
... from the north bank of the Orange River to the 26 degrees south
latitude, 20 geographical miles inland, including the islands belonging
thereto by the law of nations.6
The area encompassed in this Proclamation included on its face all of the
Penguin Islands except Hollandsbird and Mercury Islands which are
north of 26 degrees south latitude. The following month Germany ex-
tended its claim north nearly to the border of Portuguese Angola exclud-
ing only the British territory of Walvis Bay.62 Thus, it appeared that the
Germans had not accepted the British claim to the Penguin Islands.
The British Foreign Secretary responded to this Proclamation on
September 19, 1884, with instructions to the British Embassy in Berlin to
call attention to the German Government that the Penguin Islands were a
part of the British Colony of the Cape of Good Hope as well as to suggest
a mixed commission to settle the claims of British subjects in South West
57. 75 B.F.S.P. 528-53. See also PHILLIPS, supra note 45, at 65-66, 90-92.
58. Id. at 528-31.
59. Id. at 531-34 (British translation from the German).
60. Id. at 536-37.
61. Id. at 546. See Appendix "B".
62. Id.
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Africa."' Four days later, the Foreign Office communicated to the Colonial
Office that the Germans had recognized that their Proclamation of annex-
ation did not include the Penguin Islands."
On October 8, 1884, the German Charge d'Affairs in London commu-
nicated acceptance of the British proposal for a mixed claims commission
and that note stated that:
The duties incumbent on the Mixed Commission will, in the opinion
of His Majesty's [German] Government, include the investigation of
the question what islands off the coast referred to, shall, as being sub-
ject to British sway, be excepted from the German Protectorate. The
Undersigned has given expression to the views that His Majesty's
[German] Government lays no claim to the several islands which, ac-
cording to the information then at hand, had been already in the year
1874 incorporated with Cape Colony. More recent information, which
has reached the Government of the Undersigned, however, leaves it
doubtful whether the premises on which the statement made reposed
were correct, and whether the facts, title of acquisition on which the
63. Id. at 547.
64. Id. at 549. The Germans referred to ten islands as being excluded. Ten of the Pen-
guin Islands are south of 260 south latitude, only Hollandsbird and Mercury Islands lie
north of that latitude. Nine days later, on October 2, 1884, the British Foreign Secretary
sent the following instructions to the British Embassy in Berlin:
In my despatch of the 19th ultimo, referring to my earlier despatch of the 13th ultimo,
on the subject of Baron Plessen's announcement in regard to the establishment of the Ger-
man Protectorate over the south-west coast of Africa from the 26th degree of south latitude
northwards to Cape Frio, with the exception of Walfish Bay and the other British Posses-
sions, you were instructed to make a communication to the German Government to the
effect that the islands on the coast form part of Cape Colony, and are consequently British
territory.
I now enclose a copy of a despatch from the Governor of the Cape to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, accompanied by a Minute of Ministers to the Governor, referring to
the Proclamation by the Captain of the German ship Elisabeth of the assumption, by Ger-
many, of the Protectorate of the coast from the Orange River to the 26th degree of south
latitude, including the islands on that portion of the coast.
The representation which in my despatch of the 18th ultimo, above referred to, you
were instructed to make to the German Government, with special reference to their Protec-
torate north of the 26th degree of south latitude in regard to the claim of Her Majesty's
Government to the islands on the coast, will apply equally to the case of the islands between
the 26th degree and the Orange River, and of which the principal are Ichaboe, Long Island,
Seal Island, Penguin Island, Halifax, Possession Island, Albatross Rock, Pomona, Plum
Pudding, and Roast Beef (or Sinclair Island). These islands have, as you will see by the
accompanying correspondence, been acquired by the Cape Colony under the authority of
Her Majesty's Letters Patent of the 27th February, 1867, and the Act of the Cape Parlia-
ment No. 4 of 1874, and are no doubt identical with the 10 islands referred to by Baron
Plessen in his verbal communication recorded in the letter to the Colonial Office of which a
copy is hereto annexed.
I have accordingly to request that you will make a communication to the German Gov-
ernment in the sense of the foregoing remarks, and you will at the same time say that a
further communication will be made to them with reference to Baron Plessen's verbal state-
ment of the 20th ultimo in regard to Shark Island, and probably some islets and other
territory in the same vicinity.
Id. at 550-51.
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British claims were founded, are to be deemed legally valid. The
Mixed Commission will, according to the view of His Majesty's [Ger-
man] Government, have to examine and report upon these points.65
A joint Anglo-German claims commission was appointed with notice
being given in both London"6 and Cape Town 67 of the Commission's
meetings. Meanwhile, the British Foreign Secretary continued to corre-
spond with the German Foreign Office via the German Embassy in
London and noted that the commission would have to decide the validity
of a lease given by the Governor of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope
to De Pass, Spence and Company to exploit guano deposits on a number
of unnamed rocks and islets off the coast of South West Africa. 68 The
joint Anglo-German claims commission was unable to reach agreement,
but the British and German Governments agreed to have a new joint
claims commission in Berlin try again to reach a settlement.6 9 On July 15,
1886, the new joint claims commission reached agreement and signed a
five paragraph Protocol disposing of claims arising out of activity by Brit-
ish subjects in what had become German South West Africa.70 Only the
fourth paragraph of the Protocol which dealt with the "unnamed rocks
and islets" is of interest here. That paragraph provided:
That Messrs. De Pass, Spence and Co., and their assigns, be free to
make use, as they have hitherto done, of these islets and rocks, includ-
ing Shark Island, without payment until the expiry of their lease, that
is to say, until the 30th June, 1895; and if the British Government
waive all claim to the sovereignty of these islands and rocks, and ac-
knowledge the sovereignty of Germany over them, then that the latter
Power should consent to confer no private rights over them to any
persons other than the lessees for the time being of the 12 British
islands named in the Letters Patent of the 27th February, 1867.
Upon this understanding the British Commissioner will recom-
mend his Government to acknowledge forthwith the sovereignty of
Germany in these islets and rocks.7'
By November 13, 1886, the British and German Governments had ex-
changed notes accepting this Protocol.72
This Protocol is significant because of the reference in the fourth
65. Id. at 552 (British translation from the German).
66. 76 B.F.S.P. 1009. This notice stated that the Commission would not concern itself
with claims arising at ".. . the British territory of Walfish Bay and the Penguin and Ichaboe
Islands (forming part of the Cape Colony)," Id.
67. 77 B.F.S.P. 8-9. This notice did not have the limitation contained in the notice
issued in London. 76 B.F.S.P. 1009 and PHILLIPS, supra note 45, at 105 et seq.
68. 77 B.F.S.P. 1283-84.
69. 77 B.F.S.P. 1287-88.
70. 77 B.F.S.P. 1042-44, 168 C.T.S. 129-32. See Appendix "B".
71. 77 B.F.S.P. 1043, 168 C.T.S. 131. See Appendix "B". On the same day, the British
Commissioner forwarded the Protocol to London recommending that the British Govern-
ment approve the settlement. 77 B.F.S.P. 1289.
72. 77 B.F.S.P. 1044-45, 168 C.T.S. 132-33. See Appendix "B".
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paragraph to "the twelve British islands named in the Letters Patent of
the 27th February, 1867." Although indirect, this is clear recognition by
Germany of British sovereignty over the Penguin Islands. A review of the
unpublished German Memorandum prepared for the negotiations which
resulted in this Protocol as well as the unpublished British Memorandum
in response and the unpublished British Report to the Protocol makes
this quite clear." It is surprising, however, that the 1890 Agreement be-
tween Germany and Great Britain 7 , by which the respective spheres of
influence in Africa and the joint colonial boundaries were fixed with pre-
cision, contains no mention of the Penguin Islands. Territory north of the
Orange River was reserved to the German sphere of influence with only
Walvis Bay in that area being identified as British territory. As the Pen-
guin Islands lie north of the Orange River, from the face of the 1890
Agreement, one would conclude that the Penguin Islands were German.
Notwithstanding this clear implication that the Penguin Islands were
German territory, in fact, both the British and the Germans continued to
regard them as British.
7 5
The Penguin Islands faded from public view until 1962 when the
South African Government published a map of southern Africa showing
South Africa's claims to the Penguin Islands7 6, a map which was corrected
and republished in 1965.77 In 1980, South Africa took the position with
the United Nations that, since their annexation, the Penguin Islands had
been part of the Cape of Good Hope; and upon the granting of indepen-
dence to Namibia, South Africa will retain them along with Walvis Bay.7
73. The German Memorandum only challenged British claims to the islands off the
coast of South West Africa other than the Penguin Islands. The British Memorandum ar-
gued that these other islets and rocks were British by virtue of the British annexation of the
Penguin Islands to which they are "adjacent". The British Commissioners' Report spoke of
the twelve Penguin Islands as being "unquestionably British". The original of the Protocol,
the German and British Memoranda, and the British Commissioners' Report can be found
in the Embassy and Consular Archives Germany (Prussia) Correspondence, 1784-1913, FO
244/415, Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, England. In 1897, the German Colo-
nial Company of South West Africa leased these unnamed islets and rocks to the Govern-
ment of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope for a period of ten years. 103 B.F.S.P. 983.
The Germans were very insecure about their claim to these islets and rocks and wanted this
lease in part to obtain British recognition of German sovereignty over them. 1 SANDER, Gas-
CHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN KOLONIAL-GEsELLSCHArr FOR SODWEST-AFRIKA VON IHRER
GRONDUNG BIS ZUM JAHRE 1910 117-18 (1912).
74. 82 B.F.S.P. 35, 40; 173 C.T.S. 271, 277. See also Appendix "A".
75. See infra pp. 273-278; Letter from British Consul, supra note 8.
76. Infra note 162.
77. Infra note 163.
78. Letter from South African Permanent Representative to United Nations Secretary-
General (May 29, 1980), U.N. SC Doc. S/13968, Annexure 111-3. This letter also erroneously
bases South Africa's claim to the Penguin Islands on the 1866 Proclamation. Likewise, M.
Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, Irr'L LEGAL ISSUES 137 (1986), erroneously states that
the Penguin Islands were annexed by the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope in 1866.
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IV. LEGAL FACTORS TO BE APPLIED IN DETERMINING SOVEREIGNTY
A. Introduction
In the previous sections, the legal and constitutional history of
Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands was presented. So far, this article
has ignored the political, economic, and other non-legal factors involved
in the disputes in question. This has been done solely to give a legal per-
spective to the issues. South Africa's domestic policies, which were also
imposed on South West Africa' 9, arouse very strong emotional responses
which clutter an objective legal analysis and tend to cause observers to
first take their position and then justify it. That many people outside of
South Africa find the South African determination to retain Walvis Bay
and the Penguin Islands to be politically unwise and bound to leave a
legacy of ill-feeling between South Africa and an independent Namibia is
not a basis for deciding for or against South Africa as to the legal issues
here. If the rule of law is to have meaning in the international sphere,
analysis must be objective and South Africa's domestic policies must be
ignored except to the extent (and no further) that these policies violate
relevant international law. In this section, these other factors will be ex-
amined to the extent they impact on the legal issues presented.
B. The Acquisition of Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands
The manner of acquisition of Walvis Bay has been the subject of dis-
pute, the South African view being that Walvis Bay was terra nullius in
1878; that is, it belonged to no state.80 Others have taken the position
that Walvis Bay was not a terra nullius.8 ' What is the significance of
whether Walvis Bay (or the Penguin Islands) was terra nullius at the
time of annexation?
Traditionally, it has been said that there are five modes of acquiring
territory in international law - accretion, cession, conquest, occupation,
and prescription.82 This nice compartmentalization appears to lend itself
to easy application. One looks to the requirements of each mode and un-
less the acquisition in question fits one of the modes, there has been no
valid acquisition. Accretion, cession, and conquest have no application
here. The first is obviously inapplicable; it is undisputed that no one
ceded Walvis Bay to the British; and there certainly was no resistance by
anyone to British occupation which resulted in a conquest. As for occupa-
tion, that mode has the requirement that the territory be a terra nul-
lius. 3 Thus, if a land was inhabited, as the Walvis Bay area was by the
79. DUGARD, supra note 30, at 431-33.
80. PRINSLOO, supra note 2, at 20; SAYIL, supra note 2, at 189.
81. Huaraka, supra note 2, at 164; Note, Namibia, supra note 2, at 912.
82. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 134 (2nd ed.1973); 1 D. P.
O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 465 (1965).
83. 1 J. B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 300 (1906); 1 O'CONNELL, supra
note 82, at 468-70. M. F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISrTON AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRI-
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Topnaar Namas, an indigenous African tribal group, it could not have
been a terra nuilius
8 4
This "analysis", however, is not only arbitrary, but it is based on a
selective application of international law as espoused by the writers. By
the late nineteenth century, many writers had construed the term terra
nullius to include lands inhabited by natives which were not considered
as states by European standards."5 Also, in determining whether land was
terra nullius, it was necessary to find the "critical date" at which the
determination is to be made.86 As will be seen, "critical date" is irrelevant
to the issues here.
Modern writers reject this arbitrary classification of modes of acqui-
sition because (1) it is often little more than a poor substitute for analy-
sis, and (2) when tribunals decide cases these classifications are ignored
because the facts of any given case rarely permit such organization.87 In
particular, occupation and prescription are often indistinguishable or in-
terwoven; and, in reality, the right to sovereignty is often established by
nothing more than the fact of sovereignty."8 This is the situation in the
case of Walvis Bay where it is undisputed that there has been an unop-
posed, effective, and unbroken administration since 1878 by the British
Empire and then its successor, South Africa. 9 The question really is
whether the mode of acquisition is important, or is the fact of an effective
occupation and administration the key?
Possession and administration are the two essential facts that consti-
TORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 43-44 (1926).
84. This is the argument of Huaraka, supra note 2, at 164. He ignores prescription as a
mode of acquisition, see infra note 92, and thus concludes that South Africa never acquired
sovereignty over Walvis Bay. That the Walvis Bay area was so inhabited, see supra note 13,
and MOORSAM, supra note 2, at 17. For a description of the Nama people and their social
organization, see Counter-Memorial of South Africa, South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S.A./
Lib. v. S.A.), 1966 I.C.J. Pleadings Vol. II, 336-40.
85. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 555 (Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955); 1 O'CONNELL,
supra note 82, at 470; M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 143
(5th ed. 1984); Cooper v. Stuart, (1889) 14 A.C. 286, 291 (P.C.)(treating Australia, by impli-
cation, as having been terra nullius). Contrast Cooper v. Stuart with In re Southern Rhode-
sia, [19191 A.C. 211, 215-16 (P.C.)(natives of Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, not desti-
tute of any recognizable form of sovereignty). Shaw, supra note 78, at 31-38, has a good
discussion of the various positions taken on this issue.
86. BROWNLIE, supra note 82, at 133-34; Clipperton Island (Mex. v. Fr.), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A.
1105 (1931) (decision in French), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932) (english trans.). Note,
Namibia, supra note 2, at 913. The Note even rejected 1878 as a possible "critical date",
choosing instead 1884, but then 1884 was rejected in favor of 1810.
87. BRowNuE, supra note 82, at 134-35; 1 O'CONNELL, supra note 82, at 465.
88. O'CONNELL, supra note 82, at 465-68.
89. MOORSOM, supra note 2, at 13-15; Huaraka, supra note 2, at 170; Asmal, supra note
2, at 29. The Germans, however, did play havoc with Walvis Bay in late 1914 after the
outbreak of World War I. WILKEN & Fox, supra note 3, at 171-96. That there has been an
effective occupation of Walvis Bay was expressly recognized in the 1911 boundary arbitra-
tion. Walfish Bay Boundary (Ger. v. U.K.), 11 U.N.R.I.A.A. 263, 307-08, 104 B.F.S.P. 50,
101-02 (1911).
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tute an effective occupation of a territory, the formal mode of acquisition
sometimes being uncertain.90 It has been argued that the failure to obtain
an agreement of cession from the natives at Walvis Bay is fatal to South
African claims of sovereignty,0 ' a view that exhalts form over substance.
As one writer has pointed out, such an agreement is usually neither un-
derstood nor appreciated by the natives, and even if understood, it has
moral value only.9" In the final analysis, sovereignty is determined by evi-
dence of the display of state activity." This was formally recognized by
the European powers in the 1885 Act of Berlin by which the European
powers set the rules for the completion of the colonial occupation of Af-
rica. 4 The South African argument that sovereignty over Walvis Bay is
theirs by virtue of effective occupation appears to be unassailable. 5
The fifth mode of acquisition requires some elaboration. Prescription
is the acquisition of the territory of another whereas occupation is the
acquisition of terra nullius.9" For one writer, the basis of prescription in
international law is recognition of a fact by the family of nations.97 An-
90. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 85, at 557-58; BROWNLIE, supra note 82, at 141-42; 1
O'CONNELL, supra note 82, at 471-80. This question is important, as O'Connell notes, be-
cause the international law which applies to the creation of rights (i.e., occupation as a mode
of acquisition) is the law at the time the rights are created while the international law to be
applied to the existence of rights (i.e., effective occupation) is the law applicable during the
existence of those rights. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829, 845-46, 22
AM. J. INT'L L. 867, 883-84 (1928); BROWNLIE, supra note 82, at 131-33.
91. Huaraka, supra note 2, at 164-65.
92. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 85, at 558; but see Shaw, supra note 78, at 37, where it is
noted that such agreements negate the possibility of a territory being terra nullius. The
absence of such an agreement, however, does not foreclose the acquisition of inhabited terri-
tory by other modes of acquisition such as prescription. Id. at 38; LINDLEY, supra note 83, at
45.
93. Walfish Bay Boundary (Ger. v. U.K.), 11 U.N.R.I.A.A. 263, 307-08, 104 B.F.S.P. 50,
101-02 (1911); Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829, 838-40 22 AM. J. INT'L
L. 867, 874-77 (1928); Honduras Borders (Guat. v. Hon.), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1307, 1327-29
(1933); Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 20 I.L.R. 94; Rann of Kutch
(Ind. v. Pak.), 17 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1, 481-82, 50 I.L.R. 2, 446-54 (1968); Munkman, Adjudication
and Adjustment - International Judicial Decision and the Settlement of Territorial and
Boundary Disputes, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 99-100, 103, 106 (1972-73); Murty, Evidence of
Traditional Boundaries and Some Problems in its Interpretation, 8 IND. J. INT'L L. 479,
486-89 (1968). Shaw, supra note 78, at 17-24.
94. 3 AM. J. INT'L L. SupP. 7 (1909); 1 O'CONNELL, supra note 82, at 479-80; see S.
CROWE, THE BERLIN WEST AFRICAN CONFERENCE 1884-1885 (1942).
95. PRINSLOO, supra note 2, at 20; SAYIL, supra note 2, at 189; CILSA, supra note 2, at
271 n.89; the assertion by Huaraka, supra note 2, at 170, that effective occupation is a politi-
cal consideration not based on international law existing at the time of acquisition makes no
sense. The determination as to Walvis Bay is made as of today, not as of a past date. He
appears to have confused "occupation" as a mode of acquisition with the concept of "effec-
tive occupation" in which the mode of acquisition is sometimes uncertain. See supra note
90.
96. AKEHURST, supra note 85, at 144. For a discussion of the role of prescription in
international law, see Y. Z. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-37 (1965).
97. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 85, at 576; see 1 O'CONNELL, supra note 82, at 489-91;
Munkman, supra note 93, at 95, 105. It has been said that every act of recognition creates
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other writer rejects prescription as a mode of acquisition by finding that,
for our purposes, its role can be assumed by acquiescence and estoppel,
the former, along with recognition, supplementing effective occupation. 8
In reality, this is just another way of applying the concept of an effective
occupation, i.e., who is in fact sovereign has sovereignty.
This brings us to an important point overlooked by the opponents of
South Africa's claim to sovereignty over Walvis Bay. Modes of acquisition
are irrelevant where the original acquisition is not challenged."s In view-
ing the dispute over Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands, there seems to
be little realization that the issue is not whether and how the British (and
thus South Africa) acquired sovereignty; but whether, upon Namibia be-
ing granted independence, will Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands be
part of Namibia or South Africa. The issue is in essence prospective only,
the past providing relevant evidence in determining this question, but not
being determinative in and of itself without regard to the prospective is-
sue. And the issue arises as to Walvis Bay solely because of South Africa's
de facto integration of Walvis Bay into South West Africa in 1922.
The issue is, in fact, reduced to determining whether Walvis Bay and
the Penguin Islands were part of the Mandated Territory of South West
Africa at the time the Mandate was established in 1920. The Mandate, as
noted previously, was defined as comprising the territory which consti-
tuted German South West Africa. The record seems clear as to both
Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands that Germany had recognized them
as British territory and thus they were part of South Africa in 1920.
The next question is whether anything has occurred since the estab-
lishment of the Mandate which would have resulted in the Mandate be-
ing increased in size by the addition of Walvis Bay or the Penguin Is-
lands. As for the Penguin Islands, there is no difficulty because the South
Africans did virtually nothing which could be construed as a renunciation
of sovereignty. It is as to Walvis Bay that the problem arises because of
South Africa's de facto integration of Walvis Bay into South West Africa
so totally that Namibia has become and will remain overwhelmingly de-
pendent upon the port for its economic survival. Here, the political and
economic issues must be noted, but it is the legal issues that concern us.
It is appropriate to start with an examination of the status of Walvis Bay
an estoppel. MacGibbon, Estoppel in International Law, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 468, 473
(1958). See Schwarzenberger, Title to Territory: Response to a Challenge, 51 AM. J. INT'L L.
308, 316-18 (1957).
98. BROWNLIE, supra note 82, at 159, 164-65. Acquiescence, recognition, and estoppel
and their interrelationship in international law are discussed at length in BLUM, supra note
96, at 38-98. See also Rann of Kutch (Ind. v. Pak.), 17 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1, 449-54, 498, 549, 50
I.L.R. 2, 409-15, 466, 494-95 (1968); Honduras Borders (Guat. v. Hon.), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1307,
1327-29 (1933). Acquiescence may give rise to an estoppel. MacGibbon, supra note 97, at
501; Bowett, Estoppel Before International Tribunals and its Relation to Acquiescence, 33
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 176 (1957).
99. AKEHURST, supra note 85, at 142; Western Sahara,(Advisory Opinion,) 1975 I.C.J.
12, 123, 59 I.L.R. 30, 140(Sep. Op. J. Dillard).
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in South African municipal law.
C. Walvis Bay in South African Municipal Law
It has been argued that Walvis Bay was never formally incorporated
into the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.100 The basis of this argument
is not clear, but this assertion is certainly incorrect. There is no sugges-
tion that the incorporation was not properly promulgated; and it is undis-
puted that Walvis Bay was administered as part of the Colony or Prov-
ince of the Cape of Good Hope from 1884 until 1922. It has been further
argued that Walvis Bay was never accorded the treatment or status as an
integral part of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope or the Union of
South Africa, the inhabitants of Walvis Bay, for example, never having
the vote.1"' This argument does not withstand examination and is factu-
ally incorrect.
The Colony of the Cape of Good Hope expanded gradually in pieces
with periodic annexations steadily increasing its size. With these annexa-
tions, the franchise was sometimes extended to white adults at the time
of annexation' and sometimes not.10 s In this regard, Walvis Bay was
treated no differently than some other territories annexed to the Cape.
Further, the laws of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope were not made
uniformly applicable throughout the Colony. Some laws were excluded
from parts of the Colony with provision for extension to those excluded
parts at a later date. °" And in 1949, Walvis Bay finally gained represen-
tation in the Union Parliament.'0 "
That Walvis Bay was part of the Cape of Good Hope, at least prior to
100. Note, Namibia, supra note 2, at 904 n.5.
101. Id. at 917.
102. The British Kaffraria Incorporation and Parliamentary Representation Amend-
ment Act 3 of 1865; Griqualand West Annexation Act 39 of 1877; British Bechuanaland
Annexation Act 41 of 1895.
103. Xesibe Country Annexation Act 37 of 1886; Transkeian Annexation Act 38 of
1877; Pondoland Annexation Act 5 of 1894. For an act extending the franchise to previously
annexed territory, see Transkeian Territories Representation Act 30 of 1887.
104. E.g., Act 12 of 1890 To Provide for the Registration of Brands, and to facilitate the
identification and recovery of Lost or Stolen Horses, Cattle and Ostriches; and Act 28 of
1886 to More effectually Prevent the Spread of Scab Disease in Sheep and Goats, Act 25 of
1889 to Extend the provisions of the "Scab Acts" to Field-Cornetcies adjoining areas or
districts wherein the said Acts are in force, and Act 7 of 1890 to Amend the "Scab Acts
Extension Act, 1889." Even when a law was brought into effect throughout the Colony on
the same date, sometimes separate proclamations were made for some parts of the Cape.
E.g., Proclamations 222 and 223 of 1903, Colony of the Cape of Good Hope Government
Gazette No. 8568 (Aug. 7, 1903). The first Proclamation extended a new customs law to
Walvis Bay and five other parts of the Cape; the second Proclamation set the same date as
the first for the same law to go into effect generally in the Colony. 96 B.F.S.P. 1225. Some
parts of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope had their laws made by the Governor pursu-
ant to a grant of power by statute, e.g., the Transkeian Territories, Tembuland and Pondo-
land Laws Act 29 of 1897.
105. South-West Africa Affairs Amendment Act 23 of 1949, §§ 27-33.
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1922 according to South African municipal law, can be seen in the crimi-
nal case of Rex v. Mahoney0 6 in which the defendant was convicted in an
inferior court in Walvis Bay of an offense under a South West Africa law,
which by a 1921 proclamation provided that the laws enacted for South
West Africa would have effect in Walvis Bay. The case was sent for re-
view to the High Court of South West Africa which refused to review it
on the ground that Walvis Bay was not part of the Mandated Territory.
The case was then sent to the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme
Court of South Africa, the jurisdiction of which was limited to the Prov-
ince of the Cape of Good Hope."' The Cape Provincial Division reviewed
the case and reversed the conviction because of an improper promulga-
tion of the law in question in Walvis Bay which was "Union territory"
and not part of the Mandated Territory of South West Africa. 0 8
With the transfer of the administration of Walvis Bay to that of
South West Africa in 1922, the port and settlement was "deemed" to be
part of South West Africa, and it became de facto part of South West
Africa. The leading case concerning the status of Walvis Bay after 1922, a
criminal prosecution from Walvis Bay involving the evasion of customs
duties, is Rex v. Offen' 09 in which the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of South Africa, South Africa's highest court, was called upon to
construe the 1922 Act transferring the administration of Walvis Bay. The
Chief Justice of South Africa in that case said:
... If we examine the words of sec. 1 of the Act of 1922 we do not find
that Walvis Bay is made a part of the mandated territory. The section
says: "(1) ... the port and settlement of Walvis Bay, which forms part
of the Province of the Cape of Good Hope, shall be administered as if
it were part of the mandated territory and as if the inhabitants of the
said port and settlement were inhabitants of the mandated
territory."' 10
This construction is consistent with the use of the word "deemed" gener-
ally in South African law where it has been recognized that the word can
mean ... that the persons or things to which it relates are to be consid-
ered to be what really they are not .... "I
The final case is Regina v. Akkermann"" in which the defendant was
convicted of entering the territory of South West Africa without a re-
quired permit, the accused having entered Walvis Bay. The High Court of
South West Africa, in construing the 1922 Act and the Proclamation
thereunder, held that:
106. 1921 C.P.D. 557.
107. South Africa Act of 1909, 98; 102 B.S.F.P. 25.
108. 1921 C.P.D. 557, 562.
109. 1935 A.D. 4, afl'g 1934 S.W.A. 73.
110. 1935 A.D. 4, 6.
111. Chotabhai v. Union Government, 1911 A.D. 13, 33, citing Rex v. Norfolk County
Council (1891), 65 L.T.R.(n.s.) 222, 224, 60 L.J.Q.B. 379, 380-81 (Cave, J.).
112. 1954 (1) S.A. 195 (S.W.A.) at 196.
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... this legislation, passed by virtue of Act 24 of 1922 (Union), was
intended to state and did in fact state that for all practical, legal, stat-
utory, legislative and procedural purposes whether civil or criminal,
the port and settlement of Walvis Bay shall, as from a certain date, be
regarded, unless specifically excluded, as if it were an integral part of
the Territory of South West Africa ..... Put differently, for the pur-
poses of criminal law, this legislation in my opinion proclaimed that
after a certain date any act or omission which would, if committed
within the Territory constitute a crime, would, under the same law,
likewise constitute a crime, if committed or omitted within the port
and settlement of Walvis Bay. When this interpretation is applied to
[the law allegedly violated], the word "Territory" must be interpreted
to include the port and settlement of Walvis Bay.118
These court decisions were made years before sovereignty over
Walvis Bay became an international issue so that there can be no sugges-
tion that they were influenced by political or other nonlegal factors. The
gist of these decisions interpreting the statutes and proclamations in
question is that Walvis Bay, while part of the Province of the Cape of
Good Hope and thus under the sovereignty of South Africa, was for all
purposes other than sovereignty part of the Mandated Territory of South
West Africa.
A close analogy in international law is found in Article III of the 1903
Panama Canal Treaty whereby Panama, in ceding the Canal Zone to the
United States of America in perpetuity, granted to the United States "....
the rights, power and authority.., which the United States would pos-
sess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory [the Canal Zone]
"..14", There was never any doubt that Panama had retained sovereignty
during the 75 years that the United States of America administered the
Canal Zone. 1 5 The use of "if' in both of these cases was intended to de-
scribe a situation de facto which was not intended to change the situation
de jure.' 6
D. Walvis Bay in International Law Since 1922
Until 1977, when South Africa transferred the administration of
113. Id. at 196 (Claassen, J.). By virtue of Walvis Bay Administration Proclamation 30
of 1922, 13, South West Africa Government Gazette No. 94 (Oct. 2, 1922), judicial review of
inferior court cases was transferred from the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court
of South Africa to the High Court of South West Africa.
114. 96 B.F.S.P. 553, 554-55; 194 C.T.S. 263, 264.
115. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 85, at 458-59; BROWNLIE, supra note 82, at 116-17; see
Canal Zone v. Coulson, 1 C.Z. 50, 55 (1907), although careless language can be found in cases
to the effect that the United States of America acquired sovereignty (rather than just the
powers of the sovereign) over the Canal Zone. General Petroleum Corp. v. S.S. "David", 3
C.Z. 601, 604 (1925); Dixon v. Goethals, 3 C.Z. 23, 24, appeal dismissed per curium, 221 F.
1021 (5th Cir. 1915), aff'd per curium, 242 U.S. 616 (1916); Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 32-
33 (1907) (by implication).
116. J. GAYNER, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN AFFAIRS, Namibia: The Road to Self-Govern-
ment, 35-36 (1979).
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Walvis Bay back to that of the Province of the Cape of Good Hope, there
was no issue concerning South African sovereignty over Walvis Bay. Dur-
ing the Third Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the
League of Nations in 1923, a member of the Commission observed that
Walvis Bay, although not part of the Mandated Territory, was included
in the coverage of South Africa's Annual Report to the League, and a
South African representative replied that Walvis Bay had been attached
to the Mandated Territory for administrative reasons.11 In its Report to
the Council of the League of Nations following the Third Session, "[t]he
Commission . . . noted that the territory of Walvis Bay had been treated
as if it formed part of the Mandated Territory, whereas it was not, in
fact, included in that territory."' ' s
Five years later, during the Fourteenth Session of the Permanent
Mandates Commission, there was an extensive discussion of the adminis-
tration of Walvis Bay as part of the Mandated Territory when, in fact, as
one member of the Commission noted, Walvis Bay was not part of that
Territory."' The South African representative reiterated that Walvis Bay
" . . .was merely included in the territory of South-West Africa for ad-
ministrative purposes." Another member questioned what right the voters
of Walvis Bay had to vote as part of the Mandated Territory when it was
part of the Union, a concern shared by a third member of the Commis-
sion. The importance of the port to South West Africa was discussed, the
South African representatives confirming that the port of Swakopmund
just north of Walvis Bay had fallen into disuse and Walvis Bay had been
developed as the principal port of South West Africa. The South African
representative stated that Walvis Bay was essential to the economic de-
velopment of South West Africa, and he expressed concern that if the
inhabitants of Walvis Bay did not have a voice in the affairs of South
West Africa, they might seek to transfer the administration of Walvis Bay
back to that of the Union which would result in South West Africa losing
control of its most important port.
In 1929, during the Fifteenth Session of the Permanent Mandates
Commission, the Commission, after one member questioned the South
117. Permanent Mandates Commission Minutes 6A, 103 (3rd Sess., 1923). Presumably,
this observation was the result of the following paragraph in the Report of the Administra-
tor of South West Africa for the Year 1922 to the UNION PARLIAMENT, (at 3), (which Re-
ports until 1922 or 1923 were also submitted to the Council of the League of Nations as
South Africa's annual Report on South West Africa):
By Proclamation No. 30 the laws of the territory of South West Africa as existing on the
2nd October, 1922, were proclaimed in force at Walvis Bay which was declared to be a
portion of the district of Swakopmund, all laws hereafter enacted in the mandated territory
to operate at Walvis Bay unless expressly excluded.
(The Permanent Mandates Commission Minutes were published in both English and
French with the pagination corresponding in both editions.)
118. 4 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. at 1394 (1923).
119. Permanent Mandate Commission Minutes 6A, 68-71 (14th Sess., 1928). The Com-
mission's Report to the Council of the League of Nations, to which the Minutes were ap-
pended, made no mention of Walvis Bay. 10 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 505 (1929).
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African representatives about voting rights, 2 ' requested "... clear expla-
nations as regards the right of the inhabitants of Walvis Bay - adminis-
tered as an integral part of the Mandated Territory - to participate in
the elections to the Parliament of the Union and in those of the Legisla-
tive Council of South West Africa respectively."'21 And in 1938, during
the 34th Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, in response to
120. Permanent Mandates Commission Minutes 6A, 75 (15th Sess., 1929).
121. Id. at 294. In the Report Presented by the Government of the Union of South
Africa Concerning the Administration of South West Africa for the Year 1929, 10 LEAGUE
OF NATIONS O.J. 1655, paras. 748-52 (1929), South Africa gave the following response to this
request:
REPLIES TO SPECIAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE PERMANENT MANDATES
COMMISSION.
1. Legal Relations Between the Mandatory Power and the Mandated Territory.
2. General Administration.
(a) Right of the inhabitants of Walvis Bay to participate in the elections to the Parliament
of the Union.
748. Section 1 of the South West Africa Affairs Act No. 24 of 1922 (see page 20, Laws of
South West Africa, 1915-22), has been interpreted as empowering the complete disassocia-
tion of Walvis Bay judicially, administratively, and in consequence, electorally, from the
Cape Province. In terms of Proclamation No. 145 of 1922,issued under Section 1(1) of Act
No. 24 of 1922, the port and settlement of Walvis Bay was administered as from the 1st
October, 1922, as if it were part of the mandated territory of South West Africa, and as if
the inhabitants of the said port and settlement were inhabitants of the said territory. Subse-
quently, it was provided in terms of Section 43(a) of the South West Africa Constitution Act
No. 42 of 1925, that the port and settlement of Walvis Bay shall be deemed to form part of
the territory for the purposes of that Act. The Schedule to Act No. 42 of 1925, provides for
the registration of voters for the election of elective members of the Assembly of the
territory.
749. In so far as Walvis Bay, in its relation to the Union, is concerned,it may be stated that
Act No. 35 of 1884 (Cape), provided for the annexation to the Colony of the Cape of Good
Hope of the port and settlement. Section 1 provided that the territory should be subject to
the laws of the Colony and Section 2 inter alia, that those laws might, unless otherwise
provided by Act of Parliament, be repealed, altered, amended and modified, and new laws
applicable to the territory might be made and might be repealed, altered, amended and
modified by the Governor, and that no Act thereafter passed by the Parliament of the Col-
ony should extend or be deemed to extend to the territory unless expressly so stated.
750. It may be pointed out, that at no time, have the electoral laws of the Union or of the
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope been applied by Act or Proclamation to Walvis Bay, as
required by Section 2 of Act No. 35 of 1884 (Cape), and no Delimitation Commission has at
any time assigned Walvis Bay to any electoral division in the Union. The British residents
at Walvis Bay cannot, therefore, in the absence of the requisite machinery, be enrolled as
voters in the Union.
751. The European adult population of Walvis Bay was taken into consideration by the
Fifth Delimitation Commission, but only for the purpose of determining the number of
members to represent the Cape Province in the Union House of Assembly, as the original
quota was based on figures which included the Walvis Bay European male adult population.
(b) Right of the inhabitants of Walvis Bay to participate in the elections to the Legislative
Assembly of South West Africa.
752. By virtue of Section 43(a) of the South West Africa Constitution Act No. 42 of 1925,
the inhabitants of Walvis Bay are entitled to participate in the elections to the Legislative
Assembly of the Mandated Territory.
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a question from a member of the Commission, the South Africans reiter-
ated that Walvis Bay came under South West Africa for "administrative
purposes"."'
Quite clearly the Permanent Mandates Commission was concerned
about South Africa administering Walvis Bay as part of South West Af-.
rica when it was not part of the Mandated Territory. 23 Of far more im-
portance is that South Africa could not unilaterally alter the Mandate by
adding Walvis Bay (or the Penguin Islands) to the Mandated Territory,
the consent of the Council of the League of Nations being required for
any modification of the terms of the Mandate.1 24 Had South Africa
wished to enlarge the Mandate by adding Walvis Bay (or the Penguin
Islands) to South West Africa, there was the precedent in 1923 whereby
the Mandate for the Belgian portion of German East Africa (now Rwanda
and Burundi) was increased in size and the Mandate for the British por-
tion of German East Africa (now the Tanganyika portion of Tanzania)
correspondingly decreased in size by resolution of the Council of the
League of Nations following an Anglo-Belgian request for such modifica-
tion.1 2 5 There was never a request to the Council of the League of Nations
to enlarge the Mandate for South West Africa, and no such modification
was ever made.
When the League of Nations dissolved itself in 1946 recommending
that the League of Nations Mandates be transformed into United Na-
tions Trusteeships, 2 South Africa refused to comply and found itself in
conflict with the United Nations. In 1966, the United Nations General
Assembly terminated the South African Mandate over South West Af-
122. Permanent Mandates Commission Minutes 6A, 82-83 (34th Sess., 1938).
123. The statement in the Note, Namibia, supra note 2, that the Permanent Mandates
Commission had been persuaded by 1929 that Walvis Bay "was an integral part of South
West Africa" is incorrect because it is clear from reading the Minutes, (See sources cited
supra notes 117-122,) that the Commission considered Walvis Bay not to be part of South
West Africa even though it was administered as if it were.
124. Rex v. Christian, 1924 A.D. 101, 111; Art. 7, Mandate for German South West
Africa, 113 B.F.S.P. 1109, 1110, 17 AM. J.INT'L L. Supp. 175, 176 (1923); LINDLEY, supra note
83, at 262. See Appendix "C". The Mandate continued in force notwithstanding the dissolu-
tion of the League of Nations in 1946. International Status of South-West Africa (Advisory
Opinion), 1950 I.C.J. 128, 138, 17 I.L.R. 47, 55; South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S.A./Lib. v.
S.A.), Preliminary Objections, 1962 I.C.J. 319, 341, 37 I.L.R. 3, 22-23. The United Nations
General Assembly terminated the Mandate in 1966. G.A. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GOAR Supp.
(No. 16) 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); 1966 U.N.Y.B. 606. The validity of this termination
was upheld by the International Court of Justice in 1971 which found that South Africa's
continued occupation in Namibia is illegal. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 49 I.L.R. 3. It is evident that
South Africa could hardly acquire a greater right to alter the boundaries of South West
Africa/Namibia by virtue of its illegal occupation.
125. 4 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1273 (1923). The diplomatic correspondence relating to
this modification can be found at 118 B.F.S.P. 899-905.
126. DUGARD, supra note 30, at 96-97.
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rica." 7 That same year, the International Court of Justice ruled against
Ethiopia and Liberia in cases they had brought against South Africa con-
cerning the administration of the Mandate." 58 The merits of these cases,
which were consolidated, are not significant here, but the conduct of the
parties is very significant.
Ethiopia alleged that South Africa had construed a "military landing
field" in the Swakopmund District of South West Africa in violation of
Article 4 of the Mandate prohibiting military bases. 2 9 South Africa an-
swered this allegation by stating that the landing ground in question was
in Walvis Bay which is not ".... within the territorial boundaries of South
West Africa", but which is South African territory not included in the
Mandate.' In reply, Ethiopia and Liberia stated "[w]ith respect to the
military landing ground in the Swakopmund District, [Ethiopia and Libe-
ria] accept [South Africa's] geographical explanation.'3' They went on to
argue, however, that ". . . Walvis Bay must, in a military sense, be consid-
ered to be 'in' South West Africa, inasmuch as it is completely sur-
rounded by territory subject to the Mandate .... ,1S In the separate opin-
ion by the South African judge ad hoc in these cases, this admission was
noted as well as the obvious fact that Walvis Bay is not completely sur-
rounded by the Mandated Territory. 83 This was the only mention of
Walvis Bay by any of the judges.13 This admission is another example of
acquiescence and recognition by other nations of South Africa's sover-
eignty over Walvis Bay.
127. G.A. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 16) 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); 1966
U.N.Y.B. 606.
128. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S.A./Lib. v. S.A.), 1966 I.C.J. 4, 37 I.L.R. 243.
129. Memorial of Ethiopia, South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S.A./Lib. v. S.A.), 1966
I.C.J. Pleadings vol. 1, at 183. See Appendix "C".
130. Counter-Memorial of South Africa, South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S.A./Lib. v.
S.A.), 1966 I.C.J. Pleadings, vol. 4, at 57-58, and id. at vol. 2, at 309.
131. Reply of Ethiopia and Liberia, South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S.A./Lib. v. S.A.),
1966 I.C.J. Pleadings, vol. 4, at 560. It is significant that, at this time, no nation disputed
South Africa's sovereignty over Walvis Bay. E.g., the United States of America has consist-
ently recognized South Africa's sovereignty over Walvis Bay. Map of Southwest Africa, De-
partment of State, Division of Map Intelligence and Cartography, No. 10459 (Sept. 1946); U.
S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE FAcT BOOK OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 590-91 (1970); U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 733-34, 743-44 (1974); and DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN 3 (Sept. 1986) and id. map preceding p. 1.
132. Reply of Ethiopia and Liberia, South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S.A./Lib. v. S.A.),
1966 I.C.J. Pleadings, vol. 4, at 560.
133. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S.A./Lib. v. S.A.), 1966 I.C.J. 4, 206-07, 37 I.L.R.
243, 394 (Sep. Op. J. Van Wyck). On the west, Walvis Bay is bounded by the Atlantic
Ocean.
134. The only mention of the Penguin Islands in the judgment or record of the South
West Africa Cases was a note in the South African Counter-Memorandum mentioning the
British annexation of the Islands by way of the 1867 Letters Patent. Counter-Memorandum
of South Africa, South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S.A./Lib. v. S.A.), 1966 I.C.J. Pleadings,
vol. 2, at 364 n.10. The South African map included at the end of this volume shows none of
the Penguin Islands, but Walvis Bay is expressly identified as South African territory.
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E. The Significance of Maps as to Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands
Maps are playing a greater role in international law today than ever
before. The International Court of Justice has had three opportunities to
discuss the significance of maps in territorial dispute cases. In the Min-
quiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.) case8 8 involving the issue of sovereignty
over some islets and rocks near the Channel Islands, the Court considered
a French Government map which the French had provided to the British
Government and which showed the Minquiers to be British territory." "
In the judgment, only one judge commented on the map noting that while
maps are not always decisive in the settlement of legal questions relating
to sovereignty, they ". . . may... constitute proof that the occupation or
exercise of sovereignty was well known."""
In the Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land
(Belg. v. Neth.), 3 8 Belgium and the Netherlands both claimed two small
plots of land which if recognized as Belgian would create an enclave en-
tirely surrounded by Netherlands territory. In the settlement of their
boundary by a convention in 1893, there was a special map which showed
clearly that these plots in question were Belgian. There was also contra-
dictory language between a written description of the boundary, which
incorporated the maps and stated that the plots were Belgian, and an
earlier document which was also purportedly incorporated in the conven-
tion, but which in fact stated the plots were Dutch. The Court found,
however, that on the map signed by the boundary commissioners, these
plots ".... stood out as a small island in Netherlands territory coloured to
show, in accordance with the legend of the map, that they did not belong
to the Netherlands but to Belgium. The situation of those plots must
have immediately arrested attention."'3' In addition, the court relied on
Belgian military staff maps which, since their first publication in 1874,
had shown the plots as Belgian territory. "1 0 In this case, maps were deci-
sive in the court deciding in favor of Belgium.
In the third case, the Temple of Preah Vihear (Camb. v. Thai.),'
the 1904 boundary treaty between France and Siam (now Thailand)
stated that the boundary between Siam and Cambodia (now Kampuchea,
then part of French Indo-China), would follow the watershed line. A
mixed commission fixed the boundary by survey; and maps were subse-
quently prepared by the French based on the survey and at the request of
Siam, but these maps were not part of the boundary delimitation. The
135. 1953 I.C.J. 47, 20 I.L.R. 94.
136. Id. at 71, 20 I.L.R. at 114-15.
137. Id. at 105, 20 I.L.R. at 141-42 (Sep. Op. J. Carneiro).
138. 1959 I.C.J. 209, 27 I.L.R. 62.
139. Id. at 225, 27 I.L.R. at 75.
140. Id. at 227, 27 I.L.R. at 77. J. Armand-Ugon, dissenting, disagreed with giving these
military maps any significance because there had been no showing that the Netherlands
knew of them. Id. at 247, 27 I.L.R. at 90.
141. 1962 I.C.J. 6, 33 I.L.R. 48.
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Temple of Preah Vihear was on the Siamese side of the watershed line,
but the French map of the area in question put the Temple in Cambodia.
Siamese officials received these maps and distributed them widely. In
1937, Siam published a map showing the Temple to be in Cambodia. And
in 1947, Thailand submitted a map to the Franco-Siamese Conciliation
Commission, dealing with areas other than the Temple, which showed the
Temple to be in Cambodia. The Court found that Thailand was pre-
cluded from challenging the map evidence and ruled for Cambodia hold-
ing that the map line prevailed over the treaty line. " 2
It would seem clear that maps produced by a state, or utilized or
accepted by it, are going to be strong evidence, if not conclusive of bound-
aries or sovereignty as described thereon;148 although if the governmental
agency which drew the map did not have the "authority to draw bounda-
ries", the map in question would not be given "decisive weight for the
purpose of ascertaining or determining sovereign rights.""" The question
here then is what does the map evidence, especially official maps, show as
to Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands." 5
Turning to the maps published by the South African Government,
the first map, circa 1914," 6 shows Walvis Bay separated from South West
Africa by an international boundary;14 7 and of the Penguin Islands, only
Hollam's Bird and Possession Islands are shown and they are not identi-
fied as South African territory. In 1923,148 1935,1 9 1937,50 1938,151 and
1940,152 maps were published which showed either no boundary 53 or only
142. Id. at 32-33, 33 I.L.R. at 70-71.
143. See also, Rann of Kutch (Ind. v. Pak.), 17 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1, 566-67, 50 I.L.R. 2, 514-
15 (1968); Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829, 852, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867,
891 (1928); Weissberg, Maps as Evidence in International Boundary Disputes: A Reap-
praisal, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 781 (1963). In Honduras Borders (Guat. v. Hon.), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A.
1307, 1360-61 (1933), Guatemala was held to be estopped (although called "acquiescence"
by the tribunal) to deny the boundary was where it had placed it on one of its official maps.
144. Rann of Kutch (Ind. v. Pak.), 17 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1, 540, 50 I.L.R. 2, 485 (1968).
145. All maps cited in this article were found at one or more of the following institu-
tions: Geography and Map Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.; Public
Record Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, England; Institut G6ographique Nationale, Saint
Mand6, Val de Marne, France. The maps cited in this article are by no means exhaustive of
all published maps on this subject.
146. War Map of German South-West Africa, Government Printing Works, Pretoria
(undated), scale 1:1,900,800 (30 miles = 1 inch). As South African forces conquered South
West Africa in a campaign that began in December 1914 and ended in July 1915, this map
was probably produced right after the outbreak of World War I in August 1914.
147. But without the color shading that is found on the other international boundaries
on the map.
148. Map of the Union of South Africa, Surveyor-General, Cape Town (1923), scale
1:1,000,000 (hereinafter Map 1923).
149. South Africa, C.M. 04.500-35, 1000-35 (rev.), scale 1:1,400,000.
150. South Africa, C.M. 0104-1937, scale 1:4,000,000.
151. South Africa, C.M. 0104-1938, scale 1:4,000,000 (hereinafter Map 1938).
152. South Africa, C.M. 0104-1940, scale 1:4,000,000 (hereinafter Map 1940).
153. See maps cited supra notes 150-152. Of these maps, the latter two maps, Map
1938, supra note 151 and Map 1940, supra note 152, have color shading added to interna-
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a magisterial1 " boundary between Walvis Bay and South West Africa.
The 1923 map shows none of the Penguin Islands. The other four maps
show all of the Penguin Islands except Seal, Penguin, and Long Islands,
plus a Roast Beef Island separate from Sinclair Island (as is the case on
all South African maps which show Sinclair Island). On none of these
maps are any of the islands identified as South African territory. The
maps attached to the annual Reports submitted by South Africa to the
Council of the League of Nations for the years 1937 to 1939, however, do
show an international boundary between Walvis Bay and South West Af-
rica."5 Of the Penguin Islands, these maps show only Ichaboe Island and
it is not identified as South African territory.
Then, from 1940,156 international (or provincial) boundary lines are
shown on the South African Government maps between Walvis Bay and
South West Africa, and such boundary lines are found on the maps of
1943,157 1944 (two maps),158 1950,159 1952,160 1955,161 1961,162 1962,13 and
tional boundary lines to highlight them. On these two maps this shading runs along the
Atlantic coast of South West Africa through Walvis Bay, thus showing it distinctly as part
of the Mandated Territory.
154. See maps cited supra notes 148 and 149. The color coding on Map 1923, supra
note 148, indicates that Walvis Bay is not Union territory.
155. The same map was used for all three years. Reports Presented By the Government
of the Union of South Africa to the Council of the League of Nations Concerning the Ad-
ministration of South West Africa for the Years 1937, 1938, 1939. However, para. 1 (as read
with the errata) of the 1930 annual Report, which gave a description of the boundaries of
South West Africa which was confirmed in the nine subsequent annual Reports, states that
the western boundary is the Atlantic Ocean, Walvis Bay not being mentioned and thus by
implication included within the Mandated Territory. In the one and only Report to the
United Nations, "Report by the Government of the Union of South Africa on the Adminis-
tration of South West Africa for Year 1946", the same western boundary description was
given in para. 2, but para. 3 stated:
... Walvis Bay, which is 374 square miles (96,867 hectares) in extent, is admin-
istered by the Administration of South West Africa, but the area remains nev-
ertheless an integral part of the Province of the Cape of Good Hope.
156. South West Africa, Sheet No. South F-33-5, Government Printer, Pretoria (1940),
scale 1:5,000,000. The boundary shown is designated as Mandated Territory boundary.
South West Africa, Sheet No. South G-33-2 shows Hollams Bird and Mercury Islands. The
sheet (South G-33-5) showing the remaining Islands was not found by the author.
157. South Africa, Conical Projection with Two Standard Parallels (180 and 320 S.
Lat.), drawn in the Trigonometrical Survey Office (1935, rev. 1943), scale 1:4,000,000.
158. Map of the Union of South Africa, 1944, reprinted [from 1923 map]: G.P.W. -
Directorate of Map Printing. U.D.F., (1944), scale 1:1,000,000, which shows a provincial
boundary between Walvis Bay and South West Africa; and South Africa, UDF 655/447,
Survey Depot (Tech.) S.A.E.C. (1944), scale 1:2,000,000.
159. South West Africa, 1950, Surveyor-General, Windhoek (1950), scale 1:800,000.
This map shows Hollam's Bird, Ichabo, and Possession Islands, but does not identify them
as South African territory.
160. South Africa, Survey Depot (Tech.) S.A.E.C. 1944, Revised Trigonometrical Sur-
vey Office (1952), scale 1:2,000,000.
161. South West Africa, 1955, Surveyor-General, Windhoek (rev. ed. 1955), scale
1:800,000. This map shows Hollam's Bird, Ichabo, and Possession Islands, but does not
identify them as South African territory.
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1965.14 As to the Penguin Islands, maps from 1926-1927165 show all of the
Islands except Mercury and Long Islands. The 1943 map shows all of the
Islands except Seal, Penguin, and Long Islands. The 1944 and 1952 maps
do not show the Penguin Islands. The 1950, 1955, and 1961 maps show
only Possession Island. On none of these maps are any of the Penguin
Islands identified as South African territory. The 1962 and 1965 maps
show all of the Penguin Islands, the 1962 map showing fourteen islands
specifically identified as South African territory (Long Island is shown as
North and South Long Islands, and Sinclair and Roastbeef Islands are
shown as separate islands). The 1965 map is identical to the 1962 map
except that Long Island has become one island and the separate
Roastbeef Island is not identified as South African territory.
When we look at the German maps of South West Africa, both offi-
cial and non-official, published in 1892,116 1894,167 1896,168 1899,11 1904,170
162. South West Africa, 1961, Surveyor-General, Windhoek (rev. ed. 1961), scale
1:800,000. This map shows Hollam's Bird, Ichabo, and Possession Islands, but does not
identify them as South African territory.
163. Southern Africa 1962, Trigonometrical Survey, Government Printer, Pretoria (1st
ed. 1962), scale 1:2,500,000. For a non-official South African map showing the same territo-
rial claims as this map shows, see South West Africa, 1966, lithographed by Keartland Press
(Pty.) Ltd., Johannesburg, scale 1:1,000,000.
164. Southern Africa 1965, Trigonometrical Survey, Government Printer, Pretoria (2nd
ed. 1965), scale 1:2500,000. The third (1972), fourth (1979), and fifth (1983) editions of this
map show the same territorial claims. For a non-official South African map showing the
same territorial claims, see Namibia/SWA Prospectus, Africa Institute of South Africa 31-
32 (1980), but see the map of South West Africa, Surveyor-General's Office, Windhoek
(1964), scale 1:3,000,000, which shows only a magisterial boundary between Walvis Bay and
South West Africa. All of the Penguin Islands are shown plus a separate Roastbeef Island,
but none are identified as South African territory. The same map was published in 1960, but
without showing the Penguin Islands. For commercial and official South African maps show-
ing all of the Penguin Islands (excluding Roast Beef Island) as South African territory with
Long Island shown as North and South Long Islands, see READER'S DIGEST ATLAS OF SOUTH-
ERN AFRICA 138 and 196 (1984), and map sheets 2314 Rehoboth, 2514 Ldlderitz, and 2714
Alexander Bay, Government Printer, Pretoria (1st ed. 1977), scale 1:500,000.
165. South West Africa, Sheets No. South G-33-2 and South G-33-5, drawn in the Sur-
veyor General's Office, printed at the Ordnance Survey, Southampton (1926 and 1927 re-
spectively), scale 1:500,000. The sheet in this series (South F-33-5) which shows Walvis Bay
was not found by the author.
166. Deutsch-Sfidwest-Afrika, Map No. 3, 1892, R. KIEPERT, DEUTSCHERKOLONIAL-AT-
LAS (Berlin 1893), scale 1:3,000,000. This map shows Hollams Bird, Mercury, Ichaboe, Seal,
Halifax, Long, Possession, Pomona, Plumpudding, and Roast Beef Islands as British
territory.
167. S(idwestafrikanisches Schutzgebiet, Blatt 3, 1894, LANGHANS' DEUTSCHER
KOLONIAL-ATLAS, Nr. 17, (1897), scale 1:2,000,000. This map shows Hollam's Bird, Mercury,
Ichabo, Guano or Halifax, Long, Possession, Plumpudding, Pomona, Sinclair, and Roast
Beef Islands as British territory. Seal, Penguin, and Shark Islands (as well as Halifax Is-
land) are color coded as British territory on the inset map of L0deritz Bucht.
168. Ubersichtskarte von Deutsch-Stidwest-Afrika, Map No. 5, KLEINER DEUTSCHER
KOLONIALATLAS, GEOGRAPHISCHE VERLAGSHANDLUNG DIETRICH REIMER (1896, 1898, 1899,
1900, 1905, 1906, 1908, 1910, 1911, 1913, 1914, and 1918), scale 1:500,000. Through 1906 all
of the Penguin Islands plus a separate Roast Beef Island are identified as British territory.
The 1908 edition does not show Seal, Penguin, or Halifax Islands. The 1910, 1911, and 1912
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1909,'M' 1910,' .1 1911 (5 maps), 17 and 1914,' 7 we find that Walvis Bay is
editions, under the title Deutscher Kolonialatlas mit illustriertem Jahrbuch, restore Alba-
tros Island, but does not identify it as British territory. The 1913 edition shows Albatros
Island as British territory, but Seal and Penguin Islands are not shown. The 1914 and 1918
editions are identical to the 1910, 1911, and 1912 editions except that the map is renum-
bered as no. 6.
169. Politisch-militdrische Karte von Siid-Afrika zur Veranschaulichung der Kiimpfe
zwischen Buren und Englhndern bis zur Gegenwart, Habenicht, Spezialkarte v. Afrika u.
Langhans, Deutscher Kolonial Atlas, Gotha: Justus Perthes (1899), scale 1:4,000,000. This
map shows all of the Penguin Islands as British territory.
170. Kriegskarte von Deutsch-Siidwestafrika, Berlin (1904), scale 1:800,000. This set of
eight strip maps shows all twelve Penguin islands plus a separate Roast Beef Island as Brit-
ish territory on the single sheet key for the eight strip maps. The second map is Karte von
Deutsch-Siidwestafrika nach amtlichen und anderen verlisslichen Quellen bearbeitet von
Otto Herkt, Carl Fleming, Verlag, Buchund Kunstdruckerei, A.G., Glogau (1904 ?),scale
1:3,000,000. All of the Penguin Islands plus a separate Roast Beef Island are shown as Brit-
ish territory.
171. Verwaltungs u. Verkehrskarte von Deutsch-S~idwestafrika, Ofraudeuz and Schin-
dler, Die Deutschen Kolonien (1982), scale 1:6,000,000. Halifax, Penguin, and Seal Islands
are not shown and Plumpudding Island is not identified as British territory.
172. Deutsch-Sdidwestafrika, Sheets No. 19 "Kuiseb - Unterlauf", No. 23 "Liider-
itzbucht", and No. 27 "Pomona", bearbeitet in der Topographischen Abteilung der Kgl.
Preuss. Landes-Aufnahme, Berlin (1910), scale 1:400,000. All of the Penguin Islands are
shown on this map, but only Possession, Albatross, Pomona, Sinclair, and Roastbeef Islands
are identified as British territory. Long Island is shown as North and South Long Islands.
173. The first map is entitled Karte des Landbesitzes und der Minenberechtsame in
Deutsch-Sidwestafrika, map no. 3 from the inside back cover of 2 L. SANDER, supra note 73,
scale 1:5,000,000. This map does not show Penguin and Seal Islands, and Halifax Island is
called Guano Island. Albatros Island is not identified as being British. Penguin Island is
shown on map 6 (Karte der Weichbildgrenze der Ansiedlung Luideritzbucht, scale 1:16,000),
also from the inside back cover, but it is not identified as British territory. The second and
third maps from 1911 are a set, Karte des Gebiets 1iings der Ldideritzbahn zwischen Lfider-
itzbucht und Schakalskuppe nach Aufnahmen des Regierungsgeologen Dr. Paul Range, Mit-
teilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten, Band XXIV (1911), scale 1:200,000, and Karte
der Namib zwischen dem 270 sfidl. Breite und dem Oranje-Fluss nach Aufnahmen des
Regierungsgeologen Dr. Paul Range, Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten, Band
XXIV (1911), scale 1:400,000. Hollandsbird and Mercury Islands as well as Walvis Bay are
not shown on this map's coverage. Halifax Island is not identified as British territory. Long
Island is shown as three islands, the two in the north identified as North Long Island and
the one in the south as South Long Island. Both North and South Long Islands are identi-
fied as British territory. The fourth map is entitled Obersichtskarte der Wildreservate von
Deutsch-Sfidwestafrika nach dem stand vom 1. Oktober 1911, Karte 3, from the Kleiner
Kolonialatlas, Verlag von Gustav Fischer, Jena (1911), scale 1:5,000,000. This map shows
Hollam's Bird, Mercury, Itschabo, Guano [Halifax], Long, Possession, Pomona, Plumpud-
ding, Sinclair, and Roast Beef Islands as British territory. Albatros Island is shown, but it is
not identified as British territory. The fifth map is an official admiralty chart, SUd-Atlan-
tischer Ozean, Westkiiste von Afrika, Sao Paulo de Loanda his Kapstadt, herausgegeben
vom Reichs-Marine-Amt, Berlin (1911), scale 1:3,000,000. This chart shows Hollams Bird,
Mercury, Possession, Sinclair, and Roastbeef Islands as British territory. Ichabo Island and
Albatros Rock are also shown, but they are not identified as British territory. There is also
an undated map circa 1911 which shows Long Island as three islands in the same fashion as
the previous map as well as identifying Seal, Penguin, and Halifax Islands as British terri-
tory. Karte des Sperrgebietes, Blatt 3 [of 10], Lflderitzbucht, Verlag der Geographischen
Verlagshandung Dietrich Reimer (Ernst Vohsen) Berlin (undated).
174. Deutsch-S~idwestafrika from the Kleiner Kolonialatlas 1914, Geographische
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shown as British territory as well as nearly all of the Penguin Islands -
and Sinclair and Roast Beef Islands are shown as separate islands, both
being identified as British territory. There is also a French military
map,17 a British military map, 'M and a Portuguese military map'7 of
interest, the first identifying ten of the Islands as British territory, the
second showing only two of the Islands and identifying neither as British
territory, and the third showing five of the Islands as British territory.
Looking at the non-governmental and commercially produced maps
from the United Kingdom, South Africa, and the United States of
America, one finds maps which identify, by clear implication or better,
the Penguin Islands as German territory,'"7 fail to identify them as Brit-
Verlagshandlung Dietrich Reimer (Ernst Vohsen) Berlin (1914), scale 1:5,000,000. This map
shows Hollam's Bird, Mercury, Itschabo, Guano [Halifax), Long, Possession, Albatros, Po-
mona, Plumpudding, Sinclair, and Roast Beef Islands as British territory.
175. Afrique (Region australe), Windhoek, File No. 53, Publi6 par le Service g6-
ographique de l'arm~e (1897), scale 1:2,000,000. Seal and Penguin Islands as well as Alba-
tross Rock are shown but not named. Plumpudding Island is shown north of Pomona Island
instead of south where it actually lies. Sinclair and Roastbeef Islands are shown as separate
islands. Walvis Bay is shown as British territory.
176. (Provisional) Map of German South West Africa, reproduced and printed for the
Geographical Section, General Staff, at the Ordnance Survey Office, Southampton (1914),
scale 1:3,000,000. Only Hollam's Bird and Possession Islands are shown. Walvis Bay is
clearly marked as falling outside of German South West Africa.
177. Esboo Geographico do Sudoeste Africano AllemAo e Colonias Limitrophes, Braga
(1915), scale 1:5,772,000. This map shows Holland's Bird, Mercury, Ichaboe, and Pomona
Islands as British territory. Roast Beef Island is shown but is not identified as British terri-
tory. Walvis Bay is shown as British territory.
178. Map of Africa Shewing the Territories in Dispute between Great Britain & Ger-
many Prior to the Arrangement Just Arrived at (July 1890) and the Exact Nature of the
Arrangement, Stanford's Library Map of Africa (1890), scale 1:5,977,382. This map shows
Hollandsbird, Mercury, Ichaboe, Seal, Penguin, Halifax, Possession, Albatross, Plumpud-
ding, Pomona, and "Sinclair or Roast Beef" Islands as German territory. Another map is the
lower half of a map of Africa of unknown title by Edward Stanford (1890), but approxi-
mately the same as the previous map. This map shows Hollandsbird, Mercury, Ichaboe,
Seal, Penguin, Halifax, Possession, Albatross, Pomona, and "Sinclair or Roast Beef" Islands.
A third map is 2 RAND McNALLY & Co.'s INDEXED ATLAS OF THE WORLD (1907), which both
lists (at 231) and shows (by implication at 228) all of the Penguin Islands except Long and
Plumpudding Islands (which are neither listed nor shown) as part of German South West
Africa, but the map of Africa (at 224-225) shows Hollams Bird and Ichaboe Islands as Brit-
ish territory. Sinclair and Roast Beef Islands are shown as the same island. Walvis Bay is
shown as British territory on all of these maps. It should be kept in mind that maps custom-
arily do not specifically identify coastal islands which belong to an adjacent state as part of
that state except by color coding. The Penguin Islands are so small that they usually appear
as dots on maps, so color coding is generally of no assistance. Thus, there is a certain ele-
ment of subjectivity in determining the significance of a failure to identify the Penguin
Islands as British territory on a map. One can draw a clear implication that these 1890 maps
show the Penguin Islands as German territory because they are of such a scale that the
Penguin Islands would not normally be shown. In addition, the first of these maps was made
for the purpose of showing the consequences of the 1890 Agreement. However, when one
looks at the two Juta maps, see maps cited infra note 179, it is not so easy to determine the
significance of the failure to identify the Penguin Islands as British territory, especially
when other Juta maps of the period do identify some of the Penguin Islands as British
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ish territory," 9 or identify them as British territory."' ° This confusion is
of limited evidentiary value in view of the German maps, both official and
commercial, which identify the Penguin Islands as British territory. Some
of this confusion arises out of the failure of the 1890 Anglo-German
Agreement to mention the Penguin Islands, thereby allocating them to
Germany by implication. However, in both Germany and South Africa,
there seems to have been no doubt that the Penguin Islands remained
British as part of the British Colony of the Cape of Good Hope and then
the British Dominion of the Union of South Africa. i s '
territory. See maps cited infra note 180.
179. Same map, two editions. Juta's Enlarged Map of South Africa from the Cape to
the Zambesi (1898 and 1900), scale 1:1,900,800 (30 miles = 1 inch), and Juta's Map of South
Africa from the Cape to the Zambesi (1899), scale 1:2,534,400 (40 miles = 1 inch). These
maps show Hollands Bird, Mercury, Ichaboe, Seal, Penguin, Halifax, Possession, Albatross,
Plum Pudding, Pomona, and "Sinclair or Roast Beef" Islands, but do not identify them as
British territory. By implication, these islands appear to be German territory. See also
Stanford's Map of British South Africa (1895), scale 1:5,977,382. This map shows all of the
Penguin Islands (Sinclair and Roast Beef Island being shown as one island) except for Long
and Plumpudding Islands. Walvis Bay is always identified as British territory.
180. Same map, four editions. Central & South Africa, Edinburgh Geographical Insti-
tute (1891, 1894, 1896, and 1899), scale 1:5,600,000. These maps show Mercury, Ichaboe,
Penguin, Halifax, Possession, Pomona, Plumpudding, and Roast Beef Islands as British ter-
ritory. Hollam's Bird Island is shown but not identified as British territory. Also, Bartholo-
mew's Special Map of South Africa, Edinburgh Geographical Institute (1899), scale
1:2,500,000. This map, covering the region south of 270 south latitude, shows Plum Pudding,
Pomona, Sinclair, and Roast Beef Islands as British territory. Also, A Map of Africa Show-
ing the Boundaries Settled by International Treaties & Agreements, published for the Pro-
ceedings of the Royal Geographical Society (1890), scale 1:18,000,000. This map shows Hol-
lam's Bird, Mercury, Ichaboe, Penguin, Seal, Halifax, Possession, Pomona, Plumpudding,
and Roast Beef Islands as British territory. Finally, four British publications identify one or
more of the Penguin Islands as British territory. In the first, Hollams Bird and Mercury
Islands are identified as British territory, and Ichaboe, Halifax, Long, Possession, Plumpud-
ding, Pomona, and Roast Beef Islands are shown but not so identified. NEW ENCYCLOPEDIC
ATLAS AND GAZETTER OF THE WORLD 71 (special 1910 census ed. 1911). In the second, the
twelve islands so identified include Roast Beef Island, but not Sinclair Island. 2 ENCYCLOPE-
DIA BRITANNICA 42 (11th ed. 1910). The Britannica map of South Africa shows Hollams Bird,
Ichaboe, Possession, Plumpudding, and Roast Beef Islands, none of which, however, are
identified as British territory. Plumpudding Island is misidentified and the island identified
as Roast Beef is the same as the Roast Beef Island identified on modern South African
maps lying approximately 30 kilometers south of Sinclair Island. 25 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITAN-
NICA following 466 (11th ed. 1911), scale 1:7,500,000. In the third, over half of the Penguin
Islands are shown on very small maps and the islands are color coded as British territory.
They are identified as the Guano Islands, but are not individually named except on the last
map in each Part where Possession Island is identified. 4 C. LucAs, A HISTORICAL GEOGRA-
PHY OF THE BRITISH COLONIES, SOUTH AFRICA, Part I at 309, and maps following 310, 320,
and 331, Part III at map following 332 (new ed. 1913), and 4 C. LucAs, A HISTORICAL GEOG-
RAPHY OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS, SOUTH AFRICA, Part II at maps facing title page and fol-
lowing 533 (new ed. 1915). The fourth, THE STATESMAN YEARBOOK 1901 at Plate 1, identifies
Ichaboe Island as British territory on a world map which shows the European colonial em-
pires. Walvis Bay is shown or described as British territory in all of the above publications.
181. In 1899, the Cape Prime Minister stated in the House of Assembly of the Colony
of the Cape of Good Hope, that the Penguin Islands were ". . . a valuable possession of the
Colony." HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, COLONY OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 280 (1899).
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Finally, there are a number of official United Nations maps of South
West Africa/Namibia, none of which show the Penguin Islands. Nineteen
such maps have been found and the thirteen maps dating from May 1950
to March 1977 show an international boundary between Walvis Bay and
South West Africa/Namibia while the six maps dating from October 1977
to March 1984 show no boundary at all.182
What conclusions can be drawn from these maps? As South Africa
could not unilaterally alter the terms of the Mandate,183 the official South
African maps showing Walvis Bay as part of South West Africa as well as
those failing to identify the Penguin Islands as South African territory
are of very limited value."8 4 Further, since 1940, the South African maps
182. These United Nations maps have the following numbers and dates:
238 May 1950
559 May 1954
560 May 1954
1109 Sep 1958
1208 Nov 1959
1417 Apr 1963
1548 Sep 1964
1688 Nov 1966
1689 Nov 1966
1765 Dec 1967
1689 Rev 1 Jan 1969
1765 Rev 1 Jan 1969
2927 Mar 1977
2947 Oct 1977
2947 Nov 1977
3124 Dec 1980
3168 May 1982
3228 Mar 1983
3228 Rev 1 Mar 1984
All but the first map and the last two maps carry either of the following disclaimers: "The
boundaries on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Na-
tions," or "The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement
or acceptance by the United Nations." The disclaimer on the last two maps is more exten-
sive, but of the same nature. The boundary of Walvis Bay was settled in 1911, and there has
been no dispute since. It can be fairly argued that these disclaimers only relate to the "de-
limitation" of the boundaries shown and not to the "allocation" of territory shown. Thus,
the United Nations maps which show an international boundary between Walvis Bay and
South West Africa/Namibia show acquiescence and recognition by the United Nations to
South African sovereignty over Walvis Bay. The first map, which lacks any disclaimer, even
identifies Walvis Bay as belonging to the Union of South Africa. The next twelve maps just
show an international boundary between Walvis Bay and South West Africa/Namibia. Map
No. 1765 Rev 1 (1969) was republished with the same number in 20 U.N. Chronicle (No. 3)
at 18 (1983), but without the international boundary between Walvis Bay and Namibia. The
international boundary, however, was on the map when it was published in 1969. The copies
of the United Nations maps of Namibia collected by the author are now at the Geography
and Map Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., U.S.A. The United Nations Map
Library in New York does not have a complete set of these maps.
183. 4 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1273 (1923).
184. But see Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829, 852, 22 AM. J. INT'L
L. 867, 891 (1928), where the arbitrator said ".... official or semi-official maps ... would be
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almost always have shown Walvis Bay as not part of South West Africa/
Namibia, a situation acquiesced in and recognized by the United Nations
and the world, at least until 1977. It is difficult to see any basis at this
time, predicated on the map evidence, to deny South African sovereignty
over Walvis Bay. As to the Penguin Islands, the situation is similar al-
though the record is much more scanty. Although South Africa did not
note its claim on its maps until 1962, South Africa's claim to the Penguin
Islands had been previously recognized; and so long as South Africa ad-
ministered South West Africa, it just did not matter. Once South Africa's
claim was asserted in 1962, it was not challenged until 1977 when the
issue was raised in the United Nations. If anything, the case for South
Africa is even stronger as to the Penguin Islands.' s
F. The Role of Estoppel in International Law
It has been argued that principles of estoppel in international law bar
South Africa's claim of sovereignty over Walvis Bay. 8 ' The argument is
predicated on South Africa's conduct in severing Walvis Bay from the
Province of the Cape of Good Hope and incorporating it into South West
Africa so totally that an independent Namibia is not economically viable
without Walvis Bay. Having caused the people of Walvis Bay and
Namibia to rely on the integration as a fait acompli, the argument goes,
South Africa is now estopped to claim sovereignty over Walvis Bay.
The principal problem with this argument is that estoppel, like ac-
quiescence and recognition, is not a mode of acquisition of territory, but
rather forms a part of the evidence of sovereignty - acquiescence, recog-
nition, admissions, and estoppel often blurring together in any given
case. "' This means that the place of estoppel in international law, espe-
cially in territorial issues, serves as an aid in the interpretation of the
facts and legal instruments." In other words, although estoppel has been
called a principle of substantive law,8 9 it is essentially procedural in that
there must be a recognized basis for claiming sovereignty over disputed
territory or estoppel has no application. One writer' 0 has pointed out
that the attitude of international law towards estoppel is not consistent,
sometimes requiring the English law prerequisite of reliance and detri-
of special interest in cases where they do not assert the sovereignty of the county of which
the Government has caused them to be issued."
185. It is interesting that the exhaustive study of African boundaries by BROWNLIE,
supra note 20, makes no mention of the Penguin Islands.
186. Note, Namibia, supra note 2, at 904-910; Landis, supra note 2; Asmal supra note
2, at 29-31.
187. BROWNLIE, supra note 82, at 164-65; AKEHURST, supra note 85, at 148-50. See also
Rann of Kutch (Ind. v. Pak.), 17 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1, 449-54, 549, 50 I.L.R. 2, 409-15, 494-95
(1968).
188. BROWNLIE, supra note 82, at 165.
189. Argentine-Chile Frontier Case, 16 U.N.R.I.A.A. 11, 164, 38 I.L.R. 10, 76-77 (1966).
190. AKEHURST, supra note 85, at 149.
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ment '9 and sometimes not.'9 2 Further, sometimes estoppel in interna-
tional law has the effect of making it impossible for a party to contradict
his previous statement, as in English law;' 93 other times it is merely evi-
dentiary, that is, its effect is simply to make it difficult for a party to
contradict his previous statement.
94
A quick review of the leading international law cases on this issue
demonstrates that estoppel is not a mode of acquisition of territory, but it
can prevent the acquisition of territory. In the Preah Vihear Temple
(Camb. v. Thai.) case, estoppel (called recognition and acceptance) was
invoked to prevent Thailand from denying that the boundary was that as
shown on a map195 - this was a delimitation of a boundary case, not an
acquisition of territory case, the Court finding that the boundary that was
established was the map boundary, not the treaty boundary. In the Legal
Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.) case, estoppel (called recog-
nition) was invoked to prevent Norway from denying its own recognition
of Danish sovereignty over the disputed territory'9" - here estoppel was
used to prevent the acquisition of territory. In the Right of Passage Over
Indian Territory (Port. v. Ind.) case, estoppel (called recognition) was
invoked to prevent India from denying Portugal's effective occupation of
Portuguese enclaves in Indian territory.' 7 In the Arbitral Award of the
King of Spain (Hon. v. Nic.) case, estoppel (called recognition) was in-
voked to prevent Nicaragua from denying that the boundary fixed by the
King of Spain in prior arbitration and accepted by Nicaragua was in fact
191. Preah Vihear Temple (Camb. v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 63-64, 33 I.L.R. 48, 91-93
(Sep. Op. J. Fitzmaurice). The opinion of the Court spoke only of acceptance and recogni-
tion. Id. at 32-33, 33 I.L.R. at 70-71.
192. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53,
at 68-69, 3 WORLD CT. R. 148, 189.
193. Preah Vihear Temple (Camb. v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 63-64, 33 I.L.R. 48, 91-93
(Sep. Op. J. Fitzmaurice); Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 53, at 68-69, 3 WORLD CT.R. at 189; Right of Passage Over Indian Territory
(Port. v. Ind.), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 39, 31 I.L.R. 23, 51-52; Arbitral Award Made By the King of
Spain (Hon. v. Nic.), 1960 I.C.J. 192, 213, 30 I.L.R. 457, 473-74; Honduras Borders (Guat. v.
Hon.), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1307, 1327-29, 1360-61 (1933).
194. Miniquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 71, 20 I.L.R. 94, 114-15; Fish-
eries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 138-39, 18 I.L.R. 86, 101-02.
195. 1962 I.C.J. 6, 63-64, 33 I.L.R. 48, 91-93 (Sep. Op. J. Fitzmaurice). It is important to
distinguish in boundary delimitation situations between boundaries fixed upon readily iden-
tifiable geographical features, such as the center of a river, and boundaries fixed upon non-
readily identifiable features, such as lines of longitude and latitude or the watershed in
Preah Vihear Temple, id. In the latter situation, the boundary remains inchoate until it is
marked upon the ground or upon a map of such a scale that one using the map can readily
determine where on the ground (or water) the boundary is. There is the further question, in
a boundary determination case, of whether the final decision fixing the boundary amounts
to a mere delimitation of the boundary or is an allocation of territory. The Supreme Court
of India in Patel and Others v. Union of India, 1969 A.I.R.(S.C.) 783, opted for the former
viewpoint in interpreting Rann of Kutch (Ind. v. Pak.), 17 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1, 50 I.L.R. 2,
(1968).
196. 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 68-69, 3 WORLD CT. R. 148, 189.
197. 1960 I.C.J. 6, 39, 31 I.L.R. 23, 51-52.
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its boundary" 8 - another delimitation of a boundary case. In The Min-
quier and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.) case, estoppel (by admission, i.e., recogni-
tion) was invoked to prevent France from denying that the boundary be-
tween France and the Channel Islands was where France had previously
said it was ' 9 - still another delimitation of a boundary case, but here
estoppel acted to prevent France from acquiring territory. In the Fisher-
ies Case (UK, v. Nor.), estoppel (called acquiescence) was invoked to
prevent the United Kingdom from claiming that the fishing zone bound-
ary set by Norway had not been set according to a valid principle of in-
ternational law200 - yet another delimitation of a boundary case. And in
the Honduras Borders (Guat. v. Hon.) case, estoppel (called acquiescence
and recognition) was invoked to (1) bar Honduras from denying Guate-
mala's sovereignty over territory over which there had been a continued
and long unopposed assertion of Guatemalan authority which should have
invited opposition,"'1 and (2) bar Guatemala from denying that another
part of its border with Honduras was where Guatemala had placed it on
one of its official maps 22 - yet another delimitation of a boundary case
where estoppel acted to prevent the acquisition of territory by both par-
ties. There is just no authority in the international law cases that estoppel
may act to effect the transfer of territory from one state to another.
Turning to the prerequisites of estoppel, one writer, after noting that
estoppel in international law is procedural, sets out the following essential
elements of international estoppel:
(1) the right was apparently actionable;
(2) the party actually seised of the right ought to have been aware
that it was actionable;
(3) that party ought to have been aware that his silence might be con-
strued by others as a communication of assent to their behavior, ar-
guably contrary to the right;
(4) that party ought to have communicated, unequivocally in all
processes available to him, that he did not accede to such behavior
and that he reserved his right to action;
(5) under the circumstances, others could not have been expected to
be informed of such intentions or to consider them serious or prima
facie valid;
(6) others did not, manifestly or tacitly, attempt to defer or prevent
authoritative resolution of the conflicting claims;
(7) subsequent action on the initial right will be prejudicial to the in-
terests of either the community or to its individual members.0 3
198. 1960 I.C.J. 192, 213, 30 I.L.R. 457, 473-74.
199. 1953 I.C.J. 47, 71, 20 I.L.R. 94, 114-15.
200. 1951 I.C.J. 116, 138-39, 18 I.L.R. 86, 101-02.
201. 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1307, 1327-29 (1933).
202. Id. at 1360-61.
203. W. M. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION 385-86 (1971). Note, Namibia, supra note
2, at 904, purports to rely on Reisman for its estoppel argument, but it fails to note the
procedural aspect of estoppel and recasts Reisman's elements eliminating some of them
without explanation. For a discussion of estoppel in international law, see MacGibbon,
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Putting aside any difficulties2 other than applying these criteria to
the status of Walvis Bay, we find that these criteria cannot be met.
(1) the right was apparently actionable: South Africa's right to keep
Walvis Bay as a part of the Cape Province cannot be said to have
been actionable. By the terms of the Mandate, South Africa had the
right to administer South West Africa as an integral part of the
Union.2 s0 Including Walvis Bay in the administration of South West
Africa is within the confines of the Mandate and was acquiesced to by
the League of Nations, the only body that would have any right to
bring an action.2"
(2) the party actually seised of the right ought to have been aware
that it was actionable: The right not being actionable, this element
has no application.
(3) that party ought to have been aware that his silence might be
construed by others as a communication of assent to their behavior,
arguably contrary to the right: The right not being actionable, this
element has no application. Here, South Africa was not silent as it
repeatedly asserted that the administration of Walvis Bay had been
transferred to the Mandated Territory only for administrative pur-
poses and that it remained part of the Province of the Cape of Good
Hope.
(4) that party ought to have commtnicated, unequivocally in all
processes available to him, that he did not accede to such behavior
and that he reserved his right to action: By expressly stating that
Walvis Bay remained part of the Province of the Cape of Good Hope,
by only treating it "as if" it were part of South West Africa, and by
never petitioning the Council of the League of Nations to include
Walvis Bay in the Mandated Territory, South Africa adequately pre-
served its sovereignty over Walvis Bay.
(5) under the circumstances, others could not have been expected to
be informed of such intentions or to consider them serious or prima
facie valid: As South Africa, in effect, informed the entire world that
Walvis Bay remained under South African sovereignty, a position ac-
quiesced to by the League of Nations and unchallenged by the United
Nations until 1977, this element has no application.
(6) others did not, manifestly or tacitly, attempt to defer or prevent
authoritative resolution of the conflicting claims: As there were no
conflicting claims to be resolved until 1977, this element has no
application.
supra note 97; Bowett, supra note 98; Rubin, The International Legal Effects of Unilateral
Declarations, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 16-23 (1977).
204. As previously noted, South Africa was forbidden to unilaterally alter the terms of
the Mandate, see sources cited supra note 124. In addition, there is no recognized basis or
mode of acquisition whereby Namibia would have a claim to Walvis Bay.
205. In 1960, South African legal scholars considered that ".... while not a portion of
the Union as such, the territory, whose exact juridical status is a mystery, is so closely con-
nected with the Union as to be practically a fifth province." HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 22.
See also AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 1986, at 693-94 (15th ed.1985).
206. See sources cited supra notes 123-24.
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(7) subsequent action on the initial right will be prejudicial to the
interests of either the community or to its individual members: Here
is the only element where one can present an argument against South
Africa retaining Walvis Bay. South African retention of Walvis Bay
could adversely affect the economy of Namibia. However, is this effect
any different for any landlocked country that must depend upon its
neighbors for seaborne trade? In other words, is this the kind of
prejudice which counts, especially when Walvis Bay is just as depen-
dent economically as Namibia is on Namibia's continued use of the
port.
Even if the last element is conceded, this is insufficient for the applica-
tion of estoppel in international law to the question of South African sov-
ereignty over Walvis Bay.
207
Turning to the Penguin Islands, there is no basis whatever to apply
estoppel. The Penguin Islands were never administered as part of the
Mandated Territory, and there is nothing to link them to Namibia other
than their geographical proximity.
208
207. It should be noted in passing that the proponents of estoppel against South Africa
over Walvis Bay assumethat sovereignty is the only issue. Little thought has been given to
the application of estoppel to the way South Africa will administer Walvis Bay after
Namibian independence. Likewise, there is the issue of whether South Africa's obligations
under the Mandate might continue after Namibian independence insofar as Walvis Bay is
vital to the economic survival of Namibia. An argument can certainly be made that South
Africa, having created this situation of dependance, is bound by a residual duty under the
Mandate to maintain Walvis Bay for the benefit of the people of Namibia. These issues of
estoppel and residual duty under the Mandate are beyond the scope of this article. The only
conduct of South Africa relevant to the issue of sovereignty over Walvis Bay relates to the
maps produced by South Africa which failed to show an international boundary between
Walvis Bay and South West Africa, see maps cited supra notes 148-154. This is hardly
sufficient to invoke estoppel against South Africa. In view of South Africa's administration
of the Mandate, it is questionable whether these maps were intended to ascertain sovereign
rights.
208. In its annual Reports to the Council of the League of Nations Concerning the'
Administration of South West Africa which were submitted from 1920 until 1939, there was
a section in each Report (except for the first three or four years) entitled "Mining" which
contained statistics and other data on guano production in the Mandated Territory. Not
once did this section ever include any data on the Penguin islands. The Penguin Islands
(also known as the Northern or Ichaboe Group of the Government Guano Islands) were
under the administration of the Departments of Agriculture of the Cape or Union Govern-
ments from 1895 until 1951 when the administration was transferred to the Department of
Commerce and Industry of the Union Government. See The Guano Islands of South Africa,
in Official Yearbook of the Union and of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swazi-
land, No. 9, 1926-1927, at 41-43 (1928), and id. at No. 29, 1956-1957, at 668 (1958). There
are other islands like the Penguin islands which lie in or near the territorial waters of an-
other state, but are an integral part of the nation to which they belong; e.g., the French
Department of St. Pierre and Miquelon off the south coast of Newfoundland, Canada; the
numerous Greek islands in the Aegean Sea adjacent to Turkey; and the Vietnamese island
of Phu Quoc off the coast of Kampuchea.
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G. Walvis Bay as a Non-Self-Governing Territory
It has been argued that, if Walvis Bay is not part of the Mandated
Territory of South West Africa and thus not subject to the trust imposed
on South Africa by the Mandate, it is a non-self-governing territory
within the meaning of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter which
imposes a duty on South Africa to administer Walvis Bay as a "sacred
trust"." 9 If Article 73 applies to Walvis Bay, then the principle of self-
determination also applies and South Africa has the duty to abide by the
desires of the inhabitants21 ° as to whether they wish to be part of South
Africa or part of Namibia.211
This argument has been predicated upon two United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions by which the following criteria were estab-
lished for determining if a territory is non-self-governing: (1) the territory
must be geographically separate from the administering state; (2) its peo-
ple must be ethnically or culturally distinct from those of the administer-
ing state; and (3) its status must be arbitrarily subordinate to that of the
administering state." 2 Applying these criteria, Walvis Bay does not qual-
ify as a non-self-governing territory.
The first of the three criteria is established by virtue of Walvis Bay's
geographical separation from the rest of South Africa. However, it must
be noted that such a situation is not unique in Africa. Three other similar
coastal enclaves forming integral parts of their respective nations exist on
209. Note, Namibia, supra note 2, at 916-20; Asmal, supra note 2, at 6-12. Note that
this principle can have no application to the Penguin Islands because they are uninhabited.
210. What these desires would be has never been determined, but a majority of the
population of Walvis Bay is non-white and thus may wish to be incorporated into an inde-
pendent Namibia. The 1980 population of Walvis Bay was 18,735 of which there were 5,772
whites, 4,751 "Coloureds" (persons of mixed race), and 8,212 Africans. See MOORSOM, supra
note 2, at 8.
211. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Ad-
visory Opinion), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31, 49 I.L.R. 3, 21.
212. Note, Namibia, supra note 2, at 916, and Asmal, supra note 2, at 33, citing to G.A.
Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); 1960 U.N. Y.B. 49;
G.A. Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); 1960 U.N.
Y.B. 509. G.A. Res. 1514 is a declaration of the right to self-determination for non-self-
governing territories. It sets out no criteria for determining what is a non-self-governing
territory. Paragraph 6 of G.A. Res. 1514 provides that "any attempt aimed at the partial or
total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompati-
ble with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." This paragraph
can be utilized by both sides in the Walvis Bay dispute to support their respective positions.
It is the Annex to G.A. Res. 1541, entitled Principles which should guide Members in deter-
mining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for in Article
73e of the Charter of the United Nations, which set out the criteria. G.A. Res. 1541, supra
Annex at Principles IV, V. The question naturally arises as to whether this "guide" can be
said to state positive international law because General Assembly Resolutions are nonbind-
ing recommendations only. U.N. CHARTER arts. 10-11, 13-14. But note that the General As-
sembly had the power to terminate South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa. See
supra note 124.
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the continent - the Angolan enclave of Cabinda and the Spanish Medi-
terranean enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.212 This criterion is not particu-
larly helpful here.
Turning to the second, this is somewhat difficult to apply. As to the
majority white and "coloured" populations of Walvis Bay, there clearly is
ethnic and cultural identity with the same population groups in South
Africa.214 As to the minority black African population, what is the ethnic
and cultural test and how can it be applied on a continent where national
boundaries as a matter of practice ignore ethnic and cultural identity?1 5
This problem of the cultural or ethnic arbitrariness of African boundaries
has been addressed by the independent nations of Africa on two occasions
- the first in 1964 when the member states of the Organisation of Afri-
can Unity by resolution pledged themselves to respect their frontiers
which existed at their independence, 2  and the second in 1969 in the
Manifesto on Southern Africa (the Lusaka Declaration) approved by the
Conference of East African and Central African States and adopted by
the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity
in which it was stated that "the present boundaries of the states of
Southern Africa are the boundaries of what will be free and independent
African states."'2 1' Quite clearly, the African nations themselves have
taken the position that colonial boundaries override ethnic or cultural
distinctions, and specifically so in southern Africa. To apply this criterion
to Walvis Bay and not to the rest of Africa would be wholly arbitrary.2 18
It is with the third of these criteria that this argument truly fails.
Apart from the problem of determining exactly what is meant by "arbi-
213. On the Arabian Peninsula, there is the Omani enclave on the Musandam Penin-
sula separated from the rest of Oman by the United Arab Emirates. In Europe, there is the
German enclave of Bosingen am Hochrhein, surrounded entirely by Switzerland, and the
Belgian enclave of Baerle-Duc, surrounded entirely by the Netherlands. As to the latter, the
International Court of Justice ruled in favor of Belgium in its dispute with the Netherlands
over the question of sovereignty over this enclave thereby implicitly rejecting the principle
of contiguity as a rule of positive international law which grants contiguous states para-
mount claims to enclaves and adjacent territories (the argument of contiguity not having
been raised). Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land (Belg. v. Neth.),
1959 I.C.J. 209, 27 I.L.R. 62. See also Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829,
854-55, 869, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867, 893-94, 910 (1928); BROWNLIE, supra note 82, at 153;
AKEHURST, supra note 85, at 153. For some more enclaves, past and present, see F. E.
KRENZ, INTERNATIONAL ENCLAVES AND RIGHTS OF PASSAGE (1961).
214. Whites and "Coloureds" (persons of mixed race) constituted 56.2% of the popula-
tion of Walvis Bay in 1980. See MOORSOM, supra note 2, at 8.
215. Note Namibia, supra note 2, at 917 n.83, solves this dilemma by deciding that the
relevant ethnic and cultural group in Walvis Bay is the entire population while that of
South Africa is only the white population. Such an arbitrary choice defies logic.
216. BASIC DOCUMENTS ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS 360, para. 2 (I. Brownlie ed. 1971).
217. 1 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 141, para. 11 (L.B. Sohn
ed. 1971).
218. This criterion is sound in the context of a colonial power located far from the
African continent. It is when it is applied to a wholly African context that it has little
validity.
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trarily subordinate", the status of Walvis Bay is not in any significant
manner any more subordinate than any other part of South Africa. Here,
it is irrelevant to look at the status of Walvis Bay prior to the establish-
ment of the United Nations in 1945 because the concept of non-self-gov-
erning territory did not exist prior to that time, at least as used in the
modern context here. This concept, along with the corresponding concept
of self-determination, is the product of a gradual evolutionary develop-
ment which manifested itself in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter
and has continued to develop and mature since." 9
With the granting of parliamentary representation to South West Af-
rica in 1949,220 the Government of South Africa gave the people of South
West Africa and Walvis Bay rights virtually identical to those of the peo-
ple of the four provinces of South Africa; in effect, South West Africa had
become a de facto fifth province.2 ' Considering the political framework
of the unitary state predicated upon parliamentary supremacy which
South Africa has been since the formation of the Union in 1910,22 it is
difficult to see how South Africa's administration of Walvis Bay through
Windhoek from 1922 until 1977 instead of through Cape Town provides
the basis for arguing that the status of Walvis Bay was or is "arbitrarily
subordinate". And since 1977, with the transfer of administration back to
that of the Province of the Cape of Good Hope, the argument for the
third criterion collapses completely.223
Finally, the argument that South Africa's imposition of apartheid in
Walvis Bay provides a basis under Article 73 for depriving South Africa
of Walvis Bay, a position predicated on the proposition that apartheid
deprives the South African government of any internal legitimacy at
all,22 is a fallacious argument. One could easily use this argument to jus-
tify dismembering not only the rest of South Africa, but a number of
other countries in the world with oppressed minorities. Governmental le-
gitimacy and territorial sovereignty are not the same thing, and there is
no basis for applying the criteria of the former to that of the latter.225
In the final analysis, the degree of subjectivity here should make the
international lawyer hesitate. How can one validly argue that Walvis Bay
219. Asmal, supra note 2, at 10-12; G.A. Res. 1541, Principle II, Annex, 15 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); 1960 U.N. Y.B. 509.
220. South Africa never de jure incorporated South West Africa as it was permitted to
do. Mandate for German South West Africa, art. 2. See Appendix "C".
221. Honduras Borders (Guat. v. Hon.), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1307, 1327-29 (1933).
222. The author accepts that if Walvis Bay was a non-self- governing territory in 1977,
South Africa's action in transferring the administration of Walvis Bay back to that of the
Cape of Good Hope would have no effect on that status. It is submitted that the argument
in favor of such status was hopelessly weak in 1977, and that the 1977 transfer and subse-
quent internal developments as to Walvis Bay have destroyed this argument completely.
223. Asmal, supra note 2, at 16-22.
224. Id.
225. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 85, at 131 et seq. (recognition of governments) and id. at
451-52 (territorial sovereignty).
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is a non-self-governing territory subject to the right of self-determination
in terms of these United Nations General Assembly Resolutions when the
United Nations General Assembly refuses to accord such status to Gibral-
tar and the Falkland Islands, colonies which would so obviously qualify
but for their neighbors' questionable claims to sovereignty?2 " In the con-
text of Walvis Bay, the arguments premised on Article 73 are not legally
valid.22 They form no basis for taking Walvis Bay from South Africa
under any claim predicated on rules of international law.
V. Conclusion
From the foregoing, it is difficult to draw any conclusion based on
law other than that South Africa's claims to sovereignty over Walvis Bay
and the Penguin Islands22 8 are valid. Since annexation in the last century,
sovereignty over both Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands by the British
Empire and its successor, South Africa, has been continuous, effective,
and internationally recognized. No action by South Africa has altered this
state of affairs. While the United Nations General Assembly2 has con-
demned South Africa for its 1977 transfer of the administration of Walvis
Bay from that of South West Africa/Namibia to that of the Province of
the Cape of Good Hope, calling it an "annexation", this characterization
is legally erroneous. Annexation of territory is a method of acquiring ter-
ritorial sovereignty. 20 As sovereignty over Walvis Bay has been vested in
South Africa (or its predecessor, the British Empire) for more than a cen-
tury, the 1977 transfer of administration had no effect on that sovereignty
which continued to be vested in South Africa. For better or worse, as to
226. R. PERL, THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DispuTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 36-
40 (1983). The argument against self-determination for Gibraltar is predicated on the doc-
trine of "colonial enclaves" which holds that territory detached by a colonial power from the
surrounding territory should be returned to the surrounding state. It could be argued that
Walvis Bay is a "colonial enclave" although South Africa is not a colonial power in the
traditional sense. See Shaw, supra note 78, at 134-40. Note, however, that this doctrine is
inconsistent with self-determination. The difficulty here is that the status of Walvis Bay is
no different than that of the Angolan enclave of Cabinda or the Spanish African enclaves of
Ceuta and Melilla.
227. Other nonlegal reasons have been advanced for giving Walvis Bay to Namibia such
as economic and military necessity, but these reasons have little or no legal basis and are in
fact political reasons; and thus they are beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of
these other considerations, see MOORSOM, supra note 2, at 58-66; Note, Namibia, supra note
2, at 920-22; Dore, Self-Determination of Namibia and the United Nations: Paradigm of a
Paradox, 27 HARv.INT'L L.J. 159, 173-76 (1986); Munkman, supra note 93, at 99-100.
228. Any problem over there being one island too many (a Roast Beef Island separate
from Sinclair Island) has been eliminated because South Africa is not claiming Roast Beef
Island. The problem of how many islands constitute Long Island should be only a question
of evidence.
229. G.A. Res. 32/9D, U.N. Doc. A/32/2.7 paras. 6-8 (1977) and id. at Add. 1-3 (1977);
1977 U.N. Y.B. 918. The Security Council Resolution only called for the "reintegration" of
Walvis Bay into Namibia. S.C. Res. 432, U.N. Doc. S/RES/432 (1978).
230. J. G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 160 (9th ed. 1984); 1
O'CONNELL, supra note 82, at 432-33.
VOL. 16:2,3
1988 WALvIs BAY: SOUTH AFRICA'S CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY 289
both Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands, this time South Africa stands
in the legal right.
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APPENDIX "A"
1. BRITISH PROCLAMATION, taking possession of the Port or Set-
tlement of Walfisch Bay. - Walfisch Bay, Mar. 12, 1878. [69 B.F.S.P.
11771
PROCLAMATION by Richard Cossantine Dyer, Esquire, Staff-Com-
mander in command of Her Majesty's ship Industry, at present lying at
anchor off the Port or Settlement of Walfisch Bay.
WHEREAS it is expedient that the Port or Settlement of Walfisch
Bay, together with a certain portion of the territory surrounding the
same, shall be taken possession of on behalf of Her Britannic Majesty
Queen Victoria, and, subject to the pleasure of Her Majesty in that be-
half, be declared a dependency of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland: Now, therefore, I, Richard Cossantine Dyer, the officer in
command of Her Majesty's ship Industry, at present lying at anchor off
the said settlement, do, in the name of Her said Britannic Majesty, Queen
Victoria, take possession of the said port or settlement of Walfisch Bay,
together with the territory hereinafter described and defined, in token
whereof I have this day hoisted the British flag over the said port, settle-
ment, and territory, and I do proclaim, declare, and make known that the
sovereignty and dominion of Her said Britannic Majesty shall be and the
same are hereby declared over the said port, settlement, and territory of
Walfisch Bay; and I do further proclaim, declare, and make known that
the said territory of Walfisch Bay so taken possession of by me as afore-
said shall be bounded as follows: that is to say, on the south by a line
from a point on the coast 15 miles south of Pelican Point to Scheppman-
sdorf; on the east by a line from Scheppmansdorf to the Rooibank, in-
cluding the Plateau, and thence to 10 miles inland from the mouth of the
Swakop River; on the north by the last 10 miles of the course of the said
Swakop River.
This Proclamation of Her Majesty's sovereignty and dominion shall
take effect forthwith, but shall be subject to Her Majesty's gracious con-
firmation and disallowance.
God save the Queen!
Given under my hand and seal at Walfisch Bay, this 12th day of
March, 1878.
RICHARD C. DYER, Staff-Commander in command.
2. BRITISH LETTERS PATENT, for the Annexation to the Colony of
the Cape of Good Hope of the Port or Settlement of Walfisch Bay, on the
West Coast of South Africa, and of certain Territory surrounding the
same. - Westminster, Dec. 14, 1878. [70 B.F.S.P. 495]
VICTORIA, by the grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland Queen, Defender of the Faith, Empress of India: To all to
whom these presents shall come, greeting:
VOL. 16:2,3
1988 WALVIS BAY: SOUTH AFRICA'S CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY 295
WHEREAS the port of settlement of Walfisch Bay, situated on the
West Coast of South Africa to the north of the Tropic of Capricorn, to-
gether with certain territory surrounding the same, and bounded as fol-
lows, viz.: - On the south by a line from a point on the coast 15 miles
south of Pelican Point to Scheppmansdorf; on the east by a line from
Scheppmansdorf to the Rooibank, including the plateau, and thence to 10
miles inland from the mouth of the Swakop River; on the north by the
last 10 miles of the course of the said Swakop River, and on the west by
the Atlantic Ocean; was, on the 12th day of March, 1878, by Proclamation
duly taken possession of for us* and on our behalf:
And whereas it is expedient to provide that the said port, settlement,
and territory may be annexed to and form part of our Colony of the Cape
of Good Hope:
Now we do, by these our Letters Patent, under the Great Seal of Our
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, ratify and confirm the
aforesaid Proclamation of the 12th day of March, 1878. And we do fur-
ther authorize our Governor for the time being of our said Colony of the
Cape of Good Hope, by Proclamation under his hand and the public seal
of the said Colony, to declare that, from and after a day to be therein
mentioned, the said port, settlement, and territory shall be annexed to
and form part of our said Colony. Provided always that our said Governor
issues no such Proclamation as aforesaid until the Legislature of our said
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope shall have passed a law providing that
the said port, settlement, and territory shall, on the day aforesaid, be-
come part of our said Colony, and subject to the laws in force therein.
Provided also that the application of the said laws to the said port, settle-
ment, and territory may be modified either by such Proclamation as
aforesaid, or by any law or laws to be from time to time passed by the
Legislature of our said Colony for the government of the said port, settle-
ment, and territory so annexed.
2. And we do hereby reserve to us, our heirs and successors, full
power and authority, from time to time, to revoke, alter, or amend these
our Letters Patent as to us or them shall seem meet; and we do hereby
further reserve to us, our heirs and successors, full power and authority to
erect by Letters Patent the said port, settlement, and territory into a sep-
arate Colony, with or without any adjacent territory, or to include the
same in any adjacent British Colony or Colonies for the time being estab-
lished in South Africa.
3. And we do further direct and enjoin that these our Letters Patent
shall be read and proclaimed at such place or places as our said Governor
shall think fit within our said Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.
In witness whereof we have caused these our letters to be made pat-
ent. Witness ourself at Westminster, the 14th day of December, in the
42nd year of our reign.
By warrant under the Queen's Sign Manual.
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
C. ROMILLY.
3. ACT of the Government of the Cape of Good Hope, to provide for
the Annexation to that Colony of the Port or Settlement of Walfish Bay,
on the West Coast of Africa, and of certain Territory surrounding the
same, and of certain British Territories on the St. John's River, in South
Africa. [Act 35 of 1884]
WHEREAS it is expedient that the Port or Settlement of Walfish
Bay, situated on the west coast of South Africa, to the north of the
Tropic of Capricorn, together with certain territory surrounding the same,
and bounded as follows, viz.: on the south by a line from a point on the
coast 15 miles south of Pelican Point to Scheppmansdorp; [on the east by
a line from Scheppmansdorp] to the Rooibank, including the plateau, and
thence to 10 miles inland from the mouth of the Swakop River; on the
north by the last 10 miles of the course of the said Swakop River, and on
the west coast by the Atlantic Ocean, be annexed to this Colony; and
whereas by Her Majesty's Letters Patent, bearing date at Westminster
the 14th day of December, 1878, and passed under the Great Seal of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Governor for the time
being of this Colony was authorized by Proclamation under his hand and
the public seal of this Colony to declare that, from and after a day to be
herein mentioned, the said Port, Settlement, and territory, as in the said
Letters Patent described, should be annexed to and form part of this Col-
ony: And further whereas it is expedient that the port and tidal estuary
of the St. John's River in South Africa, and certain lands on the banks of
the said river forming part of Her Majesty's dominions be also annexed to
this Colony; and whereas by Her Majesty's Letters Patent, bearing date
at Westminster, 10th day of October, 1881, and passed under the Great
Seal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Governor
for the time being of this Colony was authorized by Proclamation under
his hand and the public seal of this Colony to declare that, from and after
the day to be therein mentioned, the said territories should be annexed to
and form part of this Colony, and by Proclamation to signify the limits of
the said territory so annexed, provided that in the case of either of the
territories to be so annexed, no such proclamation should be issued until
the Legislature of this Colony should have passed a law providing that
the said territories shall, on the day aforesaid, become part of this Colony
and subject to the laws in force therein: and provided also, that the appli-
cation of the said laws to the said territories might be modified either by
such Proclamation as aforesaid or by any law or laws to be from time to
time passed by the Legislature of this Colony for the government of the
said territories so annexed: And whereas it is expedient that a law should
be enacted providing that the said respective territories shall, on the day
to be mentioned in that behalf in a Proclamation or Proclamations of the
Governor as aforesaid, become part of this Colony: Be it enacted by the
Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, with the advice and consent of the
Legislative Council and House of Assembly thereof, as follows:
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1. From and after such day as the Governor shall, pursuant to the
powers in that behalf contained in the said Letters Patent, by Proclama-
tion under his hand and the public seal of this Colony, fix in that behalf
the Port or Settlement of Walfish Bay on the West Coast of Africa, and
certain territory surrounding the same, the limits of which are defined in
the Letters Patent of the 14th December, 1878, aforesaid, and the British
territories on the St. John's River, with the limits and name in any such
Proclamation signified, shall respectively become and be part of the Col-
ony of the Cape of Good Hope, and subject to the laws in force therein,
except as the application of the same to the said respective territories
may be modified by any such Proclamation.
2. From and after the annexation of the said respective territories to
this Colony as aforesaid, the laws which may be in force therein under
and by virtue of the last preceding section may, until it shall be otherwise
provided by Act or Parliament, be repealed, altered, amended, and modi-
fied, and new laws applicable to the said territories respectively may be
made, and may be repealed, altered, amended, and modified by the Gov-
ernor; and no Act hereafter passed by the Parliament of this Colony shall
extend or be deemed to extend to the said territories or any or either of
them unless such Act shall be extended thereto in express words either
contained therein or in some other Act of Parliament, or unless the oper-
ation thereof shall be extended to any or either of such territories by the
Governor, and no Proclamation published in the Gazette after any Proc-
lamation or Proclamations as in the last preceding section mentioned
shall be deemed to extend or apply to the said territories, or any or either
of them, unless the same shall be declared in express words contained in
such or some other Proclamation as aforesaid to extend or apply thereto.
3. The Court of the Eastern Districts shall have the jurisdiction con-
current with that of the Supreme Court in and over all causes arising, and
persons residing and being, within the territory of St. John's River so to
be annexed as aforesaid.
4. This Act may be cited as the "Walfish Bay and St. John's River
Territories Annexation Act, 1884."
4. PROCLAMATION by the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope and
High Commissioner for South Africa, annexing Walfish Bay to the Colony
of the Cape of Good Hope. - Aug. 7, 1884. [75 B.F.S.P. 407]
PROCLAMATION by his Excellency the Right Honourable Sir Her-
cules George Robert Robinson, a Member of Her Majesty's Most
Honourable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distin-
guished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Governor and Com-
mander-in-chief of Her Majesty's Colony of the Cape of Good Hope in
South Africa, and the Territories and Dependencies thereof, and of Tem-
buland, Emigrant Tambookieland, Bomvanaland and Galekaland, and
Her Majesty's High Commissioner, &c.
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WHEREAS it is enacted by the Act No. 85 of 1884, intituled "An Act
to provide for the annexation to the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope of
the Port or Settlement of Walfish Bay on the West Coast of Africa, and
certain territory surrounding the same, and of certain British territories
in the St. John's River in South Africa," that from and after such day as
the Governor shall, pursuant to the powers in that behalf contained in
Her Majesty's Letters Patent, bearing date at Westminster the 14th day
of December 1878, by Proclamation under his hand and the public seal of
this Colony, fixed in that behalf, the Port or Settlement of Walfish Bay
on the Port or Settlement of Walfish Bay on the West Coast of Africa,
and certain territory surrounding the same, the limits of which are de-
fined in the Letters Patent aforesaid, shall become and be part of the
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and subject to the laws in force
therein, except as the application of the same to the said Port or Settle-
ment of Walfish Bay and certain territory surrounding the same may be
modified by any such Proclamation;
Now, therefore, I, the Governor aforesaid, under and by virtue of the
powers aforesaid, do hereby proclaim, declare, and make known, that I
have fixed the date hereof as the day from and after which the said Port
or Settlement of Walfish Bay and certain territory surrounding the same,
and included under the following limits, that is to say: on the south by a
line from a point on the coast 15 miles south of Pelican Point to
Scheppman's Dorp; on the east by a line from Scheppman's Dorp to the
Rooibank, including the plateau, and thence to 10 miles inland from the
mouth of the Swakop River; on the north by the last 10 miles of the
course of the Swakop River, and on the west by the Atlantic Ocean, shall,
under the name, designation, and title of Walfish Bay, become and be
part of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and subject to the laws in
force therein.
2. I do further proclaim a Court of Resident Magistrate to be erected,
constituted, and established for and within the said territory of Walfish
Bay, and the said Court shall be holden by and before the Resident Mag-
istrate for the territory aforesaid.
God Save the Queen!
Given under my hand and the public seal of the Colony of the Cape
of Good Hope, this 7th day of August, 1884.
(L.S.) HERCULES ROBINSON, Governor.
By command of his Excellency the Governor in Council, THOMAS
UPINGTON.
5. AGREEMENT between Germany and Great Britain Respecting Zan-
zibar, Heligoland and the Spheres of Influence of the Two Countries in
Africa, signed at Berlin, 1 July 1890. [82 B.F.S.P. 35, 173 C.T.S. 271]
THE Undersigned,
Sir Edward Baldwin Malet, Her Britannic Majesty's, Ambassador
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Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary;
Sir Henry Percy Anderson, Chief of the African Department of Her
Majesty's Foreign Office;
The Chancellor of the German Empire, General von Caprivi;
The Privy Councillor in the Foreign Office, Dr.Krauel;
Have, after discussion of various questions affecting the Colonial in-
terests of Germany and Great Britain, come to the following agreement
on behalf of their respective Governments:
III. In South-west Africa the sphere in which the exercise of influence
is reserved to Germany is bounded -
1. To the south by a line commencing at the mouth of the Orange
River, and ascending the north bank of that river to the point of its
intersection by the 20th degree of east longitude.
2. To the east by a line commencing at the above-named point,
and following the 20th degree of east longitude to the point of its in-
tersection by the 22nd parallel of south latitude, it runs eastward
along that parallel to the point of its intersection by the 21st degree of
east longitude; thence it follows that degree northward to the point of
its intersection by the 18th parallel of south latitude; it runs eastward
along that parallel till it reaches the River Chobe; and descends the
centre of the main channel of that river to its junction with the
Zambezi, where it terminates.
It is understood that under this arrangement Germany shall have
free access from her Protectorate to the Zambezi by a strip of territory
which shall at no point be less than 20 English miles in width.
The sphere in which the exercise of influence is reserved to Great
Britain is bounded to the west and northwest by the above-mentioned
line. It includes Lake Ngami.
The course of the above boundary is traced in general accordance
with a Map officially prepared for the British Government in 1889.
The delimitation of the southern boundary of the British terri-
tory of Walfish Bay is reserved for arbitration, unless it shall be set-
tled by the consent of the two Powers within two years from the date
of the conclusion of this Agreement. The two Powers agree that, pend-
ing such settlement, the passage of the subjects and the transit of
goods of both Powers through the territory now in dispute shall be
free; and the treatment of their subjects in that territory shall be in
all respects equal. No dues shall be levied on goods in transit. Until a
settlement shall be effected, the territory shall be considered neutral.
6. ACT to make provision as to certain matters in respect of the rela-
tions between the Union and the Mandated Territory of South-West Af-
rica. [Act 24 of 1922]
1. Administration of and legislation for Walvis Bay as if it were part
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of the mandated territory. -
(1) From a date to be fixed by the GovernorGeneral by proclamation
in the Gazette (which date shall also further be notified by the Ad-
ministrator of the mandated territory in the Official Gazette thereof)
the port and settlement of Walvis Bay which forms part of the prov-
ince of the Cape of Good Hope shall be administered as if it were part
of the mandated territory and as if inhabitants of the said port and
settlement were inhabitants of the mandated territory; and the pow-
ers conferred upon the Governor-General by Section 2 of Act No. 35
of 1884 of the Cape of Good Hope to repeal, alter, amend or modify
any law in force in that port and settlement and to make new laws
applicable thereto may be delegated by the Governor-General to the
Administrator of the mandated territory to the intent that the said
Adminisrator may, by the repeal, alteration, amendment or modifica-
tion of laws and the making of new laws, bring the laws in force in
that port or settlement into conformity with the laws of the mandated
territory.
(2) Every proclamation by the said Administrator making such a law
and every regulation made by him in respect of the said port and set-
tlement shall be deemed to be sufficiently promulgated and published
in the Official Gazette of the mandated territory.
(4) No Act of the Union Parliament passed after the date fixed as
aforesaid shall apply to the said port and settlement unless by such
Act it is specifically expressed so to apply or unless it is declared to
apply by proclamation of the Governor-General in the Gazette.
(5) As from the date fixed as aforesaid the said port and settlement
shall for all judicial purposes be regarded as forming part of the man-
dated territory and not as forming part of the province of the Cape of
Good Hope.
(10) This Act may be cited for all purposes as "The South-West Af-
rica Affairs Act, 1922."
7. Walvis Bay Administration. By His Royal Highness the Governor-
General. [Proclamation 145 of 1922]
UNDER and by virtue of the authority vested in me by subsection
(1) of Section 1 of the South-West Africa Affairs Act, 1922, I do hereby
fix the First day of October, 1922, as the date from which the port and
settlement of Walvis Bay, which forms part of the Province of the Cape
of Good Hope, shall be administered as it were part of the mandated ter-
ritory of South-West Africa and as if inhabitants of the said port and
settlement were inhabitants of the said territory.
I do further, under and by virtue of the authority aforesaid, as from
the said First day of October, 1922, delegate to the Administrator of the
mandated territory of South-West Africa the powers conferred upon the
Governor-General by Section 2 of Act No. 35 of 1884 of the Cape of Good
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Hope, to repeal, alter, amend or modify any law in force in the port and
settlement of Walvis Bay and to make new laws applicable to that port
and settlement to the intent that the said Administrator may, by the re-
peal, alteration, amendment or modification of laws and the making of
new laws bring the laws in force in the port and settlement of Walvis Bay
into conformity with the laws of the mandated territory of South-West
Africa.
GOD SAVE THE KING
Given under my Hand and the Great Seal of the Union of South
Africa at Durban this 11th day of September, One Thousand Nine Hun-
dred and Twenty-Two.
ARTHUR FREDERICK,
Governor-General.
By Command of His Royal Highness the Governor-General-in-Council.
J. C. SMUTS.
8. Walvis Bay Administration. [Proclamation 30 of 19221
WHEREAS His Royal Highness the Governor-General of the Union
of South Africa has under and by virtue of the authority vested in him by
sub-section (1) of section one of the South-West Africa Affairs Act, 1922,
been pleased to fix by Proclamation dated at Durban on the 11th day of
September, 1922, and published in the Gazette of the Union dated 15th
September, 1922, the First day of October, 1922, as the date from which
the port and settlement of Walvis Bay, which forms part of the Province
of the Cape of Good Hope of the Union, shall be administered as if it
were part of the Mandated Territory of South-West Africa and as if its
inhabitants were inhabitants of the said Territory;
AND WHEREAS under and by virtue of the authority aforesaid, His
Royal Highness the Governor-General of the Union has been pleased as
from the said First day of October, 1922, to delegate to me as Administra-
tor of the Mandated Territory of South-West Africa, the powers con-
ferred upon him by section two of Act No. 35 of 1884 of the Cape of Good
Hope, to repeal, alter, amend or modify any law in force in the port and
settlement of Walvis Bay and to make new laws applicable to that port
and settlement to the intent that I may, by the repeal, alteration, amend-
ment or modification of laws and the making of new laws bring the laws
in force in the port and settlement of Walvis Bay into conformity with
the laws of the Mandated Territory of South-West Africa;
NOW THEREFORE, I do hereby proclaim, declare and make known
as follows: -
1. The said port and settlement of Walvis Bay shall be deemed to
form portion of the District of Swakopmund created within this Terri-
tory under the provisions of section two of the Magistrates' Courts
Act, 1917, of the Union Parliament as applied to this Territory by
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section nine of the Administration of Justice Proclamation, 1919, and
Proclamation No. 40 of 1920, dated the 2nd day of September, 1920,
shall be and is hereby amended accordingly.
2. (1) From and after the First day of October, 1922, all laws now
enforced within the said port and settlement of Walvis Bay shall be
and are hereby repealed and from that date the law as existing and
applied in the Mandated Territory of South-West Africa on that date
shall be of force and effect within the said port and settlement.
(2) From and after the said First day of October, 1922, every enact-
ment issued by the Administrator of the Territory of South-West Af-
rica having the force of law within the said Territory shall be of force
and effect within the said port and settlement unless the operation
thereof within the said port and settlement is expressly excluded.
3. Every suit and proceeding civil or criminal pending in the Court of
the Magistrate of Walvis Bay or in the Cape of Good Hope Provincial
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa at the date of the tak-
ing effect of this Proclamation shall be regarded as having by virtue of
this Proclamation been removed into the Court of the Magistrate of
the District of Swakopmund or the High Court of South-West Africa
as the case may be and may be carried on, tried, heard and deter-
mined in such lastmentioned courts in like manner as nearly as may
be as if they had been instituted or taken in those courts subsequent
to the date of the taking effect of this Proclamation provided that -
(a) All suits and proceedings relating to rights, privileges, obliga-
tions or liabilities acquired, accrued or incurred prior to the First day
of October, 1922, shall be determined according to the law in force in
the said port and settlement at the time of acquisition, accrual or in-
currence; and
(b) All offenses committed prior to the taking effect of this Procla-
mation shall be tried and determined according to the criminal law in
force in the said port and settlement prior to the First day of October,
1922.
4. (1) Any license, permit or authority issued under the authority of
any law in force in the said port and settlement before the First day
of October, 1922, shall remain valid for the period for which it was
issued and any duty, charge, fee or payment payable thereunder shall
remain payable but no additional duty, charge, fee or payment shall
become payable thereon by virtue of the provisions hereof.
(2) When any such licence, permit or authority is renewable or the
issue of a similar licence, permit or authority is permissible under the
law in force in the said port and settlement after the 30th day of Sep-
tember, 1922, but such renewal or issue cannot be immediately
granted it shall be lawful for the person having lawful authority to
grant such renewal or issue to grant a temporary licence, permit or
authority for such period as may elapse before such renewal or issue is
possible subject to such payment as the Administrator may direct.
5. All taxes, duties, dues and revenue of every kind and nature paya-
ble within the said port and settlement and due to or claimable by the
Union Government or the Provincial Administration of the Province
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of the Cape of Good Hope at the date of the taking effect of this Proc-
lamation shall become, be and continue claimable by and payable to
the Administration of South-West Africa and shall be collected and
accounted for in the like manner as the taxes, dues and revenue ac-
cording to the nature and kind thereof respectively are or ought to be
collected in the Territory of South-West Africa.
6. This Proclamation may be cited for all purposes as the Walvis Bay
Administration Proclamation, 1922, and shall commence and take ef-
fect on the First day of October, 1922.
GOD SAVE THE KING.
Given under my Hand and Seal at Pretoria this 2nd day of October,
1922.
GIJS. R. HOFMEYR,
Administrator.
9. ACT to amend the South-West Africa Affairs Act, 1922. [Act 24 of
19221
1. Section one of the South-West Africa Affairs Act, 1922, is hereby
amended by the substitution for sub-section (4) of the following sub-
section:
(4) Any Act of Parliament or proclamation by the Governor General,
passed or issued after the date fixed as aforesaid, which is in force or
which may come into operation in the mandated territory, shall, as
long as and to the extent to which it is in force also in the said port
and settlement, unless the Act or proclamation otherwise provides.
2. This Act shall be called the South-West Africa Affairs Amendment
Act, 1944.
10. NEW PROVISION for the Administration of Walvis Bay. [Procla-
mation R.202 of 1977]
Whereas from 7 August 1884 the port and settlement of Walvis Bay
formed part of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope and was adminis-
tered and legislated for as such until 30 May 1910;
And whereas from 31 May 1910 the said port and settlement has
formed part of the Province of the Cape of Good Hope and was adminis-
tered and legislated for as such until 30 September 1922;
And whereas from 1 October 1922 and in terms of the South-West
Africa Affairs Act, 1922 (Act 24 of 1922), the said port and settlement was
for reasons of expediency administered and legislated for as if it were part
of the Territory of South-West Africa and as if inhabitants thereof were
inhabitants of the said Territory;
And whereas it is expedient and desirable again to administer and
legislate for the said port and settlement as part of the Province of the
Cape of Good Hope;
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Now, therefore, under section 38 of the South-West Africa Constitu-
tion Act, 1968 (Act 39 of 1968), I make the laws set out in the Annexure.
Given under my Hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Africa
at Pretoria this Thirtieth day of August, One thousand Nine hundred and
Seventy-seven.
N. DIEDERICHS: State President.
By Order of the State President-in-Council:
B. J. VORSTER.
ANNEXURE
Definitions
1. In this Proclamation, unless the context otherwise indicates -
(iii) "province" means the Province of the Cape of Good Hope; (v)
(v) "territory" means the Territory of South-West Africa;(ii)
(vi) "Walvis Bay" means the port and settlement of Walfish Bay men-
tioned in the Walfish Bay and St. John's River Territories Annexation
Act, 1884 (Act 35 of 1884 of the Cape of Good Hope), and includes the
territory surrounding it and bounded as described in the said Act. (vi)
Administration of Walvis Bay, and application of laws in force
therein and in the province
2.
(1) Walvis Bay shall cease to be administered as if it were part of
the territory and as if inhabitants thereof were inhabitants of the Ter-
ritory and shall again be administered as part of the province.
(2) Any law in force in the said Walvis Bay on the date immediately
prior to the date of coming into operation of this subparagraph shall,
subject to the provisions of paragraph 4, continue to apply therein
until repealed, or except in so far as it may be amended or modified,
in terms of this Proclamation or any other law.
(3) Any law in force in the province and not already in operation in
Walvis Bay or any law coming into force in the province shall, subject
to the provisions of paragraph 3, also apply in the said Walvis Bay.
Electoral matters
5. Walvis Bay shall cease to be part of the Electoral Division of
Omaruru for the election of members of the House of Assembly and be
deemed not to have been part thereof at all relevant times, and shall be-
come part of the Electoral Division of Namakwaland and be deemed to
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have been part thereof at all relevant times.
Short title and commencement
8. This Proclamation shall be called the Walvis Bay Administration
Proclamation and shall come into operation on 1 September 1977.
SCHEDULE
LAWS REPEALED OR AMENDED
No. and year Extent of repeal
of Law Title or amendment
Act 24 of 1922 South-West Africa The repeal of the
Affairs Act, 1922 whole.
Act 39 of 1968 South-West Africa The repeal of
Constitution Act, 1968 section 36.
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APPENDIX "B"
1. ORDINANCE for declaring certain Guano to be the Property of Her
Majesty the Queen. [Ordinance 4 of 1845]
WHEREAS considerable quantities of the substance commonly
called "guano" have been found in and upon certain islands or rocks in
the sea within the limits of this Colony and its dependencies: And
whereas it is possible that further quantities of the said substance may
exist and be hereafter discovered at other places within the said limits:
And whereas doubts exist whether the said substance being merely or
mainly the dropping of unreclaimed birds of a base nature can in law,
though a merchantable article, be deemed to be property or possessed of
legal value: And whereas it is expedient that such doubts should be re-
moved and that all of the said substance lying and being in and upon any
place or territory within the limits aforesaid, and not granted or belong-
ing to any private individual, should be declared to be the property of
Her Majesty the Queen, and that provision should be made for prevent-
ing or punishing the unauthorized removal of the same: Be it therefore
enacted and declared by the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, with
the advice and consent of the Legislative Council thereof, that all of the
said substance commonly called guano which may now or at any time
hereafter be found lying and being in or upon any island, rock, or other
place not being the property of any private person or persons and within
the limits of this Colony and its dependencies, shall be deemed and taken
to be property and to belong to and be in the lawful possession of Her
Majesty the Queen, her heirs and successors.
6. And be it enacted that this Ordinance shall commence and take
effect from and after the date of the promulgation thereof [Jan. 30, 1845].
2. PROCLAMATION by His Excellency Sir George Grey. [Proclama-
tion 53 of 1861]
Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Gov-
ernor and Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Colony of the Cape of
Good Hope in South Africa, and of the Territories and Dependencies
thereof, and Vice-Admiral of the same, and Her Majesty's High Commis-
sioner, &c., &c., &c., &c.
WHEREAS, the Island of Ichaboe was, on the 21st day of June last
past, taken possession of for and in the name of Her Britannic Majesty
Queen Victoria, and declared a dependency of the Cape of Good Hope:
And whereas it is expedient that, subject to the pleasure of Her Majesty
in that behalf, Her dominion [sic] shall also be declared over a cluster of
small Islands or Rocks adjacent to the said Island of Ichaboe, now there-
fore, I do hereby proclaim, declare, and make known, that the sovereignty
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and dominion of Her said Britannic Majesty, Queen Victoria, shall be,
and the same are hereby declared over the following Islands or Rocks
adjacent to Ichaboe, that is to say, Hollamsbird, Mercury, Long Island,
Seal Island, Penguin Island, Halifax, Possession, Albatross Rock, Po-
mona, Plumpudding, and Roastbeef, or Sinclair's Island. This Proclama-
tion of Her Majesty's sovereignty and dominion to take effect forthwith,
but to be subject to Her Majesty's gracious confirmation and
disallowance.
GOD SAVE THE QUEEN!
Given under the Public Seal of the Settlement of the Cape of Good
Hope, this 12th day of August, 1861.
G. GREY, Governor.
By command of His Excellency the Governor,
RICHARD SOUTHEY,
Acting Colonial Secretary.
3. PROCLAMATION by His Excellency Sir Philip Edmond Wodehouse.
[Proclamation 27 of 1864]
Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Gov-
ernor and Commander in Chief of Her Majesty's Colony of the Cape of
Good Hope in South Africa, and of the Territories and Dependencies
thereof, and Vice-Admiral of the same, and Her Majesty's High Commis-
sioner, &c., &c., &c.
WHEREAS, by a Proclamation bearing date the 12th day of August,
1861, it was proclaimed and declared that the Sovereignty of Her Britan-
nic Majesty Queen VICTORIA should be, and the same was thereby, de-
clared over certain Islands on the Coast of Africa, that is to say, Hollam-
sbird, Mercury, Long Island, Seal Island, Penguin Island, Halifax,
Possession, Albatross Rock, Pomona, Plumpudding and Roastbeef, or
Sinclair's Island, and that such Proclamation should be subject to Her
Majesty's gracious confirmation and disallowance; and whereas such
Proclamation has been recently brought to the knowledge of Her Maj-
esty's Government:
Now, therefore, I do hereby proclaim and declare that Her Majesty
has been pleased to disallow the said Proclamation, and that the several
Islands, Islets, and Rocks referred to therein are not to be viewed as Brit-
ish Territory.
GOD SAVE THE QUEEN!
Given under the Public Seal of the Settlement of the Cape of Good
Hope, this 9th day of May, 1864.
P. E. WODEHOUSE, Governor.
By command of His Excellency the Governor,
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RAWSON W. RAWSON,
Colonial Secretary.
4. PROCLAMATION by His Excellency Sir Philip Edmond Wodehouse.
[Proclamation 66 Of 1866]
Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Gov-
ernor and Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Colony of the Cape of
Good Hope, in South Africa, and of the Territories and Dependencies
thereof, and Vice-Admiral of the same, and Her Majesty's High Commis-
sioner, &c., &c., &c.
WHEREAS the Island of Ichaboe was, on the 21st day of June, 1861,
taken possession of for and in the name of Her Britannic Majesty Queen
Victoria, and declared a dependency of the Cape of Good'Hope: And
whereas by a Proclamation bearing date the 12th day of August in the
same year, it was proclaimed and declared that the Sovereignty of Her
said Majesty should be, and the same was thereby declared over certain
Islands, Islets, or Rocks on the Coast of Africa, adjacent to the said Island
of Ichaboe, that is to say: Hollamsbird, Mercury, Long Island, Seal Island,
Penguin Island, Halifax Possession, Albatross Rock, Pomona, Plumpud-
ding and Roastbeef, or Sinclair's Islands, and that such Proclamation
should be subject to Her Majesty's gracious confirmation or disallowance:
And whereas Her Majesty was pleased on such lastmentioned Proclama-
tion being brought to her knowledge to disallow the same: And whereas
by a Proclamation bearing date the 9th day of May, 1864, such disallow-
ance was publicly notified, and it was thereby declared that the said sev-
eral Islands, Islets, or Rocks in the said Proclamations of the 12th day of
August, 1861, and the 9th day of May, 1864, respectively, should not be
viewed as British territory: And whereas it has, since the date of the
Proclamation lastly hereinbefore recited, seemed good to her said Majesty
that the same Islands, Islets, or Rocks should be taken possession of for
and on behalf of Her Majesty: And whereas it has also seemed and does
seem to Her Majesty that it is expedient, and that it is for the interest as
well of Her Majesty's dominions and subjects, especially of Her said Col-
ony of the Cape of Good Hope and the inhabitants thereof, that the same
Islands, Islets, or Rocks, and the said Island of Ichaboe, should be an-
nexed to and become and form part of the Colony of the Cape of Good
Hope: And whereas, pursuant to orders in that behalf received,
CHARLES CODRINGTON FORSYTH, Esquire, Captain of Her Maj-
esty's Steam Frigate Valorous, did on the 5th day of May last past pro-
ceed to Penguin Island aforesaid, being one of the said Islands, Islets, or
Rocks, and did there, by Proclamation bearing date the 5th day of May,
take possession of the same, in the name of all the said Islands, Islets, or
Rocks hereinbefore and in the said Proclamations of the 12th day of Au-
gust, 1861, and the 9th day of May, 1864, respectively mentioned, for and
on behalf of Her Majesty, and did thereby declare the sovereignty and
dominion of Her Majesty over all the same Islands, Islets, or Rocks: Now,
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therefore, I do hereby proclaim and make known that the said Island of
Ichaboe, and the said Islands, Islets, or Rocks adjacent thereto, that is to
say: Hollamsbird, Mercury, Long Island, Seal Island, Penguin Island,
Halifax Possession, Albatross Rock, Pomona, Plumpudding and
Roastbeef, or Sinclair's Islands, shall be from the day of the date hereof,
and the same are hereby annexed to and form part of the said Colony of
the Cape of Good Hope.
GOD SAVE THE QUEEN!
Given under the Public Seal of the Settlement of the Cape of Good
Hope, this 16th day of July, 1866.
P. E. WODEHOUSE, Governor.
By command of His Excellency the Governor,
R. SOUTHEY,
Colonial Secretary.
5. ACT to Confirm the Annexation to this Colony of the Islands, Islets,
or Rocks, on the South-West Coast of South Africa, Called Ichaboe, Hol-
land's Bird, Mercury, Long Island, Seal Island, Penguin Island, Halifax,
Possession Island, Albatross Rock, Pomona, Plumpudding and Roast
Beef or Sinclair's Island. [Act 1 of 1873]
WHEREAS the Island of Ichaboe on the southwest coast of South
Africa was, on the twenty-first day of June, 1861, duly taken possession of
for behoof of Her Britannic Majesty Queen Victoria, and on her behalf:
And whereas on the fifth day of May, 1866, certain other islands, islets,
and rocks on the said southwest coast of South Africa, that is to say: -
Holland's Bird, Mercury, Long Island, Seal Island, Penguin Island, Hali-
fax, Possession Island, Albatross Rock, Pomona, Plumpudding and Roast
Beef or Sinclair's Island, hereinafter called the Penguin Islands, were also
duly taken possession of for behoof of her said Majesty and on her behalf:
And whereas by a proclamation dated the sixteenth day of July, 1866, by
His Excellency Sir Philip Edmond Wodehouse, Knight Commander of
the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, then the Governor of this Col-
ony, the said island of Ichaboe and the said Penguin Islands were de-
clared to be annexed to and form part of this Colony: And whereas it is
expedient that the declarations in the said proclamation contained should
be confirmed by the Parliament of this Colony by an Act thereof: Be it
therefore enacted by the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, with the
advice and consent of the Legislative Council and House of Assembly
thereof, as follows:
I. The declarations contained in the said proclamation of the six-
teenth day of July, 1866, shall be, and the same are hereby confirmed;
and the said Island of Ichaboe and the said Penguin Islands shall be
held to have been duly annexed to and have formed part of the Col-
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ony from and after the date of the said proclamation.
II. Notwithstanding such annexation as in this Act is contained, the
said Islands shall for the purposes of the laws relating to the Customs
of this Colony be deemed to be foreign ports respectively, until the
Parliament shall otherwise determine.
III. This Act may be cited for all purposes as the "Annexation of
Ichaboe and Penguin Islands Act, 1873."
6. BRITISH LETTERS PATENT appointing the Governor of the Col-
ony of the Cape of Good Hope to be Governor of the Island of Ichaboe
and the Penguin Islands, and authorizing the Annexation of the aforesaid
Islands to that Colony. - Westminster, February 27, 1867. [67 B.F.S.P.
5541
VICTORIA, by the grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland Queen, Defender of the Faith, to all to whom these
presents shall come, greeting:
Whereas the Island of Ichaboe, on the southwest coast of South Af-
rica, was on the 21st day of June, 1861, duly taken possession of for us
and on our behalf;
And whereas on the 5th day of May, 1866, certain other islands, is-
lets, and rocks on the said southwest coast of South Africa, that is to say,
Hollandsbird, Mercury, Long Island, Seal Island, Penguin Island, Halifax
Possession, Albatross Rock, Pomona, Plumpudding and Roast Beef or
Sinclair's Island, which said islands, islets, and rocks are hereinafter
called the Penguin Islands, were also duly taken possession of for us and
on our behalf;
And whereas, by Proclamation, dated the 16th day of July, 1866, by
his Excellency Sir Philip Edmund Wodehouse, Governor and Com-
mander-in-chief of our Colony of the Cape of Good Hope and of the terri-
tories and dependencies thereon and Vice-Admiral of the same, the said
Island of Ichaboe and the said Penguin Islands were declared to be an-
nexed to, and to form part of, the said Colony of the Cape of Good Hope;
And whereas doubts are entertained touching the legality of the said
annexation of the said Island of Ichaboe and the said Penguin Islands by
Proclamation and it is expedient that such doubts should be removed;
And whereas it is further expedient that the said Island of Ichaboe
and the said Penguin Islands should be annexed to, and form part of, the
said Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, if the Legislative Council and
House of Assembly thereof should desire such annexation;
And whereas it is expedient that, until such annexation, the affairs of
the said Island of Ichaboe and of the said Penguin Islands should be ad-
ministered by a Governor, to be for that purpose appointed by us;
Now know ye, that in consideration of the premises, we, of our spe-
cial grace, mere motion, and certain knowledge, have thought fit to con-
stitute and appoint, and by these presents do constitute and appoint, the
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Governor and Commander-in-chief for the time being of our said Colony
of the Cape of Good Hope to be the Governor of the said Island of
Ichaboe and Penguin Islands, and we do hereby invest in him all the pow-
ers and authorities which by these presents are given and granted to the
Governor for the time being of the said Island of Ichaboe and Penguin
Islands.
And we do hereby further declare our pleasure to be, that in the
event of the death or incapacity of the said Governor and Commander-in-
chief of the said Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, or, in the event of his
absenting himself from the said Colony otherwise than for the purpose of
visiting the said Island of Ichaboe or the said Penguin Islands, then and
in either of these cases the officer for the time being who may be adminis-
tering the Government of the said Colony of the Cape of Good Hope shall
be and he is hereby constituted and appointed Governor for the time be-
ing of the said Island of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands.
And we do hereby further authorize and empower the said Governor
of the said Island of Ichaboe and the Penguin Islands to make all such
rules and regulations as may lawfully be made by our authority for the
order, peace, and good government of the said Island of Ichaboe and Pen-
guin Islands, subject, nevertheless, to any instructions which may from
time to time be hereafter given him under our sign manual and signet, or
through one of our Principal Secretaries of State.
And we do hereby further authorize and empower the said Governor
of the said Island of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands, so long as he shall be
Governor thereof, by any instrument under his hand and seal, to make
leases and other dispositions for a term or terms of years, of any of the
said Islands of Ichaboe or Penguin Islands, as aforesaid, or any part or
parts thereof, and to issue licenses authorizing the person or persons des-
ignated therein to take guano or other fertilising substances or produce
from the said Islands of Ichaboe or Penguin Islands, or any of them, and
to insert in such leases, dispositions, or licenses, as the case may be, all
such reservations by way of rent, or royalty, or otherwise, and all such
conditions, exceptions, and stipulations as may to him seem advisable:
Provided always that, in the execution of the powers hereby conferred on
him, he shall conform to such instructions as he may from time to time
receive from us, under our sign manual and signet, or through one of our
Principal Secretaries of State.
And we do hereby further authorize and empower the said Governor,
as he may deem expedient, under his hand and seal, to confirm any grant,
disposition, lease or license, which may have been made or issued before
the date of these presents, to any person or persons in respect to the said
Island of Ichaboe or the said Penguin Islands, or any of them, or any part
thereof, by any Governor of the said Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, or
to accept a surrender of any such grant, disposition, lease, or licence, and
to make and issue any new disposition, lease, or licence to the persons
surrendering the same, or their nominees, under the powers and in the
manner hereinbefore declared.
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And we do hereby further declare our pleasure to be that if any time
hereafter the Legislative Council and House of Assembly of the said Col-
ony of the Cape of Good Hope shall, by resolution or otherwise, request
the said Governor of the said Island of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands to
transfer the same to the said Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, for the
purpose of their being annexed to and forming part of the said Colony,
and shall by law provide that upon such transfer and annexation all laws
which may be in force in the said Colony on the day on which the said
Island of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands shall be annexed thereto shall im-
mediately upon such annexation take effect and be in force in and upon
the said islands so annexed, then the said Governor shall, and he is
hereby authorized and empowered to transfer to the said Colony the said
Island of Ichaboe and the said Penguin Islands, and from and after the
date of such transfer the said islands so transferred shall be deemed and
taken to be, and shall be, annexed to and form part of the said Colony of
the Cape of Good Hope.
And we further declare our pleasure to be that the said Governor of
the said Island of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands shall declare by Proclama-
tion the said transfer, and from and after the date of such Proclamation
these presents shall cease and be of none effect so far as relates to the
appointment of a Governor of the said Islands of Ichaboe and Penguin
Islands and his powers thereunder, but not further or otherwise, and not
so as to affect any instruments, acts, matters, or things made or done by
him while such Governor as aforesaid, in pursuance of the powers hereby
conferred on him.
And we do hereby reserve to us, our heirs and successors, full power
and authority from time and time to revoke, alter, or amend these our
Letters Patent, as to us or them shall seem meet.
In witness whereof we have caused these our Letters to be made Pat-
ent. Witness ourself at Westminster, the 27th day of February, in the
30th year of our reign.
By warrant under the Queen's sign manual.
C. ROMILLY
7. ACT to repeal "The Annexation of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands Act,
1873," and to make other provisions in lieu thereof. [Act 4 of 1874]
WHEREAS the Island of Ichaboe, on the southwest coast of South
Africa, was, on the 21st day of June, 1861, duly taken possession of for
and on behalf of Her Majesty Queen Victoria: And whereas, on the 5th
day of May, 1866, certain other islands, islets, and rocks on the said coast,
viz., Hollandsbird, Mercury, Long Island, Seal Island, Penguin Island,
Halifax Possession, Albatross Rock, Pomona, and Plumpudding and
Roast Beef, or Sinclair's Island, hereinafter called the Penguin Islands,
were also duly taken possession of for and on behalf of Her said Majesty:
And whereas, by a Proclamation dated the 16th day of July, 1866, by his
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Excellency Sir Philip Edmund Wodehouse, the then Governor of this Col-
ony, the said Island of Ichaboe and the said Penguin Islands were de-
clared to be annexed to and to form part of this Colony: And whereas
doubts having been entertained touching the legality of the said annexa-
tion by the said Proclamation, Her said Majesty, by Her Letters Patent
dated the 27th day of February, 1807, after reciting (amongst other things
the said doubts) that it was expedient that the same should be removed,
and that the said islands should be annexed to and form part of this Col-
ony, if the Legislative Council and House of Assembly thereof should de-
sire such annexation, and that until such annexation the affairs of the
said islands should be administered by a Governor, to be for that purpose
appointed by Her said Majesty, did constitute and appoint the Governor
and Commander-in-chief for the time being of this Colony to be the Gov-
ernor of the said islands, with certain powers therein mentioned, and did
declare her pleasure to be that if at any time thereafter the said Legisla-
tive Council and House of Assembly should by resolution or otherwise
request the said Governor of the said islands to transfer the same to this
Colony for the purpose of their being annexed to and forming part
thereof, and should by law provide that upon such transfer and annexa-
tion all laws which might be in force in this Colony on the day on which
the said islands should be annexed thereto should immediately upon such
annexation take effect and be in force in and upon the said islands so
annexed, the said Governor should and was thereby authorized and em-
powered to transfer to this Colony the said islands, and from and after
the date of such transfer the said islands so transferred should be deemed
and taken to be, and should be, annexed to and form part of this Colony:
And whereas it is expedient that the said islands shall be annexed to and
form part of this Colony, and that, for the purpose of enabling the said
annexation to be carried out according to the said Letters Patent, the
said "Annexation of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands Act, 1873," which was
passed in ignorance of the said doubts and of the said Letters Patent,
should be repealed: Be it enacted by the Governor of the Cape of Good
Hope, with the advice and consent of Legislative Council and House of
Assembly thereof, as follows: -
1. "The Annexation of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands Act, 1873," is
hereby repealed.
2. Upon the transfer and annexation of the said Island of Ichaboe and
the said Penguin Islands to this Colony, all laws which may then be in
force in this Colony shall immediately upon such annexation take ef-
fect and be in force in and upon the said islands so annexed.
3. This Act may for all purposes be cited as "The Ichaboe and Pen-
guin Islands Act, 1874."
8. ACT to exempt temporarily the Island of Ichaboe and Penguin Is-
lands from the operation of the Customs Laws of that Colony. [Act 5 of
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1874]
WHEREAS in case of the annexation of the Island of Ichaboe and
certain other islands, islets, and rocks following, and hereafter called the
Penguin Islands, to wit: Hollandsbird, Mercury, Long Island, Seal Island,
Penguin Island, Halifax Possession, Albatross Rock, Pomona, and
Plumpudding and Roast Beef, or Sinclair's Island, it is expedient that the
Customs Laws of this Colony should not at present be in force therein: Be
it enacted by the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, with the advice
and consent of the Legislative Council and House of Assembly thereof, as
follows: -
1. Notwithstanding that the said Island of Ichaboe and the said Pen-
guin Islands may be annexed to this Colony, the said islands shall, for
the purposes of the laws relating to the Customs of this Colony, be
deemed to be foreign ports respectively until the Parliament shall oth-
erwise determine.
2. This Act may for all purposes be cited as "The Ichaboe and Pen-
guin Islands Act, 1874."
9. PROCLAMATION by His Excellency Sir Henry Barkly. [Proclama-
tion 45 of 1874]
Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael
and St. George, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the
Bath, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Colony of the
Cape of Good Hope in South Africa, and of the Territories and Depen-
dencies thereof; and Her Majesty's High Commissioner, &c., &c., &c.
WHEREAS by Letters Patent of Her Majesty Queen Victoria bear-
ing date the 27th day of February, 1867, after reciting, amongst other
things, that the Island of Ichaboe, on the Southwest Coast of South Af-
rica, had been duly taken possession of for her said Majesty and on her
behalf, on the 26th day of June, 1861, and that on the 5th day of May,
1866, certain other Islands, Islets, and Rocks, on the said Southwest
Coast of South Africa, that is to say, Hollandsbird, Mercury, Long Island,
Seal Island, Penguin Island, Halifax, Possession, Albatross Rock, Po-
mona, and Plumpudding and Roastbeef, or Sinclair's Island (therein and
hereinafter called the Penguin Islands), had also been duly taken posses-
sion of for her said Majesty and on her behalf; and that by a Proclama-
tion dated the 16th day of July, 1866, by His Excellency Sir Philip Ed-
mond Wodehouse, the then Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and of the Territories and Dependen-
cies thereof, and Vice-Admiral of the same, the said Island of Ichaboe and
the said Penguin Islands were declared to be annexed to and form part of
the said Colony; and that doubts were entertained touching the legality of
the said annexation of the said Islands by Proclamation, and that it was
expedient that such doubts should be removed, and that the said Islands
should be annexed to and form part of the said Colony, if the Legislative
Council and House of Assembly thereof desire such annexation, and that
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until such annexation it was expedient that the affairs of the said Island
should be administered by a Governor to be for that purpose appointed
by her said Majesty: her said Majesty did in and by the said Letters Pat-
ent constitute and appoint the Governor and Commander-in-Chief for
the time being of the said Colony of the Cape of Good Hope to be the
Governor of the said Island of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands, and did
thereby vest in him all the powers and authorities which by the said Let-
ters Patent were given and granted to the Governor for the time being of
the said Island of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands, and did, (amongst other
things), declare her pleasure to be that if at any time thereafter the Leg-
islative Council and House of Assembly of the said Colony of the Cape of
Good Hope should by resolution or otherwise request the Governor of the
said Island of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands to transfer the same to the
said Colony for the purpose of their being annexed to and forming part of
the said Colony, and should by law provide that upon such transfer and
annexation, all laws which might be in force in the said Colony on the day
on which the said Island of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands should be an-
nexed thereto, should immediately upon such annexation take effect and
be in force in and upon the said Islands as annexed, then the said Gover-
nor should be and he was thereby authorized and empowered to transfer
to the said Colony the said Island of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands, and
from and after the date of such transfer the said Islands so transferred
should be deemed and taken to be and should be annexed to and form
part of the said Colony of the Cape of Good Hope: And whereas her said
Majesty did by the said Letters Patent further declare her pleasure to be
that the said Governor of the said Island of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands
should declare by Proclamation the said transfer, and from and after the
date of such Proclamation the said Letters Patent should cease and be of
none effect, so far as related to the appointment of a Governor of the said
Islands of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands and his powers thereunder, but
not further or otherwise, and not so as to affect any instruments, acts,
matters, or things, made or done by him while such Governor as aforesaid
in pursuance of the powers thereby conferred on him.
And whereas the said Legislative Council and House of Assembly of
the said Colony of the Cape of Good Hope have, by resolutions bearing
date respectively the 16th and 11th days of June, 1874, requested me to
transfer the said Island of Ichaboe and Penguin Islands to the said Cape
of Good Hope for the purpose of their being annexed to and forming part
of the said Colony, and have by law, to wit, by the "Ichaboe and Penguin
Islands Act, 1874," provided that upon such transfer and annexation all
laws which may then be in force in the said Colony shall immediately
upon such annexation take effect and be in force in and upon the said
islands so annexed.
I do hereby, pursuant to the said Letters Patent, proclaim, and make
known, and declare, that I have, by an instrument bearing even date
herewith, executed under and by virtue of the powers and authority
vested in me by the said Letters Patent, transferred the said Island of
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Ichaboe and the said Penguin Islands to the said Colony of the Cape of
Good Hope, and that the said Islands shall henceforth be deemed, and
taken to be, and shall be, annexed to and form part of the said Colony.
GOD SAVE THE QUEEN!
Given under my hand and the Public Seal of the Colony of the Cape
of Good Hope, this 9th day of July, 1874.
By command of His Excellency the Governor in Council,
HENRY BARKLY, Governor.
J. C. MOLTENO,
Colonial Secretary.
10. GERMAN PROCLAMATION placing under the Protection of the
German Emperor the Territory acquired by M. Luderitz on the South-
west Coast of Africa. - Aug. 16, 1884. [75 B.F.S.P. 546]
(Translation.)
His Majesty the German Emperor William I, King of Prussia, has
commanded me to proceed to Angra Pequefia with His Majesty's two-
decked corvette the Elisabeth, to place under the direct protection of His
Majesty the territory belonging to M. A. Luderitz on the West Coast of
Africa.
The territory of M. A. Luderitz will, according to official communica-
tion, be taken to extend from the north bank of the Orange River to the
260 south latitude, 20 geographical miles inland, including the islands be-
longing thereto by the law of nations.
In carrying out His Majesty's commands I herewith hoist the Impe-
rial German flag, and thus place the abovementioned territory under the
protection and sovereignty of His Majesty the Emperor William I, and
call upon all present to give three cheers for His Majesty.
Long live his Majesty the Emperor William I. SCHERING,
Captain at Sea, and
Commandant of His Imperial Majesty's ship Elisabeth.
11. PROTOCOL between Germany and Great Britain for the Settle-
ment of British Claims in Territories under German Protection in South-
West Africa, signed at Berlin, 15 July 1886. [77 B.F.S.P. 1042, 168 C.T.S.
129]
The undersigned Commissioners, having met and discussed fully
those British claims in the territories placed under German protection in
South-West Africa, upon which Messrs. Bieber and Shippard, the Com-
missioners at Cape Town, had disagreed, agree to submit to their Govern-
ments the following recommendations: -
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1. Ebony Mines.
That if Robert Lewis or his assigns desire to work this mine, he or
they be at liberty to do so, and to convey the ore to the coast, until the
21st of September, 1898, without payment to, and without hindrance or
interference by, the Colonial Company.
2. Sandwich Harbour.
That Mr. Anders Ohlson (trading as A. Ohlson and Co.) and Messrs.
De Pass, Spence, and Co., respectively, be held to have acquired a full
title in perpetuity for themselves and their assigns to the lands and build-
ings which they respectively have heretofore occupied in Sandwich Har-
bour for the purposes of the fishery, together with the right to each firm
of taking at any time any other sites on the shore of this harbour, and of
erecting buildings thereon, should the sand, as has happened before, shift
so as to render useless the land which is now, or at any future time may
be, occupied by the buildings; it being understood that any site so taken
becomes the absolute property of Messrs. De Pass, Spence, and Co., or of
Mr. Ohlson, or their respective assigns, as the case requires, and that they
have no further claim to the land which they previously occupied; but
that neither firm nor their assigns are entitled to take any site occupied
by other persons, nor to take any site the occupation of which would in-
terfere with other persons.
That it should be further recognized that the firms of A. Ohlson and
De Pass, Spence, and Co. have the right of coast fishery in Sandwich Har-
bour, and along the coast between Sandwich Harbour and the point 230
20' south latitude, 140 31' east longitude, with the right of landing on and
using for fishery purposes any part of the coast not in the private posses-
sion of third parties, subject always to the observance of any laws and
regulations which may be issued by the competent authorities. The said
firms shall not, however, have any right to hinder other persons from also
fishing there, or from establishing themselves in Sandwich Harbour.
3. Hottentot Bay.
That Messrs. De Pass, Spence, and Co. have in like manner acquired
a full title in perpetuity for themselves and their assigns to the guario
deposits at Hottentot Bay, and to the land which they now occupy there
for carrying on fishery or collecting of guano.
4. Unnamed Islets and Rocks.
That Messrs. De Pass, Spence, and Co., and their assigns, be free to
make use, as they have hitherto done, of these islets and rocks, including
Shark Island, without payment until the expiry of their lease, that is to
say, until the 30th June, 1895; and if the British Government waive all
claim to the sovereignty of these islands and rocks, and acknowledge the
sovereignty of Germany over them, then that the latter Power should
consent to confer no private rights over them to any persons other than
the lessees for the time being of the 12 British islands named in the Let-
ters Patent of the 27th February, 1867.
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Upon this understanding the British Commissioner will recommend
his Government to acknowledge forthwith the sovereignty of Germany in
these islets and rocks.
5. Mainland Claims.
That Messrs. De Pass, Spence, and Co. should be held to have ac-
quired for themselves and their assigns a full title in perpetuity to the
Pomona mine, with 2 English miles of land round the mine on every side;
and that they should have the right to use the lagoon for their vessels,
and to make use of the land round the lagoon for all purposes as they
have done hitherto, without payment and without hindrance or distur-
bance by the Colonial Company, and if irreconcilable disputes between
the firm and the Company should arise as to the proper exercise of these
rights on land, then that the chief officer of the German Government
within the Protectorate shall allot to Messrs. De Pass, Spence, and Co., or
their assigns, sufficient land for the purposes of their business, conve-
niently situated on the shore of the lagoon, and that the land so allotted
shall become the absolute property in perpetuity of the persons to whom
the same is allotted, but that such allotting of land shall in no way affect
or lessen their right to use the lagoon for their vessels.
Berlin, July 15, 1886.
CHARLES S. SCOTT.
R. KRAUEL.
Sir E. Malet to Count Bismarck
M. LE SECRETAIRE d'ETAT, Berlin, October 23, 1886.
Her Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the
Protocol signed by Dr. Krauel and Mr. Scott, containing the joint recom-
mendations of the Imperial and British Commissioners for a settlement of
certain outstanding British claims in the Imperial Protectorate of South-
west Africa, in regard to which the Commissioners at Cape Town failed to
arrive at an agreement. I have now the honour to inform your Excellency,
by direction of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Af-
fairs, that the arrangements embodied in the Protocol in question are ap-
proved and accepted by Her Majesty's Government. In acquainting your
Excellency with this decision, I am directed to add that Her Majesty's
Government would be glad to be informed whether the Imperial Govern-
ment in like manner approve and accept the arrangement in question.
I have, &c.,
Count Bismarck. EDWARD B. MALET.
Count Hatzfeldt to the Earl of Iddesleigh.
(Translation.)
MY LORD,
German Embassy, London, November 13, 1886.
In a note of the 23rd ultimo the British Ambassador in Berlin in-
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formed the Imperial Government that his Government agreed to the pro-
posals contained in the Protocol, the German version of which is herewith
inclosed, respecting the rights of British subjects in the South-West Afri-
can territories under German protection, which Protocol was signed on
the 15th July last by Mr. Scott, the First Secretary of the English Em-
bassy in Berlin, and Dr. Krauel, Privy Councillor of Legation.
Sir Edward Malet stated at the same time that the British Govern-
ment wished to be informed whether the Imperial Government also
agreed to the proposals in question.
In reply, I am instructed to express the concurrence of my Govern-
ment in the proposals made in the inclosed Protocol.
The Imperial Government is prepared to take the necessary steps to
communicate the provisions of the Protocol to those interested, and as far
as necessary to superintend the execution of those provisions through the
Imperial officials in the protected territory.
I have, &c.,
The Earl of Iddesleigh. v. HATZFELDT.
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APPENDIX "C"
Mandate for German South West Africa
The Council of the League of Nations:
Whereas by Article 119 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany signed
at Versailles on June 28th, 1919, Germany renounced in favour of the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her oversea
possessions, including therein German South-West Africa; and
Whereas the Principal Allied and Associated Powers agreed that, in
accordance with Article 22, Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) of
the said Treaty, a Mandate should be conferred upon His Britannic Maj-
esty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of
South Africa to administer the territory aforementioned, and have pro-
posed that the Mandate should be formulated in the following terms; and
Whereas His Britannic Majesty, for and on behalf of the Govern-
ment of the Union of South Africa, has agreed to accept the Mandate in
respect of the said territory and has undertaken to exercise it on behalf of
the League of Nations in accordance with the following provisions; and
Whereas, by the aforementioned Article 22, paragraph 8, it is pro-
vided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exer-
cised by the Mandatory not having been previously agreed upon by the
Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the
League of Nations:
Confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows:
Article 1
The territory over which a Mandate is conferred upon His Britannic
Majesty for and on behalf of the Government of the Union of South Af-
rica (hereinafter called the Mandatory) comprises the territory which for-
merly constituted the German Protectorate of South-West Africa.
Article 2
The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legisla-
tion over the territory subject to the present Mandate as an integral por-
tion of the Union of South Africa, and may apply the laws of the Union of
South Africa to the territory, subject to such local modifications as cir-
cumstances may require.
The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral
well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory sub-
ject to the present Mandate.
Article 3
The Mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited, and that
no forced labour is permitted, except for essential public works and ser-
vices, and then only for adequate remuneration.
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The Mandatory shall also see that the traffic in arms and ammuni-
tion is controlled in accordance with principles analogous to those laid
down in the Convention relating to the control of the arms traffic, signed
on September 10th, 1919, or in any convention amending the same.
The supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the natives shall
be prohibited.
Article 4
The military training of the natives, otherwise than for purposes of
internal police and the local defence of the territory, shall be prohibited.
Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifica-
tions erected in the territory.
Article 5
Subject to the provisions of any local law for the maintenance of
public order and public morals, the Mandatory shall ensure in the terri-
tory freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship,
and shall allow all missionaries, nationals of any State Member of the
League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the territory for the
purpose of prosecuting their calling.
Article 6
The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations
an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full infor-
mation with regard to the territory, and indicating the measures taken to
carry out the obligations assumed under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Article 7
The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for
any modification of the terms of the present Mandate.
The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise be-
tween the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations re-
lating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the
Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be
submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for
by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
The present Declaration shall be deposited in the archives of the
League of Nations. Certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-
General of the League of Nations to all Powers Signatories of the Treaty
of Peace with Germany.
Made at Geneva the 17th day of December, 1920.

The Legality of Military Bases in Non-Self-
Governing Territory: the Case of United
States Bases in Puerto Rico
JOHN QUIGLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
A state administering a non-self-governing territory is obliged to act
in the best interests of the local population. Since this norm emerged in
the early twentieth century, regulation has not been uniform as to
whether an administering state may establish military bases in the non-
self-governing territory. An administering state that establishes military
bases not to defend the non-self-governing territory, but for its own pur-
poses, may violate its obligations to the non-self-governing territory.
Such bases can cause economic harm by diverting land and sea areas
from traditional uses. They may involve the non-self-governing territory
against its will in military conflicts with neighboring states. They may
impair the non-self-governing territory's opportunity of achieving self-de-
termination because the administering state may be reluctant to jeopard-
ize its bases.
This article asks whether establishment of military bases in a non-
self-governing territory is consistent with an administering state's obliga-
tions to the non-self-governing territory. It analyzes applicable customary
law, developed largely through the League of Nations and United Na-
tions. It examines United States military bases in Puerto Rico as a case
study, to permit a more detailed examination of the question of whether
bases are used for the administering state's benefit, and of the question of
whether a territory is non-self-governing.
Finally, the article examines the state responsibility of an adminis-
tering state that establishes unlawful military bases towards the people of
a non-self-governing territory. Here it draws on the Puerto Rico case to
explore the damage that may be caused to a non-self-governing territory
by military bases.
II. QUESTION OF WHETHER MILITARY BASES VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE
POPULATION OF A NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORY
A state holding a non-self-governing territory must assist it in achiev-
Professor of Law, Ohio State University. The author is grateful to his colleague Prof.
Stanley Laughlin for consultation, and to Anne Hoke, J.D., Ohio State University 1987, and
Olga Bosques, J.D. Ohio State University 1986, for research in an international law seminar
that contributed to the writing of this article.
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ing self-determination.1 Until that occurs, the state must so administer
the territory as to maximize the interests of the local population.2 As a
corollary, it may not exploit the territory for its own benefit.' An example
of use for the benefit of the administering state is South Africa's intensive
mining in Namibia, in an apparent effort to extract valuable minerals
before granting Namibia independence. This action has been condemned
as a violation of the rights of the people of a non-self-governing territory.'
A. The "Sacred Trust" Norm
Establishment of military bases to benefit the administering state
may conflict with the right of the population of a non-self-governing terri-
tory to have it administered for its benefit. That right emerged in the late
nineteenth century.5 The European colonial states recognized an obliga-
tion to benefit colonized populations. Britain called it the "white man's
burden,"" France the mission civiliatrice. That obligation is reflected in
an 1885 treaty regarding the Congo: "All the powers exercising rights of
sovereignty or influence in the said territories agree to protect the indige-
nous populations and to ameliorate their moral and material conditions of
existence."7
1. League of Nations
This obligation was expanded and regulated by the League of Na-
tions, which decided that states taking colonies from Turkey and Ger-
many in World War I had no right to accept them as colonies.8 The
League determined that the international community carried an obliga-
tion to these territories, and that administering states bore a "sacred
trust of civilization" to benefit the local population, and to aid it in
achieving self-determination.
The League concretized this concept in a system it called
"mandates":
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late
war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which for-
merly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able
to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern
1. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 2.
2. U.N. CHARTER, art. 73.
3. A. MARGALITH, THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATES 1 (1930).
4. G.A. Res. 37/233A, preambular para. 18, Dec. 20, 1982, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
51) at 40, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1983) (Vote: 120-0-23).
5. A. MARGALITH, supra note 3, at 50-68.
6. R. ANAND, NEW STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (1972). The phrase is that of
Rudyard Kipling.
7. General Act of the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries of Austria-Hungary, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain,
Sweden-Norway, and Turkey (and the United States) respecting the Congo, Feb. 26, 1885,
art. 6, 165 (1885), CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 485 (C. Parry ed. 1978).
8. A. MARGALITH, supra note 3, at 1-17.
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world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and
that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in
this Covenant.9
2. American States
A "sacred trust" norm emerged among the American states as well.
The United States recognized that obligation towards Cuba, over which it
acquired jurisdiction in 1898. The U.S. President said that the United
States would "give aid and direction to its people to form a government
for themselves."1 The U.S. Supreme Court characterized Cuba as
territory held in trust for the inhabitants of Cuba to whom it right-
fully belongs and to whose exclusive control it will be surrendered
when a stable government shall have been established by their volun-
tary action."
At the outset of World War II, the American states established an
international commission to administer any European-held Western
Hemisphere territory over which Germany might try to assume adminis-
tration. They decided that such administration should be carried out "for
the benefit of the region under administration, with a view to its welfare
and progress." They included one specific guarantee of rights, obliging
the prospective inter-state administration to "guarantee freedom of con-
science and worship. "12
3. United Nations
The United Nations Charter identifies pursuit of self-determination
of peoples as a purpose of the Organization. It views the right to self-
determination as necessary not only to protect peoples, but as well "to
strengthen universal peace." The Charter takes the position that peace
cannot be secure so long as peoples are deprived of their right to self-
determination.13
Consonant with its emphasis on self-determination, the Charter ex-
panded the applicability of the "sacred trust" norm. It applied it to all
states administering non-self-governing territory. Article 73 provided:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities
9. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 22, para. 1. 2 F. ISRAEL, MAJOR PEACE TREATIES
OF MODERN HISTORY 1648-1967 1274, 1283 (1967).
10. Quoted in Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 120, 21 S.Ct. 302, 306, 45 L.Ed. 448, 455
(1901).
11. Id.
12. Convention on the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Posses-
sions in the Americas (Act of Havana), July 30, 1940, arts. 3-4, 56 Stat. 1273, T.S. No. 977,
161 U.N.T.S. 254, 3 Bevans 623. For diplomatic correspondence leading to adoption of the
Convention, see 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940 180-256 (1961).
13. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 2.
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for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet at-
tained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that
the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and
accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost,
within the system of international peace and security established by
the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these
territories."
As one method of enforcing the "sacred trust" obligation, the Charter
established a system equivalent to the League's mandate system, which it
called trusteeship. States were invited to place their non-self-governing
territories under supervision of a Trusteeship Council.1" The Charter re-
quired a "trustee" state
to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advance of
the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive develop-
ment towards self-government or independence...'0
States accepting trusteeship remained bound by their Article 73 "sacred
trust" obligation.
17
B. Legality of Military Bases Under the "Sacred Trust" Norm
Existence of a "sacred trust" norm raises the question of whether an
administering state may use a non-self-governing territory to its military
benefit.
1. League of Nations Practice
The League of Nations prohibited administering states from main-
taining military bases in mandate territory. But it did not apply that
principle consistently.
In resolving this issue, the League distinguished on the basis of
whether a mandate territory was an "A," "B," or "C" mandate. The
League designated as "B" and "C" mandates those it deemed less ready
for independence than those it designated "A" mandates. "B" mandates
were those in Central Africa. "C" mandates were Pacific Ocean territo-
ries, plus South West Africa. The only "A" mandates, those territories
considered closest to independence, were Palestine and Syria. s
The Covenant mentioned military bases only with respect to "B" ter-
ritories. It required the mandatory state to "prevent. . .establishment of
fortifications or military and naval bases."1 9 That language was evidently
intended to apply as well to "C" territories, because the League's agree-
ments with mandatory states regarding all "B" and "C" territories pro-
14. U.N. CHARTER, art. 73.
15. U.N. CHARTER, art. 75.
16. U.N. CHARTER, art. 76(b).
17. Yearbook of the United Nations: 1946-47, at 570 (1947).
18. A. MARGALITH, supra note 3, at 82-83.
19. COVENANT, supra note 9, art. 22, para. 5.
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hibited military bases.2 0 For example, the League's agreement with New
Zealand respecting German Samoa, a "C" mandate, provided: "[N]o mili-
tary or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the
territory."" When Japan established fortifications in certain of its "C"
territories in the Pacific Ocean, in violation of similar provisions, protests
were made to the League's Mandates Commission.
22
With "A" mandates, however, military bases were not prohibited.
The League's agreement with Great Britain for Syria authorized military
bases. This limited their purpose to local defense: "The Mandatory may
maintain its troops in the said territory for its defence.""'
The League's agreement with Great Britain for Palestine did not au-
thorize military bases but included provisions that assumed British mili-
tary activity in Palestine. An article limiting Britain's recruitment of local
militia provided,
"Nothing in this article shall preclude the administration of Palestine
from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the
Mandatory in Palestine. The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times
to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of
armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.
24
Britain established a naval base in Palestine at Haifa.2 5 The League's ex-
ception regarding Palestine is likely attributable to Britain's strong inter-
est in providing military protection for approaches to the Suez Canal.
2. United Nations Practice
Practice under the United Nations Charter rejects the permissibility
of military bases in a non-self-governing territory to benefit the adminis-
tering state.
a. Charter Provisions
The negotiating history of the Charter provisions on trusteeship
shows an intent to prohibit such bases. Drafters rejected a proposal that
administering states establish military bases only with Security Council
approval. The concern underlying the proposal was that bases might be
established for the benefit of the administering state.27 It was argued in
opposition to this proposal that supervision of trusteeship came under
20. Q. WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONs 471 (1930).
21. Mandate for German Samoa, art. 4, in A. MARGALITH, supra note 3, at 211.
22. H. HALL, MANDATES, DEPENDENCIES AND TRUSTEESHIP 69, 210 (1948). Akzin, The
Palestine Mandate in Practice, 25 IOWA L. REV. 32, 34 (1939).
23. Syria and the Lebanon, art. 2, in Q. WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 608. "Its" refers to
"territory," meaning that Britain was forbidden to establish bases for its own purposes.
24. PALESTINE CONST., art. 17, in Q. WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 603-604.
25. Akzin, supra note 22, at 34.
26. S. ZEBEL, BALFOUR: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 240 (1973).
27. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMEN-
TARY AND DOCUMENTS 513 (1969).
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Security Council jurisdiction.2 8 It was anticipated that the Security Coun-
cil would ensure that administering states not establish military bases for
their own benefit.
The final Charter language was silent on military bases. The intent
was to permit military bases, but for two purposes only. The first was
defense of the non-self-governing territory, since lack of fortifications in
League of Nations mandate territories had facilitated Axis takeovers. 9
The second was participation in international peacekeeping, since non-
self-governing territories were expected to participate in the peacekeeping
envisaged by the Charter."0
The General Assembly has construed the Article 73 "sacred trust"
norm to prohibit military bases established to benefit the administering
state. It finds military bases inconsistent with the obligation to benefit
the local population and to move a territory towards self-determination:
Member States shall oppose all military activities and arrangements
by colonial and occupying Powers in the Territories under colonial
and racist domination, as such activities and arrangements constitute
an obstacle to the full implementation of the Declaration, and shall
intensify their efforts with a view to securing the immediate and un-
conditional withdrawal from colonial Territories of military bases and
installations of colonial Powers."'
b. General Assembly Restrictions in Trusteeship Agreements.
In agreements with states placing non-self-governing territories
under trusteeship, the General Assembly has permitted military bases.
However, the purpose is limited to: (1) defense of the non-self-governing
territory; (2) participation in United Nations peacekeeping. The Assem-
bly's trusteeship agreement with the United Kingdom for Tanganyika is
typical. The United Kingdom was given the right,
to establish naval, military and air bases, to erect fortifications, to sta-
tion and employ his own forces in Tanganyika and to take all such
other measures as are in his opinion necessary for the defence of Tan-
28. U.N. CHARTER, art. 83; R. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER:
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-1945, 836 (1958).
29. H. HALL, supra note 22, at 68-69.
30. It was on this basis that the United Kingdom and Australia proposed that trustee
States be permitted to station troops in trust territories. R. RUSSELL, supra note 28, at 836.
31. G.A. Res. 35/118, Annex: Plan of Action for the Full Implementation of the Decla-
ration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, art. 9, Dec. 11,
1980, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981); reprinted in 1983
U.N.Y.B. 1057, (Vote: 120-6-20). Cf. G.A. Res. 41/405, para. 1, Oct. 31, 1986, Advance Text
of Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly at Its 41st Session from 16
September to 19 December 1987, Press Release GA/7463, Jan. 12, 1987, at 559, reported in
U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Feb. 1987, at 130. (Vote: 124-13-15). The Special Committee on
Decolonization has similarly characterized bases as an impediment to self-determination
and called for their removal. See, e.g., Resolution, paras. 11-12, Aug. 8, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.109/584 (1979).
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ganyika and for ensuring that the territory plays its part in the main-
tenance of international peace and security."3
Thus, the United Kingdom was not authorized to establish military bases
for its own benefit.
c. General Assembly Criticism of Particular Bases
The General Assembly has on several occasions criticized administer-
ing states for bases in non-self-governing territory. It has condemned
South Africa for maintaining military bases in Namibia."3 In 1960 it criti-
cized Belgium for using bases in its trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi to
send troops into the Congo. The Assembly called on Belgium "to refrain
from using the Territory [Ruanda-Urundi-J.Q.] as a base, whether for
internal or external purposes, for the accumulation of arms or armed
forces not strictly required for the purpose of maintaining public order in
the Territory.
34
3. Conclusion as to Permissibility of Military Bases
The "sacred trust" norm prohibits military bases for the benefit of an
administering state in a non-self-governing territory. This prohibition
precludes not only bases whose purpose is offensive but those designed
for defense of the administering state. Bases even for defense of the ad-
ministering state involve a use of the non-self-governing territory for a
purpose that does not benefit the local population.
III. QUESTION OF WHETHER BASES ARE DESIGNED TO BENEFIT THE
ADMINISTERING STATE
If an administering state establishes military bases in a non-self-gov-
erning territory, it may assert that the aim is to defend that territory
from attack. A base may serve both to defend that territory and to fur-
ther interests of the administering state. This mixture of motives is illus-
trated by the United States bases in Puerto. The United States has ac-
knowledged that its bases serve its own interests, though it views benefits
flowing to Puerto Rico as well.
The United States has administered Puerto Rico since 1898.38 It first
32. Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Tanganyika, art. 5(c), 1947 U.N.Y.B.
193.
33. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 35/227A, para. 21, March 6, 1981, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48)
at 40, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981); reprinted in 1981 U.N.Y.B. 1149 ("strongly condemns
South Africa for its ever-increasing military build-up in Namibia"). (Vote: 114-0-22). See
also G.A. Res. 36/121A, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982);
reprinted in 1981 U.N.Y.B. 1154 ("condemns South Africa for...the massive militarization
of Namibia") (Vote: 120-0-27). On South Africa's military presence in Namibia, see I. DORE,
THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATE SYSTEM AND NAMIBIA 168 (1985).
34. G.A. Res. 1579, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 34, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961)
(Vote: 61-9-23).
35. Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, Spain-United States, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343.
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established military bases there in 1938, in a program of founding naval
bases "for purposes of national defense" in various of its "territories and
possessions. 36 In that year Congress appropriated $30 million to con-
struct air and naval bases in Puerto Rico.
3 7
The United States governed Puerto Rico at that time through ap-
pointed governors. In 1939 President Roosevelt appointed an Admiral,
William D. Leahy, to govern Puerto Rico, because of base construction
plans.3 No local authority had a role in the base-construction decision.
A. Extent of Military Use of Puerto Rico
In 1943 the U.S. Assistant Secretary of War characterized Puerto
Rico as "largely a garrison."8 9 Between 1939 and 1944 the United States
Navy had acquired land for base construction on Vieques, an off-shore
island of Puerto Rico. On the western end of the main island, it had built
Borinquen Fields (later Ramey Air Base), and on the eastern end
Roosevelt Roads Naval Base, which it equipped to accommodate the Brit-
ish fleet should Britain fall to Germany.40 It had built another naval base
in San Juan harbor.4'
A naval ammunition depot on Vieques that the Navy had closed after
World War II was re-activated following the United States' 1962 confron-
tation with Cuba over the stationing of Soviet missiles there.' By 1966
the U.S. Navy was using 44,249 acres in Puerto Rico.43 The Roosevelt
Roads base became one of the largest naval bases in the world" and "one
of the most exclusive and sophisticated control centers for weapons train-
ing in the world."'45 It uses an "electromagnetic environment" for military
training that extends into the ocean, covering 194,000 square miles that,
according to the U.S. Navy, cannot be duplicated at any other location to
which it has access.' 6 Roosevelt Roads has docking facilities for United
States nuclear-armed vessels, which it harbors there.
36. Pub. L. No. 528, sec. 10(a), 52 Stat. 401 (1938).
37. THE PUERTO RICANs: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 185 (K. Wagenheim ed. 1973). N.Y.
Times, Nov. 12, 1939, at 43, col. 5 (on base construction).
38. THE PUERTO RicAs' supra note 37, at 185. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1939, at 42, col. 4.
N.Y. Times, June 7, 1939, at 2, col. 2.
39. A Bill to Provide for the Withdrawal of U.S. Sovereignty Over the Island of Puerto
Rico and for the Recognition of Its Independence, 1943: Hearings on S. 952 Before the
Senate Comm. on Territories and Insular Affairs, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1943) (state-
ment of John McCloy, Ass't Sec. of War).
40. R. CARR, PUERTO Rico: A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 310 (1984).
41. Hearings on S. 952, supra note 39, at 15 (statement of Sen. Taft).
42. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 310-311.
43. United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico, Inventory of
Federal Agencies with Offices in Puerto Rico, in Status of Puerto Rico: Selected Back-
ground Studies 947 (1966
44. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 310.
45. Id. at 311 (citing U.S. Navy documents).
46. Id.
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By the 1970s, the U.S. Navy had acquired title to 76% of Vieques
Island, which is 20 miles long by four miles wide.4 7 It upgraded its facili-
ties there in the 1980s. 4
8
While most U.S. military use of Puerto Rico is done by the Navy, its
Army and Air Force have established smaller bases. The Army estab-
lished there its Antilles Command in the late 1930s and by 1966 used
14,660 acres of land.49
The Air Force began operations in Puerto Rico in 1939. In 1952 it
established there the 72nd Bomb Wing of its Strategic Air Command, 0
which came to use 4169 acres."' The Air Force withdrew the Command in
the early 1970s but used its Puerto Rico bases for exercises in the 1980s.52
Because of the scope of United States military activity in Puerto
Rico, the governor of Puerto Rico described it in 1982 as a "land super
carrier.' 5
3
B. Defense of the Administering State
Depending on its own military situation, an administering state may
find it useful to employ bases in the non-self-governing territory for its
own defense. This consideration has been prominent in U.S. military pol-
icy in Puerto Rico.
1. Protection of Panama Canal
In 1939 the U.S.-appointed governor of Puerto Rico called the bases
"the keystone of our eastern defense." A major purpose of bases then
under construction was protection of the Panama Canal.55 Stated Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt:
When the island [Puerto Rico] was brought under our flag, the Pan-
ama Canal had not yet been dug, and the airplane had not yet been
invented .... When the present war became imminent, however, it
was obvious that the chain of islands... formed a vast natural shield
for the Panama Canal, suited in distance and conformation to the
uses of the military plane. And of this island shield, Puerto Rico is the
47. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 837 (1st Cir. 1981), rev'd, 456 U.S. 305
(1982).
48. Lidin, Navy's Signal Tower for Carib Upgraded, San Juan Star, May 6, 1983, at 1,
col. 1.
49. U.S.-Puerto Rico Commission, supra note 43, at 915.
50. Strategic Air Command, General Order No. 32, 1952, in U.S.-Puerto Rico Commis-
sion, id. at 914.
51. Id. at 915.
52. Turner, Ramey Part of Response to Russians, San Juan Star, Apr. 25, 1983, at 1,
col. 2.
53. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 315 (quoting Feb. 1, 1982, speech of Gov. Romero-
Barcel6).
54. Gov. Blanton Winship (1934-1939), quoted in N.Y. Times, May 14, 1939, at 42, col.
4. See similar comments of Gen. George Marshall, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1939, at 3, col. 7.
55. The Puerto Ricans, supra note 37, at 185.
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Puerto Rico became "an Atlantic Gibraltar for defense of the Panama
Canal.""7
2. Protection of the Eastern Seaboard of the United States
The U.S. Navy considers Puerto Rico vital for defense of the eastern
United States." This factor was cited by a United States federal judge to
deny a requested injunction to suspend Navy exercises on Vieques Island
in Romero-Barcelb v. Brown.5 The Governor of Puerto Rico, acting on
behalf of Puerto Rico, had sued the U.S. Secretary of Defense, to stop
exercises on and around Vieques Island, on the grounds of harm to the
environment. Puerto Rico alleged violation of environmental protection
statutes. U.S. District Judge Juan R. Torruella found that the Navy had
violated such statutes but denied the injunction, citing the importance to
the United States of the exercises. Judge Torruella said:
The Atlantic Fleet is responsible for providing naval forces through-
out a geographic area that extends from as far north as the Arctic, to
as far south as the Antarctic, as far east as Turkey and as far west as
Mexico."'
Its most important function, Judge Torruella said, is to protect sea lanes
used by U.S. vessels:
From an economic and defense standpoint, the United States is an
island which must import 90% of its strategic materials over the sea
lanes of the World. Petroleum is the single most important commod-
ity moved by sea, the primary sources in the Atlantic seaboard being
the Middle East, and secondarily, South America. These sea lanes are
also of vital importance in allowing the United States to meet its in-
ternational obligations with 41 of the 43 nations with which it has
mutual defense treaties. 61
56. An Act to Amend the Act to Provide a Civil Government for Puerto Rico, 1944:
Hearings on S. 1407 Before the House Comm. on Insular Affairs, 78th Cong., 2d sess. 14-15
(letter of Pres. Franklin Roosevelt). Roosevelt's 1941-46 governor of Puerto Rico also saw
Puerto Rico as protection against threats to the Panama Canal:
The source was Germany, the objective was the Panama Canal, and the direc-
tion was through the Caribbean island arc from Florida to Trinidad. In this arc
Puerto Rico was central. Bases there were, in the strict sense, strategic and
essential. Puerto Rico therefore had to be maintained as a controlled and, if
possible, friendly base.
R. TUGWELL, THE ART OF POLITICS 150 (1958).
57. N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1943, at 7, col. 1.
58. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 310. Immediately after World War II and prior to the
Cold War, some U.S. officials thought that Puerto Rico would no longer be necessary in U.S.
military strategy. R. TUGWELL, supra note 56, at 150-151.
59. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. 646 (D. P.R. 1979), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, remanded in part, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcel6, 456 U.S. 305, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982).
60. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. at 708.
61. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. at 707.
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C. Military Training Exercises
Because major military exercises disrupt civilian activity, a non-self-
governing territory may provide a more convenient location than sites in
the administering state, since citizens of the territory are less able effec-
tively to object.
The U. S. Navy has used Puerto Rico for its own exercises and for
N.A.T.O. exercises.6 2 A U.S. military commander wrote of Vieques Island:
Actually the island is a part of Puerto Rico, but the U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps had established something of a squatters right over it.
They used it as a target area for the long guns of the Caribbean Fleet
and as a place where the marines could practice their amphibious
landings."
The United States military finds Puerto Rico more appropriate for
training than other available areas for military exercises using sophisti-
cated weaponry:
The island of Vieques is the only place presently available wherein the
Atlantic Fleet can conduct the full range of exercises under conditions
similar to simulated combat. It is the only place which possesses the
potential or existing capability to conduct combined exercises involv-
ing air-to-ground ordnances delivery, Marine amphibious assaults,
anti-submarine warfare, surface-to-air missiles, close support bom-
bardment, and electronic warfare; in short everything that a battle
group would undertake to secure our sea lanes from interdiction by
hostile forces."
Judge Torruella, who made that finding, stated that "the continued use of
Vieques by Defendant Navy for naval training activities is essential to the
defense of the Nation."" He therefore denied the injunction requested by
Puerto Rico:
[T]he injunctive relief sought would cause grievous, and perhaps ir-
reparable harm, not only to Defendant Navy, but to the general wel-
fare of this Nation. It is abundantly clear from the evidence in the
record, as well as by our taking judicial notice of the present state of
World affairs, that the training that takes place in Vieques is vital to
the defense of the interests of the United States.66
On appeal in that case, the U.S. Supreme Court cited with approval this
finding of fact.6 7 Noting that the Navy had used Vieques Island for weap-
ons training for many years, it concurred as to the unique utility of Vie-
62. Vieques Fishermen Fight Back (interview with Carlos Zenon, President, Fisher-
men's Association of Vieques), 1 PUERTO RICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 16, 18 (no. 2,
1978).
63. W. HARRIS, PUERTO Rico's FIGHTING 65TH U.S. INFANTRY 15 (1980).
64. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. at 708.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 707.
67. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcel6, 456 U.S. at 310.
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ques Island for training exercises: "Currently all Atlantic Fleet vessels as-
signed to the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean are required to
complete their training at Vieques because it permits a full range of exer-
cises under conditions similar to combat."'
The United States military has used Puerto Rico not only for mili-
tary training aimed at defense of the United States, but as well for train-
ing in intervention, taking advantage of Puerto Rico's situation as a Car-
ibbean island. In the early 1980s the U.S. Atlantic Command conducted
exercises in and around Puerto Rico to simulate the type of landing that
it carried out in Grenada in 1983. The exercise was called Ocean Ven-
ture." Its objective was to install a "government friendly to America" in a
Caribbean island state that was "exporting terrorist activities to neigh-
boring islands."' 0 In its 1983 invasion of Grenada, the U.S. Navy assem-
bled part of its assault force in Puerto Rico." The U.N. Special Commit-
tee on Decolonization has expressed concern about U.S. use of military
facilities in Puerto Rico as part of its Central America policy.
72
IV. QUESTION OF WHETHER A TERRITORY IS SELF-GOVERNING
The question of whether a territory is self-governing may not be
clear. An administering state's power with respect to military use of the
territory is a factor relevant in answering that question. If an administer-
ing state has power of military use, that fact casts doubt on whether the
territory is self-governing. This section uses Puerto Rico to examine the
question of how it is determined whether a territory is non-self-governing.
When the United Nations established supervision over non-self-gov-
erning territories, the United States listed Puerto Rico as non-self-gov-
erning.7 1 Beginning in 1946, it annually submitted to the United Nations
information about Puerto Rico, as required by Article 73 of the United
Nations Charter.7" Submission of these reports constituted recognition by
the United States that Puerto Rico was non-self-governing. The United
68. Id. at 307.
69. Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1983, at A24, col. 3. For a view that Ocean Venture 1981 was
intended as practice for intervention in Grenada, see London Times, Nov. 7, 1983, at 5, col.
1. See also Quigley, The United States Invasion of Grenada: Stranger than Fiction, 18
INTER-AMERICAN L. R. 271, at 318-319 (1986-87).
70. C. SEARLE, GRENADA: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST DESTABILIZATION 37-38 (1983).
71. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at Al, col. 2.
72. Resolution, para. 5, Aug. 24, 1983, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/751 (1983), reported in U.N.
MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1984, at 83 (Vote: 10-2-10) (links strengthening of the U.S. mili-
tary apparatus in P.R. with U.S. policy in Central America).
73. 1946-1947 U.N.Y.B. 572. The listing had been requested by G.A. Res. 9, Feb. 9,
1946, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During the First Part of Its First
Session from 10 January to 14 February 1946 13, U.N. Doc. A/64 (1946).
74. Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During the Second Part of Its First
Session from 23 October to 15 December 1946, G.A. Res. 66, preambular para. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/64/Add.1, at 124 (1947). Axtmayer, Non-Self-Governing Territories and the Constitutive
Process of the United Nations: A General Analysis and the Case Study of Puerto Rico,
45(3-4) REVISTA JURfDICA DE LA UNIV. DE P.R. 211, 236 (1976).
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States approved a 1946 General Assembly resolution that listed all non-
self-governing territories held by member states. The resolution included
Puerto Rico.75 Thus, at that period the United States' position was that
Puerto Rico was non-self-governing.
Since Puerto Rico was non-self-governing when the bases were
founded, their establishment violated the United States' obligations as an
administering state. This illegal situation could be corrected, at least for
the future, however, if Puerto Rico were to achieve self-governing status
and then to agree to the bases. A state has the right to permit other
states to establish military bases.76 While international law provides guid-
ance in determining whether a territory is non-self-governing, application
of the law to specific situations is hazardous.
A. 1950-52 Legislation on Puerto Rico's Status
The position of the United States is that it made Puerto Rico self-
governing in 1952. This section examines that position. In 1953 the
United States informed the United Nations that it would stop sending
annual reports regarding Puerto Rico. It asserted that Puerto Rico was no
longer non-self-governing. 77 The General Assembly discussed the United
States communication and adopted by a narrow vote Resolution 748, in
which it agreed with the United States' assertion that Puerto Rico had
become self-governing." It,
recognize[d] that... the people of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
have been invested with attributes of political sovereignty which
clearly identify the status of self-government attained by the Puerto
Rican people as that of an autonomous political entity.. . ." and "con-
sider[ed] that, due to these circumstances, the Declaration regarding
Non-Self-Governing Territories and the provisions established under
it in Chapter XI of the Charter [Article 73-J.Q.] can no longer be
applied to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.71
The basis for the United States' assertion that Puerto Rico had be-
come self-governing was that in 1950 the U. S. Congress adopted P.L.
600, authorizing the drafting in Puerto Rico of a constitution, to be ap-
75. G.A. Res. 66, supra note 73.
76. See, e.g., Defense Agreement, art. 2, Sept. 26, 1953, Spain-United States, 4 U.S.T.
1895, 207 U.N.T.S. 83 (providing for U.S. military bases in Spain).
77. Report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, 8
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15), U.N. Doc. A/2465 (1953). On events surrounding this submis-
sion, see Garcia Muffiz, Puerto Rico and the United States: The United Nations Role 1953-
1975, 53 REvISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIV. DE P.R. 1, at 13-18 (1984); and Axtmayer, supra note
74, at 238-46.
78. G.A. Res. 748, Nov. 27, 1953, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/2630
(1953). Vote: 26-16-18. Leibowitz, The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: Trying to Gain Dig-
nity and Maintain Culture, 11 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 211, at 278 (1981).
79. G.A. Res. 748, supra note 78, para. 5. On U.N. discussion leading to adoption of
Res. 748, see Garcia Mufliz, supra note 77, at 26-48.
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proved by referendum there.80 The constitution so drafted would be sub-
ject to the approval of the U.S. Congress."1 A constitution was drafted by
a constituent assembly. That constitution used the term "common-
wealth" to describe Puerto Rico.82 The constitution was approved by a
referendum in Puerto Rico and then by the U.S. Congress, which, how-
ever, demanded certain changes as condition of its approval.8"
States voting against Resolution 748 argued that the 1950-1952
changes left Puerto "non-self-governing" and that the 1952 referendum
offered a choice only between the new proposed arrangement and the sta-
tus quo, leaving no option of independence."
They also cited the unlimited power of the U.S. government to legis-
late for Puerto Rico.8 Despite adoption of the Puerto Rico Constitution,
United States law retained an earlier provision that federal U.S. legisla-
tion applies in Puerto Rico.8 There was no requirement that Puerto Rico
accept existing or future federal legislation.7
B. United Nations Standards for Self-Determination
A strong indication of the customary law standard is provided by cri-
teria formulated by the General Assembly to determine whether a terri-
tory has attained self-determination. The Assembly has drawn up a list of
factors.88
80. Pub. L. No. 81-600, July 3, 1950, 64 Stat. 319, 48 U.S.C. 731b, 731c (1950).
81. 48 U.S.C. 731d.
82. PUERTO Rico CONST. art. 1, sec. 1, re-produced as appendix in Magruder, The Com-
monwealth Status of Puerto Rico, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 20-33 (1953).
83. H.R.J. Res. 567, 66 Stat. 327 (1952). For a fuller account of the 1950-1952 legisla-
tion and adoption of the Puerto Rico constitution, see W. REISMAN, PUERTO RICO AND THE
INTERNATIONAL PROCESS: NEW ROLES IN AssOCIATION 31-35 (1975); J. TORRUELLA, THE SU-
PREME COURT AND PUERTO Rico: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 152-159 (1985);
Magruder, supra note 82, at 1-33; Mufliz, supra note 77, at 8-9.
84. Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 278. See also Mufliz, supra note 77, at 41-43.
85. Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 278; Rodriguez-Orellana, In Contemplation of Micro-
nesia: The Prospects for the Decolonization of Puerto Rico Under International Law, 18 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. R. 457, 460-461 (1987). Congress' power is limited in certain respects by
the U.S. Constitution, as construed by the U.S. Supreme Court, Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S.
651, 100 S.Ct. 1929, 64 L.Ed.2d 587 (1980), but that limitation is irrelevant for present pur-
poses. The significant point is that the three branches of the U.S. government collectively
hold plenary legislative power over Puerto Rico. On limitations imposed by the U.S. Su-
preme Court on the basis of the U.S. Constitution, see Laughlin, The Burger Court and the
United States Territories, 36 U. FLA. L.R. 755-816 (1984).
86. 48 U.S.C. 734, construed in Feliciano v. U.S., 297 F.Supp. 1356, 1361 (D. P.R. 1969).
87. Caribtow Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 493 F.2d
1064, 1066 (1st Cir. 1974). W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 36. Ortiz-Alvarez, The Compact
between Puerto Rico and the United States: Its Nature and Effects, 24 REVISTA DE DER-
ECHO PUERTORRIQUE&O, nos. 91-92, 179, 258-259 (1984-85).
88. The factors appear in two resolutions: (1) G.A. Res. 742, Nov. 27, 1953, 8 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 21, U.N.Doc. A/2630 (1953); (2) G.A. Res. 1541, Dec. 15, 1960, 15
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
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1. Indigenous Legislation
One factor is "enactment of laws for the Territory by an indigenous
body."89 While Puerto Rico enacts laws on many important topics, s ° it
has less legislative power than is typical of entities in "free association."'
U.S. courts have power to construe Puerto Rico's statutes, regardless of
the construction given by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, if they find
construction by the latter "inescapably wrong."" s The U.S. Congress re-
tained the power to change the law applicable in Puerto Rico.9 3 Puerto
Rico remains in United States law a "territory,"' 4 and Congress has un-
limited power to legislate for territories."
89. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 88, Annex, Part II: Factors Indicative of the Attainment
of Other Separate Systems of Self-Government, para. C(1). For agreement that it is Part II
of Res. 742 that is applicable to Puerto Rico, see Garcia Mufkiz, supra note 77, at 49.
90. W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 33-34.
91. Accord Axtmayer, supra note 74, at 246. Several U.N. member states so asserted in
opposing the draft of G.A. Res. 748; Garcia Muftiz, supra note 77, at 42, 49-50; Note, Puerto
Rico: Colony or Commonwealth?, 6 N.Y.U. J. INTr'L L. & POL. 115, 130-131 (1973). Berrios
Martinez, Self-Determination and Independence: The Case of Puerto Rico, 67 PRoc. AM.
Soc. INT'L L. 11, 13-15 (1973). Contra W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 49, 113 (that despite
defects, status is one of "free associated state"). For analysis of relations between "associ-
ated states" and metropolitan states, see T. FRANCK, CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES BY SEMI-
AUTONOMOUS STATES 7-26 (1978). Unlike most such states, Puerto Rico does not, for exam-
ple, have the right to establish an exclusive economic zone around its shore, that power
being retained by the United States. Id. at 28-29.
92. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41, 43, 91 S.Ct. 156, 157, 27 L.Ed.2d 174, 177
(1970).
93. Ortiz-Alvarez, supra note 87, at 258-259. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 83. J. TOR-
RUELLA, supra note 83, at 167-195, 200.
94. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 469-470, 99 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 61 L.Ed.2d 1, 7
(1979). Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. at 651, in which the Court stated: "Congress, which is
empowered under the Territory Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST., art. IV, sec. 3, cl. 2,
to 'make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory... belonging to the
United States,' may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as there is a rational
basis for its actions." The U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of Puerto Rico as a "territory"
deprives of any force the dictum that Puerto Rico since 1952 is not a "territory." The Dis-
trict Court of Puerto Rico had stated: "[Tihe Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States is no longer applicable on the basis that Puerto Rico is a possession, depen-
dency or territory subject to the plenary power of Congress. But it continues to be applica-
ble to Puerto Rico as part of the compact referred to." Mora v. Torres, 113 F.Supp. 309, 319
(D. P.R. 1953), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377 (1st Cir.
1953).
95. "The Congress shall have Power to... make all needful Rules and Regulations re-
specting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONSTITU-
TION, art. IV, sec. 3. construed in Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 377-378
(1949) ("While ... great respect is to be paid to the enactments of a territorial legislature by
all courts.., the position of the state [state of the United States-J.Q.] as sovereign over
matters not ruled by the Constitution requires a deference to state legislative action beyond
that required for the laws of a territory. A territory is subject to congressional regulation.")
In light of that statement, which has never been repudiated by the Court, the view of the
U.S. District Court in Mora v. Mejias, 115 F.Supp. 610, 612 (D. P.R. 1953) that "Puerto
Rico is, under the terms of the compact, sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitu-
tion of the United States," is incorrect.
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As part of its plenary legislative power over Puerto Rico, the United
States retains the exclusive right over military installations. This right
was evident in Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown. Puerto Rico had no option for
stopping damaging military exercises other than by suing in court, and
then only by alleging environmental harm." And even when it demon-
strated violation of environmental legislation, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the denial of an injunction.Y
The United States' plenary rights over military use of Puerto Rico
was demonstrated as well in Feliciano v. United States. In that case the
District Court of Puerto Rico denied a requested injunction against the
U.S. President's designation as a "defensive sea area" of a sea sector off
Culebra, an offshore island of Puerto Rico.' 8 The President had forbidden
entrance into Culebra's territorial waters without authorization by the
Navy.9" Residents of Culebra sought the injunction to gain access without
Navy authorization, asserting that Navy denials prevented them from
earning a livelihood.100
The district court found the power of the United States to designate
a "defensive sea area" unlimited by any power of the government of Pu-
erto Rico. Even had Puerto Rico attempted legislatively to countermand
the designation, it could not have done so.101 The court found, moreover,
that the U.S. Congress has no power to divest itself of the right to make
military decisions affecting Puerto Rico, because of the Congress' power
over U.S. territory:
[A]s long as Puerto Rico remains a part of the United States, it would
probably be unconstitutional for Congress to allow Puerto Rico any
say whatever over maritime regulations involving national defense.'0 2
Puerto Rico has no voice in decisions regarding military operations in Pu-
erto Rico, since it has no voting representation in the U.S. Congress that
appropriates funds for the operations, 08 and no role in the electoral col-
lege that elects the president who carries them out.'04 Lack of Puerto
Rico representation in Congress also relieves the Defense Department of
pressure in Congress from Puerto Ricans whose lives are disrupted by
military activities. The Navy has acknowledged that one reason it con-
ducts weapons testing offshore from Puerto Rico is that Puerto Rico has
96. 478 F.Supp at 707.
97. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcel6, 456 U.S. at 305.
98. Executive Order No. 8684, Feb. 14, 1941, Federal Register, Feb. 18, 1941, at 1016.
99. Id.
100. Feliciano v. U.S., 297 F.Supp. at 1356.
101. Id. at 1361.
102. Id. at 1362.
103. It has a "resident commissioner" who participates in Congress on a non-voting
basis. 48 U.S.C. sec. 891, 5 U.S.C. sec. 2106. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 320-321.
104. U.S. CONST., art. II, sec. 1. Helfeld, How Much of the United States Constitution
and Statutes Are Applicable to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico?, in Proceedings of the
First Circuit Judicial Conference: Applicability of the United States Constitution and
Federal Laws to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Nov. 4-6, 1985, 110 F. R. D. 449, at 475.
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no representation in the United States Congress."0 5
2. Indigenous Constitution
"The associated territory should have the right to determine its in-
ternal constitution without outside interference," recites one of the Gen-
eral Assembly's criteria.'" The U.S. Congress, as indicated above, de-
manded changes as condition of its approval.'07 Among them was addition
of a provision to require that amendments conform to existing and future
Congressional legislation on Puerto Rico.'0 8 The Puerto Rico assembly
made the required changes and submitted them to a second referendum,
which approved them."0 9 Thus, amendments to the Puerto Rico Constitu-
tion must conform to whatever statutes Congress may enact on the Pu-
erto Rico-U.S. relationship."
Moreover, P.L. 600 gave Congress unlimited power to change Puerto
Rico statutory or constitutional law by stating that "the statutory laws of
the United States not locally inapplicable. . .shall have the same force
and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States.""' The U.S. represen-
tative to the General Assembly's Fourth Committee told the Committee
in 1953 that Puerto Rico's Constitution "stem[s] from their [the people of
Puerto Rico-J.Q.] own authority.""' 2 In fact, it stemmed from the U.S.
Congress. She further asserted that the Puerto Rico Constitution was a
document "which only they [the people of Puerto Rico-J.Q.] can alter or
amend."' 8 But the Puerto Rico Constitution is overridden by contrary
U.S. legislation.""
105. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 313.
106. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 88, Annex: Principle VII(b).
107. See supra note 83.
108. Pub. L. No. 477, 66 Stat. 327 (July 3, 1952).
109. W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 33. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 79, 347. Reisman
finds the factor of U.S. approval of the Puerto Rico Constitution insignificant as part of "a
process in which there are two parties, for both of whom the contemplated relation must be
voluntary. Surely the principal may state the minima it will demand in the organization of
the associate." W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 44-45.
110. Garcia Mufliz, supra note 77, at 9. W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 34. Amendments
do not, however, require prior approval of the U.S. Congress. Carri6n v. Gonzalez, 125
F.Supp. 819, 825-826 (U.S.D.C. D. P.R. 1954). Reisman ignores those limitations enumer-
ated in the text apart from U.S. approval and concludes that the relationship was voluntary.
111. Act, sec. 9, 48 U.S.C. sec. 34. W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 36.
112. Statement of Frances Bolton, U.S. representative, Fourth Committee, Nov. 3,
1953, 29 DEP'T ST. BULL. 804 (1953), summarized in 8 U.N. GAOR C.4 (350th mtg.) at 225,
U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SER/350 (1953).
113. Id.
114. U.S. v. Quinofles, 758 F.2d 40, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1985); U.S. v. P6rez, 465 F. Supp.
1284 (D. P.R. 1979). (In both cases, an accused, prosecuted in federal court, moved to sup-
press telephone conversation on grounds that the interception violated an anti-wiretap pro-
vision of the Puerto Rico Constitution. The interception was lawful under an Act of Con-
gress. Held: the Act of Congress prevails. The conversation may be used in evidence even if,
as the courts assumed, the interception violates the Puerto Rico Constitution.) In Figueroa
v. Puerto Rico, 232 F.2d 615, 620 (1st Cir. 1956), the First Circuit stated that the people of
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3. Freedom to Modify Status
Another factor established by the General Assembly is "the freedom
of the population of a Territory which has associated itself with the met-
ropolitan country to modify at any time this status through the expres-
sion of their will by democratic means."" 5 Resolution 748 mentioned a
"compact agreed upon with the United States of America."' A preambu-
lar clause indicates that the resolution was adopted
considering that the agreement reached by the United States of
America and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico... maintains the
spiritual bonds between Puerto Rico and Latin America." 7
As several United Nations members noted, however,"' there was no
"compact" in the sense of a bilateral agreement. P.L. 600, to be sure, re-
cited that it was "adopted in the nature of a compact,"' 9 and the Puerto
Rico Constitution referred to the relationship as based on a "compact."' 0
But neither term correctly characterized the post-1952 Puerto Rico-
United States relationship.
The U.S. Congress adopted P.L. 600 and gave the voters in Puerto
Rico a choice of approving or disapproving it on a take-it-or-leave-it ba-
sis. There was no agreement between Puerto Rico and the United
States.' 2 ' The absence of an agreement is further indicated by the fact
that twice since 1952 bills have been introduced in the U.S. Congress to
conclude such an agreement. Neither bill was adopted.'22
Puerto Rico were free to amend the Puerto Rico Constitution, if they were to decide to do
so, to delete from it the right to trial by jury. While the Court was to that extent correct, the
U.S. Congress has the right to require Puerto Rico to use trial by jury. Reisman construes
Figueroa as holding that if an Act of Congress conflicts with the Puerto Rico Constitution,
the Act would be "inapplicable." W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 36. Figueroa does not so
hold. Reisman construes to the same effect Moreno Rios v. U.S., 256 F.2d 68 (1st Cir. 1958).
Moreno Rios does not so hold either.
115. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 88, para. A(3). Similar language appears in G.A. Res.
1541, Annex: Principle VII(a), supra note 88.
116. G.A. Res. 748, supra note 78, para. 5.
117. Id., preambular para. 5.
118. Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 278.
119. 48 U.S.C. sec. 731b.
120. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO Rico CONST., art. 1, sec. 1, in Magruder, supra note 82,
at 21.
121. For a view that in Pub. L. No. 600 Congress ceded powers that it may not re-take,
thereby making the law a "compact," see Ortiz-Alvarez, The Compact between Puerto Rico
and the United States: Its Nature and Effects, REVISTA DE DERECHO PUERTORRIQUEIO, nos.
91-92, at 185-287 (1984-85). For a position that Congress did not give up its legal power over
Puerto Rico but created for itself a moral obligation not to intervene in Puerto Rican do-
mestic affairs, see Helfeld, Las Relaciones Constitucionales entre Puerto Rico y los Estados
Unidos, REVISTA DE DERECHO PUERTORRIQUE O, no. 93, at 297, 316 (1985); and to the same
effect, see Helfeld, in Proceedings of the First Circuit Judicial Conference, supra note 104,
at 465-466.
122. (1) H.R. 5945, Fernbs-Murray bill, 1959. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 82-84. (2) Pu-
erto Rican Compact: Hearing On the compact of Permanent Union between Puerto Rico
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A U.S. representative, endeavoring to convince the U. N. Committee
on Information from Non-Self Governing Territories that Puerto Rico
was self-governing, had told the Committee that a "compact" had been
concluded: "A compact, as you know, is far stronger than a treaty. A
treaty usually can be denounced by either side, whereas a compact cannot
be denounced by either party unless it has the permission of the
other."' Another U.S. representative had told the Fourth Committee
that the United States and Puerto Rico had "a compact of a bilateral
nature whose terms may be changed only by common consent."' 2
The U.S. representative to the General Assembly told that body of a
commitment by the U.S. President that "if, at any time, the Legislative
Assembly of Puerto Rico adopts a resolution in favor of more complete or
even absolute independence, he will immediately thereafter recommend
to Congress that such independence be granted."'2 5 No commitment was
made on behalf of the Congress; the intent behind the statement was to
lead Assembly delegates to believe that introduction of such a bill by the
President would result in favorable legislation. Thus, the statement, while
not false, was misleading."2 '
4. Free Expression of Opinion as to Status
Related to the freedom to modify status is another factor: "the opin-
ion of the population of the Territory, freely expressed by informed and
democratic process, as to the status or change in status which they de-
sire.""27 International supervision of status referenda has been deemed
necessary to guarantee fairness in ascertainment of opinion. 2 "
and the United States Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th
Cong., 1st sess. 47-87 (1975). Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 247-248.
123. Statement of Mason Sears, U.S. representative to U.N. Committee on Information
from Non-Self-Governing Territories, Aug. 28, 1953, 29 DEP'T ST. BULL. 392 (1953), quoted
in Mora v. Mejias, 115 F.Supp. 610, 612 (1953).
124. Statement of Bolton, supra note 112.
125. Statement of Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representative to U.N. General Assembly,
Nov. 27, 1953, 29 DEP'T ST. BULL. 841 (1953), summarized in 8 U.N. GAOR (459th mtg.)
para. 66, U.N. Doc. A/PV.459 (1953).
126. Reisman construes the statement as importing an obligation on the President,
binding under international law. W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 45. Reisman misconstrues it
in the way the U.S. delegation apparently intended it to be misconstrued, stating that
"President Eisenhower's 1953 communication to the General Assembly made express, de-
spite equivocation, that Puerto Ricans could go their own way if and when they wanted to."
Id. at 118. The statement is also misconstrued as importing an agreement to grant indepen-
dence by R. TUGWELL, supra note 56, at 148, and by Crawford, who cites it for the proposi-
tion that "Puerto Rico has been regarded by the United States Government since 1952 as
entitled to opt for a different status-either complete independence or integration with the
United States." J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 372 (1979).
127. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 88, para. A(1).
128. Puerto Rico: Colony or Commonwealth, supra note 91, at 130-131. See, e.g., plebi-
scites organized by U.N. in Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons to determine
future status, mentioned in Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.),
Preliminary Objections, Dec. 2, 1963, 1963 I.C.J. 15, 23. Practice has also been for the Gen-
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In Puerto Rico, the 1952 referendum was not internationally super-
vised and did not include options involving less connection to the United
States than the one that carried a majority. The absence of international
supervision has been characterized as "only a formal flaw, since there ap-
pears to be no substantial criticism of the quality of the referendum con-
ducted."' 2 9 However, without international supervision one cannot be cer-
tain that possible defects were uncovered.
In 1967, the United States conducted in Puerto Rico a plebiscite on
status, also not internationally supervised. That plebiscite offered three
options: independence, status quo, or statehood (as a state of the United
States); 425,081 voted for the status quo, 273,315 for statehood, and 4204
for independence.8 0
It is questionable whether the 1967 plebiscite represents "the opinion
of the population.. .freely expressed," since: (1) there was no interna-
tional supervision; "8 (2) the United States had not promised to abide by
the most popular choice, which must have made voting for "indepen-
dence" seem a wasted vote; 3 2 (3) expression of opinion is not free so long
as Puerto Rico is occupied by a large U.S. military force, viewed as an
intimidating factor;'38 (4) no option of true "free association" was on the
ballot, since the status quo fell short of "free association." 4
Pro-independence forces boycotted the plebiscite, "' arguing that the
United States must first transfer power to local authority, so that the
people could choose status without the pressure of U.S. presence.' 6 The
Federal Bureau of Investigation, considering most of the pro-indepen-
dence groups "subversive," tried to undermine this boycott by disrupting
these groups.13 7 The boycott nonetheless apparently achieved some suc-
eral Assembly to approve the plebiscite after determining that it was fairly conducted. Id.
129. W. REISMAN, supra note 83, at 44.
130. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1967, at Al, col. 1.
131. See, eg., plebiscite conducted under United Nations observation in Palau in 1986
to decide on future status. U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, at 93, (April 1986).
132. Berrios Martinez, supra note 91, at 15. "[B]efore the Puerto Ricans can possibly
take a significant constitutional initiative, they must be given explicit and detailed guaran-
tees about the possible political responses from Washington in the event particular options
are chosen." Cabranes, in Proceedings of the First Circuit Judicial Conference, supra note
104, at 484.
133. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 314. Martinez, supra note 91, at 15.
134. Mufliz, supra note 77, at 62. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 88.
135. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1967, at Al, col. 1.
136. Mufiz, supra note 77, at 63. Withey, Puerto Rico and the United Nations 1977, 1
PUERTO RICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 12, 14 (1977). R. CARR, supra note 40, at 89.
137. Berrios Martinez, supra note 91, at 15. Gautier Mayoral, La Elevaci6n del Caso de
Puerto Rico ante la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas en ta Decada Actual, 45
REVISTA DEL COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE P.R. 69, 77 (1984). See, e.g., F.B.I. memorandum
describing a plan, based on information that an official of one pro-independence group had
called an official of another pro-independence group "a coward," to compose and send a
flyer to members of the Movement for the Independence of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rican
Socialist League, and the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico stating, "You have two weeks to
prove or retract your statement that [name deleted in version released] is a coward." The
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cess, as 34% of eligible voters did not cast ballots. s3 That represented a
30% higher abstention rate than in general elections in Puerto Rico.139
The F.B.I. efforts cast further doubt on whether the plebiscite repre-
sented a free expression of opinion.
On the basis of the 1967 plebiscite, the United States moved in the
U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization, which by then had taken up
the question of whether Puerto Rico remained non-self-governing, to re-
move Puerto Rico from its agenda. But the Special Committee postponed
indefinitely a vote on that motion, apparently disagreeing with the U.S.
position that the plebiscite had provided an adequate opportunity for
Puerto Rico to determine its status."1 0
C. United Nations Re-Consideration of Puerto Rico's Status
In the 1970s, the United Nations' Special Committee on Decoloniza-
tion has characterized Puerto Rico in terms that suggest non-self-gov-
erning status. "1 In 1972 it "recogniz[ed] the inalienable right of the peo-
ple of Puerto Rico to self-determination and independence." '142 The
General Assembly approved the work of the Committee, an action that
endorsed the Committee's finding on Puerto Rico." '4 In 1973 the Special
Committee
request[ed] the Government of the United States of America to re-
frain from taking any measures which might obstruct the full and free
exercise by the people of their inalienable right to self-determination
and independence.1 4 4
The General Assembly again approved the report. 4"
In 1978 the Special Committee "[a]ffirm[ed] that self-determination
by the people of Puerto Rico in a democratic process should be exercised
memorandum recited: "it is believed this flyer will further the conflict between the groups
there by diverting their energies from the issue of the upcoming plebiscite." Memorandum,
June 16, 1967, to F.B.I. Director, from Special Agent in Charge [of the F.B.I.], San Juan
[Puerto Rico], re "Groups Seeking Independence for Puerto Rico, Counterintelligence Pro-
gram (Subversive Control Section)," in Scholarly Resources, (Wilmington, Delaware),
Cointelpro: The Counterintelligence Program of the F.B.I. (microfilm), File No. 105-93124,
Nationalist Groups, Reel 1 (1978).
138. Total number of eligible voters was 1,067,000. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1967, at Al,
col. 1.
139. Id. at A18, col. 1.
140. Gautier Mayoral, supra note 137, at 77.
141. Leibowitz, supra note 78, at 278-279. Axtmayer, supra note 74, at 252-253.
142. Aug. 28, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/419 (1972) (Vote: 12-0-10).
143. G.A. Res. 2908, para. 3 (Nov. 2, 1972), 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/8730 (1973) (Vote: 99-5-23). Withey, supra note 136, at 14-15; Mufiiz, supra note 77,
at 146-147. "Approval of the Special Committee's report signifies approval of its determina-
tions and recommendations." Puerto Rico: Colony or Commonwealth, supra note 91, at 120.
144. Resolution, Aug. 30, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/438 (1973) (Vote: 12-2-9). See also
Garcia Mufiiz, supra note 77, at 128-129; Withey, supra note 136, at 15.
145. G.A. Res. 3163, art. 2, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 5, U.N. Doc
A/9030 (1974) (Vote: 104-5-19).
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through mechanisms freely selected by the Puerto Rican people in com-
plete and full sovereignty." 46 In 1982 it
reaffirm[ed] the inalienable right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-
determination and independence and urged once again the Govern-
ment of the United States to adopt all necessary measures for the full
and effective transfer of all sovereign powers to the people of Puerto
Rico.147
In 1985 it expressed the hope that Puerto Rico might exercise its right to
self-determination and independence "without hindrance" and "with the
express recognition of the people's sovereignty and full political
equality."148
The Special Committee in 1981 asked the General Assembly to "ex-
amine the question of Puerto Rico, 1 49 but the Assembly declined, follow-
ing objection by the United States'3 0 that included threats of economic
assistance cuts to member states.'5
D. Conclusion as to Status of Puerto Rico
The 1950-52 legislation effected no fundamental change in the
Puerto Rico-United States relationship. It increased Puerto Rico's control
over internal affairs "within the established colonial system.
1 52
146. Resolution, para. 3 (Sept. 12, 1978), U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/574 (1978). Vote: 10-0-12.
In 1979 the Special Committee, referring back to the resolutions cited in the text "[n]ot[ed]
with preoccupation that so far the Government of the United States has not taken any
concrete steps to comply with the mandate of the above-mentioned resolutions with respect
to Puerto Rico, including, inter alia, the complete transfer of all powers to the people of the
said Territory, and urge[d] that concrete measures be taken in that direction without fur-
ther delay." Resolution, para. 2, Aug. 15, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/589 (1979) (Vote: 11-0-
12).
147. Resolution, para. 1 (Aug. 4, 1982), U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/707 (1982) (Vote: 12-2-9).
Identical language appears in Resolution, paras. 1-2, (Aug. 24, 1983), U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/
751 (1983), reported in U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, at 83 (Jan. 1984) (Vote: 10-2-10).
148. Resolution, para. 2 (Aug. 14, 1985), U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/844 (1985), reported in
U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, at 14 (July-Aug 1985) (Vote: 11-1-10).
149. Resolution, para. 3 (Aug. 20, 1981), U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/677 (1981), reported in
1981 U.N.Y.B. 1113-1114 (Vote: 11-2-11).
150. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 363. Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Nov. 20, 1981), U.N. Doc. A/36/L/
20 (approval of Special Committee resolution that included request for General Assembly
consideration of Puerto Rico question on understanding that Assembly would not examine
Puerto Rico question). A vote against inclusion of Puerto Rico question on Assembly agenda
was taken Sept. 24, 1982 (Vote: 70-30-43). 1982 U.N.Y.B. 1276; Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1982,
at Al, col. 2.
151. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 363. Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1982, at A10, col. 1 (quoting
U.S. Deputy Representative Kenneth Adelman that U.S. mission had indicated to states
considering abstention that abstention "would be unfavorably met in bilateral relations and
on Capitol Hill.")
152. Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional Doctrine (Book Review) 100
HARV. L. REV. 450, 460 (1986) (reviewing J. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO
Rico: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985)). To the same effect, see Rodriguez-
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The legislative history of P.L. 600 indicates an intent to retain in the
U.S. Congress the power unilaterally to modify Puerto Rico's status. 1 5 3
The State Department told Congress that P.L. 600 would have "great
value as a symbol" in response to" 'colonialism' and 'imperialism' in anti-
American propaganda."'" The Secretary of the Interior, seeking to assure
Congress that under P.L. 600 it would retain control over Puerto Rico,
stated that it "would not change Puerto Rico's political, social, and eco-
nomic relationship to the United States.' '
5 5
"The island's basic political status has not changed since the turn of
the century."'" "No word other than 'colonialism,'" states one commen-
tator regarding the United States and Puerto Rico, "describes the rela-
tionship between a powerful metropolitan state and an impoverished
overseas dependency disenfranchised from the formal lawmaking
processes that shape its people's daily lives.11 5
For Puerto Rico, "[i]nternal autonomy is restricted, especially in leg-
islative and judicial matters."' 58Puerto Rico is "still subject to the laws
and regulations adopted by the political branches of the national govern-
ment before which they appear only as supplicants; and that national
government retains virtually unlimited discretion to determine whether
or how the island will fit into national policy."' 1 '
The fact that Puerto Rico remains non-self-governing means that the
military use of Puerto Rico remains a violation of the United States' "sa-
cred trust" obligation.
V. STATE RESPONSIBILITY OF AN ADMINISTERING STATE FOR UNLAWFUL
MILITARY BASES IN A NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORY
A variety of harms may befall a non-self-governing territory from
military use of it by an administering state.
A. Risk of Becoming a Military Target
Military use of a non-self-governing territory makes that territory a
Orellana, supra note 85, at 462-463.
153. TORRUELLA, supra note 83, at 155-159.
154. Letter to Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. Senate, from
Jack K. McFall, Asst. Secretary of State (for the Secretary of State), Apr. 24, 1950, 81st
Cong., 2d sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 2688, 2689.
155. Letter to Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. Senate, from
Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior, May 19, 1950, id. at 2685. For views to the
same effect of other executive branch and Congressional sources, see Cabranes, Puerto Rico
and the Constitution, in Proceedings of the First Circuit Judicial Conference, supra note
104, at 483.
156. Cabranes, supra note 152, at 461.
157. Cabranes, in Proceedings of the First Circuit Judicial Conference, supra note 104,
at 480.
158. CRAWFORD, supra note 126, at 372.
159. Cabranes, supra note 152, at 461.
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potential target in a military confrontation of the administering state
with other states. Puerto Rico is particularly at risk because of the impor-
tance of the installations to defense of the United States.
The existence and moveability of nuclear weapons poses a special
risk to non-self-governing territories. United States vessels with nuclear
armaments dock in Puerto Rico. This makes Puerto Rico a potential nu-
clear target.16 0 A 1967 treaty established a nuclear-free zone in Latin
America and the Caribbean to keep the region free of nuclear war. 6 ' The
treaty prohibits "receipt" or "possession" of nuclear weapons."6
B. Potential for Offensive Use
Military bases subject a non-self-governing territory to the possibility
that aggressive attacks may be launched against other states. Aggression
was launched from Puerto Rican bases in 1983 against Grenada. 1 3 The
General Assembly has asked administering states "not to involve those
Territories in any offensive acts or interference against other States."'"
The Special Committee on Decolonization
deplor[ed] the decision of the United States to enlarge and reinforce
its military installations in Puerto Rico and establish new facilities, as
well as the increasing militarization of the United States National
Guard in Puerto Rico and its participation in United-States sponsored
manoeuvres in Central America.'66
C. Displacement of Economic Activity and Population
The General Assembly has "deprecat[ed] the continued alienation of
land in colonial Territories for military installations.""6 Land use for ba-
ses has displaced residents and agriculture in Puerto Rico. The bases oc-
cupy 13% of Puerto Rico's arable land."6" Many farmers have lost their
livelihood; 60% the population has received food stamps in recent
years. 16
Objecting in 1948 to the establishment of bases on Vieques Island,
U.S. Rep. Vito Marcantonio said:
160. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 314.
161. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, (Treaty of
Tlatelolco), Feb. 14, 1967, entered into force Dec. 31, 1979, 634 U.N.T.S. 281, reprinted in 6
ILM 521 (1967).
162. Id., art. 1, sec. 1. The United States is a party to Additional Protocol I, which
requires application of art. 1 of the Treaty in territories for which it is internationally re-
sponsible. Additional Protocol I, art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 10147, 634 U.N.T.S. 361.
163. See supra note 71; Quigley, supra note 69, at 271-352.
164. G.A. Res. 41/405, supra note 31, para. 2.
165. Resolution, Aug. 24, 1983, supra note 147, para 5.
166. G.A. Res. 41/405, supra note 31, para. 11.
167. Independencia, Newsletter of the Puerto Rico Subcommittee, National Lawyers
Guild, 1986, at 7.
168. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 215.
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The United States is depopulating the Puerto Rican island of Vieques
and turning it into a military training base. .... Vieques is a fertile
spot. .... Despite the frantic opposition of the Puerto Ricans, the
Navy has already ordered the complete evacuation of the inhabitants
of Vieques by the early part of this year. This order will affect some
5,000 people and will cripple an agricultural economy which supported
4 sugar mills-producing 20,000 tons of sugar annually-and an ex-
tensive grazing industry. To the people of Puerto Rico who do not
have nearly enough arable land to support their dense population the
removal of Vieques as a source of agricultural products is a national
calamity.8 9
Weapons firings on Vieques Island have removed most of its land area
from productive agriculture. The U.S. Court of Appeals found that
"[slince the mid 1940's. . .the sugar cane industry [on Vieques Island]
has declined to a point where it is of no current importance to the is-
land.' 1 70 As a result, the Court stated, "the islanders now derive their
livelihood from the same sources relied upon by their ancestors more than
one hundred fifty years ago-fishing, subsistence farming and ranching.
17
D. Disruption of Economic Activity
In Puerto Rico, economic activity is hampered by military opera-
tions. The United States Navy operates its Atlantic Fleet Weapons
Training Facility from Roosevelt Roads and from Vieques Island. 7 If its
training, which employs an electromagnetic field, were conducted in the
United States, the Navy acknowledges, it would interfere with television
signals for many residents.'
The Navy typically conducts weapons firing 200 days per year. 4 The
U.S. Supreme Court found that "[d]uring air-to-ground training.. .pilots
sometimes miss land-based targets, and ordnance falls into the sea. That
is, accidental bombings of the navigable waters and, occasionally, inten-
tional bombings of water targets occur.'
7 5
That training has engendered local protest because of disruption to
economic activities, particularly fishing.171 Protests were directed at dis-
ruption caused by weapons exercises, as mentioned, on Culebra Island.1
7 7
169. 94 CONG. REC. 9283 (1948). On previous economic activity on Vieques, see also
Vieques Fishermen, supra note 62, at 20.
170. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 643 F.2d at 838.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 838-839.
173. R. CARR, supra note 40 at 311 (citing his interview with Chief of Staff, Roosevelt
Roads Naval Base). On the electronic warfare range, see also Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 643
F.2d at 839.
174. Romero-BarceI6 v. Brown, 643 F.2d at 839.
175. Weinberger, v. Romero-Barcel6, 456 U.S. at 307.
176. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 311-313. Vieques Fishermen, supra note 62, at 16-23.
177. Rousseau, Chronique des Faits Internationaux, 75 REvuE GtkN9RALE DE Dsorr IN-
TERNATIONAL PUBLIC 465, 521-523 (1971). See also supra note 100.
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In 1975 the Navy stopped the firings on Culebra Island."'
According to Carlos Zenon, President of the Vieques Fishermen's As-
sociation, which has been prominent in protests, these exercises "destroy
fish and fishing equipment. Our lives are in constant danger, due to unex-
ploded bombs in the water."' 79 Many Vieques fishermen had to quit fish-
ing: "we have to go to the Food Stamp lines."' 80 The United Nations Spe-
cial Committee on Decolonization
demand[ed] that the armed forces of the United States terminate per-
manently their operations in the island municipality of Vieques, thus
allowing the people of that island to live in peace in their own land
and to enjoy fully the results of the exploitation for their benefit of
the natural resources in the land and sea of the island municipality.' 8'
E. Damage to the Environment
Base use may damage the environment. Judge Torruella found (and
the U.S. Supreme Court did not question) that the Navy had violated
environmental protection laws in its weapons firing on Vieques Island.'82
The Court of Appeals ordered issuance of an injunction to the Navy to
cease these violations until it obtained statutorily-required permits.'
The Court of Appeals found that the Navy had, before firing weapons
around Vieques Island, failed to secure a biological opinion on the impact
on various endangered species, including pelicans, turtles, and
manatees.""
F. Possible Benefits to the Non-Self-Governing Territory
Even if an administering state uses a non-self-governing territory for
military purposes of its own, benefit may accrue to the non-self-governing
territory. The United States' military use of Puerto Rico provides em-
ployment for Puerto Ricans. Judge Torruella said, in explaining the im-
portance of keeping sea lanes open, that "the ability to maintain free sea
lanes to and from the Mainland [of the United States] would seem of
some interest to the residents of this Commonwealth.' ' 85 The governor of
Puerto Rico said in 1982 that the Roosevelt Roads base "boosts island
178. Rousseau, Chronique des Faits Internationaux, in 78 REVUE GIkNIkRALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 1096, 1183 (1974). Vieques Fishermen, supra note 62, at 22. See also
Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 643 F.2d at 839.
179. Vieques Fishermen, supra note 62, at 17. See also id. at 18. Zenon was a plaintiff
in suit accompanying that of Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. at 650.
180. Vieques Fishermen, supra note 62, at 18.
181. Resolution, para. 6, Aug. 15, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/589 (1979).
182. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcel6, 456 U.S. at 309-310.
183. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 643 F.2d at 837.
184. Id. at 857. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding that the district court had
discretion to refuse an injunction, even in the face of statutory violations. Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcel6, 456 U.S. at 311.
185. Romero-Barcel6 v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. at 707, n. 119.
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security.""18 Where an administering state operates military bases for its
own benefit, however, benefits to the non-self-governing territory are inci-
dental. The administering state is using the non-self-governing territory
for its own purposes.
G. Bases as an Impediment to Self-Determination
Military use of a non-self-governing territory may affect the adminis-
tering state's promotion of self-determination. The General Assembly, as
noted, characterizes military bases as an "obstacle" to self-determina-
tion.187 The military significance of Puerto Rico influences United States
policy as to its status.' In 1943 the Puerto Rico legislature asked for a
referendum on independence:
The colonial system of government ought to be totally and definitely
abolished in Puerto Rico, and the form of this definite political status
ought to be democratically decided through the free vote of the people
themselves. 18
A bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate to grant independence; but it
stipulated that the United States was to maintain the right to its bases.'90
One senator stated that Puerto Rico must, as a condition of indepen-
dence, give guarantees "as to military and naval installations and means
of egress and ingress."'' The Navy Department opposed independence
without guarantees for "retention of naval and military and air bases and
reservations by the United States and for such expansion of naval and
military and air facilities as may be required in the future for hemisphere
defense." ' 2
Objecting to independence, the War Department stated: "For mili-
tary reasons, we believe that would be unwise."'8 3 One senator opposed
independence even with guarantees:
I can understand a certain amount of autonomy, but I cannot under-
stand how you can reconcile complete independence of the Island with
the effective and necessary use of Puerto Rico for a military control of
the Caribbean." 4
The United States' hostile relationship with Cuba has solidified its
position that it must keep Puerto Rico as a military outpost. 9 " Antici-
186. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 315 (quoting Feb. 1, 1982, speech of Gov. Romero-
Barcel6).
187. See supra note 31.
188. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 311.
189. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1943, at 6, col. 4. THE PUERTO RiCANS, supra note 37, at 190.
190. N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1943, at 7, col. 1.
191. Hearings on S. 952, supra note 39, at 20 (statement of Senator Bone).
192. Id. at 41-42 (statement of Capt. Paul Foster, Navy Dept.).
193. Id. at 10 (statement of John McCloy, Asst. Secretary of War).
194. Id. at 15 (statement of Senator Taft).
195. R. CARR, supra note 40, at 310.
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pated removal of United States bases from Panama in the year 2000
heightened the perception that Puerto Rico is important in United States
military strategy: "the U.S. military's growing interest in Puerto Rico
stems from the pending removal of U.S. military operations in the Canal
Zone."' 9 Finally, the increasing sophistication of weaponry has rendered
Puerto Rico useful, as indicated, as a test firing site. 19 7
Bases are a sector not controlled by nascent self-governing institu-
tions. Whatever portion of a non-self-governing territory is devoted to
military use is outside the reach of those institutions.
Bases may skew the economy to the extent that whatever self-gov-
erning authority emerges may find it difficult to administer the domestic
economy.198 Finally, the presence of a significant military apparatus may
intimidate the people of a non-self-governing territory in expressing their
opinions on territorial status.
H. Obligation to Make Restitution and Compensation
Military use of a non-self-governing territory violates the rights of
the people of that territory, giving rise to state responsibility.19 9 The stan-
dard for state responsibility is that an administering state must restore
the status quo before the breach and, to the extent this is not possible,
compensate for harm.'0 A "people," even one that has not achieved self-
determination, can carry rights and bear obligations under international
law.2 '01 In Puerto Rico, the United States is obliged to remove its bases,
return the land to its owners, and compensate for damage to individu-
als.20 2 Compensation should be sufficient to make farmers, fishingpeople,
196. Lidin, Navy's Signal Tower for Carib Upgraded, San Juan Star, May 6, 1983, at 1,
col. 1. Reisman questioned the military importance of Puerto Rico to the United States, W.
REISMAN, supra note 83, at 118, as did former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, quoted in
Friedman, P.R. Not Vital to Security of U.S., Kissinger Says, San Juan Star, March 16,
1981, at 3, col. 3.
197. See supra note 63.
198. See, e.g., the situation in South Vietnam after 1975, where previous dependency of
the economy on the U.S. military made economic management difficult. J. QUIGLEY, Viet-
nam's First Modern Penal Code 9 N.Y. LAW SCHOOL J. INT'L. & COMP. L. (1988).
199. On state responsibility, see generally C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928); I. BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS-STATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY PART 1 (1983); Draft Articles on State Responsibility, in Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission to the General Assembly, 35 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10), at 59,
U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1980/Add.1, part 2 (1980); Quigley, Complicity in International Law: A New Direction in
the Law of State Responsibility, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77-131 (1986).
200. C. EAGLETON, supra note 199, at 182. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorz6w
(Claim for Indemnity) (Merits) (Germany v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J. ser. A No. 13, at 47
(Judgement of Sept. 13), reprinted in 1 M. Hudson, WORLD COURT REPORTS 578, at 677-678
(1922-26).
201. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Re-
quest for Advisory Opinion), 1971 I.C.J. 31, para. 52.
202. See resolution of the Puerto Rican Bar Association making these three points.
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and others whole for their losses. Fixing monetary compensation for dam-
age to the environment will be difficult.
I. Procedure for Effectuating Restitution and Compensation
Were the United States to grant Puerto Rico self-governing status, as
it is also obliged to do under international law, then it could negotiate
with a Puerto Rican government for continued military use. It could ne-
gotiate return of land and compensation to individuals. Third-party arbi-
tration might provide a method of evaluating claims.
The mechanism would vary depending on the form of self-determina-
tion chosen by the people of Puerto Rico-whether integration into the
United States, a status of free association, or independence. Without at-
tainment by Puerto Rico of self-determination, no entity can represent it
vis-a-vis the United States.
So long as a territory remains non-self-governing, its only protection
comes from United Nations supervision over the administering state.
With Puerto Rico, as indicated, the Special Committee on Decolonization
has noted problems created by United States military bases. But the
General Assembly has not addressed the issue of those bases. The United
States has been able to prevent the Assembly from exercising
supervision.103
VI. CONCLUSION
The "sacred trust" norm protects the right of a people to achieve
self-determination. Military bases for an administering state's benefit in a
non-self-governing territory may cause significant hardship and may pre-
vent a people from achieving self-determination.
A non-self-governing people is unable to protect itself from an ad-
ministering state. The international community must take seriously its
obligation of supervision over administering states, to ensure that mili-
tary bases do not cause present harm and that they do not jeopardize
achievement of self-determination.
Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, Comisi6n para el Estudio del Sistema Constitucional
de Puerto Rico, Informe de 1980 para el Comitk de DescolonizaciOn de las Naciones
Unidas, Aug. 15, 1980, in 47 Revista del Colegio de Abogados de P.R. 281 (1986).
203. See supra note 150.
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The Concept of Neutrality in International
Law*
ALFRED P. RUBIN**
I. ORIGINS
A. Religious and Secular Obligations
Earliest written records show an interesting contrast between the no-
tion of war as the imposition on another religious-political organization of
a tribe's "law" in obedience to the directions of a tribal god, presumably
as interpreted by a priestly caste spokesman, and imposition of "law" by
asserting secular "jurisdiction." By the first notion, "neutrality," non-in-
volvement in the struggle for life and dominance, was a temporary politi-
cal fact but inconceivable as a legal status; a state could not opt out of
the struggle for survival any more than a person could. The only path to
avoid the struggle was to die.
Illustrations of this abound. In the Old Testament, God commands
the Jews:
When you draw near to a city to fight against it, offer terms of peace
to it. And if its answer to you is peace and it opens to you, then all the
people who are found in it shall do forced labor for you and shall
serve you. But if it makes no peace with you, but makes war against
you, then you shall besiege it; and when the Lord your God gives it
into your hand you shall put all its males to the sword.. . Thus you
shall do to all the cities which are very far from you, which are not
cities of the nations here. But in the cities of these peoples that the
Lord your God gives you for an inheritance, you shall save alive noth-
ing that breathes, but you shall utterly destroy them ... that they
may not teach you to do according to all their abominable practices
which they have done in the service of their gods, and so to sin against
the Lord your God.'
This command was in fact obeyed literally, according to the Bible, except
for the one case of the Hivites from Gibeon who, masquerading as people
"from a far country," concluded a treaty with the secular leader Joshua
and the leaders of the Hebrew congregation under which peace with
forced labor was provided as a matter of what seems secular Jewish law."
* This article is scheduled to be published also in NEuTRALrry: CHANGING CONCEPTS
AND PRACTICES (Leonard, ed. 1988). The author is grateful to the Institute for the
Comparative Study of Public Policy, University of New Orleans, for permission to print it
here.
** Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
1. Deuteronomy 20:10-18 (Revised Standard Version).
2. Joshua 9:3-27. It is possibly evidence of one of the underlying roots of the modern
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
This religious conception of the impossibility of neutrality with re-
gard to holy commands is carried on in the New Testament where the
universality of monotheism and the conception of life as a continuing bat-
tle between good and evil, between the Kingdom of God and the King-
dom of Satan, is summed up by Jesus: "He who is not with me is against
me, and he who does not gather with me scatters."'
As to the second notion, just as the secular needs of even a conqueror
like Joshua overrode the religious commandments passed to the nation by
the priests, so notions are anciently evident of the limits of legal prescrip-
tion even when uttered by sacerdotal rulers sharing religious worship with
their neighboring kings. The earliest known example of this is about two
centuries after the events narrated in the Book of Joshua; it is in an
Egyptian papyrus of the early Twenty-first dynasty, in the lth century
B.C. An Egyptian priest, Wen-Amon, on a religious tribute-collecting mis-
sion at Dor, on what the translator calls the Syrian coast, was robbed on
his ship in the harbor. He appealed to Beder, the local ruler, also a wor-
shipper of Amon and under Egyptian political influence (although not le-
gal control):
I have been robbed in your harbor. Now you are the prince of this
land, and you are its investigator who should look for my silver. Now
about this silver - it belongs to Amon-Re, King of the Gods, the lord
of the lands ... It belongs to you...
Beder replied:
Whether you are important or whether you are eminent -look here, I
do not recognize this accusation which you have made to me! Suppose
it had been a thief who belonged to my land who went on your boat
and stole your silver, I should have repayed it to you from my trea-
sury, until they had found this thief of yours - whoever he may be.
Now about the thief who robbed you - he belongs to you! He belongs
to your ship! Spend a few days here visiting me, so that I may look for
him.'
The underlying legal conception seems to be that Beder, as the secu-
lar ruler of Dor, alone had the legal power to search out and arrest the
thief in the territory of Dor, but only Wen-Amon and the ship's authori-
ties could make rules to govern what happened on board the ship; that
the limited extent of Beder's jurisdiction made him legally "neutral" with
regard to affairs on board the ship regardless of religious and moral argu-
ments, but that his neutrality could be interpreted to permit, or even to
concept of the bindingness of treaties that this one, procured by fraud, was considered to
supersede even the express command of God. The degree to which any "Jewish" law in the
biblical period can properly be called "secular" is, of course, unclear. But that the treaty was
inconsistent with the religious command is certain. The job of reconciling the two sources of
law, and the two elites responsible for uttering "law" and enforcing it, is best left to histori-
ans and theologians.
3. Matthew 12:30.
4. PRITCHARD, THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 17-18 (5th ed. 1971).
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require, him to search out an accused thief escaping to his territory and
hand him back to the ship's authorities for legal disposal.5
This conflict between religious obligations to side with God and a
conception of the limits to secular authority and political bases for action
and inaction became most notoriously significant during the days of de-
clining religious influence and expanding secularity in ancient Greece. In
its origins in 435 B.C., the Peloponnesian War was a struggle by Corcyra
to remain unentangled, "neutral," in the internal affairs of Epidamnus. In
Epidamnus, the defeated nobility had sought allies against the popular
party that had taken control of the constitution of the town. When Cor-
cyra would not intervene, the popular party of Epidamnus got help from
Corinth. Corcyra, to maintain what she regarded as her rightful external
relationship with Epidamnus, attacked Corinth. After winning a battle at
Epidamnus, Corcyra admonished Corinth to withdraw from involvement
in affairs between Corcyra and Epidamnus, and called vainly on Sparta to
help. Corcyra, after further defeating Corinth, and not being a member of
either the Athenian or Lacedaemonian League, then appealed to Athens
and offered to join its League. Corinth appealed to Athens to remain
"neutral."' The arguments by Corcyra before the Athenian Assembly
were based on (1) morality and the glory of helping the oppressed against
their oppressors; (2) future interests and the store of gratitude that would
make of Corcyra a reliable ally if Athens later needed help; and (3) cur-
rent interest and the strength of the Corcyran Navy, the second largest
navy in Greece at the time. Corinth also put first emphasis on their moral
stature, denying that Corcyra was an oppressed state but considering her
"criminal" in her acts regarding Epidamnus; secondly, Corinth argued
that admitting Corcyra to the Athenian League would make Athens an
enemy of Corinth and necessarily and legally involve war: "For if you be-
come the allies of the Corcyraeans you will be no longer at peace with us
but will be converted into enemies. But you ought in common justice to
stand aloof from both.. ." The decision by Athens was cynical: Corcyra
was not taken into the full alliance, but a defensive commitment was
made in case of an attack in its territories or the territory of an "ally" of
either. The reason, according to Thucydides, was the military calculation
regarding the strength of the Corcyran navy and Corcyra's strategic loca-
tion between the Peloponnesus and Italy."
The most famous dispute regarding neutrality in the ancient writings
5. It is not suggested that this natural law underpinning to an early, perhaps the earli-
est, non-political extradition arrangement is in any way involved with modern extradition
practice or conceptions. Something like the assumed moral obligation to search out thieves
and hand them over to the territorial authority of the place in which the rights of property
had been violated by them is apparent in a lot of the current rhetoric about terrorists. It
might be noted that Beder denied any legal obligation in this transaction, only promised out
of grace to search for the thief.
6. THUCIDYDES, I THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 24, 33, 40, in 1 THE GREEK HISTORIANS 565
(F. R. B. Godolphin, ed., 1942).
7. Id. at 44.
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is, of course, the Melian Dialogue of 416 B.C.8 The people of Melos, a
small island, were linked legally and politically to Sparta, but tried to
maintain neutrality in the Peloponnesian war. The Athenians rejected the
Melian argument that Melos, having maintained a strict neutrality in its
actions, there was no justification in law or morality for Athenian action
against it. The Athenian "justification" was that other client states of
Athens would be tempted to "neutrality" if Melos could opt out of the
struggle, and that disintegration of the Athenian system was an even
greater threat to the well-being of Athens than defeat; the primary argu-
ment was thus not military or moral, but expediency and political inter-
est. Eventually the discussion turned towards religion; the Melians ar-
gued that the gods would likely favor the righteous against the
unrighteous, so Athens should think twice about her threat. The response
by the Athenians was that by a law of nature reflecting the gods' will as
perceived by common opinion, it is in the nature of man to rule wherever
he can. This natural law, perceived by physical observation, was said to
justify Athens. Moreover, the Athenians argued, the Spartans themselves
could be seen to identify whatever is expedient with "justice" in their
own transactions outside of their municipal sphere, so the Spartans them-
selves were not likely to believe that they had any obligation to come to
the aid of Melos against Athens. The Melians disagreed on an analysis of
the deeper interest of Sparta in supporting its colonists even when "neu-
tral," but concluded that in any case it should be seen to be in the inter-
est of Athens to leave Melos unmolested. The Athenians made their own
decision and shortly afterwards killed all the military age men, enslaved
the women and children, and colonized with 500 of their own settlers the
island of Melos.
B. Positivism and Natural Law
This is not the place for a deeper analysis, but it is important to an
understanding of the legal and moral underpinnings of the concept of
"neutrality" to know that Aristotle, lecturing in Athens in the middle of
the fourth century B.C., after Athens had lost the Peloponnesian War,
adopted the Athenian view identifying natural law with the observable
physical laws of nature. He rejected the sophists' argument that similar
municipal laws of many states reflect a natural overarching law such as
the physical law that a flame burns upright both in Greece and Persia,
pointing out that notions of "justice" shift and change.9 Cicero, about 300
years later, on the other hand, adopted a view that identified the moral
law, the "vera lex" discoverable by right reason and inherently universal
and eternal, with an overarching and binding system superior to the "pos-
itive" laws of the Roman Senate, and thus superior to the laws of any
single municipal order.10 To the Athenian-Aristotelian "positivist," neu-
8. Id. at V, 84-114, 116.
9. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1134b18 sec. 7.
10. CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, III, xxii, 33.
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trality is permissible when acceptable to the legislator of the system
within which it is asserted; when legislation is by such use of force as
seems expedient to the dominant force possessing actor, "neutrality" is
made a permissible legal status only within whatever bounds that legislat-
ing actor allows. In the horizontal, tribal-council-like, legislative structure
of the current international legal order, where legislation is induced from
customary behavior or from treaty commitments, no single state has legis-
lative authority; therefore the bounds of what is "neutral" remain subject
to counter-assertion and change. When legislation is conceived as the
adoption of moral rules perceived by right reason, then "neutrality" is a
matter of each state's claiming the clearest insight into the implicit rules
of the community and quarreling with its neighbors as to which percep-
tion is deepest or reflects the higher values. In neither the physical-natu-
ralist Aristotelian or "positivist," nor the Ciceronian-moralist "natural-
ist," framework is "neutrality" a uniform conception, although to those
who claim a monopoly of moral insight, it does appear to them as if it
were so and they are likely to feel very frustrated by the obtuseness of
their neighbors.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE
A. "Just war" Doctrine and Neutrality
To "naturalist"-moralist jurists and historians, like the Melians and
the Roman Livy (d. 17 A.D.), breach of "neutrality" in circumstances in
which "law" required neutrality could be seen as a reason for defeat.
Thus, to Livy the Fabian Ambassadors to the Gauls in Etruria (386 B.C.)
violating their legal obligation to abstain from participating in the mili-
tary struggle between Clusium and the Gauls committed an unjust action
worse than the injustice of the Gauls' attack on Clusium. That delict, in
Livy's view, justified the sack of Rome itself by the Gauls."' The gods
took care of enforcing the law.
With the development of political influence in the moral institution
of the Church, moral-natural law theory was strengthened and became
more abstract. The notion that God enforces "justice" was too simplistic
to survive in a world that read the Biblical book of Job, and the religious
notion of "just war" became part of the currency of legal as well as moral
thought.
In order to clear away some confusion in modern literature, it should
be pointed out that the phrase itself, "just war," is not a correct transla-
tion of the pre-renaissance Latin "bellum justum." "Jus" in Ciceronian
Latin related to "law," not "justice;" "lex," as in "vera lex," the eternal
and universal rules superior to positive law, more nearly approximated
11. LtvY, HISTORY OF ROME V, 36-49. Modern scholarship regards the entire narrative as
baseless in fact except for the sack of Rome. See OGLVIE, A COMMENTARY ON LivW BOOKS 1-
5, at 716 (1965).
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our concept of "justice." But the reception into English, via clerical
scribes, of the Latin genitive "legis" as the root of our word "legislation,"
and the insistence of natural law scholars that their conceptions of "jus-
tice" were binding as "law" universally, and their appropriation of the
word "jus" to emphasize the legally binding effect of "lex," seem to have
led to a reversal of meanings in English.
The first use of the phrase "just war" in a sense that has survived
and had direct influence was by St. Augustine," who suggested about 420
A.D. that the injustice of an opposing side might require a wise man to
wage war, and that no other war than such an one is morally defensible.
But, if moral law is binding not only on conscience but in action, and
injustice can morally require a military response, then surely "neutrality"
in some cases is not only morally reprehensible, but also illegal.
It would serve no point to trace in detail the elaboration of this thesis
in medieval legal theory. Those aspects of the definition of "just war"
that relate to the legal authority of the parties to engage in duels or wars
are of no concern to the concept of "neutrality," nor are questions of per-
sonal capacity to bear arms in feudal theory. But the idea that there must
be a "just cause" (e.g., a prior injury) and a "just object" (i.e., no better
way to resolve the dispute) to the recourse to arms, and that there must
be a "just intention" (i.e., a personal commitment to the righting of a
moral wrong as the dominant motivation for the war), notions that speak
to the belligerents and imply some need for jus standi, some legal inter-
est in the struggle, presume an underlying concept of neutrality. Those
who lack the standing; the just cause, object or intention, have no moral
or legal basis for participating in the armed struggle. Neutrality for them
would not be a right, but an obligation.
Interestingly, Islamic legal theory seems to have paralleled Christian
thought in this regard, as Ibn Khaldun, writing about 1377 A.D., also di-
vides wars into categories of "just" and "unjust." He reserved for the
"just war" category only wars required by religious law (which included
rules of normal behavior, since the Koran, to Muslims, is the primary
source for legal rules as well as a religious work in the secular Western
sense)"s and "dynastic war," presumably war based on vindicating a right
to inherit authority, which also has at least overtones of religious law. "
Now, if wars within the legal order could be classified as "just" or
"unjust" and "neutrality" was an obligation in most cases even with re-
gard to "just wars," the situation was quite different with regard to wars
fought with those outside the order. In Western legal theory, Crusades,
12. St. AUGUSTINE, DE CivrrATE DEi XIX, 7.
13. To translate this conception into more familiar terms, the Koran might be com-
pared to the Pentateuch in Jewish society; the rules of behavior in Leviticus and here and
there elsewhere, like the rules explicit and implicit in the New Testament, are binding in
daily life to those within the religious worship; to those who, in St. Augustine's felicitous
phrase, live in the City of God.
14. IBN KHALDUN, THE MUQADDIMAH 224 (Rosenthal, trans., Dawood, ed., abr. ed. 1967).
VOL. 16:2,3
CONCEPT OF NEUTRALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
religious wars, were a moral obligation and to establish a legal right to
abstain from such a war seems to have involved strains and ultimately a
rejection of the bindingness of the order itself. Quite apart from the
struggles within Europe between Church and State authorities for the ul-
timate power to make law, it is probably not merely coincidental that the
split between the Eastern Church and Rome occurred formally in 1054
A.D. and relations between the Byzantine rulers and the "Franks"
("Kelts" to Anna Comnena) were established on strictly secular lines with
the Empire feeling no obligation at all to help in the struggle of "Chris-
tendom" to "recover" the Holy Land." Byzantium remained "neutral" as
suited her political situation.
In Islamic theory such "neutrality" would have been hard to justify,
and the classical distinction between the Dar-al-Salaam and the Dar-al-
Harb, the lands in which applied the laws of peace based on the Koran
and the lands in which Islamic peoples were bound by the laws of strug-
gle, seem to allow of no intermediate status. 6 On the other hand, there is
ample evidence that in practice Islamic rulers did in fact conclude armi-
stices and treaties with non-Islamic authorities, and "neutrality" was
practiced regardless of the "natural" or "divine law" theories.
The Christian theory was necessarily modified as the balance of in-
fluence in daily affairs changed between the secular legal order on the one
hand, and the religious legal order interpreted by the Papacy on the
other. The moral requirement of a crusade lost its persuasiveness over
time, and the struggle among temporal rulers for empire assumed a larger
role in statecraft, although until the 16th century in Europe the major
rationalizers of policy remained clergymen. Even in countries faithful to
the Catholic institutions, like Spain, by the early 1500s, difference in reli-
gion was rejected by influential advisers as a cause of "just war. 17 In-
deed, the only just cause admitted by Vitoria was response to a wrong
received, and then only a proportional response limited to righting the
wrong. 8 The wars of conquest in the New World were rationalized by this
enlightened writer as vindicating the legal rights of trade, transit and
peaceful sojourn found in natural law, evidenced by various analogies and
the jus gentium adopted as municipal law in many European nations.
Religious wars, to protect native converts from their neighbors, and to
end the abominable practices of the Indians, which were viewed as violat-
ing natural and divine law at least when they involved human sacrifice,
were also permissible.' 9 But from the point of view of this brief study, the
most significant basis found for engaging in a "just war" was to assist
15. COMNENA, THE ALEXIAD, 309 sq. (1148 A.D.) (Sewter, trans., 1979); Cf. BERMAN, LAW
AND REVOLUTION 104-105 (1983).
16. SHAYBANI, SIYAR 75 sq. (c. 800 A.D.) (Translated as KHADDURI,THE ISLAMIC LAW OF
NATIONS (1966)).
17. VITORIA, DE INDIS, §§ 427-429 (1532, 1557, 1580 rev., Carnegie Endowment, 1917).
18. Id. at 430.
19. Id. at 386-403.
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"allies and friends." Support for this was found in Roman practice and
Biblical incident when Abraham was said to have fought with the "King
of Salem" and others against four kings who had done Abraham himself
no injury.2" This expansion of "just war" theory, to allow for collective
action by those who had not suffered injury taking part of one who had,
was to have major consequences.
B. The Resurgence of Positivism
Positivism makes a resurgence as the authority of the institution of
the Church broke down. Doctrinally, it might be a significant marker that
by 1612 even the Catholic jurist Suarez, by some viewed as the founder of
modern international law, distinguished between the jus gentium reflect-
ing natural law perceived by all or many societies and jus gentium as the
coincidental prescriptions of different municipal legal orders reflecting
only similar policy choices, thus part of the human or positive law and
not necessarily reflecting natural law.2" But the great founder of modern
positivism was Alberico Gentili, an Italian Protestant Civil law expert
teaching at Oxford. His pleas as an advocate for Spain in the Royal Coun-
cil sitting in Admiralty" evidence the long and complex evolution of Mar-
itime law as applied to questions of belligerent rights and neutrality. It
was in this area that technical rules of neutrality arose and found their
greatest elaboration.
In the earliest days of recorded European civilization north of the
Alps, private reprisals were the normal way of resolving conflicting asser-
tions of right. "Just war" theory under a feudal political organization
made the natural law of reprisal, taking back that which has been un-
justly taken away by another, available to equals on the feudal scale
nearly at all levels. With the growing centralization of authority in the
13th century, one of the areas into which royalty moved at the expense of
its magnates was control of activity outside the boundaries of a county. In
England, by the end of the 14th century this took the form of the King
appointing an "Admiral" as his direct subordinate to issue "letters of
20. Id. at 405. The Biblical incident is cited by Vitoria to Genesis 14. In that place, the
incident is justified on the basis of the aggressive Kings (against Sodom, not Salem) having
taken prisoner Lot, Abram (not yet Abraham's) nephew. Obviously, in the light of kinship
ties in the society described in the Old Testament, Abram did have standing based on the
injury to Lot, his nephew. Vitoria's conclusion thus seems unsupported by his appeal to
Divine Law. Distortion of the facts to create a legal argument is not uncommon in publicists
of international law, even today, but this seems egregious.
21. SUARE Z, DE LEGlus, Ac DEO LEGISLATORE, II, 187-188 (1612) (1944 ed.).
22. English Admiralty law was based on the code of judicial decisions of the Island of
Oleron adopted by statute in England about the end of the 12th century. It was supple-
mented by Roman law principles and the Admiralty advocates were all trained in Roman
(Civil) law. Gentili seems routinely to have had his Spanish clients sell their interests to
English people, so he could always appear to be arguing English interest as the ultimate
beneficiary of the Spanish claims. See GErNri, HISPANIcAE ADVOCATIONIS (pleas of 1605-
1608, published 1613) (1921 ed.).
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marque and reprisal" to private individuals authorizing reprisals. The
Admiral then conducted a tribunal before which "prizes" were brought
and title adjudged according to the rules promulgated by the Admiral.
Since title, to be useful with regard to ships and articles in international
commerce, had to be accepted as valid in foreign countries, the "natural
law" basis for the rules of Admiralty, particularly the rules of "prize," was
vigorously asserted. The rules of Admiralty were asserted to be of univer-
sal validity; argumentation before Admiralty tribunals rested on Roman
law and on scholarly writings that seemed to have wide appeal. Since the
statutory laws of Oleron dealt in the main with distributing the risks of a
voyage among persons all subject to the laws of the "flag" state of the
vessel, and not with the laws of naval prize, there was no serious conflict
between the statute law and the natural law as they both evolved, and
eventually they evolved together.
The elaboration of the rules of prize reached major levels of interest
and complexity during the 16th century. During that century privateering
as an act of private reprisal authorized by a state, and privateering as a
belligerent act of the state by which mariners were encouraged by the
potentialities of great private profit to risk their ships and lives in naval
adventures, lost their distinction. By about 1600, it had become clear that
privateering was an act of the state and implied that the special laws of
naval warfare applied and the special Admiralty laws of prize. This meant
that specification of the permissible targets of privateering was essential
if the sovereign were not to get embroiled in naval struggles against the
whole maritime world at the discretion of a profit-seeking privateer under
an imprecise letter of marque. But, to say that no ship flying a "neutral"
flag, or a flag not specified as a proper target in the letters of marque,
could go entirely free was to invite foreign and even domestic merchants
to fly false neutral flags in order to protect their cargoes and ships. The
answer adopted by England as she became the strongest sea power in the
world was the elaboration through judicial pronouncements in Admiralty
and prize of the validity at law of certain captures from neutrals and the
invalidity of others.
Gentili was a central figure in this rapid evolution. While this is not
the place to analyze his logic in any depth, his Spanish advocacy is filled
with argumentation about the limits of neutral and belligerent rights as a
matter of law. For example, in one case an English ship (with apparent,
but unstated, Spanish connections) taking some militarily useful material
to Constantinople was captured by privateers from Sardinia and Malta. It
was in the interest of Gentili's clients that the taking be held improper.
Gentili states the arguments against his clients by citing Justinian's code
as forbidding trade with heathendom, thus holding the Civil Law against
them. He then finds religious Canon Law to the same effect. Turning to
the "jus gentium," the "law of nations," he finds a precedent against his
clients in English complaints to the Hanseatic League trading in military
supplies to Spain at a time when Spain was at war with England, a com-
plaint based on the logic of reciprocity and the Golden Rule. He even
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finds a treaty between England and Spain under which each party under-
took to prevent its nationals trading in munitions of war with an enemy
of the other. He then turns the arguments around, principally on the ba-
sis that most of the goods carried by his clients were not "contraband,"
i.e., that the goods had no significant military use, and construing the
prior arguments to be valid only in the case of a short list of military
hardware. Thus, he argued for the return of the bulk of the cargo and of
the ship itself. As to the militarily useful material, he argued that it was
part of the ship's own store, not for distribution to the Turks in Constan-
tinople, and therefore, not subject to confiscation in prize.2"
This particular case does not illustrate any great jurisprudential shift
from naturalism to positivism, but such a shift was in fact under way and
is made more evident in a series of three cases argued by Gentili concern-
ing the proper classification of the Barbary states: Pirates or Sovereign
equals of England? 24 The progression is clear. In the first case, Gentili
argued that the Barbary authorities should be classified as pirates, thus in
law unable to change title to captured goods; in the second he dithered on
the point, and in the third he came to precisely the opposite conclusion,
that those who purchase captured goods and ships in Algiers get good
title, therefore the Barbary states must be classified as sovereign, able to
make and enforce the law, and not as "pirates." In all three his logic is
invincibly "positivist." He finds his legal categories to suit the policy
ends: In the first, to inhibit legally the establishment of markets able to
pass good title in a place close to the lines of trade where captures of
doubtful validity are likely to occur; by the third, that the need for cer-
tainty of title in goods and ships purchased dictates the need for markets
able to establish valid title close to the lines of trade where such ques-
tions are likely to arise. The notion that the legal rule is not the abstrac-
tion perceived by moral reasoning and applied in order to do "justice" is
impliedly rejected. Instead, the basic logic rests on expediency, political
choice by the law-maker, in this case by the English Royal Council able
by its decision to determine the law that will be applied in England with
regard to such title transfers.
The jurisprudential battles raged throughout the 17th century, but
by the early eighteenth century it was clear that in practice the "posi-
tivists" had won and it was important then to find a way to "legislate"
the rules in the community of sovereign equals that emerged from the
religious and dynastic wars and the constitutional shifts of authority
within the leading European trading states of the 17th century. The way
found was by treaty. In the elaborate series of treaties that formed the
Peace of Utrecht at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713,
rules were bargained for and agreed through a negotiating process that
took account of the needs of both belligerents and neutrals, because each
23. Id. at I. The actual decision in the case is not known, only Gentili's argument.
24. Id. at iv, xv, xxii.
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party could imagine itself in either position in some future war. The hold-
ing of "prize courts" was agreed by the parties to those treaties address-
ing the matter to be a belligerent right; states undertook that when neu-
tral in a conflict in which the other party to the treaty was a belligerent,
not to permit the other belligerent to disencumber itself of its naval cap-
tures in any of the neutral's ports. The rule argued for by Gentili was
adopted by treaty between England and France that free (neutral) ships
and their cargoes are free to trade with an enemy without fear of capture
and condemnation in prize except with regard to contraband on board the
vessel: "Free ships shall make free goods except contraband" was the
phrase. A separate article defines "contraband." Yet another article speci-
fies items that are by the parties deemed in law not to be contraband, and
that list includes "all Provisions which serve for the Nourishment of
Mankind and the Sustenance of Life," and all things proper either for
building or repairing ships "and all other Goods whatever, which have not
been worked into the form of any Instrument or Thing prepared for War,
by Land or by Sea.""5 Obviously, the specification of precisely what the
belligerent's rights are against neutrals, and what the neutral's rights are
against belligerents, and the definitions of contraband, are matters that
would vary from negotiation to negotiation, and the positive law would
determine in each case with regard to each incident what the respective
rights were. In the absence of treaty, the questions would be left to diplo-
matic discussion and prize cases in which the national policy interest in
universal uniformity of the law might dictate reference to an otherwise
inapplicable treaty, but in which such a reference would not necessarily
produce the uniformity that would be wanted because the judge in prize
would not have his interpretation tested by the possible remonstrances of
the actual parties to the treaty and their adjustment of its terms by sup-
plemental negotiation. And treaty texts negotiated in different political
contexts had different terms. There was no necessary uniformity in the
treaties taken as a group.
To expand the authority of belligerents with strong navies, the rules
surrounding naval blockade had been elaborated in prize courts to permit
complete interdiction of neutral trade with an enemy port when the
blockade was publicly declared and could be maintained effectively, i.e.,
not merely imposed by paper to give a legal basis for sporadic captures of
neutral vessels engaged in non-contraband trade with the enemy. But by
the end of the century it had become clear that reference to even identi-
cal texts of different treaties could not create a uniform law. When
France and Spain declared war on Great Britain in 1780, the Baltic states
found their trade interrupted by British privateers and naval ships.
25. 28 Cons. Tr. Series 3 (French text). The English text used here is from a book of
EXTRACTS FROM THE SEVERAL TREATIES SUBSISTING BETWEEN GREAT-BRITAIN AND OTHER
KINGDOMS AND STATES, OF SUCH ARTICLES AND CLAUSES AS RELATE TO THE DuTY AND CONDUCT
OF THE COMMANDERS OF THE KING OF GREAT-BRITAIN'S SHIPS OF WAR 1, arts. 17, 19, 20 at 5,
7-8 (London 1741).
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Under the leadership of Russia, they, ie., Denmark and Sweden, later
joined by Prussia, declared their own interpretation of the privileges of
neutrals in maritime war, and began to defend those rights by force.
The "armed neutrality" episodes of 1780 and 1800, coupled with an
evolution of British administration and centralized authority over an in-
creasing area impossible to govern effectively from London alone, can be
argued to have ended the practice of licensing privateers in Europe. If
"free flags" really covered "enemy goods except contraband," there was
every incentive for even belligerent traders to ship their goods on neutral
vessels, and the profits dropped out of privateering.26 By 1856, the perti-
nent rules of naval warfare could be reduced to a simple prohibition of
privateering and three statements of principle: Neutral flag covers enemy
goods except contraband; neutral goods other than contraband are free on
board even enemy ships; and a blockade, to have legal effect against neu-
tral trade, must be effective, i.e., maintained by a force sufficient really to
prevent access to the coast of the enemy."1
III. CODIFICATION
As the positivist impulse ground itself more deeply into the legal or-
der during the 19th century, the utility of neutrality as a concept, and the
possibility that it might be expedient to use that concept to accomplish
humanitarian purposes, thus to satisfy "natural law" in its "morality"
guise, became apparent. In 1863 the United States issued its General Or-
ders 100 to the Union Armies in the Field which recited that honorable
belligerents allow themselves to be guided by flags or signals of protection
to avoid firing on hospitals.2" The next year in Geneva the first multilat-
eral convention directed solely toward the amelioration of the condition
of the wounded in war was concluded. Most of the major states of Europe
were signatories, although such important signatory states as France and
Spain ultimately failed to ratify it. It provided for "Ambulances and Mili-
tary hosptials" to be "neuter" and as such to be protected and respected
by belligerents as long as used by the sick or wounded and not by mili-
tary forces as such. 9 In 1868 an additional convention amended the 1864
convention somewhat and extended the applicable provisions to naval
warfare. It also adopted the "white flag with a red cross" as the protecting
symbol. s0
The positivist impulse to codify and transform whatever principles
might be derived from practice, diplomatic correspondence, moral insight
26. At least, that is the conclusion in BERGBOHM, DIE BEWAFFNETE NEUTRALITAT, 1780-
1783 (1884), (translated and extracted in 2 Scor, THE ARMED NEUTRALITIES OF 1780 AND
1800 2, at 4 (1918)).
27. Declaration of Paris, 16 April 1856, 46 Br. and For. St. Papers 137.
28. SCHINDLER & TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 18 (2nd rev. ed. 1981) (The
"Lieber" Code, arts. 115, 116).
29. 129 CTS 361.
30. 138 CTS 189.
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and other sources into law binding because of the form in which produced
probably hit its peak with regard to the law relating to neutrality with the
great 1899 and 1907 partial codifications of the laws of war at The Hague.
It cannot be the function of this study to examine the extraordinarily
complex role that neutrality had assumed in the legislative thinking of
the framers of the 1899 and 1907 conventions, or, for that matter, the
1904 convention regarding hospital ships, the 1906 convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the
Field, the 1909 London Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War-
fare, or, indeed, any of the other documents attempting with ever increas-
ing particularity to provide detailed rules which would distinguish be-
tween legitimate military targets and targets that should be "neutral." All
the conventions presume a legal status of "neutrality" and provide for
rights of neutrals against belligerents, and obligations of "neutrals" owed
to belligerents. In a positivist legal order, states assert rights for them-
selves and obligations for others on the basis of autointerpretation, mu-
nicipal tribunals are bound by national constitutions to interpret the law
as accepted for purposes of adjudication by the particular constitutional
order creating the municipal tribunal. They are not bound (in most cases
barely influenced) by the opinions of sister tribunals pronouncing inter-
pretations of municipal law or the municipal version of international law
for other states. Even with regard to the uniform law adopted by lan-
guage formulations in multilateral conventions, national interpretations
by the organs of states deriving their authority from municipal constitu-
tions and answerable to municipal constituents, are the rule. From this
point of view it is impossible to generalize about "neutrality" in the ab-
stract; to conceptualize principles from the evidence of particulars even in
multilateral conventions negotiated wholly within the international legal
order. The political process by which the formulations are negotiated
does not reflect attempts to approximate an abstract law dimly perceived
by mankind's fallible reasoning powers and susceptible to scholarly re-
finement; it reflects political compromise based on perceptions of national
expediency in a negotiating context, similar to the political process by
which individual municipal systems legislate. Suarez's valid stated dis-
tinction between the jus gentium and "natural law" blocks the analysis.
But the other meaning of jus gentium familiar to naturalist jurists
and now codified in article 38.1.c of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, the search for general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations as evidence of general principles binding states in the interna-
tional legal order, can proceed.
IV. THE REVIVAL OF NATURALISM AND NEUTRALITY
Natural law thinking was never wholly overcome by the rise of posi-
tivism. Whatever the logical weaknesses of the approach, it is also possi-
ble to seek some abstract conception of "neutrality" by examining munic-
ipal legislation to see if the political legislative processes of different
countries, reflecting different political pulls, still come to the same result,
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reflecting perhaps some consistent common thread. It is also possible to
engage directly in moral argument, weighing the values protected by com-
peting rules and deriving an ideal conception of what "neutrality" should
be if it is to maximize the values implicit in the moral system of the inter-
national order. The first job, weighing the national statutes of many dif-
ferent countries to look for their common base, is at this point impossible.
The groundwork has been done"' but the job of collating the data re-
flected in the form of legislation in many different countries is far too big
for a single researcher with limited time. It might, however, be of some
interest just to note some of the more significant points of United States
neutrality legislation. It should be borne in mind that this legislation is
the product of a constitutional order in which the authority of the legisla-
tive branch of government is restricted. Thus, it cannot be pretended that
the restrictions placed by legislation on the activities of American nation-
als abroad or any persons within American territory necessarily exhaust
the legal obligations of the United States under the international law re-
garding neutrality; there may be international legal obligations which the
United States is bound to observe in the international legal order, but
which it cannot enforce against persons within its prescriptive jurisdiction
for constitutional reasons. Nor can it be argued convincingly that all the
restrictions adopted by the American Congress to avoid foreign entangle-
ments represent the translation into municipal law of abstract principles
of international law. The debates in the United States concerning the leg-
islation rarely referred to international obligations, but reflected predomi-
nantly the opinions of the American legislators as to the expedient inter-
ests of the United States.
The first "Neutrality" legislation of the United States was the Act of
5 June 1794.32 Under this statute, it was made subject to criminal penal-
ties for "any citizen of the United States" acting "within the territory" or
"jurisdiction" of the United States, to exercise a commission to "serve a
foreign prince or state in war by land or sea." The dual qualification of
citizenship and territoriality would have left John Paul Jones, a citizen,
free to accept a naval commission from Russia because his service in war
by sea was outside the territory or jurisdiction, as jurisdiction was then
conceived, of the United States. Jones had in fact accepted such a com-
mission as Rear Admiral in the Russian Navy and fought against Turkey
in 1788-1789 without renouncing his American citizenship. He had died in
Paris in 1792. Many other Americans accepted commissions as privateers
against Spain from Buenos Aires during the second decade of the 19th
century without running afoul of the Neutrality Act.
Section 2 of the Act of 1794 made it a crime in American law for any
person, regardless of citizenship, to enlist in foreign military or pri-
vateeering service in the territory of the United States, or to hire another
31. F. DEAK & P. JESSUP, NEUTRALITY LAWS, REGULATIONS AND TREATIES (2 vols.)
(1939).
32. 1 Stat. 381; Id., at 1079.
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person within United States territory to go abroad and enlist. Exceptions
were made for enlisting in a friendly foreign privateer or warship tran-
siently in the United States, and for a locus poenitentiae, an exemption
for persons illegally enlisting who, within thirty days, came home and
gave information leading to the conviction of the person soliciting enlist-
ments for the foreign state. This last exception was deleted by a super-
seding statute in 1818.
Section 3 forbade the arming or fitting out within the United States
of a foreign privateer or naval vessel knowing it to be for employment
against another foreign country with which the United States was at
peace. It did not apply to the acts of American citizens abroad.
Section 4 forbade in the United States the augmenting of existing
armaments on a foreign vessel merely owned by foreigners whose prince
was at war with another country at peace with the United States.
Section 5 forbade any person within the United States to "prepare
the means for any military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from
thence gainst the territory ... of any foreign prince or state with whom
the United States are at peace." In 1917, this provision was augmented by
forbidding also the furnishing of money in the United States for military
or naval expeditions against friendly foreign states."3
All these provisions, with the amendments noted, and with some mi-
nor technical modifications, are still in force in the United States.
It seems noteworthy that this original view of "neutrality" main-
tained since 1794 emphasizes the territory of the United States as the
limit of prescriptive authority. The only provisions dealing with activity
outside the United States relate to enlistments set in motion under ar-
rangements made within the United States. The only mention of citizens
of the United States does not extend jurisdiction to actions abroad, but,
in section 1, limit the territorial prescription to exempt foreigners who
have foreign commissions from their scope; foreigners with foreign com-
missions can legally "exercise" those commissions within the territory of
the United States or on board American vessels, subject, of course, to
other laws of the United States which might make criminal here any of
the particular actions that might be required by some foreign government
under its commissions.
The continued validity of section 5, and its place in the basic net-
work of criminal law certainly raises questions about unlicensed fund-
raising and other private activities in the United States in support of for-
eign "freedom fighters" against the governments of countries with which
33. The augmentation was merely to insert the words "or furnishes the money for, or
who takes part in" between "prepare the means for" and "any military expedition." F. DEAK
& P. JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1097, reprinting 18 U.S.C. § 25 (1934 ed.). The current codifi-
cation appears in 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1976 ed.). The history of this language is summarized by
the Editor's Note in F. DEAK & P. JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1081. The key amendment was
made in the Act of 15 June 1917, § 8, 40 Stat. 217 at 221.
1988
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the United States is at peace, like Nicaragua. Whether or not permitting
such fund-raising to continue is a violation of the public international law
regarding neutrality, a question as to which the municipal statute is not
determinative and, in theory, not even very persuasive, there are certainly
questions about the apparent failure to enforce the law by those officials
in the United States who are charged with constitutional responsibility
under the President to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed.""'
It is, of course, possible that the fund-raising and other activities in the
United States of supporters of the Nicaraguan "contras" have not been
supporting any "military or naval expeditions" but only activities unre-
lated to the ongoing hostilities in Nicaragua, despite the talk of helicop-
ters and support for the struggle that the fund-raisers are reported to
have used so freely. And activities by our government directly are author-
ized by later statutes which, to the degree inconsistent with the 1794 stat-
utes as occasionally re-enacted, would supersede them.
An Act of 14 June 1797 forbidding the fitting out of privateers by
citizens of the United States outside the territory of the United States for
employment against friendly foreign powers or against citizens of the
United States or their property, extended the jurisdictional conception
beyond territoriality. The Act specifically applied to the actions of Ameri-
can citizens abroad only. It was renewed in 1818 but repealed in 1909."5
Presumably the repeal was based upon the almost universal abolition of
privateering by the middle of the 19th century, and not any return to a
strict territorial conception of prescriptive jurisdiction, any perceived
loosening of the international legal obligations of a neutral state, or any
change in the perceived expediency of preventing citizens entangling the
United States in foreign complications or preying on their fellow-citizens.
On 20 April 1818 a new "Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes
Against the United States" 36 reenacted the provisions of the Act of 1794
and the Act of 1797 summarized above making one significant change;
section 2 of the Act of 1794 was extended to forbid, within the territory of
the United States, entering into the service of a foreign "colony, district,
or people" as well as a foreign prince or state. The purpose was to forbid
the use of the United States territory as a recruiting ground for foreign
revolutions. In 1818, Latin American wars of independence were at issue
and, as noted, above, many Americans in fact enlisted in the revolution-
ary cause and took out privateers' licenses from unrecognized revolution-
ary authorities to fight against Spain.37
34. U.S. CONST. art. II, sec. 3.
35. F. DEAK & P. JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1083.
36. 3 Stat. 447, DEAK & JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1085.
37. This caused significant legal problems in the United States when the authority of
the Latin American authorities to condemn Spanish vessels in prize arose. See U.S. v.
Palmer et al., 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818). Nor does it appear that the United States had
provided by the neutrality legislation the legal means necessary to enforce against American
citizens United States obligations under Pinckney's Treaty with Spain dated 27 October
1795, 11 Bevans 516, 53 CTS 9. Article 14 of that Treaty obliged each party to punish as a
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The first legislation authorizing an American official abroad to use
"such force as may at the time be within his reach, belonging to the
United States" to "prevent the citizens of the United States from enlist-
ing in the military or naval service" of foreign countries to make war
against a third state with which the United States was at peace, i.e., ex-
tending the reach of the Neutrality Act of 1794 provisions to the actions
of Americans outside the territory of the United States, related only to
American Ministers and Consuls in China, Japan, Siam, Persia and other
countries where by treaty the United States officials had the authority to
apply American law directly to citizens through consular courts."s
Limitations on the export of what some belligerent might want to call
contraband do not appear in American municipal legislation until 1898,
when the Congress authorized the President to prohibit by Executive Or-
der the "export of coal or other material used in war."' 9 It was repealed in
1922. Meantime, in 1912, 1915, 1916 and 1917, by a series of statutes Con-
gress authorized wider and wider discretion in the President to control
American trade in the interest of "neutrality." The 1912 Act recites only
concern about "domestic violence" in Latin America,40 but the succeeding
statutes related much more generally to "the existence of war to which
the United States is not a party,""' "the existence of a war in which the
United States is not engaged,"'" and "a war in which the United States is
a neutral nation."'43 Since the last of these three statutes was passed after
the United States joined in the European War of 1914-1918, presumably
it reflects the experience of the United States as a neutral in the changed
world of the twentieth century, and is not bound to the immediate "expe-
diency" considerations of the statutes passed in response to ongoing cri-
ses. Indeed, the 1917 Act, slightly modified in parts, served the United
States neutrality interest during the first two years of the 1939-1945 war
in Europe and the first four years of the 1937-1945 war in the Far East.
"pirate" its citizens taking letters of marque to act against the subjects or property of the
other in times of peace between the United States and Spain. No prosecutions for "piracy"
have been found in which this language was significant, and the one famous case in which
the Executive officials of the United States thought it should apply resulted in an acquittal.
Lewis, John Quincy Adams and the Baltimore "Pirates", 67 A.B.A.J. 1011 (1981).
38. 12 Stat. 72 at 77, The Act of 22 June 1860, § 24, reproduced in F. DEAK & P.
JESsUP, supra note 31, at 1086.
39. 30 Stat. 739; F. DEAK & P. JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1088. There are other statutes,
not reproduced by Deak & Jessup, which involved conceptions of "neutrality." But they
seem to have been more a response to political pressures than the implied acceptance of any
particular obligation as a matter of natural law. E.g., the Act supplementary to the Act of 20
April 1818 "for the prevention of American Armed expeditions against certain Foreign Ter-
ritories [in Canada] conterminus with those of The United States," 10 March 1838, repro-
duced in 26 B.F.S.P. (1837-1838) 1349. The Act expired in 1840 and was not renewed.
40. 37 Stat. 630; F. DEAK & P. JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1089.
41. 38 Stat. 1226 (Act of 4 March 1915); F. DEAK & P. JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1089.
42. 39 Stat. 756 (Act of 8 September 1916); F. DEAK & P. JESSUP, supra note 31, at
1090.
43. 40 Stat. 217 (Act of 15 June 1917) at p. 221, Title V of the Act; F. DEAK & P.
JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1092.
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Somewhat modified, it is still in force.
The 1917 Act authorizes but does not compel the President to forbid
the departure from the jurisdiction of the United States of any vessel,
domestic or foreign, which "is about to carry fuel, arms, ammunition,
men, supplies, dispatches, or information to any warship... of a foreign
belligerent nation in violation of the laws, treaties, or obligations of the
United States under the law of nations." It is not entirely clear what the
Congress thought the "law of nations" might require in this regard. More-
over, since the authority granted to the President is discretionary in him,
it would seem that the Congress was actually authorizing him to permit
acts which would place the United States in violation of the "law of
nations."'
Section 2 of the Act authorizes the President to forbid the departure
from the United States of any vessel owned in part by an American, or
any foreign vessel not a public vessel at the time it entered an American
port, which is "manifestly built for warlike purposes."
Section 3 forbids the delivery from American jurisdiction of any ves-
sel potentially a vessel of war to be delivered under contract to a belliger-
ent nation. It does not authorize any Presidential discretion in this regard
and can be viewed as implementing a view of neutral obligations which
the United States had adopted during the American Civil War when the
Confederate forces bought ships and supplies in England. The United
States had then strongly protested the English breach of "neutrality,"
which the British had denied was a breach of "neutral" obligations at
all.4
44. The President's obligation to faithfully execute the laws was probably felt to assure
that he would not permit the departure of vessels in violation of other laws of the United
States; the statute of 1917 certainly does not supersede obligations of the President, only
authorize further action to implement his obligations. By Article VI of the Constitution,
treaties are also law in the United States and subject to the same obligation in the Execu-
tive. It is an unresolved question whether the obligations of the United States under general
international law are part of the legal order established by the Constitution. See Rubin,
Professor D'Amato's Concept of American Jurisdiction is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 105 (1985).
45. The British Government eventually agreed to the United States position for the
purpose of re-establishing friendly relations with the victorious Union, and an international
arbitration instructed as to this view of the law awarded the United States an indemnity of
$15.5 million in 1872. See 1 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 315, 343 (1898). In the
attempted codification of the law in 1907, The Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights
and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land, art. VII, it is provided that "A
neutral Power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or
other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be
of use to an army or a fleet." On the other hand, in the Hague Convention (XIII) Concern-
ing the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, while this article is repeated in
substance, it is immediately followed by another article: VIII: "A neutral Government is
bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel
within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise, or engage in hos-
tile operations, against a Power with which that Government is at peace." How the two
articles can be reconciled seems to lie more in the realm of metaphysics than law. See
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The next several sections prescribe technical rules for the enforce-
ment of the first three sections
Title VI of the 1917 Act authorizes officials designated by the Presi-
dent to confiscate "any arms or munitions of war, or other articles" at-
tempted to be exported from the United States "in violation of law" and
does not relate that enforcement authority only to laws designed to pro-
tect the "neutrality" of the United States. This provision has been ex-
panded over the years, and given ever increasing substance to the point
that it now amounts to a general authority in the president to control
entirely and for any foreign policy purpose the export of arms, ammuni-
tion and implements of war. In its current incarnation (1988) this author-
ity of the President to control the import and export of defense articles
and defense services involves inscribing the categories of controlled items
and services in a "Munitions List" and authority to issue or refuse li-
censes is lodged in the State Department with discretion to be exercised
in coordination with the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. In fact, the bureaucratic coordination of munitions export license
applications is a complex matter in which issues of the legal restraints on
"neutrals" have little if any role.""
V. CONCLUSIONS
Looking back at the American legislation, it seems clear that concep-
tions of international law played little if any role in the drafting of the
Neutrality Act of 1794 and its successors. The current controls on the
export of arms, ammunition and implements of war are related solely to
policy, not at all to legal or moral considerations, except perhaps such
legal considerations, like treaty obligations, that are embedded in policy
by the operation of municipal American law under our Constitution. But
the fact that legislation is the product of political choice does not mean
that the uniform political choices of many countries, or the political
choices that seem likely to be uniform because compelled by similar polit-
ical factors in the foreign relations of many countries, do not reflect a
legislative process in the international legal order. There is no reason why
international law cannot be made by political decisions on the part of
states as legislators; the analogy is to municipal law processes in which
the personal motivations of members of a legislative body are irrelevant
to considerations of whether the product of their actions, legislation, is
binding as law within the legal order in which they function as legislators.
From this point of view, reviewing the overall conceptions that seem
to be reflected in the treaties and in American legislation, and in the light
of about three thousand years of jurisprudential thought in which the ba-
Rubin, The Laws of War, 76 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 139, 142-143 (1982).
46. See Rubin, United States Export Controls: An Immodest Proposal, 36 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 633 (1968), for some indication of the coordination process as of 1968 and the lack of
any role for lawyers in it. The current statute is, if anything, more complex.
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sic principles seem remarkably stable, it is possible to attempt some
generalizations.
The first would be that the basic underlying principle is not one of
substance at all, but one of a distribution of authority. Under that princi-
ple, pretentions to universal legislative authority exist only when "univer-
sal" religions or political organizations exist which in fact persuade their
subjects of their authority. That condition does not exist today, when
statesmen might pay lip-service to some common substantive ideals, such
as a commitment to human rights, but absolutely deny the legislative au-
thority of any body beyond their municipal constitutional orders to trans-
late those ideals into "law." The legislative authority of the international
legal order does not rest on dominant, or even near universal, acquies-
cence or practice, but on express or implied consent. It is true that an
implied consent can be derived from rather distant evidence, but in the
final analysis, the more indirect the evidence of that consent, the less
likely it is to convince the statesmen who must be convinced in order
actually to affect the conduct of states. Moral suasion can be used, but
claims, diplomatic correspondence, appeals to tribunals and the other en-
forcement mechanisms of the international legal order do not flow from
mere moral positions, however widely held.
From this it can be concluded that there is now no overarching natu-
ral law of "neutrality."
Nonetheless, it can be seen that there is a distinction in positive law,
and possibly in natural law, between the acts of states as such and the
acts of individuals. Obligations relating to neutrality contained in treaties
and derived from any analysis of custom as evidence of law seem to em-
phasize territoriality. Even in the export control laws of the United
States, which do affect the legal liability of Americans acting outside the
territory of the United States by defining "export" to include such things
as the imparting of "technical data," mere information, to foreigners in
any place,"7 there is implicit a limit to American authority to make rules.
It is the international legal order that defines the limit of that authority.
It would probably be undisputed, if ever anything were undisputed
among international lawyers, that there can be no obligations under inter-
national law that would require a state to act outside of its legal capacity
to act. Thus, while there might be some disagreement as to precisely what
actions taken by a state within its own territory represent "unneutral"
behavior of that state, and that determination is made by reference to
treaties and general international law subject to a great deal of interpre-
tation and dispute,"8 it is probably correct that in its essence the law of
47. This was the principal basis for the conviction and imprisonment of one former CIA
agent and the indictment of another in 1982 for activities that they argued occurred entirely
in Libya. See Rubin, To Prosecute Qaddafi's American Mercenaries, N. Y. Times, Nov. 13,
1981, at A34, for citation and some quotations from the relevant statutes.
48. For example, the United States regarded as within its concept of "neutrality" the
exchange of fifty overage armed naval vessels for control over British bases in the Western
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neutrality fixes obligations on a state but not directly on its nationals.
Thus direct transfer of military vessels, legislation favoring one party to a
foreign war, the use of public land to support one party's military effort,
and similar public acts of the public authority seem to engage the public
international law of neutrality. The failure to control the acts of nationals
abroad probably does not, and it might even be questioned whether his-
torically the failure to control the "unneutral" commercial acts of any
persons within the territory of the "neutral" state involves any degree of
state responsibility in the absence of treaty relating to the subject. The
inhibition on individual activity favorable to one or another belligerent
was historically the risk of loss; the capture of transferred property and
its condemnation in prize.
On the other hand, the extension of state authority into realms of
commerce hitherto thought distinct,4 ' and the general extension of con-
ceptions of municipal prescriptive jurisdiction to include acts done by for-
eigners abroad with only some (ever diminishing) impact on the territory
of the prescribing state, can be argued to have expanded the conception
of state responsibility. But many states have reacted to new assertions of
legislative authority by the United States, whose legislature, after all,
does not contain British, West German, Japanese or other foreign repre-
sentatives, not by imitation and expanding their own legislative purview
to create a new pattern of overlapping jurisdictions, but by resisting the
new assertions as beyond the legal authority of the United States in the
Hemisphere in 1940. At that time the United States was not yet a belligerent in the Second
World War. The exchange clearly favored the British in their fight with Germany on both
ends of the deal; it increased their naval capacity and relieved them of a defense burden in
an area of the Empire into which German military planners might have wanted to move
because of the bases' strategic locations near important shipping lanes through which con-
traband cargo was being sent to England. The American reasoning rested on the assertion
that the vessels "were not built, armed, equipped as, or converted into vessels of war with
the intent that they should enter the service of a belligerent." 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 484 (1940).
I suppose the Attorney General (Robert Jackson) was living in the same world as Sir Win-
ston Churchill. See 2 W. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 353 (3rd ed., rev. 1951).
Churchill was entirely aware that the United States action was "unneutral," but drew a fine
distinction between unneutral acts and belligerent acts. Cp. id. at 358: "The transfer to
Great Britain of fifty American warships was a decidedly unneutral act by the United
States," with his explanation to the Parliament that "Only very ignorant persons would
suggest that the transfer of American destroyers to the British flag constitutes the slightest
violation of international law, or affects in the smallest degree the non-belligerency of the
United States." Id. at 367. Because the qualification of an act by one state cannot legally
bind another, and Nazi Germany was legally as capable as the British and Americans of
categorizing the deal in legal terms, and a qualification as "belligerent" act would not have
been inconsistent with the facts, I confess to being a very ignorant person, but nonetheless
thankful that the deal was consummated.
49. This point has frequently been exaggerated in legal argument. The Dutch United
East India Company established in 1602 was in all significant ways an arm of the state; the
English East India Company had the legal authority under English municipal law both to
trade and, in some cases, to go to "war," and did so in India and elsewhere, where the
niceties of European classifications were not appreciated.
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international legal order. 0 Thus, the degree to which state responsibility
will be engaged by the failure of states to control the commerce or over-
seas activities of their nationals seems very questionable at the moment.
It is entirely possible that the United States, with its great claims to legis-
lative authority over both its nationals and foreigners based on minimal
territorial contacts with the United States, has a higher standard of be-
havior if it wants to avoid international claims, than other states which
do not make equivalent claims to jurisdiction. If that is so, then United
States assertions of authority, denial of responsibility, and apparent dis-
regard of the views of other states on the issues, threaten the equal appli-
cation of the law to all its subjects and with it the stability and security
that the law provides.
From this point of view, an entire new vista is opened for study, in
which the law of "neutrality" re-enters the natural law domain as a mere
aspect of the ancient rule, res inter alios acta reflected in the law regard-
ing jus standi. There is irony in this, since the modern spokesmen for
natural law theory seem the most inclined to disregard. national sover-
eignty as part of the law-making process, substituting reason and moral
perception for formal consent as an exercise of national discretion. But
since the trend led by the United States seems to have hit serious opposi-
tion, and some retreat will be compelled either by the politics of interna-
tional trade and our alliance structure, or by direct acknowledgment of
the limits the international legal order places on national jurisdiction, fur-
ther analysis of this aspect of the modern law of "neutrality" seems
premature.
A final implication of all this is not premature to mention. If the
legal responsibility of a state under evolving conceptions of jurisdiction is
expanding to make a state legally responsible for the acts of others, in-
cluding other states whose activities could have been prevented by the
"neutral's" exercise of its jurisdiction, serious questions can arise about
the failure of "neutral" states, like Austria and Sweden, to exercise that
jurisdiction. For example, would it be a breach of Austrian neutrality for
Austria to fail to erect a missile defense system that could deny overflight
50. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief submitted by Australia, Canada, France and the
United Kingdom in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 24(5)
I.L.M. 1293 (1985). The petitioners and Japan argue that the United States antitrust laws
cannot properly extend to forbid acts of foreign defendants mandated by the foreign state
within whose territory those acts occurred, even if the result of those acts has an effect
within American territory. Instead of adopting a universal "effects" doctrine as the basis for
overlapping jurisdictions, the petitioners deny the doctrine justifies the reach abroad of the
American prescriptions. Cf. British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 413
(H.L. 1984), summarized in 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 141 (1985). The House of Lords in that case
held that the alleged conspirators against Laker Airways, accused of violating the American
antitrust laws, could be tried by each country involved with regard to that part of their
actions that fell within the jurisdiction of each country. The Lords' conception of actions
falling within each country's jurisdiction was not based on remote impacts, but on actual
physical activities by licensees of the petitioners carried out within the territory of the
United States.
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of Austrian airspace to NATO cruise missiles? Or Soviet equivalents
aimed at NATO bases in Italy? Must Austrian nationals in West Ger-
many be prevented by Austrian legislation from participating in any as-
pect of West German industry that contributes to NATO defense? It
seems to me that a "natural-moral" law case can be made out that exten-
sions of national jurisdiction have created these new responsibilities.
On the other hand, if a fundamentally "positivist" view is taken of
the law, then what constitutes "neutral" behavior is not susceptible of
grand generalities. As long as Austria's obligations are codified in the ba-
sic treaty,5 1 then the treaty means whatever its parties intend it to mean,
and references to general international conceptions in the documents re-
lated to the treaty and in Austrian municipal law are meaningless in the
absence of diplomatic correspondence to clarify what interpretation of
general international law is intended. To the degree that state practice
"accepted as law" is a source of clarification, differences in interpretations
of the practice and the degree to which any particular practice is accepted
as "law" or merely asserted by one party to be "law" are immediately
apparent. Are Sweden's obligations under Sweden's own interpretation of
neutrality identical with the obligations equally strongly asserted for it-
self by Finland? Are Soviet interpretations, or American, under which all
acts favorable to the one side are considered consistent with neutrality,
and all acts unfavorable considered questionable, in anyway binding on
anybody? Yet, because as a matter of politics those assertions cannot be
totally disregarded, the adjustments in national policy made in considera-
tion of the views and anticipated sensitivities of others can be viewed as
part of the legislative process of positive international law.
Some closer analysis of the evolution of practice seems also neces-
sary. For example, if the Soviet explanation for its submarines' presence
in Swedish waters beyond the scope of the rules of "innocent passage"
assumed in the Corfu Channel Case, or "transit passage" as negotiated in
the 1982 UNCLOS III Convention, is to deny that presence or to excuse
it on the ground of navigational error or accident, then there is some per-
suasive evidence that Swedish "neutral" obligations toward the Soviet
Union do not extend to allowing Soviet naval penetration of the closed
areas; but perhaps the situation would be different if NATO submarines
were permitted access analogous to that which Sweden denies to the So-
viet Union. But these are questions which I believe bring us to the fron-
tiers of the current law-making process, where assertions of law are based
more on perceptions of political advantage than on any analysis of values
agreed to or inherent in the legal order.
51. State Treaty for the Reestablishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria,
Vienna, 15 May 1955, 217 U.N.T.S. 223.
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Compulsory Jurisdiction and Defiance in
the World Court: A Comparison of the PCIJ
and the ICJ
GARY L. SCOTT*
KAREN D. CSAJKO**
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, scholarly literature concerning the International Court of
Justice has exhibited great concern over increasing state defiance of the
Court. This growing concern for the effectiveness of the World Court
peaked following the United States withdrawal and subsequent flouting
of the Court's decision in the Nicaragua case.1
Concern over the increased defiance of the Court seems justified,
some literature on the subject notwithstanding, and searches for a solu-
tion to this defiance seem timely, for while the effectiveness of the Court
may at times have been threatened, it is now in danger of being rendered
impotent. But, while there has been considerable state defiance of the
Court during the recent ICJ years, the PCIJ years were relatively free of
this phenomenon.'
We intend to explore the trend toward defiance of the Court in the
* Department Chairman and Professor, Department of Political Science, Portland
State University, Portland Oregon. Ph.D., University of Washington.
** Currently a Doctoral Candidate, Political Science Department, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, California. M.A., Portland State University.
1. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27, 1986).
2. Though the instances of defiance of the Court are well documented and have been
given a great deal of scholarly attention, (See H. THIRLWAY, NONAPPEARANCE BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 3-20 (1985). See also Highet, Litigation Implications of
the U.S. Withdrawal from the Nicaragua Case, 79 AM. J. IIr'l L. 992 (1985)) there is some
disagreement regarding what constitutes defiance and what should be regarded as "normal
behavior" provided for in the statute. (THIRLWAY, id. at 1-20). Rather than debate the mer-
its of the various perspectives, we will classify defiance as any behavior where a state is
legally bound to the Court's jurisdiction but disregards the orders of the Court in a willful
manner. Thus, judgments about states' attitudes, as seen in their responses to the Court,
become an important criterion for our determination. Our definition of defiance includes
both non-appearance and non-performance. Albania's non-payment of the damages assessed
in the Corfu Channel case is an example of the former; France's behavior in the Nuclear
Tests cases (Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.; NZ v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253 and 457 (Judg-
ments of December 20)) is an example of the latter and the United States behavior in the
Nicaragua case is an example of both willful non-appearance and non-performance. This
categorization excludes then, instances like Soviet behavior toward the Court in The Aerial
Incident of October 7th, 1952, (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.) 1956 I.C.J. 9 (Order of Mar. 14) and the
non-appearance by the representative from Bulgaria in the Electric Co.of Sofia and Bulga-
ria case, (see infra note 57) who was unable to attend because of the war.
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postwar years - in comparison with the low incidence of defiance of the
Court in the interwar period - with the intent of assessing why the PCIJ
seemed relatively more able to avoid outright defiance than the ICJ. An
assessment of the apparent success of compulsory jurisdiction under the
PCIJ may provide some prescriptions for an ailing ICJ.
In discussing the possible explanations for the increased defiance of
the Court, we will argue that, although many factors are contributory, it
is primarily a changed attitude toward international adjudication in the
post World War II system that is responsible for the recent instances of
defiance of the ICJ. Most importantly, present attitudes toward third
party adjudication do not seem conducive to any form of compulsory ju-
risdiction, not even the "optional" acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction.
We will also argue that the apparent progress made toward compul-
sory jurisdiction in the period of the PCIJ was illusory and reflected no
more than an immediate postwar legal idealism that is likewise reflected
in the early years of the ICJ immediately following World War II.
II. COMPULSORY JURISDICTION AND THE PCIJ
In order to provide an adequate comparison of the success of compul-
sory jurisdiction under the two incarnations of the World, Court, we shall
first proceed with a discussion of the cases brought before the PCIJ in-
volving compulsory jurisdiction. For comparative purposes we will rely on
a recent analysis of the compulsory jurisdiction cases under ICJ auspices.3
To analyze the effect of compulsory jurisdiction on the outcome of ICJ
cases, the universe of these cases was divided into four categories: Cate-
gory I cases, in which the respondent state made no preliminary objec-
tions; Category II cases, in which there were preliminary objections that
were upheld by the Court; Category III cases, in which the preliminary
objections were overruled by the Court, but the merits decision supported
the respondent state's submissions; and Category IV cases, in which the
Court upheld the applicant state's case on both objections and merits.4
From this distribution of ICJ cases, it is evident that compulsory ju-
risdiction does not enhance the Court's role in Category I cases, which
would probably have been submitted to the Court eventually even with-
out compulsory jurisdiction, nor in Category II cases, because in these
cases the Court simply finds it lacks jurisdiction. Thus only Category III
and IV cases provide a test of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. The
record for the ICJ in these categories is rather dismal.'
Defiance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction and judgments in re-
cent years seems more the rule than the exception. A cursory look at the
3. The following analysis of the effects of compulsory jurisdiction under the I.C.J. is
based on, Scott & Carr, The I.C.J. and Compulsory Jurisdiction: The Case of the Closing
Clause, 81 AM J. INT'L L. 57 (1987).
4. Id. at 60.
5. Id. at 62-66.
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PCIJ cases, on the other hand, reveals apparent success for the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction during the interwar period. It is this apparent
success, as compared with the failure of the ICJ, that we intend to ex-
plore and explain below.
The cases submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice
under its compulsory jurisdiction, based either on the optional clause or
compromissory clauses in treaties, also can be categorized like those of
the ICJ above. One discovers, through such a categorization, that the dis-
tribution of PCIJ cases is somewhat different from ICJ cases. Not only
were there a greater number of joint submissions under the PCIJ than
the ICJ, but even in compulsory jurisdiction cases there seems to have
been a general desire for peaceful dispute settlement, either legal or nego-
tiated, and the Court apparently was seen to have a role in that settle-
ment process.
Even a state lodging preliminary objections to the Court's jurisdic-
tion may not have been seen as seriously questioning the Court's role.
The Court in the Case Concerning Minorities in Upper Silesia7 over-
ruled Poland's objections to its jurisdiction, noting that Poland had al-
ready participated in the case, thereby acknowledging the jurisdiction of
the Court.' In other words, Poland must have initially seen the Court as a
means for resolving the dispute before it lodged its preliminary
objections.
Another example, to be discussed more fully below, is Germany's
withdrawal of the Factory at Chorzow Indemnity case from the Court's
list before the Court had made a decision.9 Germany and Poland reached
an agreement through negotiations and rather than pursuing a judicial
resolution, Germany agreed to withdraw the case once a negotiated settle-
ment had been reached. The PCIJ seems then, to have afforded states a
desirable means of dispute resolution, even when the cases were submit-
ted unilaterally on the basis of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
A. Category I Cases
It is difficult to distinguish Category I cases from those that are
brought to the Court by joint submission. In 1931 Denmark requested
that the PCIJ, on the basis of the optional clause, declare that Norway's
latest action in a long-standing debate with Denmark was contrary to in-
ternational law.' 0 Since 1919, Denmark and Norway had disagreed over
6. Coplin & Rochester, The Permanent Court of International Justice, The Interna-
tional Court of Justice, The League of Nations, and The United Nations: A Comparative
Empirical Survey, 66 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 529 (1972).
7. Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.) 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 12
(April 26).
8. Id. at 24.
9. 5 P.C.I.J. ANN. R. (ser. E) No. 5, at 200.
10. Memorial of Denmark, Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.) 1933
P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 62 (October 31, 1931).
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the sovereignty of Eastern Greenland. Denmark claimed that Eastern
Greenland was its sovereign territory and Norway claimed that Eastern
Greenland was terra nullius.1" Before submitting the case to the PCIJ,
Denmark suggested to Norway that both submit the case to the PCIJ by
special agreement, and Norway initially agreed.' 2 However, Norway
wanted a guarantee that if the Court decided that Denmark did not have
sovereignty, Denmark would then acknowledge that Greenland was terra
nullius. Denmark refused, on the grounds that this would prejudge the
case. "'8 Norway thereupon refused to submit the special agreement and
issued a proclamation of its own occupation of Eastern Greenland.' But,
even in Norway's act of proclamation, there appears a desire for a settle-
ment of the dispute, a desire to ensure that if the Court did not decide in
Denmark's favor the dispute would not merely be returned to its status
before adjudication." Norway raised no preliminary objections to the
Court's jurisdiction and immediately complied with the Court's decision
that Norway revoke its proclamation."
The other cases in Category I also were cases in which both parties
seemed favorably disposed toward adjudication, even though the cases
were submitted to the Court unilaterally. In the South-Eastern Green-
land case,' 7 Norway and Denmark separately appealed to the Court on
the basis of the optional clause. The Court joined the two cases, saying
that they were equivalent to one special agreement.'s
The Diversion of Water from the River Meuse"s also resembles cases
submitted by special agreement - while the Netherlands brought the
case to the Court by means of the optional clause, Belgium entered coun-
terclaims accusing the Netherlands of equivalent breaches of the 1863
Treaty that had been designed to settle all previous and future difficulties
with regard to both states' interests in the River Meuse. °
A fourth case that falls under this first category concerns Czechoslo-
vakia's appeal to the PCIJ to revoke a decision of the Hungaro-Czecho-
slovakian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.2 ' While this case does not necessarily
11. Preuss, The Dispute between Denmark and Norway over the Sovereignty of East
Greenland, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 472 (1932).
12. Id. at 486.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 9 P.C.I.J. ANN. R. (ser. E, No. 9), at 141.
17. Case Concerning the Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland
(Nor. v. Den.; Den. v. Nor.) 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 48 (Aug. 2).
18. Id. at 270.
19. Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.) 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70
(June 28).
20. Id. at 7.
21. Appeal from Judgment of the Hungaro-Czechoslovakian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal
(The Peter Pazmany University v. The State of Czechoslovakia) (Czech. v. Hung.) 1933
P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 72, at 15.
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resemble a special agreement, Hungary, nonetheless, raised no prelimi-
nary objections, thus also appearing to desire a judicial resolution to the
dispute.22
The remaining case in this category, the Socit6 Commerciale de
Belgique,2" was submitted to the Court by Belgium against Greece, on the
basis of a compromissory clause. Greece refused to submit the case
jointly, but over the course of the hearings, Belgium so altered its case
that the Court declared that differences no longer existed between the
parties.2 4 As Belgium altered its position, the case came more closely to
resemble a negotiated settlement or one submitted by ad hoc agreement
rather than compulsory jurisdiction.25
PCIJ Category I cases resemble those heard by the ICJ; Category I
cases heard by both Courts are primarily cases that both parties identify
as amenable to adjudication. States' recognition of the Court as a legiti-
mate part of the dispute settlement process, as illustrated by the cases in
this first category, does not necessarily differentiate the PCIJ from the
ICJ in its early years. The differentiation becomes more clear in the cate-
gories in which states would be expected to be more adversarial when
faced with the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
B. Category II Cases
Cases in this category are cases in which preliminary objections are
lodged and upheld by the Court.2 The respondents' objections to a legal
resolution of the dispute are thus supported by the decision of the Court.
These cases then, whether heard by the PCIJ or ICJ, are designated by
the Court as falling outside of its compulsory jurisdiction. For example, in
the Phosphates in Morocco case,27 France responded to Italy's applica-
tion to the Court by objecting that the dispute over licenses to prospect
for phosphates in Morocco arose before France and Italy accepted the
optional clause.28 Therefore, France claimed, the dispute fell outside of
the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court agreed with France in this case
and there was no further action.29
The other two cases that fit this category are slightly more compli-
22. Appeal from Czechoslovak-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (The Royal Hun-
garian Peter Pazmany University) (Czech. v. Hung.) 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 61 (Decem-
ber 15).
23. Societe Commerciale de Belgique (Belgium v. Greece) 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
78 (June 15).
24.. Id. at 175.
25. Although Greece did not compensate Belgium in accordance with the Court's ulti-
mate declaration, this failure was due to inability to pay rather than any willful noncompli-
ance. Judicial Decisions, Sovereign Immunity - Seizure of State Property, AM. J. INT'L L.
508 (1953).
26. Scott & Carr, supra note 3, at 62-63.
27. Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. Fr.) 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 74 (June 14).
28. Id. at 17.
29. Id. at 40.
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cated, because in each the Court joined the preliminary objections and
merits phases, saying that in order to make a decision upon the prelimi-
nary objections it had to consider facts impinging upon the merits of the
cases. The Court ultimately decided, in each case, that it lacked jurisdic-
tion. In the Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway case, 30 the Court overruled
one of Lithuania's preliminary objections, only to then agree with Lithua-
nia that Estonia had not exhausted local remedies.8 Similarly, in the
Pajzs, Csaky and Esterhazy case82 the Court joined the preliminary ob-
jections and merits phases, but ultimately agreed with Yugoslavia that it
lacked jurisdiction.88
C. Category III Cases
The only PCIJ case in which there were preliminary objections over-
ruled by the Court, but where the decision on the merits supported the
respondent, is the Interpretation of the Statute of Memel. 4 This case
was brought to the Court by Britain, France, Italy, and Japan against
Lithuania. Lithuania objected that the basis for jurisdiction, the May 8,
1924 Convention Relating to Memel," indicated that any dispute must
first be referred to the League Council. The Court overruled Lithuania's
objection, saying that a hearing by the Council was not a prerequisite to
the Court's jurisdiction under the Convention. However, the Court de-
cided the merits of the case in favor of Lithuania's submissions.36
Two points may be raised in considering this case. The first is that
Lithuania did not object to the jurisdiction of the Court per se, but rather
to the interpretation of the 1924 Convention." Perhaps then, the compul-
sory nature of the Court's jurisdiction did not compel Lithuania to com-
ply with the adverse ruling on its preliminary objections, but since its
objections were not directed toward the jurisdiction of the Court it may
have had little reason not to pursue the case as directed by the Court.
The other point to consider is the possibility that a small state such as
Lithuania may have realized that it had greater bargaining power before
the Council or the Court than it might otherwise have had in ordinary
negotiations with more powerful states such as Britain, France, Italy or
Japan. This possibility could make even an unwanted court decision ap-
pear to be more desirable than certain other alternatives.
30. Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Est. v. Lith.) 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 76, at 4
(February 28).
31. Id. at 22.
32. Pajzs, Csaky, Esterhazy Case, (Hung. v. Yugo.) 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 68 (De-
cember 16).
33. Id. at 65.
34. Interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Territory (Brit., Fr., It. and Jap. v.
Lith.) 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 49 (August 11).
35. Convention Relating to Memel, May 8, 1924, 29 L.N.T.S. 85.
36. Supra note 34, at 337.
37. Supra note 34, at 247.
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D. Category IV Cases
None of the cases in Category IV were brought under the optional
clause - all three were brought to the PCIJ based upon compromissory
clauses in treaties.3 8 Interestingly, all three cases in this category were
submitted to the Court in the early years of its existence. Not only were
the disputes ones in which the respondents had specifically agreed to sub-
mit to the jurisdiction of the Court in recent treaties, but both the trea-
ties and the disputes themselves followed closely on the heels of the
Court's creation, thus creating an ideal situation for compulsory jurisdic-
tion. That is, state consent to the jurisdiction of the Court was quite
proximate to the issues involved in the dispute.8 9
The Mavrommatis Concessions case is only the second case decided
by the PCIJ and the first to fall under Category IV.40 The case began as a
dispute between a Greek national, M. Mavrommatis, and the U.K. con-
cerning public works concessions in the mandated territory of Palestine.
After negotiations between Mavrommatis and the British Colonial and
Foreign Offices, followed by negotiations between Greece (on the part of
Mavrommatis) and Britain; Greece applied to the PCIJ on the basis of
Article 26 of the Mandate for Palestine.41 Both the preliminary objections
and the merits phases of the case were decided against Britain.42 This
decision would seem to support a contention that the compulsory juris-
diction of the Court was beneficial in bringing Britain and Greece to a
peaceful resolution of their dispute. However, the judgment did not en-
tirely favor Greece's submission over the contentions of the U.K. In fact,
the decision closely resembled one of the proposals made by the British
Foreign Office to the Greek Legation before Greece submitted the case to
the Court.'s Thus, the decision, albeit one that did not fully support Brit-
ain's submission, seemed to be one that Britain had already expressed a
certain willingness to accept in its early negotiations with Greece. That
the case was resubmitted to the Court, once again unilaterally by Greece,
may suggest that the U.K. did not wish to go beyond what it had already
expressed a willingness to abide with, i.e., that it would accept the Court's
judgment insofar as that decision corresponded with Britain's own range
of possible solutions to the dispute, expressed in the bargaining with
Greece. However, whether this is true is difficult to speculate, since in the
Case of the Readaptation of the Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions
the Court agreed with Britain that it lacked jurisdiction.""
38. See supra note 7, and infra notes 40 and 45.
39. See Scott & Carr, supra note 3, at 73-74.
40. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.) 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
2 (August 30).
41. Id. at 12.
42. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.) 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
5 (March 26).
43. Borchard, The Mavrommatis Concessions Cases, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. 728 (1925).
44. Readaptation of the Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.) 1927
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The second case in Category IV is the German Interests in Polish
Upper Silesia and The Factory at Chorzow." This case might also seem,
as did Mavrommatis,"s to support the efficacy of compulsory jurisdiction.
More likely, it is another example of the different attitude directed to-
ward the PCIJ. This was a rather protracted case consisting of a series of
eight orders and judgments; the apparent attempt to use the Court to
work toward a negotiated settlement of the dispute. Upon the Court's
decision for Germany in the first question submitted to it regarding the
dispute over the alienation of properties in upper Silesia, the parties at-
tempted to reach a friendly settlement through negotiation.47 When the
negotiations failed, Germany informed Poland that the only recourse was
the PCIJ; thus the PCIJ addressed a new question concerning this prob-
lem.'8 A third question arose over the matter of any indemnity owed by
Poland to the individuals alienated from their properties. This question
was likewise submitted to the Court and decided in Germany's favor.'"
Yet, in the final phase of the case (the question over the amount of the
indemnities) Germany informed the Court that the parties had concluded
an agreement and it terminated the case.'
The third PCIJ case that falls under Category IV is the Rights of
Minorities in Upper Silesia. 51 This case concerned the exclusion of some
children from minority schools in Upper Silesia in 1926 and shortly there-
after. Germany submitted the case to the PCIJ in 1928.52 Poland chal-
lenged the jurisdiction of the Court, but did so at such a late point in the
proceedings that the Court decided that Poland had already indicated a
desire for a decision by the Court.53 Even though it had objections to the
Court's jurisdiction, Poland had used the Court initially. Thus it seems as
though Poland, as respondent, at some point in the case must have felt
that the Court could play a reasonable part in the bargaining process with
Germany - it was only at some later point in the proceedings that Poland
decided to contest the jurisdiction of the Court.
Unlike the ICJ in Category IV cases, the PCIJ experienced no defi-
ance from the losing respondent states. It is likely that international pres-
sures to uphold treaties created in the near aftermath of World War I, as
well as pressures to support legal institutions created to further peace,
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.11 (October 10).
45. Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.) 1926
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7 (May 25).
46. Supra note 40.
47. Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 Concerning the Case of the Factory at
Chorzow (Germany v. Poland) 1927 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 13, at 7 (December 16).
48. Id. at 7.
49. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.) 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17
(Jud. of Sept. 13).
50. Judgments and Orders, 5 P.C.I.J. Ann. R., ser. E, No. 5, at 193 (1928-1929).
51. Supra note 7.
52. Id. at 4.
53. Supra note 7, at 24.
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made defiance of the Court a relatively non-viable alternative at the time.
But simply to say that states during the interwar years did not defy the
Court, even in Category IV cases, does not fully address the difference
between states' behavior toward the PCIJ and the ICJ.
E. Terminated Cases
Several cases like the Factory at Chorzow Indemnity case" were
submitted to the PCIJ and later terminated by the parties. These termi-
nated cases, while not fitting specifically into the categories used in this
article, nonetheless support the contention that states often used the
PCIJ as one alternative in their negotiations. Cases in which the appli-
cant agreed to withdraw the case from the Court after the respondent's
preliminary objections, or when progress had been made in bargaining
between the parties outside the Court, indicate a desire on the part of the
states for dispute settlement rather than a specifically judicial resolu-
tion.5 These cases support the contention, based upon an examination of
the cases in the four categories above, that during the interwar years,
states approached the Court with an attitude different from the more re-
cent years in the postwar period.
In the Losinger case, Switzerland and Yugoslavia reached an agree-
ment outside of court and agreed to terminate their case before the Court
had an opportunity to hand down any judgment.56 In the Electricity
Company of Sofia and Bulgaria,'7 Bulgaria refused to participate in the
case following the Court's decision for Belgium on jurisdiction. However,
Bulgaria's refusal to participate was based upon the refusal of the govern-
ment to force its representative to travel across Europe during the war. 8
In light of Bulgaria's refusal, Belgium ultimately agreed to withdraw the
case from the Court's list.5 9
A third case, and another instance that might be construed as defi-
ance of the Court, also illustrates the attitudinal difference toward dis-
pute settlement in the interwar period. In the Denunciation of the
Treaty of November 2, 1865 between China and Belgium,0 Belgium sub-
54. Supra note 50 at 193.
55. This excludes several cases - those that were terminated when Germany left the
League : Case Concerning the Prince von Pleas, (Ger. v. Pol.) 1933 P.C.I.J., (ser. C) No.70
(Dec. 2); and Case Concerning the Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority (Ger.
v. Pol.) 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.60 (Dec. 2). The Polish Agrarian Reform is a case
wherein Poland did not appear, however it can be distinguished from cases of nonappear-
ance before the I.C.J. because the reason for Poland's nonappearance was the inability to
meet time limits rather than defiance of the Court.
56. Losinger and Co., (Switz. v. Yugo.) 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 69 (Dec. 14).
57. Electricity Company of Sophia and Bulgaria (Belg. v. Bulg.) 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 77 (April 4).
58. 16 P.C.I.J. ANN. R.,(ser. E) No. 16, at 152.
59. Id. at 153.
60. Application of Belgium, Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2nd, 1865, Be-
tween China and Belgium (Belg. v. China) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 8, at 4 (Nov. 25).
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mitted the case to the Court because it was engaged in negotiations with
China over a new treaty and feared that in the interim it would be left
without any treaty.6" China refused to participate in the case, but sug-
gested that the League was the proper forum for the matter. 2 Although
China refused to participate in the case before the PCIJ, it did continue
to negotiate with Belgium. As soon as a new treaty was negotiated,
Belgium withdrew the case from the Court's list.
3
The review of PCIJ cases above, involving the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Court, illuminates several points about the role of the PCIJ in
the dispute settlement process. First, we do not find instances of outright
defiance of the PCIJ as we do with the ICJ." Further, in those cases that
might be construed as defiance as with the Bulgaria and China cases
above, the applicant state sought to work out an amicable solution and
did not press the case. Second, there are a number of instances where
parties to the disputes worked out an amicable solution to the problem
even before the Court had the opportunity to act. Third, in those cases of
unilateral application involving compulsory jurisdiction, the applicant
state did seem genuinely to desire a settlement of the dispute. We shall
argue below that this fact alone is enough to distinguish PCIJ submis-
sions from many of the submissions to the ICJ. Finally, it should be
noted that all of the cases involving a true test of compulsory jurisdiction
were submitted in the early years of the PCIJ under what we have termed
ideal conditions for compulsory jurisdiction.
III. THE END OF LEGAL IDEALISM
At the end of each of the two major world wars the world seemed
captured by a sense of post-war legal euphoria. Struck by the need to end
war for all time, statesmen and scholars alike sought solutions in the legal
realm for the settlement of international disputes. The birth of the PCIJ,
and its reincarnation in the ICJ after World War II, were accompanied by
a feeling amongst many states that disputes were best settled rather than
allowed to continue and possibly erupt into armed conflict. Third party
adjudication seemed a reasonable means to accomplish this. Debates over
compulsory jurisdiction notwithstanding, there did seem to be a commit-
ment, by most states, to this form of dispute resolution. "
61. See Woolsey, China's Termination of Unequal Treaties, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 289
(1927).
62. Id. at 292.
63. 5 P.C.I.J. ANN. R. (ser. E) No. 5, at 203.
64. For a discussion of defiance in both the PCIJ and the ICJ, see THIRLWAY, supra
note 2. See also HIGHE'r, supra note 2; J. ELKIND, NONAPPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: FUNCTIONAL AND CoMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1984).
65. See, e.g., Lloyd, "A Springboard for the Future": A Historical Examination of
Britain's Role in Shaping the Optional Clause of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 28 (1985); S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT, 364-67 (1965).
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Up to a certain point, we can see great similarities in state behavior
toward third party adjudication between the PCIJ and the ICJ. Both
Courts saw their busiest periods in the decade or decade and one-half
after their creation. At this point, both Courts began to experience a de-
cline in the number of cases presented to them. The reasons for the de-
cline in the numbers of cases for the two Courts seem to be similar, and
both seem to be related to the perceived instability of the international
system at the time. With the PCIJ, the decline in business is coincident
with, and seems dependent upon, the uncertainties generated by the ma-
jor international financial crisis begun in 1929 and the rise of National
Socialist Germany after 1933. With the ICJ, the decline in business seems
tied to the intensification of the cold war and the proliferation of new
states following the period of rapid decolonization. But beyond this point
in the life cycle of each Court, the similarities end.
The business of the PCIJ was ended by the onset of World War II,
while the ICJ was able to continue into its next phase. It is during this
next phase in the life of the ICJ, beginning approximately in the early
1970's, that we begin to notice the serious phenomenon of defiance of the
Court. It is a period for which there is no corollary in the life of the PCIJ.
This period, that we shall call, for want of a better name,"normal" inter-
national politics, may provide a truer test of the readiness of the interna-
tional system to rely on third party adjudication and to accept the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction. If this is correct, then the apparent pro-
gress toward a genuine acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction made dur-
ing the entire period of the PCIJ and during the early years of the ICJ
may be illusory. Rather than a true commitment during times of "nor-
mal" international politics, it represents a post-war commitment to legal
idealism that did not have a chance to phase out normally with the PCIJ
but did with the ICJ.
There are several reasons that may account for the inability of third
party adjudication generally, and compulsory jurisdiction particularly, to
become viable dispute resolving mechanisms in this period of post-legal
idealism or normal international politics. Significant changes occurred
during the period of normal international politics in the later ICJ years
that affected state behavior toward the Court. In part, the changes seem
to reflect a normal phasing out of postwar legal idealism. Beyond that,
there were changes in the international system, changes in the submission
patterns of cases that reflected a different attitude toward international
adjudication, and changes in the issues brought before the Court, all of
which may have affected the success of the ICJ.
IV. ISSUE DIFFERENCES
One possible explanation accounting for the different behaviors of
states toward the PCIJ and the ICJ might be found in the kinds of issues
brought before the two Courts. If the PCIJ dealt with less politically
charged issues than the ICJ, then one might expect states to be more
compliant under the PCIJ, at least in the matter of accepting the Court's
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jurisdiction and decisions.
Coplin and Rochester, in some earlier quantitative research on the
Court, compared issues presented to the PCIJ and the ICJ on the basis of
"salience," i.e., high political significance. 6 Coplin concluded that sali-
ence of issues was an important dimension for analysis regarding state
behavior toward the Court because,
... nothing inherent in the issue makes a dispute legal rather than
political but that indeed the determination is made by the actors
themselves. A dispute is legal if the parties choose to consider it a
legal dispute. By implication, then, the decision to consider a dispute
primarily in the legal dimension, particularly for the side with the
weaker legal argument, occurs when the state stops attaching great
importance to the issue.67 (emphasis added)
Coplin and Rochester discovered that the issues presented to the ICJ
were of higher salience than those presented to the PCIJ.8 Though it is
possible to suggest that this means a higher degree of confidence in the
ICJ than in the PCIJ, the record does not warrant such a conclusion.
Rather, as Coplin and Rochester suggest, ". . . the Court has been fre-
quently used by parties for propagandizing or legitimizing purposes
rather than with the expectation of settlement." 9 This behavior has been
far more frequently exhibited in ICJ submissions than in submissions to
the PCIJ.
V. LEGAL AND POLITICAL USES OF THE COURT
Perhaps blatant political use of the Court was popularized by the
United States during the cold war period with the numerous submissions
made against Warsaw Pact states."0 Though the United States was surely
aware of the Communist states' position regarding third-party adjudica-
tion, 7 1 it nonetheless brought several issues before the Court, only to have
them later removed from the list when the Warsaw Pact states refused to
participate. It is also likely that the United States enlisted the support of
the Court in just such a political way in the Iran Hostages case72 and that
Nicaragua did, as well, in its recent case against the United States.7 '
66. Coplin & Rochester, supra note 6, at 541-542.
67. Id. at 541.
68. Id. at 542.
69. Id. at 538.
70. See, Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of U.S.A. (U.S. v. Hung. and U. S.
v. U.S.S.R.) 1954 I.C.J. 99; Aerial Incident of March 10th, 1953 (U.S.A. v. Czech.) 1956 I.C.J.
6; Aerial Incident of October 7th, 1952 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.) 1956 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 14); Aerial
Incident of 7 November 1954 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.) 1959 I.C.J. 276.
71. For a discussion of Soviet views toward third-party adjudication, see J. TRISKA & R.
SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW AND POLICY OF SoviET TREATIES 381-388 (1962).
72. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3
(May 24).
73. Nicaragua, supra note 1.
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While this politically loaded behavior toward the Court may arguably
have been learned from American actions toward the Communist bloc,
there is a marked difference between cases where the Court was able to
deny jurisdiction, in the absence of prior consent, and those cases where
the Court was virtually compelled to accept jurisdiction because of some
form of prior agreement to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction (i.e. com-
promissory clauses or the optional clause). In the former instance, while
this might still be construed as an improper use of the Court, it is un-
likely that these submissions damage the Court or its authority because
the Court is left with an escape position. That is, the Court is not faced
with having no reasonable alternative but to assert its jurisdiction over a
state that simply refuses to participate. In the latter instance however,
the Court is left with little choice but to assert its jurisdiction because of
the prior consent of the parties. It is in these instances where the Court
has encountered the recent difficulty of state defiance.
A. Submission Style: A Typology of Submissions
We can divide all of the submissions made to the Court into two ma-
jor categories and four subcategories, based upon the intended use made
of the Court by the applicant(s): The first major category is where the
party or parties genuinely desire and expect a resolution of the dispute -
we shall call these "legal submissions." The other major category of sub-
missions is where no resolution is expected but where the submitting
state is attempting to make political use of the Court for the state's own
benefit - we will call these "political submissions." 4
Legal submissions can be divided further, into those submissions
where the desired outcome is a judicial resolution and those where the
desired outcome is any kind of mutually agreeable resolution to the prob-
lem, as through bargaining. The former we will call "adjudicatory submis-
sions" and the latter will be called "bargaining submissions.""
Political submissions also can be divided into two sub-categories. The
first category, characterized by the U.S. submissions against the Warsaw
Pact states, we will label "symbolic submissions." In symbolic submis-
sions a state attempts to enlist the symbolism of the Court and legal dis-
pute settlement against another state. In these instances the Court is free
to deny jurisdiction, upon refusal of the respondent state to participate,
because there is no prior state consent to the Court's jurisdiction. The
submitting state has, nonetheless, gained politically because it has ap-
peared to desire a legal solution to the problem. In other words, the sub-
mitting state has juxtaposed itself, as a law-abiding state, against the re-
spondent, as a non-law-abiding state.
74. See, Coplin & Rochester, supra note 6, at 538.
75. For a discussion of the role of the Court in the international bargaining process, see,
e.g., Coplin, International Organizations in the Future of the International Bargaining
Process: A Theoretical Projection, 25 J. INTL. AFF. 87.
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The second kind of submission we call a "leverage submission." In
this instance the submitting state uses the Court itself as an "ally"
against the respondent state.76 Leverage submissions differ from symbolic
submissions because of the presence of compulsory jurisdiction. The
Court is relatively unable to deny jurisdiction because of a state's unwill-
ingness to participate, because there has been prior consent to the Court's
jurisdiction.77
Both symbolic submissions and leverage submissions indicate an atti-
tude on the part of submitting states that is not indicative of a desire for
either a legal or a bargaining resolution of the disputes.7 Though it is dif-
ficult to judge motive initially, once it becomes clear that the respondent
state will not submit to the Court's jurisdiction, further pursuit of the
case by the applicant can only serve political ends. It has been sufficiently
demonstrated in recent cases that when defiance occurs, the judicial set-
tlement, should it be rendered, has little impact upon the dispute. The
dispute has not been settled. As our major category name indicates, these
become purely political submissions intended for self-gain. As such, they
are damaging to the Court. Submissions to the PCIJ all fall into our cate-
gory of legal submissions, as do most of those in the early years of the
ICJ. Those political submissions that were made in the early years of the
ICJ were all of the symbolic variety. Unfortunately, in recent years the
ICJ has been faced with a number of submissions that seem to be of the
leverage variety. Respondent states have been unwilling to submit to the
Court's jurisdiction, even though there was prior consent, and the Court
has found itself increasingly facing the problem of accepting jurisdiction
in the face of defiant states.
Political submissions are likely to occur in any political system where
a legal edifice exists but where there is no common understanding
amongst states to submit important disputes for third-party adjudication,
and where there is a lack of mutually understood norms, rules and princi-
ples governing dispute settlement. This may occur because no common
understanding ever existed in the system or because the common under-
standing that once existed has eroded.
The legitimacy which states attach to international organizations to-
day is less than it was during the pre-World War II period .... the
legitimacy necessary for the ICJ and U.N. to develop distributive roles
is insufficient and accounts for the unwillingness of contemporary
states to accept the distributive function of these organizations. 7"
76. Coplin & Rochester, supra note 6 at 533.
77. We are presuming here that the dispute can be construed as a legal matter and not
purely a political issue. In the latter instance, of course, the Court is free to deny jurisdic-
tion. See, Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 36, para. 6.
78. There are times when a leverage submission will result in a judgment by the Court
as in the Iran Hostages Case and in the Nicaragua case, but the judgment does not necessa-
rily solve the dispute since, as in both of these cases, the offending state continued to defy
the Court's orders.
79. Coplin, supra note 76, at 298-299.
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The erosion of common understandings of proper methods for dis-
pute settlement may be caused by the entry of new states to the system
(systemic changes), by changes in the perceptions of states regarding the
level of acceptable conflict in the system and the desirability of eliminat-
ing or controlling conflict, 0 or it may result from a change in attitude
concerning where in the system distributive decisions should be made.
According to Coplin,
In the pre-World War II period, the higher percentage of joint sub-
missions can be interpreted as an indication of a greater willingness
on the part of the participants to allow the organizations to make dis-
tributive decisions.81
Though Coplin may be correct in his interpretation of joint submissions,
we can see from the Scott/Carr Category I cases that there is really little
difference between these unilateral submissions brought under the op-
tional clause and joint submissions. This then, raises the number of cases
under ICJ jurisdiction that might be said also to be indicative of a desire
on the part of states to have the Court make distributive decisions. Addi-
tionally, the recent Gulf of Maine case82 is one where the United States
and Canada quite obviously desired a distributive decision by the Court,
albeit in the more narrow forum of Chambers.8" Clearly there are times
when states in the contemporary system do want the Court to make dis-
tributive decisions. States are unwilling, however, to have distributive de-
cisions forced upon them without an immediate expression of their con-
sent. It might safely be said that the Court can play a distributive role
whenever both parties wish it to do so, but it can never play such a role
when one of the conflicting states objects. As Susan Strange has pointed
out, "the world lacks a .. . world court to act as the ultimate arbiter of
legal disputes that also have political consequences."" Perhaps, after all,
what we are witnessing in the defiance of the ICJ is nothing more than
proof that "the political" always takes precedence over "the legal" when
the two realms conflict. States are unlikely to seek legal resolution over
issues that are of high political significance or "salience" as Coplin calls
it.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is not revelatory to state that the international system has changed
80. For a discussion of variations in systemic tolerances of conflict, see Haas, Regime
Decay: Conflict Management in International Organizations, 1945-1981, 37 INT'L ORG. 81
(1983).
81. Coplin, supra note 76, at 298.
82. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. Rep. 246 (Oct. 12) reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1197 (1984).
83. For a discussion of this case, see Schneider, The Gulf of Main Case: The Nature of
an Equitable Result, 79 Am. J. INT'L L. 539 (1985).
84. Strange, Cave! hic dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, 36 INT'L ORG. 479, 487
(1982).
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considerably since World War II. The classic balance of power system
gave way to bipolarity in its various forms. There has also been a great
proliferation of states in the post-war system, creating not only more ac-
tors, but widening the existing wealth and power disparities as well. Of
these factors, the best indicator of likely defiance seems to be "power dif-
ferential," since the most recent instances of defiance have occurred be-
tween states of great power disparity. Interestingly, where the power lies
does not seem to be a significant determinant of which states defy the
Court - The United States 5 and Iceland"' merely represent the power
extremes of a wide spectrum of states that have exhibited defiance to-
ward the ICJ. Nor should this be surprising, for it is precisely in arrange-
ments of great power disparity where a state might resort to a political
leverage submission. Weak states stand to gain as they otherwise could
not in direct confrontation with powerful states. Powerful states can gain
without appearing to bully the weak. In both instances the submitting
states are risking little, since they are reasonably sure that the respondent
state will refuse to come before the Court.
When compulsory jurisdiction is part of this formula, states of all
kinds see the opportunity for gain through leverage submissions. The
only real loser is the Court itself. Beginning in the 1970s the ICJ clearly
entered a period for which there is no parallel in the PCIJ. It is a period
characterized by a generally low submission rate, by a high rate of politi-
cal leverage submissions involving high salience issues amongst those
cases submitted, and by an extremely high rate of defiance of the Court.
We have argued that the contemporary period is a natural outgrowth
of "politics as usual" in a system of sovereign states. We have also argued
that the apparent progress toward compulsory jurisdiction and judicial
settlement during the PCIJ years and the early years of the ICJ, was chi-
merical and attributable primarily to a temporary attitude about judicial
settlement brought on by the legal idealism following the two world wars.
It should be clear by now that, given the absence of the necessary
state attitudes to make compulsory jurisdiction work, and given the polit-
ical role into which the Court has been pressed by conflicting states, we
believe that visionary insistence on continuing or strengthening the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction can only further damage the efficacy of
the Court as an international dispute settlement mechanism. The case
history of the PCIJ, alas, offers no remedy for an ailing Court.
85. Nicaragua, supra note 1.
86. Iceland refused to comply with an exchange of notes with The Federal Republic of
Germany and the United Kingdom done on July 19, and March 11, 1961 respectively. Fish-
eries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Iceland; FRG v. Iceland), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 175 (July 25).
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STUDENT COMMENT
International Securities Markets: Will 24-
Hour Trading Make a Difference?
I. INTRODUCTION
Telecommunication advancement is having great impact on the in-
ternational business world allowing transactions to take place in a matter
of hours, and at times minutes, that in the past have taken days, weeks,
or even months. We are an inter-connected world; no longer can we rely
on the cushion of time from which to determine if our actions have been
the correct ones. The capital and securities markets reflect these advance-
ments fully; allowing international trading in securities markets instanta-
neously, permitting liquidity, increased volume and greater choice of
investments.
The effect of these developments on international markets has been
great; in 1981, the dollar volume of United States securities traded on the
international markets was $75.5 billion.' The amount increased to $277.3
billion in 1986.2 Investments in foreign equity securities by United States
investors was $102 billion, with United States' pension funds holding $45
million in foreign assets in 1986. 8 Euro Bond Trading volume jumped
from $2.2 trillion in 1985, to $3.2 trillion in 1986.' United States' issues
raised $36.5 billion in 1985, increasing to $38.6 billion in 1986.1
Increased demand and capacity have led to longer trading hours. In
October of this year, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (the "Merc") ap-
proved the first 24-hour financial futures trading market in the United
States using an automated trading system.6 Many international ex-
changes have expanded or are considering expansion of trading hours.
Twenty-four hour books are maintained by some of the larger firms, al-
lowing for trading at all times.' With the advent of increased activity in
the markets, in terms of time, volume and numbers of participants, the
1. Mann & Sullivan, Current Issues in International Law Enforcement 2, International
Bar Association, Section on Business Law, in London, England (Sept. 18, 1987).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Jouzaitis, Merc Okays 24-Hour Trading, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 7, 1987, § 3, at 7.
7. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 1.
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adequacy of the securities laws to meet the increased demands must be
considered. The potential for violation of regulations through manipula-
tion, churning, insider trading and material misrepresentation, just to list
a few, is in direct correlation with the increases of these influencing fac-
tors. A balance must be maintained between access to the international
markets for the United States' investor allowing development of world
economic growth, and making sure the investor has access to adequate
information about the securities from which he is to make an investment
decision.
This article will address the development of the international mar-
kets, their purpose and function in the international economic community
as well as the United States securities laws and subsequent changes in
response to the international markets both in terms of enforcement as
well as regulation. Finally, it will consider potential problems and solu-
tions in response to these developments especially in light of around-the-
clock trading.
II. UNITED STATES SECURITIES REGULATIONS
The purpose of the securities laws and regulations is not to prevent
the investor from making an investment, or a mistake in investment.
Rather, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has formu-
lated certain minimal requirements a company wanting to raise capital by
selling stock shares to the public must meet.8 The company must also be
willing to disclose fully, information about itself to the potential investor,
resulting in an informed decision to invest. 9. The regulation of securities
and investments is not new, nor did it originate in this country. Individ-
ual states had their own regulations a full generation prior to the passage
of the 1933 Securities Act, and England had been controlling through leg-
islation and the courts for centuries."0 The earliest known English law
was passed in the year 1285 under Edward I, authorizing the Court of
Alderman to license brokers in London.1
Perhaps the most famous of the early regulations was the so-called
"Bubble Act" of 1720, set up to control fraudulent stock promoters, and
joint stock companies." This Act was the result of England and France,
as a means of paying public debt, allowing two companies, the Mississippi
Company of Paris, which was set up to exploit the Louisiana Territory by
the French Court, and the South Sea Company of London, given exclu-
sive trading rights by the British government in the Pacific islands and
South America to promote and sell stock to a non-suspecting public. In-
8. The requirements that an issuer must meet depends on the particular offering that is
being made. See, Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) et seq. (hereinafter "Securities
Act").
9. See Securities Act, §§ 7, 10.
10. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (1983).
11. Id.
12. 6 Geo. 1, c. 18.
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vestors rushed to purchase the worthless stock, and in 1720, the bubble
burst, resulting in financial ruin for investors and severe financial set
backs for governments; France being the hardest hit. Its economy all but
collapsed; with a Regent being forced out of office as a result.18 The
"Bubble Act", with striking similarities to the fraud provisions in current
United States' securities regulations", was repealed in 1825.18
British Parliament passed the first prospectus requirement through
the Company's Act in 1844. A little less than 50 years passed before the
enactment of the Director's Liability Act of 1980.16 This gave directors
and promoters civil liability for untrue statements in the prospectus with-
out the defrauding party having to prove scienter. 17
The first United States statute dealing with securities regulation ap-
peared about 1900.11 However, the rapid growth of the American financial
community in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth century went al-
most unchecked.' 9 Capital raised from individual investors was used to
promote businesses resulting in broad diversity and absentee ownership
of the entity, with very little or no protection for the people who invested.
The collapse of the stock market in 1929 was the "bursting bubble
effect" on a world-wide scale. Prior to the crash, Wall Street had contin-
ued on its way with few legislative restraints. The crash shook the federal
government from its securities regulations sleep, resulting in the passage
of the Securities Act of 1933 (S.A.). The various states had securities reg-
13. GAY, AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT, GREAT AGES OF MAN 74, 75 (1971).
14. Securities Act, § 11; §§ 12(2), 17; Liability Provisions Covering Fraud or Misrepre-
sentation in the Interstate Sale of Securities in General for Individuals Connected with the
Initial Public Offering, Whether or Not the Offering was Registered with the SEC.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,; Rule 10b-5. Probably the most well known of the
Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Securities Act, this Section makes it unlawful for anyone to
employ any devised scheme or artifice to defraud, or to make any untrue statement of mate-
rial fact, or to omit to state a material fact necessary, or to engage in any act, practice or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Rule 15(c)(1-2) and c 1-3. These are general anti-fraud provisions applicable to broker/deal-
ers who are involved in interstate, over-the-counter securities transactions. Another liability
provision of the Securities Exchange Act is § 16, which is known as the insider trading
liability provision. This is designed to prevent corporate insiders from using inside informa-
tion to realize profits on the short term purchase and sale of their corporations securities.
Rule 10 b-5 is also applicable in this area.
15. 6 Geo. 4, c. 91.
16. L. Loss, supra note 10, at 2-3.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 3.
19. The corruption and bungling in both the public as well as private sectors was noto-
rious. A prime example was the cooperation of President Grant's Treasury Department with
Jay Gould and John Fisk, enabling them to manipulate the government selling of bullion.
Literally cornering the gold market for a short period of time in 1869, the two men forced
anyone needing gold to deal with them, causing a panic in the money market. They person-
ally profited very highly and when caught, little was done by the administration to punish
the two; A. WEINSTEIN & R.J. WILSON, FREEDOM AND CRISIS, AN AMERICAN HISTORY 472
(1978).
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ulations, but these were limited because of the individual state's sover-
eignty."0 The federal courts had addressed the issue upholding state regu-
lations on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment and regulatory power
under the Commerce Clause.2
With the passage of the 1933 Act, the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) was created along with a subsequent barrage of federal regula-
tion. From 1933 to 1940, no less than six complicated far-reaching stat-
utes were passed; the seventh and most recent being the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970, The various Acts have been modified
through the years, with much of the most recent changes being made in
the area of international regulations.
The SEC role in maintaining the securities market is complex and
broad. It is an independent agency consisting of five members by presi-
dential appointment, possessing executive as well as quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial powers. It oversees the application, modification and en-
forcement of the complex system of securities regulations. Additionally, it
supervises the Self-Regulatory Agencies (SRO's) including the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), and the various stock
exchanges.
A. Securities Act of 1933
The objectives of the Securities Act (SA) of 1933 are two; to insure
full disclosure of information about the security to potential investors,
and the prevention of fraud and misrepresentation in the inter-state sale
of securities through its liability provisions.2" If a business entity is plan-
ning to raise capital through an offering of equity securities to the public,
it must register with the SEC unless an exemption is found.23 The regis-
20. Kansas was the first state to develop a strong securities control statute. It was
passed in 1911, and is felt to be the first to coin the phrase "Blue Sky", Mulvey, Blue Sky
Law, 36 CAN. L.T. 37 (1916). The regulation of securities is now in every state, the District
of Columbia and Puerto Rico, forcing issuers to not only comply with the federal securities
laws, but the various state regulations as well.
21. The Commerce Clause, U. S. CONST., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3, grants Congress the power
to "regulated commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian tribes". Using the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1 and the Commerce Clause, the fed-
eral courts in cases involving securities transactions, applied the securities provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act; 49 U.S.C. § 1131. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TIONS 26 (1988).
22. Securities Act, § 11, Issuer liability for misrepresentation or omission in the regis-
tration statement; § 12, Issuer or underwriter liability for the improper offer to a potential
purchaser in the pre-filing period, including liability whether or not the securities were reg-
istered; § 17, Fraud liability provisions under the 1933 Act.
23. Securities Act; exemptions include:
A. Private offerings under Regulation D;
1. Rule 504 for small companies and exempting the offer and sale of up to
$500,000 in twelve months.
2. Rule 505 exempts offers and sales of issuers other than investment compa-
nies of securities in an amount not excluding $5 million during a twelve month
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tration process is a long and expensive procedure with numerous forms
and difficult regulations to be complied with. The forms for the Initial
Public Offering (IPO) vary somewhat depending on the size of the offer-
ing and related business, but all are lengthy and complicated. It is due in
part to these complex and expensive requirements that many foreign cor-
porations do not attempt registration in the United States. The SEC has
responded to this problem by modifying the amount of information re-
quired from foreign issuers2 4 but many firms, both here and abroad feel
more leniency is required.2 5
In March of 1985, the SEC sought comments from the United States,
United Kingdom and Canada as to the best way to coordinate registration
procedures. The two approaches suggested were the "reciprocal prospec-
tus approach" in which a prospectus in one country would be accepted in
another country; and the "common prospectus approach" which would
set uniform standards acceptable to all countries. The United Kingdom
preferred the reciprocal approach, but recognized that a difference in re-
quirements may be difficult to reconcile, especially in terms of accounting
principals and financial statements needed. The Canadian reaction was
that a common prospectus would be more easily accomplished between
the United States and Canada than between the United Kingdom and
either the United States or Canada. The United States' response was in
favor of the common prospectus. As can be seen, resolution of the differ-
ences in international securities markets will be long in coming.2 How-
ever, a pilot effort allowing the use of the reciprocal prospectus between
the United States, United Kingdom and Canada is underway, but will
probably initially be limited to investment-grade debt, because those se-
curities trade primarily on yield and rating, therefore accounting and au-
diting requirement differences between the countries should not present a
major problem2 7
period.
3. Rule 506 is available to all issuers under certain limitations and any
amount of securities, with no limit on the number of accredited investor
purchasers.
B. Private offerings under § 4(2) and § 4(6).
C. Broker exemption, § 4(4).
D. Intrastate exemption § 3(a)(11), Rule 147.
E. Sale of a business or business merger, Rule 145.
F. Resale of privately offered (restricted) securities, Rule 144.
24. Thomas, Increased Access to the United States Cap. Markets: A Brief Look at the
SEC's New Integrated Disclosure Rules for Foreign Issuers, 1985 J. COMP. Bus. CAP. MAR-
KET L. 5.
25. H. BLOOMENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION §
503(2), 5-16, Release No. 4-2/87.
26. J. Brooks, The Emerging Asia Dollar Market 44-54. Presentation at the Thirteenth
Annual Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 1986).
27. C. Cox, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, The Securities and
Exchange Commission's Experience in International Capital Markets, Remarks to the
Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, Zurich, Switzerland (Aug. 1987).
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B. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Securities Exchange Act (SEA) regulates the trading of securi-
ties in the market, subsequent to their initial distribution. Its purpose is
to protect interstate commerce and national credit, and to insure a fair
and honest market for the trading of securities. The SEA has three main
themes; the regulation of the exchange of the over-the-counter market"
the prevention of fraud and market manipulation; 9 and control of securi-
ties credit by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as
part of its authority over the nation's credit.30
Companies whose stocks are listed on a National Exchange, or have
assets of $5 million or more, and a cost of equity securities held by 500 or
more persons must register its equity securities under § 12 of the SEA.
This includes foreign issuers. Subsequently, all registered companies are
required to make periodic reports to the SEC to be in compliance with
the Act.
C. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939
This Act controls distribution of debt securities. With the exception
of a few well-monitored companies, mostly Canadian, foreign issuers are
not allowed to register under this Act.
A trust indenture is commonly used when a corporation floats bonds.
The trust indenture document contains the obligations of the trustee, and
rights of the beneficiaries of the trust. The Trust Indenture Act was
designed to protect investors in large debt securities by creating certain
provisions the trustee must comply with, and eliminating the ability to
use certain exculpatory clauses. The trustee ordinarily has to be indepen-
dent of the corporation issuing the bonds.
D. The Investment Advisor's Act and the Investment Company Act of
1940
Both the United States and foreign investment advisors are required
to register under the Investment Advisor's Act. The same information is
required of foreign advisors, as of their domestic counterparts. The Com-
mission also requires that foreign investment advisors appoint the SEC as
agent in case a complaint is filed.Under the Investment Company Act,
registration of all non-exempt investment companies is compelled. Sec-
tion 7(d) of the Act disallows registration, selling or delivering of securi-
ties of foreign investment companies, through the mails or interstate
28. L. Loss, supra note 10, at 40. The major theme of the 34 Act is self regulation
under the general supervision of the SEC. There are four types of self regulatory organiza-
tions: the National Securities Exchanges, the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc., "N.A.S.D." registered clearing agencies, and the Municipal Securities Rule making
Board.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 39.
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commerce unless the Commission finds, by order, "it is both legally and
practically feasible to enforce the provisions of the Act against the com-
pany" . 1 Canadian companies have usually been found to meet the stan-
dards, but it is very difficult for other foreign companies to be approved.3 '
The Commission is considering alternative means to allow these compa-
nies to register and sell their securities in the United States markets."'
III. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES
LAWS
With the increasing growth of international capital markets, come
the complex problems of comity and conflicting application of each sover-
eigns laws in case of non-compliance with regulations. Under certain con-
ditions, securities sold in the United States may be exempt from registra-
tion under the Securities Act of 1933, but the Anti-Fraud Provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 may apply. 4 This raises the compli-
cated matter of jurisdiction. Both subject matter and in personam juris-
diction over defendants must be had before the United States can apply
its securities laws.
A. Jurisdiction
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
International law recognizes five bases to achieve subject matter ju-
risdiction. Under the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations law of
the United States subject matter jurisdiction may be had under the na-
tionality principle in which a nation has jurisdiction over the conduct of
its citizens, whether the conductplays inside national borders or not; Sec-
tion 10.
It can also be had under the passive personality principle, which per-
mits a sovereign to exercise jurisdiction over conduct and activity injuring
its citizens, no matter where the act occurred. It is related usually to
criminal matters and is not recognized in the United States; Section 30.
Under the protective principle, if the extra-territorial activity threatens
national security or governmental operations, the government can pro-
mulgate laws granting itself jurisdiction to govern that activity; Section
33. The universal principle grants jurisdiction if a person commits an act,
and the state has custody of that person; Section 34.
Sovereigns have jurisdiction to punish crimes committed within its
territory, regardless of the nationality of the actor, under the territorial
principle; this is further divided into the objective territorial principle
and the subjective territorial principle; Section 10.
31. D. Goelzer & K. McGrath, The SEC Speaks in 1987, II Practicing Law Institute
591-92.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 14
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Under the objective principle, as defined in Section 18 of the Re-
statement, jurisdiction is allowed a state to formulate a rule of law re-
garding conduct that occurs outside its territory but which has an effect
within its territory if the effect within the territory is substantial, the con-
duct occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the
territory, the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice gener-
ally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems,
and the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies.
The objective principle is known as "the effects" doctrine, and cases
have distinguished between jurisdiction based on conduct and effect, as
compared to effect alone in determining jurisdiction; Schoenbaum v. First
Brook.35 This case was the first case to consider jurisdiction based on ef-
fects alone; and established that jurisdiction could be had under these
circumstances. This case involved domestic activity; however, the ques-
tion remained as to whether jurisdiction could attach absent domestic
conduct. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 6 addressed the issue and up-
held jurisdiction over a foreign accountant who had certified financial
statements used in an offering in the United States. As required by the
Restatement, the effects must be substantial, direct and foreseeable.
The subjective territorial principle is based on the conduct of the ac-
tor. The Restatement grants that nation jurisdiction over acts which oc-
cur within its boundaries, even if the effects of such conduct are felt only
outside the nation's territory. Under HT v. Vencap, Ltd., 7 the court de-
termined jurisdiction exists if the facts showed the United States had
been used as perpetuation for the fraudulent acts themselves. This distin-
guishes perpetuation of the act, as opposed to preparation to commit the
acts. Mere preparation may limit the SEC's power to sue.3"
According to case law, subject matter jurisdiction is determined by
four variables; the nationality or residence of the plaintiff, the nationality
or residence of the defendant, the country in which the fraudulent activ-
ity occurred, and the country in which the fraudulent conduct was
manifested."9
The court in Bersch distinguished United States residents, United
States citizens residing abroad and foreigners; or persons who were
neither United States Citizens nor United States residents. It determined
that there could not be jurisdiction for foreign plaintiffs in cases "where
35. Schoenbaum v. First Brook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), revised on re-hearing on
other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) cert. den. 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
36. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
37. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
38. Loomis, The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Financial Institutions
Outside the U.S. and Extra-Territorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, J. CoMP.
L. & SEC. REG. 1, n. 47 (1975).
39. Morgenstern, Extra-Territorial Application of the United States' Securities Laws:
A Matrix Analysis, 7 HASTINGS INT'L CoMP. L.R. 4 (1983).
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the United States' activities are merely preparatory to take the form of
culpable non-feasance and are relatively small in comparison to those
abroad".4 Therefore, under Bersch, an American resident plaintiff needs
to establish only minimum statutory requirements while a non-resident
American asking the protection of the United States securities laws is re-
quired to show materially important conduct occurring within United
States which significantly contributed to the foreign fraud.41
In later cases, the courts have granted jurisdiction over activities it
determined to be preparatory. In Zoelsh v. Arthur Anderson & Co.4" ac-
countants from the United States made representation to a foreign audi-
tor which were determined to be preparatory to a foreign offering made
by a foreigner.4 s In looking to the substantial conduct of a defendant
(brokerage firm) in the United States, the court in Psimenos v. E.F. Hut-
ton & Co."" upheld subject matter jurisdiction where the United States
was used as a based for fraudulent sales of United States commodity con-
tracts to foreign investors.4 In both objective and subjective jurisdiction,
the main factor of the courts appeared to consider its the degree of im-
pact on the United States interests and investors.
2. Personal Jurisdiction
In personam jurisdiction is fundamental to our legal process. One ac-
cused must have notice and opportunity for hearing. In order to achieve
this basic due process, personal jurisdiction over the defendant is neces-
sary. Section 27 of the Exchange Act provides for service of process
"where ever the defendant may be found". In Lesco Data Processing
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,46 the court interpreted section 27 as ex-
tending personal jurisdiction to the fullest reach permitted by the due
process clause.47
Sections 35, 36 and 37 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws sets forth the boundaries of due process in case of a defendant ab-
sent at the time of service of process. Section 35 permits jurisdiction over
persons doing business in a state; section 36 confers jurisdiction over per-
sons committing an act in the state; and section 37 permits jurisdiction
over persons causing effects in a state by accident elsewhere. Sections 47,
49 and 50, applies these principles to corporations allowing the court
broad discretion in obtaining personal jurisdiction.48
40. Loomis, supra note 38, at 9.
41. Morgenstern, supra note 39, at 22.
42. Zoelsh v. Arthur Anderson & Co., F.2d Law Rptr. (CCH) para. 93, 317 (D.C. Cir.
No. 86-5351, July 17, 1987).
43. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 16.
44. Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983)
45. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 16.
46. Lesco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
47. G. Loomis, supra note 38, at 14.
48. Id.
1988
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
In April, 1985, the SEC, through SEC release 34-21958, sought com-
ments from individuals and firms involved in the securities and capital
markets on the internationalization of investments.49 The comments were
solicited in response to what the Commission termed the "accelerating
movement towards global trading markets for certain securities and in-
creasing flow towards national borders ... "
The various categories for comment included the relationship be-
tween securities trading in different countries; quotations for internation-
ally traded securities; 24-hour trading, and linkages between different na-
tional markets; processing securities transactions; and international
enforcement matters and related issues.5 '
The responses to the release came from six countries including Ja-
pan, Canada, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, the United States and
Australia. The comments were wide-ranging and varied, but generally
took a conservative stand regarding the extension of securities laws in the
international markets. The commentators felt that the majority of trad-
ing was usually done by in-house market professionals, therefore, the pri-
vate individual investor was not critically affected at this point, reducing
the need for regulation. While cautioning that international markets
should be allowed to develop on their own, the respondents did indicate
that facilitation of international, inter market trading linkages and inter-
national clearance and settlement facilities should be addressed by the
Commission. 5' They also suggested that the Commission might assume a
negotiator's role in encouraging minimum standards for automated clear-
ance and settlement systems among the active trading markets.53
Regarding trading in the 24-hour markets, Japan responded by say-
ing that because of time zone differences, it saw no possibility of simulta-
neous trading by establishing market linkages between Japan and mar-
kets in New York and London. However, in October of 1985, the Chicago
Board of Trade (SBT) and the London International Financial Futures
Exchange signed a memorandum of intent to develop a yen futures con-
tract based on a Japanese government yen bond. By allowing dealers to
trade yen bonds in Chicago, London and Japan, trades can be done 24
hours a day.5 Generally, there is support for around-the-clock trading
among the international securities and investment markets. 55
49. J. Brooks, The Emerging Asia Dollar Market 56. Presentation at the Thirteenth
Annual Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego, California (Jan. 1986).
50. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 83, 759, (Apr. 24, 1985).
51. Brooks, supra note 49, at 56.
52. Goelzer & McGrath, supra note 31, at 576-77.
53. Id.
54. Brooks, supra note 49, at 56-57.
55. Twenty-four hour markets are well-developed for trading foreign currencies and
U.S. Treasury Securities, and are developing in the Eurobond market. However, the equity
markets are still lagging far behind. Cox, supra note 27, at 7.
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A. International Linkages
Market linkages between international exchanges to facilitate trading
are being developed, with five currently operational. The first linkage es-
tablished was the Boston Stock Exchange-Montreal Stock Exchange
(BSE-ME) linkage. This allows for ME specialists to send orders for exe-
cution by BSE specialists and that small number of Canadian issues
listed in the United States, and all of the United States securities listed
on the inter market trading system." It is contemplated in the future
that the BSE and ME will jointly execute orders from the United States
broker-dealers in Canadian national issues directly on the ME's auto-
mated small order execution system terminals (MORRE) placed in their
order rooms. This phase has not been approved by the Commission."
The American-Toronto Stock Exchange linkage (AMEX-TSE) cur-
rently only executes marketable limit orders of up to 1,000 shares at the
best available "on the receiving exchange". This was the first linkage es-
tablished between a primary market in the United States and a primary
market in a foreign jurisdiction. Trading is done by each exchange is
playing on its trading floor the quotes given by the other exchange in the
seven duly listed stocks. It is anticipated the linkage will be expanded to
include all issues. Orders are executed through the automated trading
systems located on each floor."
The Mid-West-Toronto Stock Exchange (MSE-TSE) linkage, estab-
lished in March of 1986, operates in similar manners as the AMEX-TSE
linkage with the exception of different stocks being listed.5
The International Stock Exchange-National Association of Securities
Dealers (ISE-NASD) operates as a quotation exchange arrangement for
approximately 300 securities listed on the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) quoted on the ISE,
with a reciprocal 300 securities listed on the ISE quoted on the NASDAQ.
The system has been in operation since April of 1986.0
The American-European Options Exchange (AMEX-EOE) link open
in August of 1987. It is the licensing agreement, approved by the SEC,
permitting EOE to trade options on the major market index (XMI) that
are fungible with the XMI contracts traded on the AMEX. The Dutch
security and banking laws are very protective of the identity of account
holders, however, in order to obtain SEC approval, the EOE now requires
a waiver of the Dutch secrecy laws, allowing customer identification for
surveillance purposes."'
56. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 3. The intermarket trading system is the formal
securities trading which occurs between the markets.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 4.
61. Id. at 4, 5. Other linkages currently being considered are:
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The various linkages have resulted in dramatic increases in the
United States trading of foreign securities; which has forced the SEC to
consider questions of adequacy and need of the United States securities
laws to deal with a developing foreign markets.
B. The Securities and Exchange Commission and International
Markets
The SEC has recognized that accommodations for foreign issuers are
necessary if the United States is to maintain its standing in the world
securities markets. The aforementioned reciprocal prospectus agreement
between the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States is one way
in which the SEC is accommodating foreign issuers.
The SEC is also considering a territorial boundary, rather than a na-
tional boundary standard for enforcement of securities regulations. Under
the application of the national boundary standard, registration require-
ments were applicable to any issuer who sold securities to any United
States' citizen no matter their location. Under a "territorial approach",
the registration requirements would be applicable to anyone who sold se-
curities within the United States' territorial boundaries, no matter the
nationality of the purchaser.6"
The regulation of tender offers for companies which have United
States investors is another concern of the SEC.6 s
The Commission realizes that potential problems in trying to maxi-
mize access to foreign markets for domestic investors, yet protect them,
while at the same time not placing domestic issuers at a disadvantage."
Put quite simply, according to Commissioner Charles Cox in his ad-
dress to the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, in 1987, the Com-
a. International Futures Exchange (Bermuda) Limited-Pacific Stock Exchange (IN-
TEX-PSE); allowing for futures and options from financial news composite index to be
traded simultaneously on the INTEX and PSE.
b. Futures NYSE-Amsterdam Stock Exchange (NYSE-ASE); with the ASE agreeing to
trade United States' securities according to United States Securities Regulations data.
c. New York-London Stock Exchange (NYSE-LSE), would involve a joint venture in
securities trading and reporting of trade data.
d. Ruters-Quadrex Securities Corporation Joint Venture. Ruters, a fully owned subsidi-
ary of Insta-Net, has been granted exclusive rights to represent Insta-Net outside the
United States.
e. AMEX-Quadrex Securities Joint Venture, Quadrex is a London-Based private corpo-
ration part. This joint venture if allowed by the SEC would permit private placement in the
United States by foreign issuers, with resales limited to institutional investors. Companies
involved would be allowed to by-pass the disclosure requirements of the U.S. Securities Reg-
ulations, and the facility would provide quotations and a settlement mechanism.
f. NASD-Singapore Stock Exchange-ISE. This would provide a 24-hour quotations
system.
62. Cox, supra note 27, at 4.
63. Id. at 4-5.
64. Id. at 6.
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mission sees its task as ".... merely coordinate, develop, survey and police
the world securities market".6
5
V. BARRIERS TO INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS
The promotion of the free flow of trade through internationalization
of the capital market stands to benefit the world society as a whole. Re-
sulting in a shifting of the concentration of wealth between nations.
For the investor, the broader market allows for greater portfolio di-
versity, decreasing investment risk. This diversity also allows for max-
imization of returns on the investment through the mixing of holdings.
For a corporation, it broadens its ownership base, thus allowing for
greater capital stability. Tax incentives may be available, interest rates
may be lower for borrowers, and foreign issuers generate foreign curren-
cies to be used in local operations.6 Other overall advantages include
technology and information exchanges.
However, there are a number of barriers hindering the international-
ization and free flow of the capital markets. Some, such as language, are
relatively easy to deal with. Others are more complex. Protectionist im-
pediments take various forms and are applied to both directly and indi-
rectly. Foreign investment is restricted in certain types of industry, such
as natural resources, and the communications field. Investment in that in
which is deemed to affect national security will be prohibited in almost
every country. Foreign taxes may be applied to dividend and interest pay-
ments, and admission to stock exchanges can be limited by regulations.
Compliance with each individual country's securities requirements
can pose a more formidable obstacle. Foreign issuers wanting to enter the
United States' market must comply with the SA (1933) and the SEA
(1934) as well as any of the legislative regulations determined to be appli-
cable. This can prove to be a major disincentive for foreign issuers due to
the high cost, plus the conflicting requirements between what is de-
manded under their own country laws as compared to demands under the
United States' laws. A specific problem area is the accounting information
and the auditing procedures of financial statements.67
In October of 1982, the SEC promulgated an integrated disclosure
system for foreign issuers; form 20-F. Under this system, an issuer want-
ing to put forth a new issue already would have a form 20-F on file. Pur-
suant to the requirements of the 1934 SEA, that issuer can incorporate by
reference, information previously disclosed on the form 20-F.68 This sys-
tem is structured around the foreign registration documents; F-1, F-2 and
F-3. These correlate with the requirements under forms S-1, S-2, and S-3
65. Id. at 10.
66. Merlowe, Internationalization of Securities Markets: A Critical Survey of U.S.
and EEC Disclosure Requirements, 8 J. COMP. Bus. CAP. MARKET L. 252 (1986).
67. Securities Act, § 7, Schedule B.
68. Thomas, supra note 24, at 3.
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for domestic issuers. Factors determining which form to use include the
type of offering, the reporting history, the amount of assets of the issuer,
and the amount of voting stock held by non-affiliates.6 Reaction to this
system has ranged from viewing it as a small step in promoting world-
wide markets;70 to being much too permissive and adaptable.
7 1
VI. INVESTIGATION AND DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES CASES
This area of internationalization of securities is ripe for additional
directives and information sharing. Protectionist laws can thwart even the
most carefully conducted investigation. In particular, laws protecting the
confidentiality of information given banks, blocking statutes used by for-
eign governments to prohibit or control distribution of information, and
secrecy laws establishing rights individuals may use to compel others to
keep certain information secret create barriers in gathering information.
The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (1965) provides assistance in this area, and has given criteria for
consideration when apparent conflict arises between two nation states as
to discovery under foreign law. When there is concurrent jurisdiction, the
existence of a foreign law which presents a conflict does not necessarily
divest one state of jurisdiction. Each state is to consider the vital national
interests of each of the nations; the extent and nature of the hardship
inconsistent enforcement actions from the different nations would impose
on the parties; the degree and extent of the necessary conduct to take
place in the territory of the nation; the nationality of the party; and the
extent to which action by either state is expected to achieve compliance
with the regulations as set forth by that particular state. Restatement
(Second) Foreign Relations Law § 40.
Through bilateral mutual assistance agreements," memoranda of un-
derstanding (MOU) and agreements with foreign governments, the Com-
mission has approved its ability to gain information from foreign sources.
To date, three MOU's have been signed; the first in Switzerland in 1982.71
Agreements with the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Indus-
try, and most recently with the Japanese Ministry of Finance are also in
existence. These agreements allow each of the government's mechanisms
by which information related to the market surveillance and enforcement
of their securities laws may be gained. If the offense is criminal in nature,
the United States can use treaties it has with various countries to obtain
the needed cooperation and information. Treaties are in effect in Switzer-
land, the Netherlands, Turkey, Italy, Canada, and the United Kingdom".7
69. Id.
70. Merlowe, supra note 66, at 275, n. 69.
71. Id. at 275, n. 70.
72. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 42.
73. Cox, supra note 27, at 10.
74. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 55-57.
VOL. 16:2,3
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS
The Swiss agreement is unique in that it mandates a provisional ar-
rangement to provide the SEC with information based on a private agree-
ment between members of the Swiss Bankers Association."5 The Agree-
ment permits bank disclosure of information under certain circumstances,
and grants an exception that such disclosure violates Swiss banking se-
crecy laws.7"
Many of the recent cases involving foreign law and potential conflict
of laws have revolved around insider trading, including SEC v. Dennis
Levine, et al., 86 CV 3726 (ro) (S.D.N.Y. 1986). In this case, the SEC
alleged Levine had made millions in profit over a period of approximately
six years by trading on material non-public information regarding tender
offers, mergers, leveraged by-outs and other business-related information.
During the investigation, the Commission was able to obtain information
by working with the attorney general of the Bahamas in Bank LEU Inter-
national (BLI) a Bahamian financial institution through which the SEC
alleged Levine placed orders relating to these transactions. The orders
were placed in either the name of two Panamanian corporations or by
using code.
After being assured by the Bahamian attorney general that criminal
charges would not ensue, BLI turned over the needed documents to the
Commission, greatly assisting in their investigation.
Another agreement which facilitates investigation of securities trans-
actions is the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad. 7
This is a multi-lateral treaty which provides a means for the taking of
evidence in countries other than the one desiring to obtain the evidence.7 8
Even though using the treaty is costly and time consuming, the Commis-
sion has resorted to it on occasion to obtain the needed information; most
notably, SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of
and Call Options for the Common Stock of Santa Fe International Cor-
poration, 81 CV 6553 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); (the "Santa Fe" case) and SEC v.
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, et al., 81 CV 1836 (MP. S.D.N.Y. 1981)
also known as the "St. Joe" case.79 However, because of the cost and time
involved in using the Hague treaty, the Commission prefers to support
and use the bilateral and multi-lateral assistance agreements."0
To further assist in case investigation discovery, the Commission has
required foreign and domestic market places through market linkages to
develop surveillance and information sharing agreements. Known as Self-
Regulatory Organizations (SRO) they are expect to assure the integrity of
trading through linkages they have developed with minimal SEC
75. Id. at 50.
76. Goelzer & McGrath, supra note 31, at 597.
77. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 58.
78. Goelzer & McGrath, supra note 31, at 601.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 603.
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supervision."1
VII. THE GLOBAL MARKET AND 24-HOUR TRADING
A one-world securities market is no longer fantasy; it's reality. Due to
advances in communications technology and travel, barriers that were so
formidable 50 years ago have been dissolved. A recent article by Professor
Peter F. Drucker"2 focussed on the changed world economy, and argued
that the "world's economy is not changing, but has changed". 83 One of
the fundamental reasons, according to Professor Drucker, is that move-
ments of capital, rather than trade, have become the driving force behind
the world's economy; that while the connection between the two has not
been totally severed, it has been loose, creating instability in the econ-
omy.8 He further refers to the world economy as being in control, rather
than the separate nation-states, individually. 85 Nothing more clearly em-
phasizes this point than the present state of the securities and investment
markets.
In soliciting comments about international trading in secondary mar-
kets from those who deal in the securities and capital markets, the SEC,
through release number 34-21958,11 in April of 1985, found general agree-
ment among respondents that transnational trading will continue to in-
crease.8 7 However, there was disagreement as to the future structure of
those markets and the role the SEC should play. Some felt trading
around-the-clock would occur through a network of inter-connected ex-
changes, while others commented that 24-hour trading would be more
likely through in-house trades by U.S. based and large foreign securities
firms.8 They also generally supported increased dissemination of quota-
tion and information as well as development of inter-market linkages.
The commentators considered these developments to be appropriate ar-
eas for Commission involvement, but cautioned generally that the mar-
kets should be allowed to develop on their own.89 Because most rating is
done by market professionals and international investors, the need for
increased commission surveillance and regulation is decreased. The re-
spondents did suggest that the SEC should play an active role in encour-
aging agreements between active trading markets in setting minimum cri-
teria for an automated clearance and settlement system.9
As with any uncharted territory in which changes are occurring rap-
81. Id. at 605.
82. Drucker, The Changed World Economy, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 768-91 (Spring, 1986).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Fed. Sec. L. Rep., supra note 50.
87. Goelzer & McGrath, supra note 31, at 602.
88. Id. at 576.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 577.
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idly an numbers of participants are increasing, it is difficult for those
charged with overseeing compliance to maintain pace with the changes.
Part of what makes this so complex and difficult is the broad spacial area
in which the transactions occur. The body of law encompassing securities
regulation in the United States was written for defined number of players
with a commonality of geographical space and legal understanding. In ap-
plying those laws to international transactions, consideration must be
given to differing standards of regulation; i.e., only recently has Switzer-
land made insider trading illegal; as well as different legal systems. The
European system of civil law can differ significantly in is application and
procedure as compared to the common law systems of the United States,
Great Britain and Canada.
The overriding concern of the Commission is the balance needed to
facilitate and encourage the growth of the international economic markets
while protecting the United States' investor. Of particular concern is the
after-hours, over-the-counter (OTC) trade reporting, and the possible gap
in information to the investor. However, most market respondents to the
SEC's survey indicated that investors prefer to trade during regular busi-
ness hours 1 , so far creating less of a problem than anticipated.
Another consideration is the increase in the volatility of the markets
due to the ability, through communication advances to respond more rap-
idly. A prime example of this was the "Black Monday Wall Street Crash"
which occurred in October of 1987. This event emphasized the inter-de-
pendence of the world's financial markets like no other. It created violent
swings in stock prices as a daily occurrence on a world-wide scale. These
swings were reflected in the apprehension of the people involved, not only
the professionals in the market, but in the small individual investor plan-
ning to send his children to school on returns from his investment. Of
greater far-reaching concern is the effect this type of reaction has on the
world's economic stability, especially among the underdeveloped nations
struggling to survive. Of some comfort is the knowledge that mechanisms
were in place to allow appropriate responses to ward off a world-wide de-
pression, in comparison to the 1929 crash."2
In considering 24-hour trading, most professionals in the securities
market comment that the Commission is simply recognizing what it has
been incurring for quite sometime." As far as the need and ability of the
SEC to deal with these changes, it is felt that methods to handle these
changes are in place, but the ability on the part of the Commission to do
91. Id.
92. Most notably was federal reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan's move to loosen the
money supply. Inflation could have been the result, but the possibility of a depression
loomed far greater if the national supply of money was not relaxed. The SEC also has the
power to close the National Trading Exchanges if the trading volume becomes too rapid and
too high over a limited period of time.
93. Interview with V. Baruttia, Registered Investment Advisor (October, 1987).
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SO is not.9"
There is an inability of the current laws to properly govern multina-
tional corporations and their foreign subsidiaries, as well as inadequate
and improper supervision of broker dealers who deal in international se-
curities.9' A prime example of a developing problem is the off-shore
fund.9' Off-shore funds are those funds organized under the laws of a for-
eign county, selling its securities exclusively outside of the United States
to non-nationals, then investing in American securities and real estate.9
While no registration is required at this point, cases within the past few
years have pointed at the ability of these funds to severely affect the
United States' markets.9' The Commission has imposed administrative
sanctions on registered broker/dealers and investment advisors because of
misleading information and prospectus disseminated to potential inves-
tors of off-shore funds.9
9
Obtaining jurisdiction over foreign issuers through broker/dealers re-
mains a problem. The American Law Institute (ALI) is considering revi-
sions of the Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law in the area of
obtaining jurisdiction. It is looking to a "reasonableness test" as opposed
to the "conduct-effect test" in determining when the United States' law
will apply. The office of the general counsel to the SEC is opposed to the
adoption of the reasonableness standard as being too vague and uncer-
tain.100 As a result, in May of 1986, the ALI conformed its jurisdictional
standards for its revision to be more in line with the traditional concepts.
Alternatives to the present standards are still being considered by the
Commission.0 1
VIII. CONCLUSION
Internationalization of the securities and capital markets continue to
be both boon and bane. As to affect the advent of 24-hour trading will
have, it is generally felt it is too soon to tell. Because of the advancements
in technology, the markets can do more in less time; and with around-the-
clock markets, there is more time in which to do more, potentially creat-
ing more problems.
As is recognized by the Commission, there is a need for bilateral and
multi-lateral agreements for cooperation between nations in the discovery
process and the exchange of information concerning enforcement of se-
curities laws. In July of 1986, a meeting of the International Organization
94. Interview with G. Scott, Professor of Securities Law, Denver University College of
Law (November 1987).
95. Id.
96. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 25, at § 5.02(3), 5-13, Release No. 4-2/87.
97. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 25, at 5-13.
98. Id. at 5-12.
99. Id. at 5-13.
100. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 35.
101. Goelzer & McGrath, supra note 31, at 605.
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of Securities Commissions (IOSC) took place in Paris, France. Fifty-eight
countries attended, excluding Japan,'0 2 and agreed to a proposal offered
by the then SEC Chairman John Shad to form committees to consider
such issues as the growth of developing nations, securities markets, accel-
eration in clearing and settlement systems, changing and modernizing
prospectus requirements, access of foreign issuers, broker/dealers and in-
vestors to national markets and exchange of information concerning the
enforcement of the securities laws. 03
Subsequent to the meeting, the executive committee of the IOSC
adopted a resolution to provide assistance on a reciprocal basis to obtain
market over-sight and guard against fraudulent transactions, and to spec-
ify contact persons to assure processing of request for assistance from
other members in a timely manner.'0
The difficulty continues to be striking the balance between laws
which are too restrictive in their application and inadequate protection of
the United States' investor. There is no doubt that trans-national trading
in capital markets will continue to increase. The question of the securities
laws' ability to effectively grapple with this increase remains.
Carolyn B. Clawson
102. L. Loss, supra note 10, at 55.
103. Mann & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 72.
104. Id. at 73.
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LEONARD v.B. SUTTON
AWARD PAPER
International Cooperation in Protection of
Atmospheric Ozone: The Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 14, 1987, in Montreal, Canada, 24 countries signed a
landmark Protocol' to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer,2 thereby taking a large step toward solution of the global
environmental problem posed by the depletion of atmospheric ozone. The
importance of this Protocol is two-fold: it serves to reduce the production
of pollutants responsible for atmospheric ozone destruction, and it repre-
sents a milestone in the field of international environmental coopera-
tion-it is the first time the international community has banded to-
gether to eliminate an environmental threat before serious damage has
occured. As such, the Protocol might help set a precedent for solving
other environmental challenges faced by the global community.
By focusing on both these aspects of the Protocol, this article will
attempt to provide a thorough analysis of the ozone problem. After a
summary of the scientific background of the current threat to atmo-
spheric ozone, the article will discuss the Protocol's historical back-
ground, analyze its provisions, and highlight its significance for the field
of international environmental law in general. It is hoped that this discus-
sion will serve to demonstrate just how unique and revolutionary the Pro-
tocol is, as well as emphasize the scope and severity of the problem of
atmospheric ozone depletion.
1. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, re-
printed in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) [hereinafter Protocol].
2. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, March 22, 1985, reprinted
in 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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II. THE PROBLEM OF DEPLETION OF THE OZONE LAYER: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Chemistry of Atmospheric Ozone
Ozone is a relatively unstable variety of oxygen consisting of three
atoms of that element bonded together to form a molecule; its chemical
formula is 03.3 Ozone is constantly being created in the upper atmo-
sphere by the action of sunlight on diatomic oxygen molecules (02), and
is simultaneously destroyed by a number of complex reactions involving
several gaseous elements.' The total concentration and vertical distribu-
tion of atmospheric ozone is determined by the combined effect of these
processes, which may create and remove ozone at different rates and at
different altitudes.' Atmospheric ozone absorbs short-wave ultraviolet so-
lar radiation, preventing most of it from reaching the Earth's surface.'
Ozone also absorbs varying amounts of infrared radiation, and is thus an
important factor in the maintenence of atmospheric temperature.'
Normally, chemical processes in the upper atmosphere produce and
destroy ozone at roughly equal rates, maintaining a balance. In recent
years, however, scientific studies have shown that this balance is no
longer being maintained, and that the ozone layer is suffering a relatively
high rate of depletion.8 More recently, public attention has been focused
on the ozone problem by the discovery of a "hole"' in the ozone layer
over Antarctica, which occurs at certain times of the year and seems to be
growing. This is a manifestation of the unique atmospheric conditions
which prevail in the Antarctic, and of recently observed trends, which
seem to indicate that ozone depletion is occuring more rapidly at higher
latitiudes (above 40 degrees north and south) than near the equator.1"
Scientific studies"' have linked ozone depletion to a number of chem-
ical agents, some of which occur naturally, but all of which are by-prod-
ucts of industry. These include nitrogen oxides (N02), nitrous oxide
3. This discussion of the scientific basis of the ozone problem is derived mainly from
Causes and Effects of Changes in Stratospheric Ozone: Update 1983 [hereinafter Update
1983], prepared by the Environmental Studies Board of the National Research Council, and
published by the National Academy Press in 1984. For more detailed information on scien-
tific aspects of the ozone problem, see the bibliographies in this book and its predecessor,
Causes and Effects of Stratospheric Ozone Reduction: An Update [hereinafter An Update,
as well as, generally, Whitten & Prasad, Ozone in the Free Atmosphere (1985).
4. Update 1983, supra note 3, at 3.
5. Id., at 50-94.
6. See Bruce, Man's Impact on Earth's Atmosphere, in 1 J. TITUS, EFFECTS OF
CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 35, 44 (1986).
7. See Environmental Assessment of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1524 (1987).
8. See An Update, supra note 3, at 2.
9. The famous "hole" observed in the ozone layer over the Antarctic in the 1970's and
'80's is not a true hole, but is rather an area of seasonal 40-50% thinning in the strato-
spheric ozone layer. See Bruce, supra note 6, at 44.
10. Id. at 48.
11. See generally, An Update and Update 1983, supra note 3.
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(N20), methane (CH4), carbon dioxide (C02), and the chlorofluoro-
carbons (abbreviated as CFCs), which are the worst offenders."2 CFCs are
man-made chemicals used primarily in aerosols and in cooling systems,
such as refrigerators and air conditioners. These chemicals are especially
harmful to atmospheric ozone because they are not easily destroyed by
natural processes in the upper atmosphere, and may remain in the strato-
sphere, continually breaking down ozone molecules, for 100 years or
more."s Due to the fact that other agents linked to ozone depletion, such
as carbon dioxide and methane, are less persistent, and are produced by
natual processes in significant quantities," the Montreal Protocol im-
poses controls on chemicals in the CFC family only.15
B. Environmental Effects of Ozone Depletion
Since atmospheric ozone absorbs short-wave ultraviolet radiation
(UV-B radiation),"6 any depletion results in higher levels of these harmful
rays penetrating the atmosphere and reaching the Earth's surface. 7 It ap-
pears that short-wave ultraviolet radiation has a variety of detrimental
effects on animal and plant life, especially on aquatic organisms."8 Studies
show that increased levels of UV-B at the surface may stunt the growth
of certain crop types, and may also inhibit plant reproduction. 9
While a number of studies have attempted to measure the effects of
increased UV-B on animals,20 the majority have focused on humans. UV-
B radiation produces a variety of effects in humans, ranging from suntan
to skin cancer, according to the amount of exposure and sensitivity of the
individual.21 UV-B has been shown to be causally linked to suppression of
12. See Update 1983, supra note 3, at 5.
13. Id., at 96; see also Bruce, supra note 6, at 41.
14. Carbon dioxide is, of course, a by-product of animal respriation as well as product
of industry. Methane is produced by various decomposition processes. For a more complete
discussion of the sources and effects of these and other gases on ozone depletion, see Bruce,
supra note 6, at 41.
15. Annex A to the Montreal Protocol contains a list of chemicals covered by the
treaty's controls, these are divided into two groups: chlorofluorocarbons and halons; these
two classes are lumped together and abbreviated for convenience's sake throughout this pa-
per as CFCs.
16. See Bruce, supra note 6, at 44.
17. Id. For every one percent depletion in atmospheric ozone, there is a corresponding
two percent increase in the amount of UV-B radiation which reaches the earth's surface.
18. The organisms which are affected by increased UV-B radiation are generally those
which live at or near the ocean's surface, and include plankton, fish larvae, and larval
shrimp and crabs. UV-B appears to disrupt the reproductive viability of these creatures,
and may also shorten their lifespans. See Update 1983, supra note 3, at 218; Letter of Sub-
mittal from the Department of State to the President of the Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer, August 22, 1985, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1518 (1987).
19. See Update 1983, supra note 3, 209-215, see generally, Teramura, Overview of Our
Current State of Knowledge of UV Effects on Plants, in J. TITus, EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN
STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE, 65.
20. Update 1983, supra note 3, at 191.
21. See generally, Emmett, Health Effects of Ultraviolet Radiation, J. Trrus, En'EcTs
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the human immune system as well as to various types of skin cancer."'
Since the ozone layer normally prevents a large percentage of UV-B radi-
ation from reaching the Earth's surface, any depletion of atmospheric
ozone leads directly to a higher incidence of skin cancer and immune sys-
tem suppression in humans. While the exact figures are as yet un-
dertermined, it is estimated that for each one percent decrease in the
amount of atmospheric ozone there will be a corresponding increase of
between two and four percent in the incidence of human skin-cancer.' s
III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE To THE OzoNE DEPLETION PROBLEM:
THE ROAD To THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL
The depletion of the stratospheric, ozone layer was first noticed by
scientists in 1974.'1 Over the next few years, as the scientific community
began to realize the potential threat to mankind and the environment
posed by this problem, international attention and concern increased." In
1977, in response to this growing concern, the United Nations Environ-
mental Program (UNEP) convened an International Conference on the
Ozone Layer, and shortly thereafter established a Coordinating Commit-
tee on the Ozone Layer.' This committee, composed of representatives
from a consortium of international, governmental, and non-governmental
organizations, conducted and coordinated research on the depletion of at-
mospheric ozone, published assessments of the problem, and made rec-
ommendations for its solution.' 7 Additionally, in 1980, the Governing
Council of the United Nations convened a working group to discuss possi-
ble international action.2 '
The work of these two groups2' reached its culmination at a confer-
ence in Vienna in March 1985, where twenty-one nations signed the Vi-
enna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. 0 This document,
which the U.S. Senate ratified in 1986," contains no significant substan-
tive provisions regarding reduction of CFCs, but instead sets up a frame-
work for internationally coordinated study of the ozone problem." The
OF CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 129 (1985).
22. Emmet, supra note 21, at 138; An Update, supra note 3, at 241.
23. See BRucE, supra note 6, at 44.
24. Golubev, Global Environmental Change: The UNEP Perspective, in J. TITUS, EF-
FECTS OF CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 22 (1985).
25. Benedick, Global Environmental Change: The International Perspective, J. TITUS,
EFFECTS AND CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 32 (1985).
26. Golubev, supra note 24, at 22.
27. Id.
28. Benedick, supra note 25, at 32.
29. For an overview of the process which led to the Montreal Protocol, see Reports of
the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the Elaboration of a Proto-
col on Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
UNEP Doc. WG.151/L.4, UNEP Doc. WG.167.
30. Vienna Convention, supra note 2.
31. Sen. Treaty Doc. 99-9, ratification deposited Aug. 27, 1986.
32. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, arts. 3, 4.
VOL. 16:2,3
PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER
Vienna Convention also provides for transfer of information regarding the
problem, promotes regular conferences of the parties, and sets up a secre-
tariat to encourage the adoption of measures to prevent further depletion
of the ozone layer."8 In short, the Convention was designed to foster an
atmosphere of international cooperation in order to enable substantive
measures to be developed at a later date, if they were found to be neces-
sary. The Convention's effectiveness in reaching this goal is evidenced by
the relative ease with which the Montreal Protocol was adopted two years
later.
IV. MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE
OZONE LAYER
A. Background
As the above discussion of the genesis of the Vienna Convention indi-
cates, the signatories and sponsors of the treaty recognized the probable
need for a Protocol to impose substantive controls on the production and
consumption of CFCs. In order to assess this need, UNEP arranged for a
summarization of the findings of the Coordinating Committee," and
sponsored two workshops of the Working Group, in May and September,
1986, in order to assess the need for and outline the form of a Protocol.3
Among the findings86 were a number of dire predictions, which indicated
that even if immediate action were taken to freeze CFC production and
consumption levels ozone depletion would continue for at least one hun-
dred years.87 It was apparent that the only way to stabilize the strato-
spheric ozone situation was to mandate deep cuts in global consumption
and production of CFC's. The Montreal Protocol was the international
community's response to this challenge.
B. Analysis of Substantive Provisions
In order to slow and eventually end the process of atmospheric ozone
depletion, the Montreal Protocol imposes a variety of controls on the pro-
duction, consumption, importation, and export of a number of harmful
chemicals, mostly chlorofluorocarbons." The controls are based on 1986
levels of production and consumption of two groups of ozone-depleting
chemicals, 9 as calculated according to a formula in Article 3.40 Parties are
33. Id., arts. 2,5-7.
34. Golubev, supra note 24, at 23.
35. Id.
36. For a report of these findings, see generally Trrus, supra note 6.
37. See generally Hoffman, The Importance of Knowing Sooner, J. Trrus, ed., supra
note 6, at 53.
38. See Annex, supra note 9. The controls apply to two groups of chemicals, CFCs and
halons. Halons are chemically related to CFCs, and are suspected to have even higher ozone-
depleting potential than the more common chlorofluorocarbons.
39. Id.
40. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3. This formula assigns a numerical factor to each con-
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required'" to limit production and consumption of the specified CFCs and
halons to 1986 levels by the beginning of the second six month period
following the entry into force of the Protocol."' Article 2 of the Protocol
limits production and consumption of the controlled chemicals to 80%"'
of 1986 levels for a five-year period beginning on July 1, 1993, and further
imposes a limit of 50%"' of 1986 levels as of July 1, 1998.
Taking into account the special circumstances of several of the par-
ties, Article 2 of the Protocol provides for a number of variations on and
exceptions to the general controls described above. Article 2(6), for exam-
ple, allows the Soviet Union to complete CFC production facilities pro-
vided for in its most recent five year plan, and to have any additional
production from such facilities counted as part of 1986 production and
consumption levels for purposes of the Protocol."5 Article 2(7) allows the
member states of the European Community, once they have all individu-
ally ratified the Protocol, to apportion production and consumption of
the controlled chemicals among the member states in such a way that
consumption or production may exceed the prescribed limits in one or
more states, so long as the Community taken as a whole meets the gen-
eral requirements of Article 2.," A similar provision 7 allows small produc-
ers of CFCs to cooperate to apportion production between themselves,
provided that overall combined production of these states does not ex-
ceed the control levels.
The major exception to the Article 2 controls applies to developing
trolled substance according to its ozone-depleting potential. Using these factors, a party
computes its 1986 production and consumption levels, arriving at a numerical figure. While
the party's consumption and production of the controlled substances may not normally ex-
ceed this figure, the party may, subject to the limitations of the Protocol, substitute larger
amounts of CFCs with a lower rating for smaller amounts of CFCs with a higher rating. A
party's total production of controlled substances may thus conceivably increase under the
Protocol, although this increased production will consist of substances with a lower ozone-
depleting potential.
41. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2(1), 2(2).
42. Id., at art. 16. Article 16 provides that the Protocol shall enter into force on January
1, 1989, so long as at least 11 signatories have ratified it. Otherwise, it becomes effective 90
days after this ratification is accomplished.
43. Id., at art. 2(3). Developed countries are allowed to exceed their 80% production
limits by up to 10% if this excess production is required for the advancement of developing
countries.
44. Id., at art. 2(4). This section provides a 15% overproduction exception at this stage,
under the same conditions described.
45. This concession was apparently necessary to obtain the acceptance of the Protocol
by the Soviet Union and other planned economies, who wished to be allowed to complete
potentially proscribed CFC production facilities in the planning or construction stages. See
[Reference File] INT'L ENVr. REP. (BNA) 531 (Oct. 14, 1987).
46. The Eurpopean Community as a whole is bound by the Protocol, although the indi-
vidual member states must also ratify it. For a discussion of the special circumstances of the
EEC vis-a-vis the Protocol, see 10 INT'L ENVT. REP. 531 (Oct. 14, 1987).
47. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2(5).
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countries,"" as is outlined in the provisions of Article 5. The drafters of
the Protocol recognized" the special requirements of these countries for
CFC use, 0 and Article 5 thus entitles developing countries to delay com-
pliance with the controls of Article 2 by ten years, so long as per capita
consumption of the controlled substances does not exceed 0.3 Kg per
annum.5
1
For ten years following the entry into force of the Protocol develop-
ing countries party to the Protocol will have the opportunity to increase
their production of CFCs and halons in order to enhance economic devel-
opment."' As an additional aid to development, Article 2 also allows de-
veloped nations, covered in full by the controls, to exceed production lim-
its by up to 10%, so long as this excess production is used to "satisfy the
basic domestic needs" of the developing nation parties.
5 3
Apart from direct controls on important sources of ozone depletion,
the Montreal Protocol also attempts indirectly to bring about a global
reduction in production of these harmful substances. It does this by im-
posing import and export restrictions on the parties to the Protocol."
First, all parties are required to ban the import of controlled substances
from non-party states within one year after entry into force of the Proto-
col.5 5 This provision seems intended to curtail production of controlled
substances in non-party countries by eliminating a large percentage of the
export market for these producers. This may indirectly provide an incen-
tive for CFC-producing countries to become a party to the Protocol, in
order to regain a wider market for their products.
Further requirements of Article 4 include a ban on the importation
from non-party nations of products containing CFCs or halons, to come
into effect within 4 years from the entry into force of the Protocol." Arti-
cle 4(4) goes even further, providing for the possibility of a ban on the
import from non-party nations of goods produced with the aid of con-
trolled substances, but not actually containing them.
48. "Developing Country" is never defined for purposes of the Protocol-an omission
which could conceivably cause problems in the future.
49. See Protocol, supra note 1, Preamble.
50. Most developing countries are located in tropical or subtropical regions, and the
"special requirements" mentioned in the Protocol refer to the need for refrigeration equip-
ment in these regions. CFCs are utilized as coolants in refrigerators and air conditioners.
See Golubev, Global Environmental Change: The UNEP Perspective, in J. Trrus, supra
note 6, at 21.
51. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 5(1).
52. Id. at art. 5(1). Unlike developed countries party to the Protocol, the basis for con-
trols in the developing countries will not be 1986 production and consumption levels, but
rather the average level of consumption and production over the three-year period 1995-
1997, or 0.3 Kgs per capita.
53. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2(1)-(4).
54. Id., at art. 4.
55. Id., at art. 4(1).
56. Id., at art. 4(3).
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The Protocol takes a more liberal stance in regard to export of con-
trolled substances and related goods from party states to non-party
states. While developing countries are flatly prohibited. from exporting
controlled substances and related goods to non-party countries, there is
apparently no prohibition whatsoever on such exports when they involve
a developed nation and a non-party. While developed parties are prohib-
ited from granting to non-parties any sort of economic assistance that
might "facilitate the production" of controlled substances," they are nev-
ertheless not prohibited from exporting technology for producing and
utilizing CFCs and halons; they are only discouraged from doing so." In
keeping with the spirit of the Protocol, party states are in no way prohib-
ited or discouraged from exporting" . . . products, equipment, plants or
technology that improve the containment, recovery, recycling, or destruc-
tion of controlled substances, promote the development of alternative
substances, or otherwise contribute to the reduction of the emissions of
controlled substances." 60
Cognizant of the possibility of new developments in scientific knowl-
edge of the relationship between man's activities and the depletion of at-
mospheric ozone, the drafters of the Protocol included several provisions
designed to ensure that the controls contained in the document are coor-
dinated with the latest research developments. The agreement provides
that the parties shall research and exchange information on the ozone
problem,61 provide each other with technical and scientific information to
facilitate the goals of the Protocol,62 and hold regular meetings to discuss
and assess its implementation." Perhaps most importantly, Article 6 pro-
vides for quadrennial meetings of party representatives and scientific ex-
perts to assess the efficacy of the Protocol's controls in the light of cur-
rent information. On the basis of conclusions reached at these meetings,
controls will be adjusted according to the procedure outlined in Articles 2
and 9. These controls are designed to promote flexibility, in the hopes
that the Protocol will not become quickly outdated.
V. THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL'S PLACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW TRADITION
A. Historical Overview of Transfrontier Pollution Law
In order to fully appreciate the Montreal Protocol, it may be helpful
to look at the development of international environmental law, specifi-
cally that area of law dealing with state responsibility for transfrontier
pollution. The unique nature of the Protocol can be fully appreciated
57. Id., at art. 4(2).
58. Id., at art. 4(5).
59. Id., at art. 4(6).
60. Id., at art. 4(7).
61. Id., at art. 9.
62. Id., at art. 10.
63. Id., at art. 11.
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only through contrast with its precursors, without which it could not have
come into existence. It is hoped that a brief overview of transnational
evironmental law will help to put the Protocol in its proper perspective.
International attempts to control transfrontier air and water pollu-
tion are relatively recent phenomena; indeed, they seem to be unique to
the latter half of the Twentieth Century.6 There are, however, a few
early cases which seem to have initiated the trend toward an internation-
ally-accepted, customary body of law in this area: the Trail Smelter case68
and the Corfu Channel Case. 6" The opinion in the latter recognized
"...every state's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be
used contrary to the rights of other states. '6 7 The Trail Smelter case, con-
cerned specifically with an incident of transfrontier air pollution, contains
a more authoritative statement: "No state has the right to use or permit
the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or
to the territory of another or the property or persons therein...,o
For more than two decades, the narrow decisions discussed above
were virtually the only authority available for cases involving trans-
frontier pollution."" With the increasing awareness of environmental con-
cerns that characterized the Sixties and Seventies came the realization
that pollution does not stop at national frontiers, and that any real solu-
tion to the problem could only be reached through international efforts.7 1
Out of this realization came the first multilateral declaration on state re-
sponsibility for transfrontier pollution, the Stockholm Declaration, which
provides:7 1
Principle 21
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their own jurisdic-
tion or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
64. See generally: V. NANDA, WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INSTIUTIONS, (ed. Ved P. Nanda 1983); Hoffman, State Responsibility in Interna-
tional Law and Transboundary Pollution Injuries, 25 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 509 (1976); J.
SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT. TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL Eco-
LOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION, (1979).
65. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
66. Corfu Channel Case (Alb. v. U.K.), [1949] I.C.J. 4.
67. Id. at 22.
68. Trail Smelter, supra note 65, at 1965.
69. See Bankes & Saunders, Acid Rain: Multilateral and Bilateral Approaches to
Transboundary Pollution Under International Law, 33 U. NEW BRUNSWIcK L. REV. 155
(1985).
70. See generally, Bleicher, An Overview of International Environmental Regulation, 2
ECOLOGY L. Q. 1 (1972).
71. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 & Corr. 1 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter
Stockholm Declaration].
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States or of other areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Principle 22
States shall cooperate to develop further the international law regard-
ing liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other
environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction and
control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
It must be noted that the Stockholm Declaration states general principles
only; it has not proved strong enough to be relied upon in most cases."
Commentators have interpreted the above principles to allow imposition
of liability on a state for transboundary pollution only where there has
been a serious injury, and where a direct causal chaim linking the pollu-
tion to the injury can be discerned.7 8 The above Principles are thus of
limited applicability as regards cases of injury caused by transboundary
pollution of an uncertain origin, as with the effects of acid rain.74 This is
especially true where a complex causal chain is involved, as it is where
problems caused by ozone depletion are concerned. Despite its shortfalls,
the Stockholm Declaration nevertheless remains the only widely-accepted
statement of transnational environmental principles, although efforts to
devise a more comprehensive body of substantive law have had some suc-
cess in some specialized areas, notably transnational water pollution.75
While the body of substantive law regarding transnational pollution
is very limited in extent, there has been a rapid expansion of internation-
ally-accepted procedural norms applicable to the field, norms which are
at least tacitly adopted in the Montreal Protocol. Some procedural obliga-
tions owed by one state to another have been included in bilateral and
multilateral treaties so often that they now enjoy the status of customary
norms of international law. For example, it is wen-accepted that a state
has the duty to notify other states of its activities which may have extra-
territorial effects.7 6 This duty was made specifically applicable to cases of
transfrontier pollution in the Athens Resolution of the Institute of Inter-
national Law.77
An extension of the duty to notify is the duty of states to exchange
information. When one state plans a project that may cause harmful ef-
72. Bankes & Saunders, supra note 69, at 163.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., A. ALTSHULLER & G. McBEAN, SEcoND REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES-
CANADA RESEARcH CONSULTATION GROUP ON THE LONG-RANGE TRANSPORT OF AIR POLLU-
TANT, 6-11 (Nov. 1980).
75. See, e.g., Helsinki Rules of the Uses of Waters of International Rivers, Report of
the Fifty-Second Conference of the International Law Association Held at Helsinki,
(1969); Resolution on the Utilization of Non-Maritime International Waters (except for
Navigation), adopted by the Institute of International Law at its session in Salzburg, Sept.
4-13, 1961, reprinted in 49 Annuaire de 1Institut de Droit International Tome II 381; and
Bourne, International Law and Pollution of International Rivers and Lakes, 6 U. BRITISH
COLUMBIA L. REV. 115 (1971).
76. See Bankes & Saunders, supra note 69, at 164.
77. Athens Resolution of the Institute of International Law, art. VII.
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fects in neighboring states, it is not enough just to notify those states of
the project; sufficient information about the project must accompany the
notice to enable the neighbor country to make a valid assessment of the
possible damage.7 8 While the status of this duty as a rule of international
environmental law is only firmly established in the area of water law, re-
cent developments have confirmed that the duty may be extended to
cases involving transfrontier air pollution.79 It has been suggested that
the duty to exchange information also includes the setting up of joint
monitoring and research stations by the affected countries.80 Evidence of
the broad acceptance of these and similar duties can be gleaned from the
fact that they are explicitly included in many recent international treaties
involving transfrontier pollution. 1
International support has been growing for yet another procedural
duty-the duty of a state planning a project with possible extraterritorial
effects to consult and negotiate with other states which might be af-
fected." This duty implies that the state which might be affected by tran-
sfrontier pollution should be allowed to suggest possible alternatives to
the prospective polluter, and negotiate a mutually acceptable solution to
the problem." This duty cannot be said to be an accepted norm of cus-
tomary international law, however. While international lawyers tend to
agree that the duty to consult and negotiate should be a customary norm,
and some support for it can be found in the opinions of the International
Court of Justice," the principle has binding effect only when it is in-
cluded in treaties," such as the Montreal Protocol.
Having examined the substantive and procedural antecedents of the
Montreal Protocol, it may also be helpful to look at two relevant prede-
cessors of that treaty, in order to fully appreciate the Protocol's signifi-
cant innovations. These include the Geneva Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution" (more conveniently known as the ECE
78. UNEP Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guid-
ance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Resources Shared by Two
or More States (1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1097.
79. See OECD Recommendation on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution,
Nov. 14, 1974, reproduced in Ruster & Simma, International Protection of the Environ-
ment, vol. I.
80. Id.
81. See, Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution ("E.C.E. Conven-
tion), Geneva, Nov. 13, 1979, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1442; Vienna Convention, supra note 2;
Montreal Protocol, supra note 1.
82. See Bourne, Procedure in the Development of International Drainage Basins: the
Duty to Consult and Negotiate (1972), 10 CANADIAN YEARBOOK INT'L L. 212.
83. See OECD Recommendation, supra note 79; Athens Resolution supra note 77.
84. Bankes & Saunders, supra note 69, at 168.
85. It should be noted that neither the Vienna Convention nor the Montreal Protocol
recognize this duty to negotiate, although consultation between the parties is required. This
is no doubt due to the fact that these documents are meant to prevent problems associated
with ozone depletion, not remedy them after they have occured.
86. E.C.E. Convention, supra, note 81.
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Convention) and the previously mentioned Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer.8 7 Both of these treaties are multilateral
efforts to come to grips with transboundary pollution of the atmosphere,
and both are almost exclusively procedural in nature. The ECE Conven-
tion is primarily concerned with the study and exchange of information
about acid rain and other transnational effects of air pollution.8 Its only
substantive provision is a vague exhortation that the parties "gradually
reduce and prevent air pollution including long-range transboundary air
pollution."8 9 Similarly, the Vienna Convention requires only that the par-
ties promise to cooperate in the exchange of information and research on
the ozone problem, and "Promote. . .the harmonization of appropriate
policies, strategies and measures for minimizing the release of substances
causing or likely to cause modification of the ozone layer. . ."9 These two
treaties, while admirable efforts to increase international awareness and
knowledge about the serious problem of transnational pollution, are un-
like the Montreal Protocol in that they have little or no effect on the
solution of the problem itself.
B. Significance of the Montreal Protocol
The text of the Montreal Protocol, upon close examination, can be
seen to incorporate virtually all of the law concerning transboundary pol-
lution, both procedural and substantive, which has attained customary
status over the past few decades, and also adopts major porvisions of the
treaties mentioned above. The Protocol is written in the spirit of the
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas;"'1 that is, a state may use its
own property freely only so long as such use does not cause harm to other
states or their citizens. The depletion of the atmospheric ozone layer
harms the citizens of all countries; therefore producers of harmful sub-
stances such as CFCs and halons are obligated to alleviate the threat to
human health posed by their activities. The Protocol's provisions thus
follow the lead of earlier treaties in the field by ensuring that parties will
be bound to perform their procedural dutues of information exchange,"2
cooperation, and consultation with one another in order to avert the po-
tential harm of ozone depletion.
Along with the more traditional provisions just listed, the Montreal
Protocol binds the parties to a number of unique requirements. It is these
which make the Protocol a true landmark in international environmental
law. First and foremost, the treaty is unique in that it imposes controls on
87. See Vienna Convention, supra note 2.
88. See Bankes & Saunders, supra note 69, at 171-179 for commentary on the ECE
Convention V(1).
89. E.C.E. Convention, supra note 81, art. 2.
90. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 6(4)(c).
91. See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY (5th Ed.), at 1238 for a complete explication of the
phrase.
92. Montreal Protocol, art. 9.
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polluters before the pollution has caused major damage."3 Prior treaties
have always come into being after the environmental damage had taken
place, and were designed to either repair or alleviate that damage."
While scientific evidence clearly shows substantial stratospheric
ozone depletion in recent years, it has not yet been conclusively shown
that this depletion has caused damage such as increases in the occurence
of human skin cancer.95 The rates of incidence of several kinds of skin
cancer are on the rise, but it is by no means certain that this is due to the
increase in UV-B which accompanies ozone depletion.96 The increases
may have been caused by other factors, such as changes in lifestyle (more
time spent in the sun, for example), or added exposure to other carcino-
gens. 9 7 It will probably be several years before a definate causal link can
be conclusively established between CFC use and increased skin cancer,
and it is likely to take even longer for the effects of ozone depletion to be
readily noticeable, in the way that effects from acid rain are noticeable in
Central Europe or Eastern North America. Nevertheless, it was not im-
possible to obtain the international consensus necessary for the drafting
and acceptance of the Montreal Protocol.
A second aspect of the ozone situation which makes it surprising that
the Protocol ever came into being is the fact that it is almost impossible
to pinpoint the source of chemicals which break down atmospheric
ozone.99 The body of law concerning transboundary pollution grew up in
response primarily to water and air pollution. Since it is relatively easy to
determine the source of these types of pollution, it is correspondingly
easy to apportion blame.99 Once the source is determined, international
pressure may be applied to the perpetrator, often resulting in a negoti-
ated solution to the problem. It is, however, virtually impossible to
pinpoint the sources of the chemicals which cause ozone depletion; CFCs
and halons are used all over the globe, and the worst damage to the strat-
ospheric ozone layer seems to be occuring over the one place on Earth
where we can be almost certain that no CFCs are being pro-
duced-Antarctica. Since there is no definitive way to trace the cause of
ozone depletion to its source, there is no way to apportion blame and
liability for the damage caused by increased UV-B radiation.100 There is
therefore likely to be considerable less pressure on CFC-producing states
to alleviate the problem than, for example, on states which pollute the
93. See Benedick, Global Environmental Change: the International Perspective, in 1
TITUS, EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 31, 32 (1986).
94. See E.C.E. Convention, supra note 81, and Helsinki Rules, supra note 75.
95. Update 1983, supra note 3, at 10, 169.
96. See Update 1983, supra note 3, at 168-191.
97. Id. Cancer rates in general have been rising, and it is difficult to determine whether
the increased incidence of skin cancer is due to ozone depletion or merely part of this over-
all trend.
98. Id., at 15.
99. See Bankes & Saunders, supra note 69, at 163.
100. Id.
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water supply of another nation. This being the case, it seems amazing
that the Montreal Protocol came into existence at all, especially when one
considers the stringent controls contained in its provisions.
The strength and thoroughness of the substantive controls imposed
by the Protocol constitute the third unique aspect of this treaty. As was
described above, the provisions of the Protocol commit the parties to a
50% reduction in production of several substances which are suspected to
be involved in ozone-layer depletion, and impose as well as strict controls
on the import and export of controlled substances and related technolo-
gies between parties and non-parties.'" Such controls are unprecedented
in the field of international environmental law; even treaties drafted in
response to obvious and well-understood transfrontier pollution problems
do not impose on parties controls which are nearly as strict and far-reach-
ing.1 0 2 As noted above, previous treaties were limited primarily to proce-
dural provisions; the Montreal Protocol incorporates these and strong
substantive provisions.
Yet another unique characteristic of the Protocol is its amenability to
revision and amendment. Indeed, the document's procedural provisions
are designed to ensure that its substantive provisions continue to reflect
the latest developments in scientific study of the ozone layer. 0 3 The sci-
entific community is engaged in ongoing research regarding the dynamics
of ozone depletion and its effect on humans and the environment in gen-
eral, and it may be years or decades before definitive conclusions can be
reached. Realizing that the controls imposed in Article 2 were based on
scientific knowledge likely to change,104 the drafters of the Protocol incor-
porated a mechanism allowing Article 2 controls to be altered to reflect
new data on ozone depletion. This mechanism is outlined in Article 6 and
Article 2(10), which provide for periodic review of the adequacy of Proto-
col controls in light of the latest scientific data, in order to ensure that
controls continue to reflect environmental needs.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL
The above discussion serves to establish the unique place the Mon-
treal Protocol holds in the field of international environmental law: it rep-
resents a huge leap forward from previous efforts made to counteract
transboundary pollution. That being the case, the Protocol may well have
a strong influence on further developments in the international environ-
mental field. The Protocol could be looked to as a precedent in the solu-
tion of several other environmental problems of worldwide scope.
One such problem, Global air pollution and its product, acid rain,
comes immediately to mind. Although it tends to be easier to pinpoint
101. See text accompanying notes 38 through 63.
102. See, Vienna Convention, supra note 2; E.C.E. Convention, supra note 81.
103. Montreal Protocol, Preamble.
104. Montreal Protocol, Annex A.
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the source of air pollution than to determine the origin of ozone-depleting
substances, acid rain caused by air pollution also tends to cause its ill
effects at great distances from its source. This makes it difficult to assess
fault and apportion blame, especially in places like Europe, where many
countries produce pollutants in a relatively small area.' Numerous at-
tempts have been made among small groups of countries to solve this and
similar problems, with only a limited amount of success."'0
Nevertheless, it would seem likely that really significant gains such as
those arising from a comprehensive treaty like the Montreal Protocol can-
not be expected from a number of uncoordinated controls on pollutants:
the European Community has made admirable efforts to reduce sulfur
dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions, yet a major source of these compo-
nents of European acid rain is pollution in Eastern Europe, where no con-
trols exist.' Also, regional efforts tend to get bogged down in unrelated
political differences, as is illustrated by the interminable struggle between
Canada and the United States for a workable agreement to alleviate the
North American acid rain problem.108
The fact remains that compared to stratospheric ozone depletion the
mechanics of acid rain damage are relatively well-understood, and this
damage is easily observed by anyone who visits the forests of eastern
North America or Central Europe. It can be hoped, therefore, that global
support can be obtained for a worldwide treaty to control acid rain in the
same way that the Montreal Protocol controls substances which cause the
less obvious damage accompanying ozone depletion.
There are a number of other environmental problems of global con-
cern which might prove amenable to multilateral solutions modelled on
the Montreal Protocol. These include the pressing problem of nuclear
waste disposal, and growing concerns over the pollution of Earth's orbital
space by old satellites, discarded boosters, and other types of "space
junk."10 9 The Protocol demonstrates that a far-reaching, comprehensive
agreement to eliminate an environmental threat can be attained before
the threat becomes a reality. This treaty also shows that political differ-
ences need not be a stumbling block to finding a solution to a problem
which is of concern to all." 0 It seems probable that future multilateral
efforts to solve international environmental problems will be influenced
by the Protocol; it is to be hoped that they are as successful.
105. See generally Cleutinx, European Community Air Pollution Abatement Policy, 17
U. TOLEDO L. REV. 113 (1985).
106. Id., at 116-119.
107. Id., at 116.
108. See generally, Harris, Canadian Positions, Proposals, and the Diplomatic Di-
lemma: Acid Rain and Emerging International Norms, 17 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 121 (1985).
109. See generally, Goedhuis, Some Recent Trends in the Interpretation and Imple-
mentation of the Rules of International Space Law, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213 (1981).
110. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1987, at Al, col..
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VII. EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PROTOCOL
In order to assess the value and efficacy of the Montreal Protocol, it
is necessary to look at both the likely effect of its provisions as well as the
overall value of the agreement. As should be evident from the preceding
discussion of various individual provisions, the drafters of the Protocol
deserve to be applauded for the thorough, almost visionary nature of the
agreement, which goes so far beyond any previous attempt to control a
serious global environmental problem. There is little doubt that the Pro-
tocol will serve to reduce consumption and production of CFCs and
halons, but whether this will be enough to halt the depletion of the ozone
layer remains to be seen."' The Protocol could have gone farther in some
respects, such as prohibiting the developed state parties from exporting
controlled substances and related technology to non-parties, and by im-
posing sanctions on parties found in non-compliance with the control pro-
visions. Nevertheless, in the final analysis the controls imposed by the
Protocol are all that environmentalists could reasonable hope for, and go
far beyond what could have been expected in the light of prior attempts
to come to grips with global pollution.
Looking at the Montreal Protocol as a whole, it is difficult to come
up with any major criticisms. Not only does the treaty serve admirable to
promote the goals of CFC and halon reduction, but it also stands as a
milestone in the field of international environmental law. It represents
the first time the world community has put aside its differences to face a
global threat before that threat's effects become widespread and obvious,
and in a manner which guarantees that cooperative efforts will continue
to reflect the latest scientific developments. It is to be hoped that this
agreement will not stand as an isolated example of worldwide coopera-
tion, but instead will serve as a paradigm for future agreements on other
threats and problems faced by the world community, environmental or
otherwise.
Bryce Blegen
111. Judging from some studies, the controls contained in the Montreal Protocol are
likely to be inadequate to halt the depletion of the ozone layer. Some projections indicate
that immediate cuts on the order of 85% are required to accomplish this goal. See Hoffman,
The Importance of Knowing Sooner, in TITUS supra note 6, at 53. It is to be hoped that as
studies continue to show the necessity for more stringent controls, the parties to the Proto-
col will respond to the findings by using the document's amendment process to bring con-
trols into line with the latest scientific assessments.
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BOOK REVIEW
The Law of War
Reviewed by Linda A. Malone*
De Lupis, Ingrid Detter, THE LAW OF WAR, Cambridge University
Press, New York, New York (1987); $64.50 (cloth), $24.95 (paper),
ISBN 0-521-34337-2, 411 pp.; bibliography, index, preface by the
author.
As the Iran-Iraq War continues into its eighth year of noncompliance
with international law, it is reassuring to read a book asserting the neces-
sity for laws regulating war. A preface claims that THE LAW OF WAR is the
first substantive treatment of the area in the English language since 1952.
As such, the book is useful in relating recent incidents in warfare to the
laws of warfare and as a general reference book in international law.
The author is very careful from the beginning to define her terms,
including "war," "terrorism," and "armed conflict," although her defini-
tions are not always satisfactory. For example, De Lupis poses the follow-
ing definition of "terrorism":
"International terrorism implies either isolated assassination and 'hos-
tility' missions or the intermittent use or threat of force against per-
son(s) to obtain certain political objective of international relevance
from a third party."
This definition, however, does not address perhaps the most important
element to identification or "terrorism": the identity of the party against
whom the violence is directly addressed. Although the author does in-
clude in the text an excellent analysis of this aspect of terrorism, the defi-
nition itself in referring to demands on third parties does not make this
distinction between targets clear. Perhaps the author cannot be faulted
for failing to define a term that is indefinable so long as one person's
freedom fighter is another person's terrorist. In any event, a more valua-
ble aspect of the book is its careful distinction between prohibition of
war, restrictions on weapons, prohibitions on methods of warfare, and the
humanitarian rules of war.
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.A. 1975,
Vassar College; J.D. 1978, Dulee University; LL.M., 1984, University of Illinois.
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On the one hand, the author quite convincingly critisizes the out-
dated notion of war as separate and distinct from belligerencies or insur-
gencies, and attempts to distinguish between "guerilla warfare" and "ter-
rorism." At other times, however, the author fails to note modern
innovations in international law, particularly in relation to prohibitions
on the use of force such as reprisals. For example, in the discussion of
consent as justifying intervention, the author accepts that voluntary con-
sent by a state can legitimize intervention that would otherwise be unlaw-
ful, although pointing out the difficulties of evaluating the legitimacy of
the consent given. Also somwhat frustrating is that the author sometimes
ends a section without coming to any ultimate conclusions, as with the
chapter on the concept of war. This occasional reticence to draw conclu-
sions is puzzling, particularly insofar as the author at other opportunities
in the text does not hesitate to reach difficult conclusions, as in her deter-
mination that the use of nuclear weapons, and perhaps even their posses-
sion, violate international law.
The incorporation of recent events into the narrative, however, is ex-
cellent. Frequently, current developments in the Iran-Iraq War, Nicara-
gua, the "Star Wars" program, and the Middle East are discussed in con-
nection with well established rules of war. In this regard, much of the
book's discussion, in particular its evaluation of the PLO as a belligerent
and the invasions of Grenada and Kampuchea as humanitarian interven-
tion, is thoughtful and provocative. One striking example of the author's
use of recent events is the disturbing parallel she draws between Iran's
refusal to appear before the International Court of Justice in the Iranian
hostages case and the United States' refusal to defend itself in United
States v. Nicaragua.
The most compelling section of the book is the chapter on restric-
tions of weapons. None of the minor failings in the rest of the book are
apparent in the author's discussion of prohibited weapons. The chapter
includes a history of weapons that cause indiscriminate suffering, techni-
cal descriptions of weapons of mass destruction, and evaluation of the
current state of international law regarding chemical, biological, and envi-
ronmental weapons. The analysis manages to be comprehensive yet main-
tain a depth of detail that is useful even to someone already familiar with
the area.
In her conclusion, De Lupis points out two emerging trends in the
law of warfare: application of international law to intra-state conflicts and
recognition of the rights of groups and individuals during war. Cynics fre-
quently critisize international law for failing to accommodate the "reali-
ties" of war, yet THE LAW OF WAR demonstrates the oppisite conclusion,
that international law flexibly adjusts to developments in warfare while
preserving humanitarian concerns and interests of national security. For
example, article 2 (4) of Protocol III to the 1981 Weaponry Convention
prohibits attacks on forests or "other kinds of plant cover" except if such
"natural elements" are used to cover, conceal, or camouflage combatants
or their military objectives. De Lupis quite correctly asserts that this so-
VOL. 16:2,3
1988 THE LAW OF WAR 431
called "jungle exception" undermines the application of Protocol III in
any countries covered by jungle vegetation. The end result is that a state
covered by jungle vegetation has no protection under the Protocol from
weapons such as napalm. In instances such as this, the rules of war trans-
form theaters of war into theatres of the absurd. Yet we have only to see
the alternative, a war waged in the Persian Gulf with little or no respect
for human life and the environment, to agree with the author's call for
renewed adherence to international laws regulating warfare.

